Dutch Racism

Thamyris/

Intersecting: Place, Sex, and Race

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Editors

Philomena Essed

Isabel Hoving

Rodopi

Mission Statement

Intersecting: Place, Sex, and Race

Intersecting is a series of edited volumes with a critical, interdisciplinary focus.

Intersecting's mission is to rigorously bring into encounter the crucial insights of black and ethnic studies, gender studies, and queer studies, and facilitate dialogue and confrontations between them. *Intersecting* shares this focus with *Thamyris*, the socially committed international journal that was established by Jan Best en Nanny de Vries, in 1994, out of which *Intersecting* has evolved. The sharpness and urgency of these issues is our point of departure, and our title reflects our decision to work on the cutting edge.

We envision these confrontations and dialogues through three recurring categories: place, sex, and race. To us they are three of the most decisive categories that order society, locate power, and inflict pain and/or pleasure. Gender and class will necessarily figure prominently in our engagement with the above. *Race*, for we will keep analyzing this ugly, much-debated concept, instead of turning to more civil concepts (ethnicity, culture) that do not address the full disgrace of racism. *Sex*, for sexuality has to be addressed as an always-active social strategy of locating, controlling, and mobilizing people, and as an all-important, not necessarily obvious, cultural practice. And *place*, for we agree with other cultural analysts that this is a most productive framework for the analysis of situated identities and acts that allow us to move beyond narrow identitarian theories.

The title of the book series points at what we, its editors, want to do: *think together*. Our series will not satisfy itself with merely demonstrating the complexity of our times, or with analyzing the shaping factors of that complexity. We know how to theorize the intertwining of, for example, sexuality and race, but pushing these intersections one step further is what we aim for: How can this complexity be understood in practice? That is, in concrete forms of political agency, and the efforts of self-reflexive, contextualized interpretation. How can different socially and theoretically relevant issues be *thought together*? And: how can scholars (of different backgrounds) and activists think together, and realize productive alliances in a radical, transnational community?

We invite proposals for edited volumes that take the issues that *Intersecting* addresses seriously. These contributions should combine an activist-oriented perspective with intellectual rigor and theoretical insights, interdisciplinary and transnational perspectives. The editors seek cultural criticism that is daring, invigorating and self-reflexive; that shares our commitment to thinking together.

Contact us at intersecting@let.leidenuniv.nl.

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Innocence, Smug Ignorance, Resentment: An Introduction to Dutch Racism

Philomena Essed and
Isabel Hoving

Dutch racism is a complex, paradoxical, and contested phenomenon. It has its own legacy in the Netherlands and the (former) colonies, operates in and beyond the national borders, is shaped by European and global influences, and intersects with other systems of domination. The language of Dutch racism varies historically, but these changes are not necessarily signs of progressive justice. During the second half of the last century, racism had become more subtle and difficult to pinpoint. It seemed as though the explicit adherence to race hierarchies was disappearing and that racism had become more cultural in its expression, less in your face, if still insidious. However, as we will see later in this volume, old-fashioned biological notions of "race" never disappeared, and in the Netherlands are bluntly expressed, among other ways, in offensive contemporary representations of people of African descent. At the same time, historical circumstances also changed, and in the new millennium, particularly in the wake of 9/11, cultural violence based on gendered and racially inscribed imaginations of "the Muslim" or "the veiled woman," became one of the most visible forms of racism (Boog, Dinsbach, Donselaar, and Rodrigues; Essed, "Intolerable Humiliations"; van der Valk, *Islamofobie*; Aouragh, and Ghorashi in this volume). The Netherlands echoes, if not leads, a wider European trend, where offensive statements about Muslims are an everyday phenomenon.[1] Increasingly, politicians have come to use the argument of "freedom" as much as media representatives to dismiss accusations of racism. Moreover, in the new millennium, the moral rejection of racism seems to be losing ground in Europe.

Dutch racism reflects these broader European developments (Lynch) but also has its own characteristics. In the Dutch context, where no shared discourse was

developed to address racism, one needs a plurality of registers, methods, and disciplinary approaches to study the phenomenon: sociology and anthropology as well as history; literary analysis and art history as well as psychoanalysis; discourse analysis as well as personal stories and interviews. This volume was conceived to present the necessary plurality of perspectives to capture the layered nature of Dutch racism.

Reading the various chapters of this volume is like putting together pieces of the Dutch racism puzzle where, sometimes, contributors grab for similar parts. The volume is meant to function as a written documentary, each author using the camera in a different way to capture what is felt to be important. As editors, we do not necessarily agree with all the points of view, but that is exactly what we wanted to achieve: within the paradigm that acknowledges the systemic nature of racism in the Netherlands, there are different elements competing for relevance, truth value, and explanatory power. Together, these contributions offer a range of voices and visions that are not often acknowledged in the Netherlands. They reveal illuminating insights in the two closely related questions that organize this book: what factors contribute to the *complexity* of Dutch racism? And why is the concept of racism so intensely *contested*?

Let us begin to sketch the book's response to the first question, that of complexity, with a concrete example, which will allow us to discuss one important, convolutional characteristic of Dutch racism: the intimate relation between ignorance and denial. Recently, Dutch official and social media served as the discursive battlefield for supporters and opponents of a highly popular novel-turned-into-movie featuring a white, Jewish young man obsessed with voluptuous "negresses" ("negerinnen"), the still commonly used terminology in the Netherlands.[2] In her newspaper column, journalist and longtime diversity advocate Harriët Duurvoort takes issue with the argument that the film was not stereotyping black women, but rather celebrating them: "The Americans have a word for this: *ignorant.* It cannot be translated unambiguously as uninformed or naïve. It refers to not knowing something, but also not wanting to know. Something that, perhaps with a bit of effort, you *should* know by now" (*De Volkskrant* 22 October 2012, transl. from Dutch, eds). *Ignorance*. In this volume, Halleh Ghorashi refers to the *self-imposed* ignorance of white Dutch people when faced with racism, and Dienke Hondius comments that the Dutch tendency to ignore "race" is the nation's main strategy of dealing with it. It is an active form of evasion and denial. *Denial*. Virtually all contributors agree on this one overriding characteristic: Though not unique to the Netherlands (Wodak and van Dijk), one of the key features of Dutch racism is its denial. In the case of the novel and film, white debaters revealed themselves to be ignorant of the negation of the historical roots of the sexual exploitation of black women.

The tendency to reject colonial history as relevant for understanding contemporary sexually offensive representations of black women is not new. Decades ago, it was

already part of academic common sense, even among otherwise critical scholars.[3] Nothing much has changed. Dominant discourses *miss* historical explanations and *dismiss* the connection between present ethnic humiliations and the brutality of colonization, slavery, and antisemitism. At the same time, in spite of countless (post-colonial) studies of cultural hegemony, there seems to be no shared knowledge of the way in which racism emerged from the ideology of the superiority of European cultures. Nor is there a shared awareness of the way in which discourses of culture and progress have been at the roots of racism, while race became the embodiment of constructs of civilization, privileging some, dehumanizing others (see Blakely as quoted by Sharpe in this volume). Remarkably, there is a sense of self-satisfaction and smugness about ignoring the issue—racism is seen as an outdated topic that has no relevance to the 21st century.

This particular form of denial may be best understood by comparing it to the US. Advocates of the opinion that we "have moved beyond racism" might be riding the waves of color blindness ideologies in the US (Goldberg; Bonilla-Silva). An important difference is, however, that the US acknowledged systemic racism, while still struggling with the contradictions between individual black achievement and the humiliating conditions of many black lives. Communities and critical scholars have developed strong and alert voices to intervene against racism. Moreover, even while racism remains insidious and widespread in the US, there is a general sense that people should not get away with it. The Netherlands, in contrast, has remained stagnant and generally accepting in the face of racism. One important reason for this evasive attitude is explained in a 2009 study of explicit racism in Amsterdam soccer culture. Müller, van Zoonen, and de Roode encountered aggressive insults such as "break that nigger," "shit Moroccan," or "dirty Turk." These insults are "even directed at players who merely look like they are from Morocco or Turkey (Müller et al. 49–50). The study confirms the role physical (racial) traits play in selecting racism targets. But even this very explicit form would not count as racism: "Because their shared discourse only recognizes racism as such, when it is expressed with the clear intention to injure and to reflect ideological convictions, those that commit racist acts are left with a discursive space through which they can avoid accountability" (Müller et al 57–58). This very narrow definition of racism makes it easier to ignore the role of racism in Dutch society.

Even mainstream politicians are more inclined to adopt populist racist discourses that attract voters, than to counter the emergence of such discourses. Nevertheless, there is ample reason to address the increasing acceptance and spiraling of racism in all areas of Dutch society. Although generally less visible to the dominant group, the Netherlands has a long history of (physical) racist violence (*Kroniek*).[4] It is hard, however, to get a clear view of the extent of the occurrence of violent racism and extremism in the Netherlands. It is only since the nineties that data began to be

collected and classified systematically (*Kroniek*), though this was not seen as a government responsibility (Donselaar and Rodrigues 24; Rodrigues and Donselaar; *Kroniek*).[5] Since the 1990s, the independent, well respected Anne Frank Foundation has published annual or bi-annual reports to monitor racism. An extensive overview of the second half of the 20th century shows that racist violence became a recurrent phenomenon again during the 1970s, after the relatively subdued decades following the defeat of Nazism. With the emergence of a successful but heavily contested right-extremist political party in the early 1980s, racism began to increase. Sociologists Coenders et al, for example, indicate that, from the mid-1980s onward, Dutch moral support for ethnic discrimination in the labor market (minorities to be fired first) and in housing (preference for native Dutch families) has increased. They agree that "[e]thnic group relations have moved into a negative direction and many people are worried about the increased 'us-them' thinking" (276). Interestingly, the moral rejection of discrimination had shown a progressive trend during the period from 1979 to 1986, which coincides with the first and only "high season" of antiracism in Dutch history since the time of the 19th century abolitionists. Whether antiracism movements of the 1980s indeed impacted Dutch morality at large is hard to say, but it would be consistent with other, scarce, Dutch data available.[6]

Racism became discernible as a structural social problem in the 1990s (while hundreds of incidents were recorded each year, they only formed a small part of the actual number), until the first half of the first decade of the 21st century became witness to an explosive range of extremely violent incidents (*Kroniek*). A 2010 report (also published by the Anne Frank Foundation) shows that a very high percentage of cases of racial discrimination (70%) remains unregistered (Boog, Dinsbach, Donselaar, and Rodrigues). Only 6.6% of those who experienced discrimination reported the cases to the police. The authors observe that the fact that most cases are not reported suggests stabilization, rather than a decline (19).[7] The period 2006–2008 shows an increase in anti-Islam discrimination, and a decline in anti-semitism, though antisemitism consistently flares up for short periods, while certain forms of antisemitism (holocaust denial, etc.) appear to be a persistent problem (20).[8] In this volume, Gans offers an extended and more detailed account of anti-semitism in the Netherlands. There is not only an increase in the number of anti-Islam incidents, but also racist acts are more violent than before. At the same time, reporters observe desensitization with respect to racist and right-extremist violence in the public sphere. Severe incidents do not elicit the same public outrage as before.

We might add that the evasion and denial of the occurrence of racism in the Netherlands makes it difficult to gain insight into the extent of Dutch racism. At her 2011 inauguration as a full professor, Marlou Schrover, analyzing media coverage of violent incidents between (predominantly) whites and ethnic groups after the Second

World War, found that, in every case, the racial dimension was vigorously denied. The recurrent explanation was that this form of violence was not racially motivated (but, for example, merely a clash between young men competing for women, etc.): "race riots . . . do not exist in the Netherlands, is frequently argued" (Schrover 6). From the available research, we can conclude that racism—in the broadest sense of the term— is a structural phenomenon (Lynch). The Anne Frank monitors, who bring together a broad range of research with original surveys and inventories, confirm the systemic presence of racism in the Netherlands (Donselaar and Rodrigues; Boog, Dinsbach, Donselaar and Rodrigues). In spite of many governmental programs to manage and structure interethnic relations, the last few decades have not seen a *consistent* government policy of adequate research and anti-racist action. There are a number of antidiscrimination agencies where people can file complaints against various forms of discrimination, including racial. There are, however, no policy implications involved. Thus, in the 21st century, racism in its many forms still shapes the lives of a large number of people in the Netherlands. Simultaneously, research illuminates that exact, systemic, and reliable data are often missing. Dutch racism is indeed subject to institutionalized *ignorance.*

Later in this introduction, we will follow up on the curious forms of ignorance, evasion, and denial that characterize the complexity of Dutch racism (section "Main insights"). But first, we want to consider the second question that structures this introduction: why has racism become such a *contested* issue in the 21st century, to the point where it is considered to be an exaggerated, ideologically charged accusation? Why is the concept itself dismissed, waved aside as irrelevant or distasteful? To do so, in the next section we will discuss some of the recent social, political, and discursive changes in the Netherlands within the larger context of Europe.

Racism without Apologies: From a Carefully Fabricated Image of Tolerance in the 20th Century to the "Right to Offend" in the 21st Century

Racism and extremism are increasing sharply, not only in the Netherlands. Nationalist groups are a visible presence again throughout Europe, sometimes even with an explicit fascist program, and cases of antisemitism, xenophobia, state violence against Roma, Islamophobia, and racism specifically targeting people of African descent are reported in the news on a daily basis (van der Valk, *Islamofobie;* ENAR). The rise of racist and nationalist extremism is often related to social crisis. Political philosopher John Gray, who addressed a Dutch audience on 2 December 2012, describes the political failure that led to the contemporary severe crisis within the European Union as "toxic politics." As political leaders are unable to repair the economic crisis, while continuing to undo the boundaries of the nation-states that seemed to offer some stability and protection, their "toxic politics" lead to potentially very dangerous forms of nationalism and racism. Political leaders should be, but

often are not, aware that "old demons" such as racism will always threaten to take on new force during a serious economic and social crisis, he said; they should address the issue of racism consistently and systematically.

In this sense, the effects of the global and European crises that mark the process of European unification are reason for grave concern. In the old democracies, retreating government social safety nets and chronic income insecurity that hit the large majority of the population have created hardship and frustrations, breeding grounds for racism. Indeed, throughout Europe, open racism becomes acceptable again, as different examples indicate. A court ruling in the city of Koblenz, Germany (March 2012, but reversed in October 2012) had declared it legal for police officers to check the ID of "non-white" train passengers, in particular on a route "often used for illegal entry into Germany."[9] In Eastern Europe, neo-Nazi and white pride physical violence against people of Afro-descent and other people of color has been rampant for decades. Corruption and frustrations have fed into the spread of extreme right networks and neo-fascism all over Eastern Europe. Many areas are no-go for people of color. People of African descent, who benefited from solidarity programs during communist times, now fear for their lives. More than half of Africans in Moscow have been the target of physical attacks, and have been beaten on trains and on the street.[10] The economic crisis has also led to soaring racism in Greece and Italy. A member of Human Rights Watch reports that migrants and asylum seekers speak of "virtual no-go areas" in Athens after dark because of the risk of attacks by vigilante groups.[11] According to UNHCR, the Greek authorities turn a blind eye to the attacks, and in some cases, police officials are involved in these incidents. Human rights organizations generally agree that the crisis has reinforced violent racism tremendously.[12]

A remarkable aspect of the increase in racism in Europe is the majority's claim to the right to express its exclusionary, racist discourse. The sense that one has the right to offend ethnic minorities, regardless of whether or not that would amount to racism, is what Essed has called "entitlement racism," a reference to claiming legal and (presumed) moral rights:

> Entitlement racism is a sign of the times we live in, where it is believed that you should be able to express yourself publicly in whichever way you feel like. Freedom of expression, though an individual right, is quintessentially a relational phenomenon. The expresser wants his or her opinion to be heard or seen. Followers, those who applaud, and even those whose silence is read as approval, can become partial in the enactment of entitlement racism. (Essed, "Entitlement Racism" 62)

Although there is no proof of this, and we thus present it hypothetically, it seems that entitlement racism might be a characteristic of neoliberal politics, and the highly

competitive consumption society where sentiments such as solidarity, empathy, and civility have less value than individual expression and rights to be claimed. Majorities respond to ethnic minorities who claim the legal right to be treated equally with fear and irritation, if not regret that one has been "too tolerant" (de Leeuw and van Wichelen, *Transformations*). Freedom of religion is a case in point, and in particular when Muslims demanded public space to exercise their religious obligations. The economic crisis may be a determining factor in the rise of racism in more than the way described by Gray.

It is at this point that we can identify one of the reasons why the concept of racism is *contested* in the Netherlands. For example, in the wake of Gilroy and Appadurai, it can be argued that white European citizens, including the Dutch, are anxious about the loss of security and privilege resulting from momentous social changes. For the Dutch, these included the end of colonization, superseded by post-World War Two globalization, and the turn to neo-liberalism. Toward the end of the 20th century, apprehension about the related demographic shifts and ambivalence about cultural recognition (Alghasi, Sharam, Eriksen, and Ghorashi) have come to be expressed as an indictment of immigration and multiculturalization, and, especially, unrestrained discontent with Muslim immigrants. As Appadurai explains, Muslim minorities began to be seen, and sometimes saw themselves, as part of a global *majority*. Especially after 9/11, this majority was seen as a violent threat. It is against this background that white public figures began to target issues such as the high level of criminality among Moroccan young men in the Netherlands, as presumed "proof" of the inherent violence of global Islam. Different essays in this volume explain how Dutch anti-racist or multiculturalist discourse came to be defined as the spineless evasion of reality—the "reality" being that Muslim migrants are a threat to the Netherlands, because of their presumed religious intolerance, their "backward" attitudes toward women and sexual minorities, and their disproportionate representation in crime statistics. Philosopher Baukje Prins coined the term "new realism" to describe the rapidly expanding discourse that insisted on the undeniable, transparent truth of this perspective on reality. New realism was extremely successful in rallying support for the belief that the tolerant Dutch nation, proud of its freedom of expression and equality, has to defend itself against the global threat of Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism. Within this framework, "racism" is dubbed as a catchword that, from a post-2001 mainstream perspective, is destructively politically correct.

The sense of entitlement white Europeans feel and the racism that emerges from it did not appear overnight. Politicians, the media, and other influential groups did not try to stop these developments, but often tapped from existing racist sentiments. In this volume, Ghorashi writes in more detail about majority claims of rights in defense against threats they feel coming from ethnic minorities. As we suggested above, there is reason to believe that the Dutch play a distinct role in exampling

political versions of entitlement racism. One of Europe's high profile representatives of entitlement racism is Dutch populist politician Geert Wilders, who followed in the footsteps of Dutch politicians Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Rita Verdonk, and Frits Bolkestein. Indeed, the Netherlands harbors a high degree of *Muslimophobia* compared to other European countries (Boog). Muslim bashing has become the new normal (see Ghorashi in this volume). The Dutch discourse of new realism supported that practice, just as it fuelled the admiration for figures claiming to break so-called taboos. Thus, the initial antisemitism of journalist Theo van Gogh (see Gans in this volume), and particularly, his Islamophobic discourse solicited support.

The names of the Dutch politicians mentioned above appeared in the international news when the new millennium brought the Netherlands a range of extreme events: the assassination of anti-Muslim politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 by an animal rights activist, the anti-Muslim movie *Submission* (Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh, 2004), the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim extremist (2004), the making of the film *Fitna* by Muslim basher and anti-immigrant populist Geert Wilders, 2008, and his election in 2010 to represent one of the largest political parties in the Netherlands at the time.

Let us offer a short overview of recent developments in the Netherlands that contributed to this new form of racism, and in which the above politicians played a decisive role. Early signs of *entitlement racism* had already emerged in the late 1980s, as can be inferred from a range of studies on the reproduction of racism through discourse (van Dijk *Prejudice in Discourse*, *Communicating Racism*, *Racism and the Press*, *Elite Discourse and Racism*; Van Dijk and Redmond; Mok; van der Valk, *Difference*). These studies agree that mainstream examples of blatant racism were uncommon. The implicit message about ethnic groups was that they "had" problems, because they "were" disadvantaged and their cultures were "backward," and that they "created" problems because they "were" a strain on societal resources and because their presence "led to" racism (Essed, *Diversity*). Ethnic prejudice coexisted with the explicit rejection of racism as "wrong" and with explicit advocacy of tolerance. In spite of its good reputation, Dutch tolerance might be better understood as *passive* tolerance, which is very close to passive *in*tolerance (Hondius in this volume). For example, Gans (in this volume) explains that Dutch tolerance in relation to Jews during the pre-World War Two period did not mean socializing with them. In the same vein, Ghorashi (in this volume) agrees that tolerance in relation to post-War ethnic minorities meant indifference toward them. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the Dutch organization of society, known as pillarization, shaped this particular attitude of dealing with difference: otherness is tolerated, but not directly engaged with (van Ginkel; Lijphart; Hoving, "Opacity").

From the disposition that ethnic groups needed guidance and government support emerged discontent and resentment. It was assumed that the Dutch government

paid too much attention to "them" (Van Dijk, *Racism and the Press*). A significant moment in the dominant perception of ethnic minorities occurred in 1990 when then Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers announced in a radio interview a new minority policy: "the State should stop pampering minorities, and [. . .] minorities should assume their own responsibility" (Van Dijk, *Elite Discourse and Racism* 77). The discourse that minorities would be pampered was starkly at odds with their experiences of everyday racism, including underestimation in schools, undervaluation of professional competence, glass ceilings in jobs, false accusations of theft in shops, and constant negative comments about ethnic minorities reminding them everyday that they did not belong (Essed, *Alledaags racisme; Understanding Everyday Racism*). Research among employment agencies showed that an overwhelming majority accepted discriminative requests from employers, meaning: don't send us a Moroccan, Turkish, or Surinamese worker.[13] Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s, the ideological climate would shift from "they have been pampered" to "we Dutch" are victims of our own tolerance (Essed and Nimako; Ghorashi in this volume; Gilroy).

In 1991, one year after Prime Minister Lubbers' speech, Frits Bolkestein, influential member of the Lubbers Government and then leader of the right wing party VVD, launched a frontal attack against Muslim immigrants, calling them a huge problem for the Netherlands. In an internationally presented keynote, also published in one of the largest Dutch newspapers, he warned that Muslim values, clipped as religious state and oppressing women, are non-European, because Europe would be rational and democratic and equal, and Muslim values incompatible with Dutch culture.[14] When in 2000, after a decade of tentative debate on these issues, journalist Paul Scheffer published an essay on the failure of immigration policies and Dutch multicultural society, media-hype flared up, and politician Pim Fortuyn picked up the ball to score with his declaration of a cold war against Islam (2000–until his assassination in 2002). Theo van Gogh and politician Ayaan Hirshi Ali (who is currently living in the US) responded with their own crusades against Islam (2000–2005).

The rapid rise of entitlement racism can be illustrated by Fortuyn's judgment that freedom of speech (Article Seven of the Dutch Constitution) was more important than Article One, which prohibits discrimination, among others things, on the basis of "religion, life principles, political inclination, race, age, or sexual preference." Fortuyn, who made no secret of his homosexuality, argued that Muslim culture had never undergone a process of modernization and therefore still lacked acceptance of democracy and women's, gays', lesbians', and minorities' rights. He feared replacement of the Dutch legal system with Sharia law, and advocated a war against Islam. The same anti-Muslim rhetoric continues with current politician Geert Wilders, who built on Pim Fortuyn's legacy and was rewarded with the approval of a substantial number of Dutch citizens. The attacks on Muslims have intensified and so have cultural humiliations, or the everyday practice of inflicting cultural pain (Essed,

"Intolerable Humiliations"). Such extreme advocates of free speech ignore the wisdom that humiliations cause damage that can be very hard to heal (Lindner).

This necessarily brief and fragmented summary nevertheless gives clues to a striking comparison with the 1980s. Paternalism (minorities need the white majority's help) has been replaced by entitlement racism (the right to offend); the right of freedom of speech has won over the right of protection against discrimination; antidiscrimination and antiracism are off the political agenda; references to the need for tolerance, no matter how contested the principle, have disappeared; Muslim women are not objects of pity and paternalism as they were in 1980, to be liberated by the Dutch from oppressive husbands, but the target of aggression–spitting, ridicule–a form of symbolic rape, an act of violence against the Muslim community. The white Dutch majority (along with white majorities throughout Europe) is waging a cultural war against Islam/Muslims. Remarkably, the apologies that were so often heard in the eighties ("I do not want to discriminate but") as an introduction to a racist comment have largely disappeared. Native Dutch citizens now feel entitled to make racist remarks without excuse or introduction.

About the Book

We have indicated some of the reasons why Dutch racism is both a complex and contested issue. We have pointed to smug ignorance and evasion to talk about everyday racism, which is also one of the main reasons *why* it remains such a contested topic and probably one of many more reasons why antiracism has all but disappeared from Dutch public discourse and academic research. We have suggested that racism has a marked social instrumentality: it reinforces white cultural hegemony and therefore offers stability to privileged groups, or those who identify with the majority; as such, it is supported by politics, and normalized. One other very sobering reason we want to mention here is that black and migrant communities in the Netherlands often opt for the strategy of ignoring racist abuse, either by avoiding situations where discrimination is to be expected, or by ignoring actual instances (Essed *Understanding*; Boog, Dinsbach, Donselaar, and Rodrigues 11–12; Wekker and Hondius in this volume). Some do so because they feel that the situation cannot be changed, and that reporting the incident will not make a difference (Boog, Dinsbach, Donselaar, and Rodrigues 8, 11). In this volume, Wekker suggests that this may also be an effort to "be above" such treatment, and to muster the strength of mind not to allow oneself to feel discriminated against (which, as Wekker remarks, places the burden of racist abuse on the shoulders of the abused). As a result, evasion and avoidance become a shared strategy of both abuser and abused.

Academic research has not provided a counterbalance to the evasion of the issue of Dutch racism either (Essed and Nimako). The absence of an oppositional, black and/or migrant voice *within* the mainstream institutions solidified the tolerance for

racist views (302). Although many critical historians, anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers, and cultural analysts published valuable studies of, for example, Dutch migration and colonial history, they did not often specifically discuss racism (Hoving, "Dutch Postcolonialism").

This book aims to fulfill the need for a critical approach to Dutch racism, which *does* acknowledge oppositional and minority voices. We hope to provide readers with the conceptual tools to contextualize contemporary racism in general and more specifically also as expressed in terms of antisemitism and Islamophobia. We hope to open a much-needed free space in which the concepts of race and racism *can* be used and discussed critically, so that it becomes possible to explore the most productive ways to address a social and cultural problem that is as urgent as ever, in the Netherlands as much as elsewhere.

The volume offers a wider transnational frame within which to trace the trajectories of racism throughout the erstwhile Dutch colonial empire. Thus, the reader can interpret in relation to each other, for instance, color segregation in Aruba (Sharpe in this volume), racism experiences of Dutch Surinamese in the Netherlands (Hondius in this volume) and post-Apartheid Afrikaners' race consciousness (Steyn in this volume). Taking this approach, we feel inspired by Ann Stoler's advice to study the interaction between practices and discourses of race, class, and gender in the colonies, and the colonial motherland, instead of taking an isolated national focus.

Interdisciplinarity

The book presents an interdisciplinary group of both established contributors and newcomers from a variety of backgrounds, who each highlight an aspect with which they are well acquainted through research, and often also through personal experience. We want to offer to the reader voices in different registers, ranging from scholarly reflections to personal accounts.

The first and fourth parts of this book adopt sociological, historical approaches and personal observations to discuss the many different forms that racism has taken on in the Netherlands from a global perspective. The first part traces the journeys of racism within the former Dutch colonial empire, whereas the fourth part offers eye-opening reflections on race and racism in the Netherlands, from the point of view of visitors and other keen observers. The second part of the book adopts different academic tools of analysis and approaches: literary theory, anthropology, political philosophy, and art history. Methods of textual and visual analysis, deconstruction, and often psychoanalysis help to come to grips with the basic psychological and affective mechanisms at work in white Dutch racist stereotyping. The third part of the book is inspired by methods of oral history and qualitative data collection (that allow a focus on lived experiences), and the broader perspectives of the social sciences and history. Through a discussion of a range of interviews and observations, these chapters

offer detailed analyses of the ways in which racism is naturalized and resisted in everyday life. In addition, they illuminate some of the political consequences of racism, for example the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the construction of idealized notions of Dutch citizenship, which is informed by the desire to establish and maintain firm boundaries between different groups of citizens.

Main Insights

Section one is about history, memory, and cultural reproduction. The contributors, focusing on Dutch colonizers, enslavers, and settlers, reconstruct the decisive influence of race and racism on colonial politics and the later reception of immigrants from the colonies in the Netherlands. Whereas South Africa's *Apartheid* produced the most globalized Dutch word, cultures of race and color segregation reigned explicitly in all of the Dutch colonial and settler territories, legitimated by the elevation of whiteness and notions of European civilization in the West Indies (Nimako et al; Sharpe), the East Indies (Captein), and South Africa (Steyn).

Across historical periods and racism targets, the chapters highlight the role of Dutch cultural elites, scholars included, in the reproduction of racism. Nimako et al., Gans, and Ghorashi reveal misrepresentations of historical writings, the whitewashing of history, and hence, the successful manufacturing of a positive national self-image, internally and internationally. Scholars contributed to dehumanizing and silencing the perspectives of blacks (Nimako et al.), reinforced anti-Jew stereotypes (Gans), and today, deny that the humiliation of Muslims amounts to racism (Ghorashi). The consistent repetition of positive self-presentations is just one of the strategies that begins to unveil how the Netherlands managed to uphold an image of progressiveness and tolerance. It took extreme expressions of Islamophobia in the 21st century, and arguably, the more democratic medium of social media, for the international community to recognize the hidden cracks in the so well-preserved positive Dutch self-image (Ghorashi). Gans' comprehensive analysis is crucial in showing that antisemitism predated many elements of later forms of modern Dutch racism.

Historical contexts help us to understand other problems as well. For instance, in the new Millennium, Antilleans, in particular youth, in search of better economic opportunities in the Netherlands, appeared in the news for violent criminality. Few if any commentators would point to the continuity of racism in their lives (see Sharpe in this volume), moving from color segregation in Aruba to the more coded racial exclusion from the labor market in the Netherlands.

The second part of the book circles around two main characteristics in Dutch racism: first, the insistence on Dutch innocence; second, the (remarkably effective) inconsistency in racist discourse that can be explained with the concept of disavowal. The case studies here are the representation of black and Muslim women;

and the contested blackface figure Black Pete (Zwarte Piet), central to one of the most popular Dutch festivals. Both offer subtle analyses of the reason why racism is such a complex issue.

The insistence on Dutch white innocence is noted by many authors in this volume. Wekker comments on the Dutch "self-image that stresses being a tolerant, small and just ethical nation and that foregrounds being a victim rather than a perpetrator of international violence" (10). Jordan, too, just as Minnaard, observes the insistence on Dutch white supremacy, serving to construct a stable, homogenous white identity, and a shared feeling of "being good." While the contributors refer to a range of different theorists, we would like to emphasize Paul Gilroy's work on British postcolonial melancholy as highly relevant to the debate. Gilroy's work suggests that the anxious claim of being innocent and good is not a specific *Dutch* strategy. Gilroy analyzes the historical and psychological processes that led to the spiteful claim of innocence and victimhood by white British people, who vigorously protest whenever their views are diagnosed as racist. Like British society, the Netherlands, too, in spite of the efforts of many, has not yet been able to fully address its colonial past (including its participation in the slave trade and slavery, and the colonial wars in Indonesia in 1947–49), let alone work through that traumatic past. For that reason, it has become a painful presence at the heart of the Dutch national identity. This past evoked feelings of national guilt and shame, but there was no collective, national strategy of responding to that guilt. Gilroy points out that the unpleasant and ultimately futile guilt, as it did not lead to adequate action, resulted in feelings of resentment against black and migrant people (both as tokens of a violent past, and as silent accusers). In the Netherlands, the term "regret-revenge" (De Jong) was coined to describe a comparable resentment (see De Leeuw and van Wichelen in this volume). To understand *Dutch* racism, it is important to analyze this claim of innocence, and by comparison, bring out the specific form it takes in the Netherlands. The chapters of this book take on this task and invite further research. It would be worthwhile, for example, to explore the question of to what extent accusations of racism are aggressively waved away because the Dutch tend to associate racism with right-extremism, specifically Second World War anti-semitism. Thus, accusations of racism cannot be accepted, as they evoke the specter of the unspeakably evil Nazi crimes against Jews. The context of monstrosity within which the debate on racism is thus situated, makes an open dialogue on everyday racism impossible (see De Leeuw, van Wichelen and Hondius in this volume). Remarkably, none of the essays identifies the apathy and cynicism signaled by Gilroy, and sometimes apparent in the public debate as an alternative native Dutch attitude.

The controversy over the playful festival figure of Black Pete is a good example of how the claim of innocence works. The claim is that Black Pete is merely a fun character, completely unrelated to messy politics, and that he is part of an innocent tradition, aimed at children, whose innocent pleasure would be free from racism or any

form of politics by definition. The claim reminds of the awkward manoeuvers analyzed in studies of primitivism. The interest in presumed primitive art and people that marked the first half of the twentieth century was kindled by the desire to find a projection screen for the authenticity that modern humanity was thought to have lost. African and Pacific people were admired and envied for what was projected on them: an unspoiled authenticity, closeness to nature, and unbridled sensuality. These seemingly positive qualities are rooted in racist discourse (Moore). For white Europeans, this strategy of projection worked well as a cultural critique, and at the same time, a way to secure the stability of their superior white modern selves. It worked well—until people of African descent travelled to the European metropoles. As white people found that it became contested to stick to their previous imaginations in the face of a real-life fellow-citizen, the primitivist imagination was removed from everyday reality and replaced by a more general sense of cultural superiority. Primitivist projections were increasingly seen as a purely artistic imagination, and as mere fun and fantasy, as they emerged in harmlessly funny figures in popular culture. The link between such racist stereotypes and the "real" Africans was denied, in an effort to safeguard the projection screen that was indispensable to the safeguarding of the white modern self. At the same time, the racist nature of the imagination remained largely unacknowledged (Miller).

What emerges in the above description is the second but related characteristic of Dutch racism analyzed in the second part: its inconsistency, which paradoxically only reinforces its effectiveness. In relation to Black Pete, for example, white people may acknowledge the fact that Pete is a caricature stemming from a racist tradition, while at the same time denying that the caricature can have the same harmful effect on others as other racist expressions. This is the structure of fantasy so eloquently analyzed by Žižek: "I know very well . . . but . . ." The psychological and social function of the disavowal of what one "knows very well" is the reinforcement of the sense of a stable, coherent self (van Dijk, *Communicating Racism*). In this volume, De Leeuw and van Wichelen offer some of the many examples of the paradoxical nature of racist discourse discussed in this book, such as: we know very well that we are intolerant toward Muslims, etc., but to defend tolerance, we must be intolerant. This inconsistency is effective because it helps to integrate and render powerless the oppositional anti-racist discourse (see Jordan in this volume). This analysis shows that psychoanalysis can also be useful to theorize the way in which racism works on a *national*—and not merely individual—level.

A final important observation on the way in which a stable national self is created can be found in both Minnaard (section two) and van den Broek (section three). Minnaard shows that it is not enough to understand Dutch racism through an analysis of white supremacy. There is another subtle cultural dynamic to be considered: normativity, or its more flexible and pragmatic alternative: the demand for *normality*,

and the intolerance of difference that goes with it. From a different perspective, Lida van den Broek discusses the comparable effects of the "just world hypothesis" that also constructs an exclusionary social homogeneity.

Section three captures the difference-equality tension of the Enlightenment (Siepman, Goldberg) in terms of contemporary experiences. Drawing from real-life experiences gathered through interviews with ethnic minorities or through observations, the picture emerges of a troubled marriage between assimilation and cultural determinism. Talking about race can be seen as making an undesirable difference. Pointing at racism might be read as an accusation of not believing in equality. There is intolerance of difference, but at the same time, a resistance to the claim of belonging as equals. Ideological repression with respect to even mentioning the word "race" (see Hondius), let alone racism (see Aouragh), exists simultaneously with the absence of inhibitions to use race terms such as "negro," to apply color codes such as "half blood" (see Hondius), or to use the generic term "allochtoon" for anyone considered not to belong because they look racially different, or have a different culture. The selective use of race terminology seems like a contradiction, but in fact, it is consistent with prevailing ignorance and indifference about the feelings of ethnic groups. Taken together, the chapters in this section give an almost tangible sense of the Dutch obsession with difference. As soon as populations are subdued into (relative) silence (Indo Europeans, Surinamese), they are considered to be less of a problem and more acceptable. But it is striking how little change there has been in the period between the 1980s and the new millennium in terms of everyday racism against Surinamese Dutch (Hondius).

This section also discusses the different discursive and material ways in which an ideal Dutch national identity is constructed. The essay on the integration exam (de Leeuw and van Wichelen) considers the exam's cultural disciplining of new citizens, which leaves no room for cultural or religious diversity, and thus continues the racist exclusionary construction of white supremacy. The essay on postcolonial citizenship by Guno Jones confirms the observation that the political majority needs "significant others" (often ethnic minorities) as a counterpart to construct its own dominant Dutch national identity. The most thought-provoking insight in his essay, however, is Jones' insistence that the inclusion or exclusion of aspiring citizens is not so much decided by certain principles ("'equality citizenship for all,' nor by a 'fixed' belief in the content of identity discourses"), but by the *political will* to exclude or include them. This variable political will is the result of unpredictable power dynamics.

The chapters provide many examples of "smug ignorance." To quote one of the ethnic artists that Trienekens and Bos interviewed, who criticized the monocultural assumptions of arts education: "These institutions are somewhat blind for developments in society. There is this self-indulgent conviction that what they teach is the foundation of skill, knowledge and art." Van den Broek had the unique opportunity to

observe (video-taped) real-life interactions between white Dutch journalists and two colleagues of Moroccan and Turkish background respectively. Analyses of these interactions illustrate in great detail how white Dutch journalists reconfirm their own identity as competent professionals by seeking contrast to Moroccan and Turkish colleagues, who are perceived as incompetent and treated in patronizing ways. Targets of racism develop strategies to cope with racism, such as ignoring racism (Hondius and van den Broek) or partially accepting marginalization and trying to work in the margins (Trienekens and Bos). These are examples of individual responses to racism. A different picture emerges from Aouragh's account of organized resistance, a chapter originally written as personal experience (for section four, see below). Aouragh gives a chilling testimony of antiracist struggle in the new millennium. Hers are thought-provoking reflections on antiracism activist struggle, a genre referred to as "writing off the shelf." This well-documented essay, the first to contextualize and analyze antiracism in the new millennium, provides an oral history of resistance in the form of a personal account embedded in a social-political account.

The fourth and last section breaks with strictly academic convention in presenting "free style" essays about the workings of race and racism, offered by a handful of sharp minds, in and outside of the Netherlands, who are very familiar with the Dutch "scene." In these final essays, critical experts, asked to write about their own experiences and observations, capture the kind of hurtful detail, awkward sensibilities, persistent intuitions, and emotional clarity that often get lost in more formal scholarly deliberations. Small highlights the everyday racism of the 20th century, while Vasta problematizes academic complacency. Finally, Arab writes eloquently about the agile response to racial tensions by youth of the 21st century. The essays make tangible, as they bring to life, many of the characteristics of Dutch racism, or to use Goldberg's phrase 'orange racism' (see Afterword), discussed throughout this volume.

In conclusion, we return to the title of this book: Dutch Racism. What is it about? One can infer from the chapters that the contributors to this book complement and confirm similar observations. Independently of each other they illustrate;

1. the Dutch *sense of moral and cultural superiority.* As the chapters unpack how the Dutch manage to cultivate and maintain a positive self-image, a picture emerges of *moral righteousness and ideological repression*: consistently ignoring morally abject parts of history; misrepresentations of history; repetition of myths (benevolent slaveholders, tolerance, saviors of Jews).
2. the anxious Dutch *claim of innocence*: disavowal and denial of racism may merge into what we have called *smug ignorance*: (aggressively) rejecting the possibility to know—this comes strongly to the fore in relation to the Zwarte Piet-phenomenon and in the silencing of critique and aggressive attacks against critical voices (what Vasta, in section four, called an ambush).

3. the strong *sense of Dutch entitlement*; the native demand for gratitude from minorities and *resentment* if that does not happen (Ghorashi; van Wichelen, and de Leeuw); and finally, claiming the right to offend (Gans; van Wichelen, and de Leeuw), while advocating the need for religious intolerance in order to protect a Dutch country to be proud of.

These essences, though prominent in shaping Dutch racism, are not unique to the Netherlands. But in their expressions and particular constellations, they seem unmistakably recognizable as elements of the broader phenomenon called Dutch culture.

Notes

1. In the words of New York Times journalist Steven Erlanger, "The sometimes violent European backlash against Islam and its challenge to national values can be said to have started here [The Netherlands], in a country born from Europe's religious wars." *New York Times* 11 August 2011.

2. It may be relevant to note that the novel was written by a white Jewish journalist, the film produced by a white director. See e.g. www.alleenmaarnettemensenfilm.nl

3. For instance, Frank Bovenkerk, one of the founding fathers of research revealing institutionalized race discrimination in the Netherlands, ridiculed the very idea of historical roots of the sexual objectification of black women in a publication called "Nederland Racistisch?" *Intermediair* 9 November (1984): 49.

4. The following definition of racial violence is used in the reports on racism and extremism (that focus on racial violence rather than on racial discrimination: "racial violence can be understood as: that form of violence in which the victims or targets are chosen on the basis of their ethnic, racial, ethnic-religious, cultural or national origins" (see introduction of Monitors, translated into English) http://www.annefrank. org/en/Worldwide/Monitor-Homepage/Research/
    The reports on Racial discrimination (2005; 2010), that are not translated, follow the definition in the Dutch Penal Code (Article 90quater), that understands discrimination as meaning any "vorm van onderscheid, elke uitsluiting, beperking of voorkeur, die ten doel heeft of ten gevolge kan hebben dat erkenning, het genot of de uitoefening op voet van gelijkheid van rechten van de mens en de fundamentele vrijheden op politiek, economisch, sociaal of cultureel terrein of op andere terreinen van maatschappelijk leven, wordt teniet gedaan of aangetast" (Boog, Dinsbach, Donselaar en Rodrigues 29). (Transl. "The term 'discrimination' or 'to discriminate against' is to be taken to mean any form of differentiation, any act of exclusion, restriction or preference that intends or may result in the destruction

or infringement of the recognition, enjoyment or equal exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the field of politics or economics, in social or cultural matters or any other area of social life" (Dutch Penal Code 110)).

5. This is mentioned in the 2008 (Donselaar en Rodrigues 24) and 2010 monitors, and in the *Kroniek*. The 2010 monitor (Rodrigues and Donselaar) was specifically interested in the conflict between freedom of speech on the one hand, and protection against discrimination on the other, and the ways in which victims of racism (for example Moroccan young men) can become perpetrators in turn (by using extremist violence against other groups). We are specifically interested in the data presented in the second chapter. See http://www. annefrank.org/ImageVaultFiles/id_12537/cf_21 /Monitor9UK.pdf; http://www.annefrank.org/ ImageVaultFiles/id_11447/cf_21/Monitor 2008-8.pdf

6. For instance, a study about racist name calling in schools showed a positive impact resulting from situations where teachers reacted to discriminatory incidents (Verkuyten and Thijs). More often than not, however, teachers remain passive rather than addressing racial harassment (Alkan). The Alkan study of Turkish and Moroccan students indicates that these young people are very concerned about racism in their schools and in society (251). Moreover, as other data show, ethnic segregation in schools is solidly ingrained in Dutch society (Boog & Hamidi).

7. In 9 out of 10 cases, native, white Dutch people are the perpetrators, often male. 3% of native Dutch are targets of discrimination. These numbers put into perspective the often heard comment that *all* ethnic groups are guilty of racism against each other, not only the white native Dutch.

8. http://www.annefrank.org/ImageVaultFiles/ id_11511/cf_21/Monitor_Rassendiscriminatie_ 2009.PDF

9. Online: http://www.thelocal.de/national /20120327-41589.html. See also *The Local, German's News in English*, 30 October 2012, reporting that as a result of the reversal, the German Police had to apologize.

10. http://www.npr.org/templates/Story/story .php?storyId=130102777

11. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/ opinion/greeces-epidemic-of-racist-attackshtml

12. www.metronieuws.nl 21 March 2012.

13. Only 6% were prepared to refuse discriminative requests from employers, which is consistent with the tendency not to challenge

racism we discussed above. In 2011, over 76% of the employment agencies would still accept racist requests. *De Volkskrant*, 2 November 2011; see a report on comparable research *De Volkskrant* 17 December 2012. Remarkably, newspapers reporting these findings would not call for action against these agencies either.

14. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q =cache:OzKBowAkvK8J:www.fritsbolkestein.com /docs/Integratie_van_minderheden.doc+bolkest ein+minderheden&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid =ADGEESjmyuMI2z4j_fEmAT rX5a-9j2fmprr 2wry78bVrE6KBjD0pdRJbVm kEfLRhb 8MEv NuPPciVru2zN5ppjZx2JweWwJuZ1FtrR Dx3HtQqP1yCDzkKlGnFF_4qbxAJrzZIf5M&sig=AH lEtbRYzQomg2BC016eyCdaGn4gL_4kZQ

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I. Narratives and Legacies of Dutch Racism

Chattel Slavery and Racism: A Reflection on the Dutch Experience

Kwame Nimako, Amy Abdou
and Glenn Willemsen

Introduction

Most countries in Africa, Europe, and the Americas acknowledge, to some degree, slavery and racism as a part of their histories during the past 400 years. However, the extent to which each country is capable of acknowledging the role that slavery has played in its social formation is dependent on its ability and desire to remember and locate these events. The role of the Dutch in the Atlantic slavery system was significant, yet the discussion of their role in the slave trade, in slavery, and the racism that permeated these events is eerily absent from the Dutch discourse. Our contention is that the problematization of the enslaved under the yoke of slavery has led to a problematization of the descendants of the enslaved for the Dutch in the present time. As slavery and racism are conspicuously absent from the Dutch historiography which focuses more on the transatlantic "slave" trade, we suggest that the memory of slavery invokes an unresolved problem for Dutch society; namely, maintaining a positive self-group identification in spite of active participation in practices that contest the imagined liberal and enlightened self.

The Dutch Master Narrative

A master narrative is a script we use when telling and retelling a story. It has an influence on the way we tell the story and it influences the way we think about that story. The use of master narratives has been critiqued by a number of theorists who are concerned with the ways in which imperialist notions of history are adapted into cultural and historical discourse. In *Culture and Imperialism,* Edward Said writes about the ways in which identities are interrogated in the postcolonial world, wondering if

we "can reconceive the imperial experience in other than compartmentalized terms" (17). That is to say that the master narrative defines our terminology, the language we use when discussing the past. And yet, in the case of slavery, the inclusion of other narratives is essential to a complete understanding of the legacy of slavery and the unequal power relations that remain in its wake.

> *All concepts connected to the transatlantic slave trade and slavery have a meaning that reflects the larger underlying dynamics on which the very conditions of slavery were perpetuated (Eichstedt and Small 9–11). For example, in the English-speaking world, one can make an analytical distinction between the concepts of slave and enslaved. This has not come about as a result of semantics; it reflects the nature and process of knowledge production. This distinction was first acknowledged by the Afro-Trinidadian historian C.L.R. James. (James,* A History of Pan African Revolt 15*)*

However, the concept has been embraced by those who wished to acknowledge the fact that the notion of a slave was imposed on captives who resisted captivity and enslavement.

Dutch historiography lacks such an analytical distinction. At the turn of this century, the Afro-Dutch community attempted an act of epistemic disobedience by introducing the concept of "enslaved" into the Dutch discourse. They coined the phrase "tot slaaf gemaakt," meaning literally "those who have been made slave." At the time of this writing, the phrase has yet to be commonly accepted into the Dutch lexicon.[2] There has also been reluctance to acknowledge the racial implications of the notion of the African slave, or the construction of the "neger" (negro) in Dutch thinking. The social relevance of the concept of "race" as such has no place in the Dutch master narrative.

The master narrative tends to focus on trade and not enslavement. This presents a discursive framework under which the concept of "trade" is anchored in some form of collaboration between Africans and Europeans (Nimako and Willemsen 20) failing to acknowledge the gruesome means by which these social relationships were entered into. A key element of this concept is the idea that it takes two or more parties to carry on a transaction or trade, regardless of the circumstances under which these parties operated. This implies that some form of African collaboration was required to initiate and sustain what became known in historiography as the transatlantic slave trade. It also suggests that the victims of enslavement were slaves in Africa before they were enslaved in the Americas. If we take this reasoning to its logical conclusion, then any acts or atrocities committed cannot be blamed on the European enslavers.

It should be mentioned that Africans did not develop the legal system that allowed slavery to flourish during the fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries. In the case

of European chattel slavery, the legal framework became embedded within a racial framework under which Africans were legally conceived of as lesser human beings. The abduction of Africans by Africans (or Arabs) as it existed then, and for that matter, as it exists today, can best be described as banditry, as it remains outside the realm of the law. This constitutes a fundamental difference from European chattel slavery.

Although the Africans had a role in the capture of the enslaved, essentially, enslavement did not take place on the battlefield, nor at the moment of capture. This distinction is not addressed by the Dutch master narrative. We often see in the narrative the suggestion that slavery was a normal state of affairs prior to the arrival of Europeans (Emmer, *Dutch Slave Trade* 54–60). This becomes evident in the formulation of questions such as "Why did Africa let so many slaves go?" (58).

Additionally, there can be a discrepancy between involvement in the "slave" trade and that of slavery. For instance, the number of captives the Dutch acquired and transported from Africa to the Caribbean and the Americas was higher than the number of Africans the Dutch physically enslaved on plantations (Postma, *Atlantic* 36). It has been argued by mainstream historians that, for this reason, the Dutch master narrative focuses more on the transatlantic "slave" trade and not slavery. This statement has two dimensions. First, that the Dutch were simply involved in the trade aspect, which suggests superiority over other European enslavers. In this setting, slavery is treated as an appendix to the "slave" trade. Secondly, although involvement in the slave trade is barbaric, when it is framed as "trade" as opposed to "enslavement," it poses less of a challenge to the imagined sense of superiority. The very nature of the trade is not contested under the master narrative.

Another aspect of the Dutch master narrative that reflects the ways in which slavery in the Dutch context is processed is the means through which Dutch academics weigh the consequences of slavery. By employing what can only be described as a bookkeeping model, the Dutch master narrative tacitly accepts slavery as a legitimate business, reflecting on the profits, losses, and sometimes, bad luck endured by the WIC. Many prominent Dutch historians (Unger, Van Dantzig, Emmer, and Postma) have argued that commercial considerations would have ensured relatively good treatment for enslaved Africans during the transatlantic crossing (van Stipriaan 73). This standpoint was reiterated as recently as 2011 by the Dutch historian, Henk Den Heijer. In an interview with Radio Netherlands Worldwide, regarding the enslaved, Den Heijer states: "They were considered to be valuable. A good trader tried to get his slaves to the other side of the ocean in good condition to sell for a good price. Slavery is still morally objectionable, but that does not mean they were abused."[3]

Den Heijer's thesis is derived from an analysis of the Middelburgese Commercie Compagnie logs. In the Dutch context, the activities of the West Indies Company (WIC) and the Middelburgse Commercie Compagnie (MCC) formed the dominant framework within which enslavers operated. In turn, the notes and records of enslavers, and the opinions expressed in such records, tend to form the basis for academic literature.

While we do not attempt to argue that narratives formed from official documents should be absent from academic literature, what seems most problematic in the Dutch case is the prominence and prevalence of the perspective of the enslavers voiced through the use of official documents. This dynamic is evident in the ways historical events and historical figures are interpreted and reflected upon. Frank Dragtenstein illustrates this paradox in his historical analysis of the life of Quassie van Nieuw Timotibo, an enslaved man who hunted Maroons and other enslaved men and women at the request of white plantation owners. Reflecting on the way in which several prominent authors have positively assessed the life of Quassie, (Oudeschans, Dentz, Price, Oostindie, Lichtveld, and Voorhoeve) and the fact that Gert Oostindie had declared Quassie an "unbelievable social success" (qtd in Dragtenstein 93), Dragtenstein writes: "The real question is, would a life of betrayal, conformism, opportunism and countless victims be perceived as an "unbelievable social success" in the eyes of the Afro-Surinamese, past and present" (93).

Here Dragtenstein introduces the issue of knowledge production. In his retelling of the life of Quassie van Nieuw Timotibo, he illustrates that sources of narratives can vary from official, unofficial, and academic literature; narratives can also overlap and contradict. Official records can form the basis of the framework and guidelines for non-official actions. Dragtenstein employs the use of official and unofficial documentation and academic literature to present a nuanced look at the actions of the actors, including the enslaved men and women in this narrative. His study is a unique example of how Dutch historians should approach research into Dutch slavery.

Unfortunately, he proves to be the exception to the rule. In contrast to Dragtenstein's nuanced view, Johannes Postma in *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade 1600–1815* provides us with a rather one-dimensional narrative that focuses largely on financial gains and losses, but occasionally weighs in on the conditions of enslavement. While contemplating the causes of death on the middle passage, Postma states: "A number of slaves died as a result of slave revolts; however, this did not involve large numbers except in a few cases such as the Middelburgs Welvaren (1751) and the Vigilantie, which had most of their slaves killed as a result of slave uprisings" (241).

Postma places the responsibility for the deaths on the enslaved, not on the enslavers who created a situation from which the enslaved tried to escape. Another

example from the same narrative suggests that the enslaved were responsible for bringing disease on board.

> *The leading cause of catastrophic death rates was epidemic diseases, which could be brought aboard by a single slave. One of the reasons for physical examinations was to avoid such catastrophes. In the crowded conditions aboard a slave ship, once an epidemic struck there was little the crew of a ship could do but hope for the best.* (253)

This passage seems to contradict earlier information Postma provides over the most common causes of death aboard a slave ship, of which smallpox, scurvy, dropsy, and tuberculosis are prominent (244). The list also includes sudden death, heart attack, suicide, mental/emotional breakdowns, respiratory problems, and venereal disease. Never does Postma contemplate the role European enslavers played in the spreading of these illnesses aboard slave ships, nor does he discuss in depth the reasons the enslaved may have committed suicide, been driven mad, or been prone to respiratory problems or venereal disease.

In short, the essence of the Dutch master narrative is that it would rather not address slavery; but that, if the issue of slavery has to be addressed, it is preferable that it is done without reference to real people. Any reflection on the motives of the actors remains in the realm of the superficial, and by actors we refer to the white Dutch, as the enslaved do not enter into this narrative as people, but rather as objects to be traded. At the same time, the master narrative suggests that, when discussing slavery, "reason should prevail over emotion", (Emmer, *Dutch Slave Trade* ix) that slavery cannot be viewed through the lens of our twenty-first century morality, and that slavery and the slave trade were initiated and perpetuated a long time ago in collusion with countless others. Information that contests the master narrative seldom comes to light in the popular discourse. The addition of more Surinamese and Antillean scholars in the field has led to the inclusion of more postcolonial, critical, and black voices in the academic literature, but this shift has not transformed the popular discourse regarding Dutch slavery (van Stipriaan 69).

A more recent, albeit informal, survey of Dutch history books by van Stipriaan in 2011 reiterates the fact that the inclusion of multiple perspectives in the academic literature has not translated to the inclusion of those perspectives in popular culture (van Stipriaan, "Slavernijonderzoek"). While there is certainly a change in what van Stipriaan identifies as the tone of the scholarship, for the majority of the Dutch, the slavery past is intangible. A summary of history books used in primary and secondary education reveals that a great deal more attention is paid to abolition than to slavery, slavery in North America, and the current human rights debate concerning ethnic and racial discrimination. The amount of attention abolition receives frames

the topic of slavery as a problem that required the values of the enlightenment and the triumph of liberalism in the European context.

Given these parameters, the master narrative determines how we remember the past, what questions we pose when interrogating the past, and ultimately how we commemorate the events of the past.

The Enslaved as a Problem

The Dutch were able to occupy a specific place within slavery through advancements in boat building and seafaring. At the same time, slavery did present a serious problem for them, as it represented a serious threat to their self-representation as Christian entrepreneurs. This also held true for other European enslavers. Underlying the objectives of slavery is that, from the beginning, those who decided to enslave other people, in this case Europeans, viewed the people they enslaved, in this case Africans, not only as sub-human, but also as a multi-faceted problem (Gordon, *Fanon* 40).

Let us review the ways in which the enslaved were and continue to be a problem to the Dutch. Clearly, the first *problem* was the unwillingness of the African captives to accept their status as slaves; therefore, they had to be chained to prevent them from breaking free. The first problem, therefore, was how to transform a free people into an un-free people. Thus, the notion of slaves was imposed on African people during their captivity. This status was maintained and supported by a legal system which required the active support of the state and its citizens. The collaborative parties were the companies that outfitted the ships and recruited crews, the insurance companies that profited from the high tariffs that could be charged for moving "human cargo" (Postma, *Atlantic* 57–58), the state that charged fees for permits and actively negotiated with other European countries to provide legitimacy and protection via the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the Treaty of Breda in 1667, the Peace of Ryswick in 1697, and the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 (Nimako and Willemsen 59–65), and the Dutch citizens themselves who profited from the enslavement of Africans via cheap raw materials.

The second *problem* was the unwillingness of the enslaved Africans to work as enslaved; thus, they needed supervision and had to be whipped and coerced to work. The use of corporal punishment was legitimatized under colonial law. Once they realized that some enslaved Africans did not fear death, the Dutch developed forms of punishment that would either prolong death or severely maim, but not impede the enslaved from forced labor. Punishments included cutting out tongues, cutting off ears, and castrations (Dragtenstein 19–21). The planters and the board of directors of the colony granted themselves the legal authority to employ whatever means they found necessary to maintain slavery in the colonies (Dragtenstein 37–38). Again, a legal system was developed within the colonies to allow the enslavers the maximum amount of

control over the bodies of the enslaved. This bred a culture of control from which legislation was born to maintain the system of slavery, even long after it had been abolished.

The third *problem* was the unwillingness of the enslaved, and later the descendants of the enslaved, to forget about slavery and the remembrance of their ancestors. As will be discussed further in the following section of this paper, the commemoration of the abolition of Dutch slavery remained a non-issue in the public domain for nearly 140 years following the King's declaration on July 1, 1863. In this time, a pervasive silence engulfed the topic in the Netherlands. In spite of this silence or perhaps because of it, the Surinamese and Antillean communities in the Netherlands continued to celebrate, commemorate, and pray; creating a variety of events and ceremonies to express their feelings concerning the Dutch slavery past. This led to a culture of anxiety concerning the past within the Dutch discourse, and simultaneously, a longing for openness on the part of the Surinamese and Antillean communities.

These three problems, which find their expression in control, resistance, and memory, are essential to the analysis of the Dutch historiography on the Atlantic "slave" trade, chattel slavery, and racism. Parts of this narrative are peculiarly Dutch and some are relevant to all the European countries that played a role. The self-proclaimed superiority of the Dutch in relation to other peoples went hand in hand with the chauvinism of Dutch nationals in relation to other nationals. But that is not only specific to the Dutch. What is unique to the Dutch is the manner in which they choose to distinguish themselves from other Europeans with regard to how they handled the enslaved. Thus, in comparing the humanity of Dutch people and their treatment of African captives in relation to other Europeans, the Dutch "slave" trader, Willem Bosman, made the following notes in the seventeenth century:

> You will really wonder to see how these slaves live on board, for though their number sometimes amounts to six or seven hundred, yet by the careful management of our masters of ships they are so regulated that it seems incredible. And in this particular our nation exceeds all other Europeans; for as the French, Portuguese, and English slave-ships are always foul and stinking, on the contrary ours are for the most part clean and neat. (Bosman qtd in Postma, Atlantic 126)

In other words, the Dutch treated their captives better than the French, Portuguese, and English. The assumption being that it was legitimate to enslave Africans provided that they were treated with Dutch care.

Though the European nations competed among themselves, when it came to their engagement with Africans, they chose to cooperate (Nimako and Willemsen 49-51). Bosman recorded that, when a "slave revolt" occurred on a Dutch slave ship, the Dutch sailors were rescued by French and English sailors. Underlying this collaboration was the self-proclaimed superiority of the European man in relation to Africans.

This view is also expressed in Dutch writings of this period. Thus, in his manual on how Dutch enslavers working for the West Indies Company should interact with Africans, including providing items such as guns and alcohol necessary to obtain captives, Bosman gave the following advice to Dutch workers on West Indies Company ships:

> Captains should carefully watch out for the thieving of the Negroes, in order that not too much gets stolen. I say "too much," since it is almost impossible to escape theft completely; at least I have never heard of such a situation. Even the rowers hired by the captain will try to steal. For this reason he must watch everyone, since theft seems to be an inherited trait of the people there. (Bosman qtd in Postma, Atlantic 138)

This quote illustrates the paradox of slavery, general for all European enslavers, where the enslavers, who are essentially stealing the freedom of the enslaved, turn around to accuse them of thievery.

In summary, the first "problem," namely, the unwillingness of the captives to accept their status as slaves, translated into an institutional, structural, and legal culture of control, articulated throughout the official and unofficial documentation through which the Dutch master narrative emerged.

This brings us to the second problem, namely, the unwillingness of the enslaved Africans, now referred to as "negers" or negroes on plantations in the Caribbean and the Americas, to work as enslaved. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the enslaved, considered sub-human and property of those who held them in captivity, were mistreated, beaten, and abused. A legal system was imposed to allow the plantation owners the maximum amount of control over the enslaved. After abolition, control over the bodies of the formerly enslaved remained a point of discussion.

In his justification of why the freedom of the "emancipated" slaves should be restricted and controlled, one of the parliamentarians, Dirks, had this to say:

> A negro remains a negro, and attempting to make anything other of the blackmoor is futile. Labor in the field is particularly problematic. The white man, it is said in Suriname, does not work in the field, which means that it is shameful. A free man, says the slave, wears shoes and a blue or yellow hat. But a free man does not work. Free is equal. I can do anything and do not have to work. (Willemsen, Dagen 91)

However, the enslaved (who were) to be "emancipated" should not confuse freedom with equality. To this effect, another speaker, de Raadt, noted:

> But it is then doubly necessary to guide them in the process of transition from slavery to freedom and to protect them from themselves and from giving in to temptations that would corrupt them. (Willemsen, Dagen 92–93)

The implication of the above statement is that we should not confuse abolition with emancipation. Clearly, abolition is an act of legal legislation whereas emancipation is a cultural, social, political, and economic process. This process, it was articulated, should be guided or controlled by the state. However, it should be noted, according to de Raadt:

> That state supervision is not so much needed for the improvement and education of the adults, who have already developed their characters and acquired certain habits, but it is useful and necessary for the next generation, to give this generation a different perspective to their parents by means of Christian and academic education and good examples. (Willemsen, Dagen 96, emphasis added)

In short, the state wished to exert intellectual as well as physical control. The need to provide the children of the "emancipated" a different perspective suggests a measure of control that would, at one level, separate them from their heritage. In turn, Dutch historians continue to reproduce this perspective when viewing the enslaved through the lens of the enslavers. This is evident in the African collaboration model (it takes two to tango), the bookkeeping model in which profits and losses are the focus of the narrative and the unproblematic reproduction of the notion of "slaves."

The reality concerning abolition is that there was very little in the way of a public outcry condemning slavery. The Dutch resisted abolition longer than most other European countries. The abolition of the Atlantic "slave" trade and slavery under Dutch control was brought about through pressure from Britain (van Stipriaan 76). When it became untenable for the Dutch to maintain slavery, a strategy had to be found to control the process of the so-called emancipation of the enslaved. This strategy found its expression in the parliamentary debates preceding the abolition of Dutch slavery on July 1, 1863.

The general opinion, however, was that not everyone was fit for emancipation. To drive this message home, the speaker, de Raadt, noted that:

> It may be necessary to declare that this is applicable to the entire generation that is currently undergoing emancipation. Giving complete freedom without any restriction to people who will now act as children in society and who view inactivity as the primary right of freedom, who can obtain everything that they need in an exceptionally mild climate, with few needs, without performing any work worthy of note—I wonder, where would that lead to? (Willemsen, Dagen 98)

In support of this perspective, another parliamentarian, Duymaer van Twist, posed two questions and answered them. "What is the slave's great objection to slavery? What is, for him, the essence of slavery? Labor—labor that he is forced to perform from his youth by the lash of the whip. This is why he hates labor and slavery."

Mr. van Twist went further to pose a third question, namely: "Or do you believe that he is oppressed by slavery because the deprivation of human rights prevents him from developing freely and independently?" To which he replied:

> I do not believe so. It is the labor that oppresses him. For him, freedom is the free-dom not to labor. It is the freedom that he desires, that he will seek and that prompts him to flee into the wilderness, where he is sure that he will not be found and where his urge not to work will prevail.

To conclude his plea, van Twist posed two last questions and answered them as follows:

> What is there to prevent him from doing this? What would prompt him to work? Neither in his habits, nor his minimal needs nor his current level of development and civilisation can such a stimulus be found. And as long as such a stimulus is lacking it must be imposed from the outside, he must be forced to work and not flee into the wilderness if necessary. The law, in accordance with nature, gives the father power over his child, the guardian power over the minor. A person who has not achieved a level of civilisation and development that will enable him to be free and independent will abuse the freedom. (Willemsen, Dagen 99)

The above quotations give us insights into the abolition debates in the Dutch parliament between 1860 and 1863 at three levels; namely the difference between freedom and equality, the confusion that abolition was equal to emancipation, and perceptions of abolition in relation to knowledge production about this event.

Ignoring pressures and interventions from the side of Britain, when the day of emancipation came, the credit went to the Dutch King. In response to the declaration of the abolition of Dutch slavery, the editor of a Dutch provincial newspaper made the following comments:

> Only where a civilization is founded upon natural principles of freedom and equality can prosperity and flourishing be expected in the long run. May this prosperity and flourishing become the destiny of our West Indian colonies so that in the future one will always—with even more joy—remember the first of July 1863 as a happy day in Dutch history, as a fortunate moment during the reign of Willem III.[4]

In a way, the Dutch King Willem III became the moral equivalent of William Wilberforce in Britain. However, for more than 100 years, it appeared that very few people in the Netherlands, if any, remembered what the newspaper editor expected people to remember. Not only was the emancipation of the enslaved credited to the then reign-ing Dutch King, Willem III, but also the enslavers had to be compensated by the Dutch state before the enslaved could gain their legal freedom under the abolition

act. Abolition in 1863 did not mean freedom but 10 years of apprenticeship and more than 100 years of additional colonial rule.

Let us now turn to the third *problem*, namely, the unwillingness of the descendants of the enslaved to forget about their ancestors. We noted above that information on the "slave" trade and slavery in various archives was obtained and preserved for a variety of purposes, and can therefore be used for the study of other phenomena. Scholars such as Humphrey Lamur show how creativity, combinations, and permutations give us a much better understanding of the period. Lamur's study of *Family Names and Kinship of Emancipated Slaves in Suriname* (2004) is an interesting and useful case in point.

> *As compensation for the emancipation, the [Dutch] government gave slave owners 300 Guilders for each slave or 30 Guilders if the slave was entitled to manumission. To be eligible for this compensation, they were obliged to submit lists of the slaves they owned. This list, the Statement of Registration, contains valuable information such as the names of slaves, their ages and dates of birth, religion, job and some comments on their personal circumstances. The majority of slaves were given a family name when they were emancipated, after which they were registered on the Emancipation Register.*
>
> *[Humphrey Lamur's study] has linked both files—the Statement and the Emancipation Register—which made it possible to create a database with significant information on individual slaves. This database was then supplemented with data on the slave owners and other socio-economic reference material, thereby creating an important source of information for further scientific research. (Willemsen qtd in Lamur* VII*)*

It should be added that the official proclamation of the abolition of slavery contained information on the compensation for the emancipation to the slave-holders; however, this information was omitted in the Suriname language version, *Sranan Tongo*, which was communicated to the enslaved.

By linking the Statement and the Emancipation Register, Lamur was able to unravel the link between the enslaved and the slave owners. Lamur's work thus provides us with some of the most accurate and verifiable information on Dutch slavery at a given point in time. These two examples, namely, compensation and construction of names, undermine the arguments by some formal historians that we cannot use current moral perspectives to judge the past. In fact, the example indicates that state actors at that time were aware of the moral implications of their deeds, and they had some idea about the long-term consequences of their policies and practices.

Equally important to note is that, in the process of conducting his research, Lamur was obstructed by a desk officer, on instructions of their superiors, at the Dutch National Archives for several months in 2003 from consulting a piece of unclassified

data that he requested. He regained access to the data after he formally protested to the appropriate authorities at the Dutch National Archives. This prompted him to report it in his book as follows:

> *The unacceptable practices of the front-desk officials were also inconsistent with the principle of* **legal equality**, *which requires that* **all citizens** *should be treated equally. I therefore decided to mention this serious matter in this report. (Lamur XIII, emphasis added)*

For our present purposes, it should also be mentioned that Lamur is an Afro-Dutch scholar of Surinamese origin. Also reported in his book is the fact that he could not find funding for his study on Family Names and Kinship of Emancipated Slaves in Suriname so he conducted the research when he retired from his job as full professor. The choice of Lamur's research topic, his treatment and experience at the Dutch National Archives, his decision to formally report it to the authorities of the National Archives, and also to record his experience in his book suggests that the production of knowledge, including the uncovering of slavery narratives within academia, are influenced by institutional power relations as well as race relations. This last challenge for the Dutch can also be seen in the remembrance and commemoration ceremonies surrounding July 1, which has always been a national holiday in (the former colony of) Suriname, but never in the Netherlands. In the next section, we will outline the various developments that led to the official recognition of this day.

(Dis)Continuities: Remembrance and Commemoration

We have argued elsewhere (Willemsen, 2004; Willemsen and Nimako) that, until about a decade ago, the issue of slavery on one hand, and the commemoration and remembrance of Dutch involvement in the Atlantic slavery in the Netherlands on the other, was history. It was *history* in the sense that it was taken for granted that "only" formal historians, and perhaps the *marginal* among them, should be preoccupied with the issue of slavery. However, as will become clear below, slavery became *a history* in the Netherlands only when a group of people, predominantly Dutch citizens of Surinamese and Antillean origin, asked the Dutch state for a place and monument to facilitate their Atlantic slavery commemoration and remembrance "rituals." In other words, the issue of the request for a slavery monument brought the parallel histories and intertwined praxis of Dutch social formation to the forefront.

We have noted above that, in response to the abolition of slavery in the Dutch orbit on July 1, 1863, a Dutch editorial newspaper implored: "*remember* the first of July 1863 as a happy day in Dutch history, as a fortunate moment during the reign of Willem III." However, it took more than 130 years before the abolition of slavery was commemorated on Dutch soil. To be precise, the official and formal monument to commemorate Dutch slavery was erected only in 2002. Why did it take so long?

For a long time in the Netherlands, it was taken for granted that the Atlantic "slave" trade and slavery took place long ago in some distant countries; Africa, the Caribbean, and the Americas. With the mass migration from the former plantation colony of Suriname that took place when the country gained independence in 1975, the legacy of slavery as lived experience was literally delivered to the Netherlands' front door. The migrant population included thousands of descendants of the enslaved. This Afro-Dutch community was the seed-bed for the development of organizations in the major cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague to organize events on July 1 with the primary objective of commemorating the legacy of slavery and celebrating its abolition.

One of the organizations that organizes activities relating to July 1 is the *Nationaal 30 juni/1 juli Comité* (National 30 June/1 July Committee). This committee holds an evening vigil on the Surinameplein in Amsterdam on June 30 each year. In 1993, the committee declared June 30 to be an annual day of reflection to mark the 130th anniversary of the abolition of slavery. Keti Koti (Breaking Chains), the abolition of slavery, is celebrated the following day, on July 1. A plaque was unveiled on the Surinameplein during the seventh commemoration, held in 1999.

The name of the organization, the *Nationaal 30 juni/1 juli Comité*, was chosen intentionally to be analogous to the (Dutch) *Nationaal Comité 4 en 5 mei*, which organizes the annual commemoration of the victims of the Second World War on May 4 and the liberation of the Netherlands from occupation by Nazi Germany on May 5. The message was clear: slavery was just as much a part of Dutch history as the Second World War. The implicit message was more provocative: slavery was also a holocaust, with the Dutch in the role of the perpetrators, not the victims.

Another high profile organization is the *Stichting Eer en Herstel, Betaling Slachtoffers van de Slavernij in Suriname (Foundation Honor and Reconciliation, Compensating Victims of the Slavery in Suriname).* In 1996, this organization had a tree planted on its behalf in the gardens of Gethsemane in Jerusalem as a monument to commemorate all the indigenous peoples and Afro-Surinamese in the slavery era. This gesture was also intended to be a symbol of reconciliation with the Jews, who had been major slave-owners in Suriname. In July 1998, the *Stichting Eer en Herstel* sent an open letter to the Lower House proposing a series of activities, including the establishment of a memorial in order to aid the acceptance of the repressed history and to "repair" the suffering. In 1998, the Afro-European Women's organization *Sophiedela* presented a petition to the Lower House, entitled *Sporen van slavernij (Traces of Slavery),* to request a national monument to commemorate the Dutch slavery legacy. This petition was discussed in the House in February 1999.

July 1 committees have since been established in other major cities, such as Rotterdam. The annual *Bigi Spikri* ("big mirror") parade, where the descendants of slaves parade past shop windows (mirrors) in traditional costumes in order to display

their beauty, always attracts thousands of visitors. On July 1, 1999, the Rotterdam committee presented a petition to the municipal council requesting that it use its influence in the Cabinet to declare July 1 a national holiday.

The many initiatives at the grass-roots level went into high gear when the Cabinet granted the request in the Sophiedela petition and the new Minister for Integration at the time, Roger van Boxtel, adopted the idea of a national slavery monument. He made it a spearhead of his policy geared to the promotion of the social integration of ethnic minorities. The various Afro-Surinamese, Antillean, Aruban, and African organizations and organizations of Maroons and Indigenous peoples joined forces at the insistence of the Ministry of the Interior. This umbrella organization—het *Landelijk Platform Slavernijverleden (LPS)* (National Platform of the Legacy of Slavery)—then consulted with the government during the process.

The developments in the Netherlands relating to the slavery legacy ran parallel to international initiatives to combat repression and exclusion. During the World Anti-Racism Conference held in Durban, South Africa in 2001, the then Minister for Integration Van Boxtel spoke on behalf of the Dutch Cabinet on the approach to the struggle against racism and racial discrimination.

Thus, the efforts of the Afro-Dutch community in the Netherlands put the Dutch slavery legacy on the political agenda, nationally and internationally. This brought the discourse on the legacy of slavery into the public domain and simultaneously gave it an emotional charge. Once in the public domain, this movement culminated in the establishment of the national monument to the legacy of slavery in the Oosterpark in Amsterdam. On July 1, 2002, this static monument was unveiled in the presence of Queen Beatrix.

There was the assumption on the part of the state officials who organized the unveiling that this would be a low key event. In short, they underestimated the importance that the Afro-Dutch community attached to this part of Dutch history. Thousands of people, the majority descendants of enslaved people, showed up to witness and celebrate the monument. The mass attendance caused a panic among the organizers who did not expect to find several thousand Afro-Dutch standing behind and pushing against the metal barrier which obstructed their view of the unveiling. The hurt among the excluded was deep, shouts and cries that it was "their" monument and that they were excluded yet again, were broadcasted through the media across the country. This set a tone for the unveiling and for subsequent discussions concerning the commemoration of the Dutch slavery past.

Let us continue this narrative with two observations. The first observation is that, despite the erection of the monument, there was by no means a general political or academic shift in the views on slavery and racism. State responses to the request to erect the monument gave rise to public (mostly radio) and private discussions in the Afro-Dutch community.

Some scholars who have written about the events leading up to the unveiling of the national monument point to the fact that, once the Dutch government became involved, the focus shifted from honoring the victims of slavery to celebrating Dutch multiculturalism (Smith; Kardux, "Slavery").

Secondly, the discourse from right wing politicians surrounding this event focused on the victimology of those who had requested the monument be built. Pim Fortuyn, who at the time ran on an anti-immigration platform before his murder by a radical environmentalist in 2002, stated in his campaign book that "those who still suffer from their ancestors' enslavement should seek psychiatric treatment" (qtd in Kardux, "Slavery" 173).

While the struggle to establish the monument stimulated other changes, namely the inclusion of slavery in the official canon of Dutch cultural history,[5] the focus on slavery remained contentious. Rita Verdonk, once Minister of Immigration and now the head of her own small "movement," Proud of the Netherlands, claimed that those who opposed her wanted to put slavery monuments all over, "to make us look bad" (qtd in Kardux, "Slavery" 175). In 2008, cartoonist Gregorius Nekschot was arrested for publishing several racist cartoons including a cartoon of an infantilized black man with a pacifier in his mouth riding on the back of a white, Dutch native with the caption, "Now also a slavery monument for the white native tax payer." The public outcry was largely tilted in Nekschot's defense.[6] He was released after serving one day in jail and, in September 2010, the case against Nekschot was dismissed despite the acknowledgement by the Ministry of Justice that the work constituted a form of racial discrimination.[7]

On July 1, 2008, at the Emancipation Day Activities in the Oosterpark in Amsterdam, the Dutch prime minister Jan Pieter Balkenende called slavery a "shameful episode in our history, a stain on the country's character." His suggestion that slavery is not a part of the larger narrative of Dutch history, but a brief period or "episode" falls directly in line with the popular discourse and the master narrative as described in the first section of this paper. It should be noted that Balkende refused to apologize for slavery during his time in office, referencing instead the speech made by Roger van Boxtel at the World Anti-racism conference in Durban in which van Boxtel offered "deep regret" for the Netherlands' role in the transatlantic slave trade and slavery.

We suggest the slavery monument constitutes a trend; one in which expressions of regret are offered but no formal apologies are made. The monument remains a contested project for many in the Afro-Dutch community who fear it may be an empty gesture. At the same time, it symbolizes the failure of multiculturalism for anti-immigrant politicians and their followers.

The ways in which these processes unfold, and their impact on Dutch society at large, reflect the highly divergent access of contemporary racial and national groups to knowledge production and political power. At the present time, there remains a

continuing struggle in the realm of ideology and collective memory among the groups we have just described. It is a struggle that continues to be waged in multiple arenas, from exhibitions, galleries, and museums to monuments and memorials; and from government, politics, and education to television, the press, and the internet. Although the power imbalances among these groups are evident, the outcomes are far from clear.

Conclusion

We set out in this chapter to locate the place of chattel slavery and racism in the Dutch master narrative. The literature in the field is largely tilted toward discussions of the transatlantic "slave" trade, offers less on slavery and racism, and fails entirely to engage with Africans and their descendants as subjects and agents of action. While we recognize that historians depend on archive materials for their narratives, we have also demonstrated how narratives are shaped by power and the desire to construct a certain self-image.

We also acknowledge the fact that, in the case of slavery and racism, one group of people is allowed to live an ordinary life under ordinary conditions while another group or other groups are expected to do so under extraordinary conditions. This ordinariness can get to a point of distorting reality, and normalizing an abnormal, violent situation (Gordon, *Introduction* 86–88, see the chapter by Liesbeth Minnaard in this book for a discussion of normalization). It is within this normalization of a distorted history that the Dutch master narrative continues to exist. Nevertheless, there is enough material to interrogate the continuity and discontinuity between slavery, abolition, remembrance, commemoration, and contemporary racism. This is the focus of our narrative because it is downplayed in master narratives.

We also demonstrated that, from the point of view of social formation, issues related to the demographic composition of Dutch society, memory, belonging, and taste are intertwined with the history and culture of slavery and racism. This, in turn, gives rise to discussions about the relevance of a slavery monument, a slavery institute, and the place of slavery in the Dutch historical and cultural canon.

Specifically, we argue that both slavery and racism are founded on social and power relations, structures, and institutions that define how slavery is discussed. The long period of colonialism that followed the legal abolition of slavery maintained similar racialized power relations, structures, and institutions. It is these social formations that also frame commemoration of the slavery past. The efforts of the Afro-Dutch community in the Netherlands put the Dutch slavery legacy on the political agenda; however, this has not influenced the dominant conceptual framework in a significant manner.

Notes

1. This paper was originally conceived by Kwame Nimako and Glenn Willemsen, before Glenn Willemsen passed away in February 2008. Much of the research on slavery in this paper was conducted by Glenn, which we acknowledge by maintaining his name as co-author.

   We would like to thank Humphrey Lamur and Stephen Small for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper.

2. The term was first used in print by Frank Dragtenstein in his book, *Trouw aan de Blanken, Quassie van Nieuw Timotibo, twist en strijd in de 18de eeuw in Suriname.* Amsterdam: NiNsee/KIT, 2004.

3. "Slavery—Less Cruel Than We Thought." Radio Netherlands Worldwide. 24 April 2011.

4. *Utrechtsch Provinciaal en Stedelijk Dagblad* 155 (2 July 1863).

5. To view the entire Dutch cultural canon, see the website http://entoen.nu/

6. There are several forums that discuss the case of the cartoonist. See http://www. geenstijl.nl/mt/archieven/2008/05/even_ de_alle_verboden_cartoons.html for a discussion in Dutch and http://www.dutch news.nl/news/archives/2008/05/cartoonist_arrested_for_ discri.php for a discussion in English.

7. Volkskrant. *Gregorius Nekschot blijft koel onder opschorten vervolging.* 21 Sept. 2010.

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Harmless Identities: Representations of Racial Consciousness among Three Generations Indo-Europeans[1]

Esther Captain

I wish to introduce the topic of racial consciousness with some words about a Dutch author born in the former colony of the Dutch East Indies: Hella S. Haasse. When she passed away in September 2011 at the age of 93, all obituaries affirmed she was one of the most-respected and admired modern novelists, whose vivid and lively evocations of life in the former colony of the Dutch East Indies have reached a worldwide audience. The career of Haasse, who has practised the art of writing historical novels to perfection, took off with the novella *Oeroeg*, which was published in 1948. This was only three years after the end of the Second World War in the Dutch East Indies and in the middle of a brutal war of decolonisation between the Netherlands and its former colony. The country was granted autonomy as the Republic Indonesia in December 1949. In the years that followed, life in the Dutch East Indies remained a secondary but recurring theme in Haasse's body of work. Her travel-diary *Krassen op een rots, notities bij een reis op Java* (1970), the historical novel *Heren van de Thee* (1992), her autobiography *Parang Sawat, een handvol achtergron*d (1993) and the novel *Sleuteloog* (2002) were all highly appreciated by readers as well as awarded important prices by literary critics.[2]

Haasse was born in 1918 in the capital of the Dutch East Indies, then called Batavia, the present-day metropolis Jakarta with its ten million inhabitants. The name of the colonial city Batavia was a reference to the (in-)famous Dutch ancestors the "Bataven," of which the continental Dutch people as a nation are descendants. Haasse was the daughter of Willem Hendrik Haasse, inspector of finance, and Katharina Diehm Winzenhöhler, a concert pianist. Both her parents were newcomers in the Dutch East Indies. Her father left the Netherlands and arrived in the Indies in

1911 and her mother in 1914. During the Second World War, her father was interned by the Japanese occupier in a prisoner of war camp and her mother in a women's civilian camp. The end of the Japanese occupation (1942–1945) also meant the end of Dutch colonial rule in the Indies. The period of 1945–1949 was characterized by conflict, negotiations, violence and outright war. Ultimately the transfer of sovereignty of the colony by the Netherlands to Indonesia in December 1949 was inevitable.

A young woman of twenty years old, Haasse left for the Netherlands in 1938 in order to study Scandinavian languages and literature at the University of Amsterdam. "Europeans," as all non-Asians were called in the colonial society at the time, automatically belonged to the elite in the Dutch East Indies. The Haasse family was part of this European elite. The fact that Haasse left her country of birth in order to study in the Netherlands was a common ingredient of a colonial childhood and a privilege only the elite could afford. Haasse's first twenty years in the Dutch East Indies have deeply influenced her as a writer. Her work is a vivid reminder of this influence. Although it could be argued that Haasse's work itself is an impressive *tour de force* of keeping the memory of the Dutch East Indies alive, she nonetheless has expressed her anxiety about the fact that ". . . her country of origin will be lost" (Meijer).

Time and again, Haasse has acknowledged her feelings of closeness and connection with Indo-Europeans, the "mixed"-race inhabitants of the colony with both Dutch and Indonesian (grand-)parents. At the same time she has been articulating that the position of an Indo-European person is fundamentally different from hers. In an interview, she stated: "Among the group of Indo-Europeans [Eurasians], or *Indische Nederlanders*, a double emotionality is visible, because they realize that they are slowly disappearing out of history. They form a category of people whose very existence will come to an end. They will transfer the Indo-feeling, if I may say so, to their children and grandchildren, but within a century, there will be no more conscious memories of the colonial past" (Meijer 1995). This statement is obviously disturbing and raises questions, especially for the Indo-Europeans themselves, including the author of this article. Is the observation that Indo-Europeans are on the verge of extinction tenable? In this contribution, I would like to elaborate on this topic and put the perspective of Indo-Europeans at the forefront. In order to articulate the double consciousness of persons of both Dutch and Indonesian ancestry, I will use the word "Indo-European" (shortly Indo) and will not refer to other concepts, such as "Indo-Dutch." During the colonial period, "Indo-European" was a current expression, while Indo-Dutch (as a modern construction) was not.

Beyond a Feeling

In the post-colonial, non-academic world, it is often stated that "being Indo" or "being Indo-European" is hard to describe. Instead of providing characteristics of

an Indo-European identity, it is commonly reduced to "a feeling" (De Vries). Interestingly enough, such opinions are expressed by the heirs to the Indo-European heritage themselves: the second and the third generation of Indo-Europeans. If one pushes for more concrete elements, stereotypes such as Indo-European food, Indo-rock music, playing badminton, riding motorbikes and line-dancing are mentioned. And while clichés always reflect a certain degree of the reality, because Indo-Europeans do indeed engage in these typical pastimes, they also tend to obscure other, less harmless aspects of Indo-Europeanness. After all, being Indo-European implies by definition being a person of mixed race, a construction that originated in and was defined by the colonial past.

Let us therefore take a closer look at this past with the intention to discern an Indo-European person from others in the Dutch East Indies colonial society and which implications this identity could have. In the context of the colony in the East Indies, the words "European" and "Dutch" were often used interchangeably. In the daily life of the colony, they were equivalents when referring to the Dutch elite in power: "European" meant "Dutch" and vice versa. The population was divided into three hierarchical categories: first Europeans, second the so-called "Foreign Orientals," and third "*Inlanders*" (Natives, meaning Indonesians). With the majority of the Indonesian population, Moluccans belonged to the category of "*Inlanders*" and shared the status of Dutch "onderdaan" (subject) instead of "burgers" (full citizens). In contrast with most Indonesians, the majority of Moluccans were Christians and had functioned in the Dutch colonial system as soldiers in the Dutch colonial army KNIL as well as civil servants, with only the lower ranks available to them. The colonial system was based on racial principles, supported by notions of primitiveness and of civilization. The awkward name of "Foreign Orientals" referred to 1.2 million Chinese and 71,000 Arabs in the East Indies. Especially the adjective "foreign" seems strange. After all: who were more "foreign" in the East Indies: Europeans or Chinese and Arabs? "*Inlanders*" were considered the most primitive, which legitimized the Dutch presence in terms of a civilizing mission. The term "*Inlander*," used to refer to 60 million Indonesians, is also suspicious because the word has a denigrating tone. Its connotation is merely of "*Inlanders*" being part of the indigenous flora and fauna of the archipelago instead of being human beings. The implication of this connotation can also be seen in other colonial contexts. In his analysis of the relationship between Great Britain and its colony India, historian David Arnold concluded that the "exotic" landscape and the tropical nature were tropes in the travelling gaze and discourse of white male explorers (often missionaries, administrators or naturalists) who wanted to "master" the impressive, but also hostile landscape, including its inhabitants (Arnold). Moreover, the juridical perspective reveals that during the colonial time, Indonesians were not considered citizens, but *subjects* of the state (Heijs).

If we turn to the term "European," this word seems neutral. But by taking a closer look at the term, a more complex picture with racial and political implications does appear. The word, in fact, refers to whites: "all" people of European descent, including those born *outside* Europe: North Americans and Indo-Europeans were part of the European category, as well as—surprisingly!—Japanese persons. The latter were included into the European category in 1896, as a result of a then signed commercial treaty between Japan and the Netherlands. Being European could be transferred by birth from parent to child. If a European parent (in most cases the Dutch father had a relationship in or outside marriage with an Indonesian woman) had acknowledged a child as his own, there was no juridical difference between Europeans and Indo-Europeans. If the parent did not acknowledge the child, it would become an "*Inlander*." The group of Europeans comprised a very small part of the population. In 1942, at the eve of the Second World War, approximately 300,000 Europeans lived in the Dutch East Indies: 0.4% of the total population. In their civilizing mission, Dutch men and Dutch women each had separate tasks. The interplay between race, gender and (homo-)sexuality as categories of distinction was at the heart of the colonial system and has been analysed extensively by many scholars (Aldrich, Gouda, Locher-Scholten, McClintock, Pattynama, Stoler, Young).

In the colonial system, Europeans were in power at the governmental, financial and political level. Within the group of Europeans, those with Dutch appearances (the cliché of white skin, blonde hair and blue eyes) and an orientation towards the Netherlands (such as speaking Dutch correctly, eating potatoes instead of rice, wearing western, "modern" clothing instead of the Indonesian *sarong* [skirt] and *kebaja* [blouse]) had more opportunities to climb the social ladder. In addition, two juridical systems were used in the colony: European law for Europeans versus Indonesian jurisdiction, based on traditional *adat* (customs), which was valid for Indonesians and "Foreign Orientals." And although recent studies have argued that skin-tone hierarchy was less relevant than class (Bosma en Raben), it cannot be denied that one's outward appearances were an important factor in colonial society (Schulte Nordholt).

The way in which racial characteristics have played a role in the life of Indo-Europeans can probably best be illustrated by a situation where racial elements are said to be of no importance (anymore): the post-colonial Dutch society. After the end of the Second World War on August 15, 1945, Dutch and a considerable number of Indo-European inhabitants wanted to leave the former colony. This wish only intensified with the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia in December 1949. During the years 1945–1963, approximately 300,000 repatriates and migrants left the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia for the Netherlands, but they also settled in Australia, the United States, Canada, Spain and other countries[3] (Willems). In this essay, I will focus on Indo-European repatriates and migrants that have settled in the Netherlands.

Settlement in the Netherlands in the late 1940s and 1950s was difficult. After having been the imperial mother country in the colonial period, the Netherlands did not turn into a fatherland for overseas Indo-Europeans, even though they formally possessed the Dutch nationality. Dutch politicians, who before 1949 had construed Indo-Europeans as loyal, kindred and excellent Dutch people, did not accept them as citizens of Dutch society. After 1949, they were primarily regarded as aliens, whose future lay not in the Netherlands, but in Indonesia. They were discouraged from coming to the Netherlands, amongst others by the refusal of Dutch authorities to grant them allowances for the passage or to provide the necessary documents for travelling. In these political discourses of the fifties, racializing played an important part: the government construed Indo-Europeans as "rooted in the East Indies" and "oriented towards Indonesia," incapable of assimilation in the Netherlands. The same happened to the group of Moluccan migrants. Although Moluccans were allowed entrance in the Netherlands in 1952 for military and constitutional reasons on which I cannot elaborate here, the Dutch government considered their stay as strictly temporary. Facilities to find work and, for the children, to go to school were not provided in those days (Jones, Schuster). It is telling that white "repatriates" had no problems going back to "patria." They were not a target group of Dutch policy, although many of them were born and raised in the Dutch East Indies as well and therefore rooted in the East Indies too.

It was not until 1956, against the background of the further deterioration of the Indonesian-Dutch relationship due to the New Guinea-issue and the fact that Indo-Europeans were more and more excluded from Indonesian society, that the Dutch government abandoned its discouragement policy. The emphasis in political dis-courses shifted to the assimilation of Indo-Europeans into Dutch society, dispersing them over the country in order to discourage community building. This policy of assimilation and integration, delegated by the government to Christian social work, showed that Indo-Europeans were construed as permanent citizens of the Netherlands, and at the same time as "other people" who were in need of civilization *within* the national borders (Jones). Welfare workers (mostly Dutch women addressing Indo-European women) prepared their "children from the Far East" for Dutch society by providing courses on how to cook, to clean and to budget, in other words: to run a household in the new environment. Although these social workers were often genuinely concerned with the wellbeing of their clients, the downside of their profes-sional help was the normative character of it. Eating potatoes was considered as a sign of integration, while eating rice was interpreted as an "Asian attitude" (Captain, *Achter het kawat*). To achieve the goal of assimilation and integration, the first generation of Indo-European migrants had to emphasize their Dutch descent and to forget about their Indonesian heritage. The claim of assimilation and integration was so strong that many of the first generation Indo-Europeans passed this message on

to their children, most of whom were born in the Netherlands. The second generation grew up with conflicting and thus confusing messages: although the course of life and the appearances of their parents told a different story, the first generation maintained to be Dutch only and neglected the Indonesian part and past in their lives.

Fashionable but Invisible

Are we indeed on the verge of disappearing from history? After a sketch of the current position of Indo-Europeans in the Netherlands I return to post-colonial history in order to trace continuities and discontinuities in the position of Indo-Europeans.

Sixty-five years after the start of the migration from the East Indies/Indonesia, Indo-Europeanness and Indo-European identity in the Netherlands in 2010 have become fashionable.[4] The third generation of Indo-Europeans, who are in their twenties and thirties now, are considered trendsetters in terms of fashion, hairdo, music and clubbing. On a global scale we should understand their rising popularity against the background of the age of the Asian Tigers. Especially in the 1990s, an "urban Asian identity" was hot. Urban Asian, also known as Urban AzN, was the term that was used for Indo-Europeans, but also Chinese, Moluccan, Malaysian, Vietnamese and Philippine youngsters. They gathered at "InvAsian" and "Very Azian Parties" as well as "I love Indo Parties" for nightclubbing (Boersma, Iburg). In the post war period in the Netherlands, first and second generations of Indo-Europeans and Moluccans used to go their own separate ways (Van de Calseijde en De Leur, Oostindie). The label of Urban Asian identity however made a rapprochement possible between Indo-European and Moluccan youngsters of the third generation. Internet has become a very important means of communication for the third generation. There are several online communities devoted to their lifestyle. They are obviously interested in Indonesia as well as in South East Asia and its history, as can be seen in their frequent travels to the region. *Nasi Idjo* [green rice] and *Darah Ketiga* [third generation] are two Indo-European organizations targeting youngsters.

That notably the third generation and not so much the second generation Indo-Europeans could identify with various Asian identities becomes understandable if we think of the conflicting messages by the first generation, who strictly sustained the representation of Indo-Europeans as Dutch-only. Identification with Indonesia, let alone other parts of Asia, was close to impossible. The third generation, however, was not susceptible to the anxieties of their grandparents. They showed a genuine interest and pride in the Indonesian past of the first generation, turning the formerly denigrating term "Indo" into a word that they could be proud of. And, evidently, the lives of the youngest generation of Indo-Europeans had been very different from those of their parents and grandparents. Born and raised in the Netherlands, they did not suffer from the racist policies which the Dutch government had applied in the

past. Being in part Indonesian even became attractive, as it distinguished the third Indo-European generation from other Dutch persons, in an era in which such an "exotic identity" had become perfectly acceptable for Dutch society in general (Captain, "Indo rulez").

The label Indo-European has even become a recommendation. In fact, Indo-Europeanness is used to increase the sales of a product, which is especially the case in the realm of literature. Since about a decade, the word "Indo-European" (in Dutch: *Indisch*) is significantly visible in book-titles. Self-acclaimed *totok*-author Adriaan van Dis wrote the book *Indische duinen [Indo-European dunes]*, which was first published in 1994.[5] In 2001, the novella *Indische tantes [Indo-European aunts]* by Yvonne Keuls appeared. Keuls, a writer who was formerly known for her critical books about persons on the margins of society, thus made her "debut" as an Indo-European author.[7] Born in the Dutch East Indies into an Indo-European family, Keuls left for the Netherlands in the 1930s and did not articulate an Indo-European identification until 2001. Since her adoption of Indo-Europeanness, she has been successfully continuing her nostalgic and best-selling series of *Indische* books. In 2002, three more Indo-European titles appeared: the novel *Indisch zwijgen [Indo-European silence]* by Anneloes Timmerije, a volume of essays with the title *Indische gezichten [Indo-European faces]* by Alfred Birney and a music CD called *Indisch hart [Indo-European heart]* by singer-songwriter Wouter Muller. As a counterpoint, it has to be said that this successful branding of Indo-Europeanness stands in contrast with the way in which Marion Bloem, prolific author, painter and filmmaker, had to deal with her Indo-European background some fifteen years before. Although the book *Geen gewoon Indisch meisje [No ordinary Indo-European girl]* was well-received in 1983, as being written by the first author who openly identified with her Indo-European background, Bloem suffered from the racialization of her work. It made her vulnerable to the claim that she was not producing art as a contribution to "high culture," but that she was merely engaging in "community" projects in which self-help and therapeutic goals were more prominent. Negative evaluations of Bloem's work illustrate how racialized and gendered notions were intertwined. As an Indo-European *woman*, she embodied an exotic and eroticized identity to the audience and critics, which sometimes interfered with an assessment of her work based on artistic, literary and aesthetic principles. Trienekens and Bos, in this volume, write in more detail about the racialization of perceptions of art in the Netherlands.

Not only in the realm of literature, but also in cultural life, Indo-Europeanness has proven to be a strong brand. In 2005, various museums and clubs in The Hague have adopted a special program during *Indische zomer [Indo-European summer]*, a cultural manifestation lasting four months. In other words: it has become possible to acquire a piece of Indo-Europeanness: by nightclubbing, by buying books and CDs, but also by indulging in the traditional food and clothing (the famous *batik* shirt for men!).

All of these examples are ways of identifying oneself as an Indo-European or, if not being an Indo-European, stating one's affinity with this identity. It is probably fair to conclude that the "Indo Stylo" of the nineties created by the third generation, was a powerful symbol of which the second generation profited as well as a success in commercial terms.

Is it too bold to posit that being Indo-European nowadays is hot? Probably it is a bit over the top. But it is a fact that Indo-Europeanness in the present Dutch society has become desirable. Paradoxically, evidence for this can be found in current political debates about integration, which foremost problematize ethnic minorities for not sufficiently adapting to Dutch society. In these discussions, Indo-Europeans have almost been invisible. Real-life experiences of Indo-Europeans as migrants remain unmentioned. Even opinion-makers with an Indo-European background were absent from the debate – with Marion Bloem as a notable exception. In 2005, she started a campaign in response to the decision of then-minister Rita Verdonk of Integration and Immigration to expel 26,000 asylum-seekers from the Netherlands on a short notice (Van Leeuwen). The goal of her campaign with the title *Een Royaal Gebaar [A Generous Gesture]* was to persuade Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands to institute a general form of pardon for these asylum-seekers.[6] Notwithstanding this exception, it is fair to say that Indo-Europeans are most often mentioned when there is a need to exemplify them as the prime examples of successful integration—a destiny that Indo-Europeans have come to share with Surinamese Dutch lately. These two population groups from the former colonies are—arguably—considered successfully integrated, which means that they are no longer seen as "problems": we are still exotic enough, but we embody a harmless identity. Expressions of the third generation Indo-Europeans themselves are depoliticized and seem restricted to an urban lifestyle.

Note should be taken here, that we have to read Islamic (and more specifically young male Moroccan) identity being constructed as posing problems for contemporary Dutch society. Perhaps Indo-Europeans or Surinamese Dutch cannot relate to this debate. In fact, it is conspicuous that Indo-Europeans and Surinamese Dutch are not perceived as potential contributors, nor as targets of discontent in the debate on Islam in the Netherlands, for their experiences in the former Dutch colonies were closely linked with Islam. Indo-Europeans are rooted in the Dutch East Indies and Indonesia, which is comprised of the largest Muslim population of the world. And although almost all Indo-Europeans who arrived in the Netherlands were Christian, their older family members may have been Muslim, and otherwise their neighbours and friends would have been. Surinam is known as the (sometimes idealised) melting-pot where Christians, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims are living relatively peacefully together. As a matter of fact, there is no problematic representation of Indo-Europeans or Surinamese Dutch as criminal youngsters or non-integrated elderly anymore.[7] This makes Indo-Europeanness (or Surinamese Dutchness, for that

matter) an interesting racial identity for commercial exploitation, as we already have seen in the successful branding of Indo-European literature.

Indo-Europeanness has been for sale indeed, but what is the underlying meaning of the fact that buying a T-shirt enables you to let the outside world know that you are Indo-European or that you have an Indo-European affinity? Cultural critic Naomi Klein has described in her book *No logo* that a successful marketing strategy paradoxically can result in an identity crisis (Klein). Her reasoning reads as follows: if a certain identity is everywhere visible and for sale, the very essence of it will be disappearing, as it has become available to everybody. Because its specificities are vanishing, it will become invisible. Does this mean that we can, à la Naomi Klein and in accord with Hella S. Haasse, come to the conclusion that the current situation is: *No Indo*, with Indo-Europeans on the verge of extinction?

As a genuine Indo-European, I have mixed feelings about this conclusion. It makes me feel uncomfortable to think of Indo-European identity as little more than just the choice of a certain product. It would make me unhappy to see commercial and cultural entrepreneurs embrace Indo-Europeanness only as a way of making money. But the most discomforting observation to me is that the Netherlands have forgotten—or are pretending to have forgotten—that Dutch together with Indo-Europeans share a respectable sixty-five years of experience with subject matters such as multiculturalism, assimilation and integration.

What we seem to have forgotten is that the allegedly successful integration of Indo-Europeans was often one-dimensional and that it took its toll on the people who were subjected to it. It is true that Indo-Europeans have been silent about this to the outside world during the first decades after 1945, just like people generally do not spread the word about experiences of paternalistic attitudes from social workers, of discrimination when trying to find a job or housing, or about the feeling of alienation while living in the so-called motherland. "Indo-European silence" is a cliché that might have been a reality to the outside world, but it went together with outright talking and writing about their opinions within the Indo-European community in the Netherlands (Captain, *Achter het kawat*). Besides adaption, Indo-Europeans always have had their own views about and defiance of the claims of assimilation and integration. We have made our home in the Netherlands and have become fully-fledged and appreciated citizens, but not by being uncritical or docile.

I would like to argue that three generations of Indo-European Dutch have expressed their ambition not to aspire for a one-dimensional, traditionally "Dutch" identity, but instead to articulate multiple identifications and accountability (partly) beyond the present Dutch frontiers of geography, language and history. By means of analyzing their own writings and other ways of expression, I will focus on the literary and cultural representations of racial consciousness of three generations Indo-European Dutch in the post-colonial era.

The White Village

In the first two decades after the Second World War, assimilation and integration were the two key-concepts of the Dutch policy with respect to Indo-European migrants. Assimilation can be understood as the strong claim to become as Dutch as possible in order to be part of Dutch society. The implication of this is that a "non-Dutch" identity or history have to be suppressed. The implicit message of this claim is that a person is not regarded as an independent individual, but as part of a group or collective which carries certain characteristics that do not pertain to the Netherlands.

Indo-European Dutch of the first generation were subjected to this ideology. An Indo-European family who, according to the opinion of Dutch social workers, looked more assimilated because they no longer were oriented to Indonesia (read: eating potatoes instead of rice), had more chances to acquire their own housing (Von Winckelmann and Willems). In order to discipline the so-called "Eastern oriented" families who were considered problematic, shelters were established which operated according to the same principles as the Dutch historical re-education centres for those considered to be asocial, those constructed as persons "outside society." One of these centres was located in Voorthuizen and was named Het Witte Dorp, which translates as The White Village. What an irony of Dutch policy that brown people were to be sent to The White Village! The message was clear: if you remained too Indo-European, then you were considered an outsider or to be asocial.

The most outspoken critic of assimilation was writer and journalist Tjalie Robinson, alias Vincent Mahieu, two pseudonyms of Jan Boon. He was born (during a colonial leave of his parents) in the Dutch city of Nijmegen in 1919, out of a Dutch father and an Indo-European mother. Born in the Netherlands but raised in the Dutch East Indies, Robinson encountered a lot of difficulties when he wanted to migrate to the Netherlands (Tinnemans). On the basis of his literary work, comprising novels, novellas and poetry that are widely acknowledged to belong to the highlights of Dutch literature, however, it was impossible to suggest that Robinson was lacking knowledge or affinity with Dutch language or culture. Finally, he got permission to leave Indonesia and he arrived in the Netherlands in 1954.

One year later, in 1955, he wrote an article in which he analyzed his position as an Indo-European person living in the Netherlands. Under the title "Who is Tjalie Robinson?" he wrote:

> *I am a Dutch citizen because my father was one. If my father would have been an Indonesian citizen, I would have been one too. But I would have remained myself. The passport does not determine me as a person, but (sadly) determines some of my power of disposal. But the state does not possess me. I will serve the power of disposal because of my duty as a citizen, as long as my own being as a*

human is respected. As I cannot deny my human being, I am obliged to resist this
power of disposal if it will damage me. Because I do this often, I am first of all a
gerilja [guerrilla], rather than a civilian or a soldier. However, please do not take the
gerilja for the enemy, but consider him the exponent of good citizenship. (Robinson;
my translation)

In this quote, Robinson states that he will comply with the Dutch law as long as he is
respected as a human being. If his rights are threatened by the government, it is his
(civilian) duty to oppose it. This is no disloyalty—rather the contrary. It is the ultimate
proof of active involvement and participation, of being a member of Dutch society.
Thus, Robinson presents himself as a conscious Indo-European person, holder of
a Dutch passport, whose resistance and rebellion are legitimate elements of good
citizenship. His wife Lillian Ducelle commented upon Robinson's self-analysis as
"a protest":

It looked like Tjalie felt the need to protect himself against this other, this Dutch
world. A country in which he, as he wrote, could not make himself a home, but
in which he could live. I knew that at the time, he felt utterly 'out of place', not
because of the ridiculous name-calling such as 'darkies,' 'poop-chinese' and the
contract pensions, but because of the conscious hiding of the term identity.
(Ducelle; my translation)

In my words: Robinson suffered primarily from the fact that Indo-Europeans did not
articulate their double ancestry, but choose to hide their Indonesian part and high-
lighted only their Dutch descent. Robinson was a guerrilla indeed. The same year in
which he wrote this article, he founded the literary magazine *Gerilja*, which he gave
the telling subtitle *Maandblad voor Zelfbehoud [Monthly Magazine for Keeping*
Self-Esteem].

Robinson's achievements as a spokesman on behalf of the Indo-European com-
munity and a highly esteemed author are undisputed. After the short-lived magazine
Gerilja, he became co-founder of the Indo-European community magazine *Onze Brug*
[Our Bridge]. After two volumes, it was followed by the widely read magazine *Tong*
Tong, which in 1984 was renamed into *Moesson [Mansoon]*. Robinson was chief edi-
tor of these magazines until his death in 1974.[10] Robinson also founded the annual
Pasar Malam Besar (which has been renamed as Tong Tong Fair) in The Hague, up
until today still considered the most important manifestation of Indo-European cul-
ture in the Netherlands, together with Mary Brückel-Beiten. She was born in 1902 in
Bondowoso (East-Java), as a child from a German father and a Javanese mother.
Brückel-Beiten was the inventor of a culinary tradition which we have come to con-
sider "typically Indo-European," but which in fact has likewise become "typically
Dutch": the rice table (Captain, "Indië-minded").

Mary Brückel-Beiten arrived in the Netherlands in 1946, together with her *totok* husband and five children. In addition to the care for her children, she was engaged in an impressive number of time-consuming activities, such as being member of the boards of several Indo-European and non-Indo foundations and giving numerous workshops in Indo-European cooking. Brückel-Beiten explained the intensity of her activities as follows: "When I arrived here, I had the feeling I was declared fair game. I didn't belong, everything was different, the climate, the pace of life, the structure of society. I felt utterly unhappy, but I understood one thing: if I do not try to adapt myself, I am lost" (Captain, "Indië-minded" 26; my translation).

Her vision on the process of adaptation is similar to the Dutch policy of integration with the preservation of one's own identity, as has been common in the 1980s. A self-confident Brückel-Beiten already stated in 1971:

> Adapting does not mean that you deny your own existence. [. . .] I arrived in a country that was completely strange to me, I had lived forty years in the East Indies, but I did not force myself by violence. You cannot possibly repress your Indo-European characteristics, you cannot possibly throw everything away. After all, isn't it impossible to imitate a Dutch mentality? By the way, if you deny your identity, you are acknowledging that in fact, it is not worth a thing. (Captain, "Indië-minded" 27; my translation)

Just like Robinson, Brückel-Beiten is in defiance. She dismantled the myth of assimilation by pointing out that a seemingly successful integration could be no more than plain imitation. Brückel-Beiten in her own way also claimed space to remain herself as an Indo-European woman, because this identity was valuable to her. Born and raised in a society that was a mixture of a racially diverse Indonesian population, plus new and older migrants from various racial backgrounds, Brückel-Beiten knew of the do's and don'ts of mutual adaptation.

Let us now shift the focus to the second generation of Indo-Europeans. After the death of Tjalie Robinson in 1974, Ralph Boekholt became the chief editor of the magazine *Moesson*. He was born in Bandung, West-Java, in 1953. In an article published in 1980, Boekholt contradicts the assumption that Indo-European Dutch are exemplary specimens of a successfully integration. The way in which Indo-Europeans in the eighties were "picked out of assimilated oblivion" in order to serve as an example for other groups of migrants arriving after them, he sarcastically commented upon as "absolutely amusing." He wrote:

> Indo's didn't adapt fast and voluntarily. [. . .] they do have their own identity, norms and values, their own education and their own ideals. That these things always have been neglected, under-estimated and silenced is another question, but to state very opportunistically today that Indo's 'have neatly adapted

themselves' is evidence only of wishful thinking vis à vis the present and future poli-
cies with respect to minorities. (Boekholt; my translation)

As a second generation Indo-European, Boekholt showed himself to be very critical of
the Dutch government:

Holland will get the bill of colonialism, arrogance, [. . .] pedantry, stupidity and,
especially, the erosion of the historical values, standards and norms that once
gave this country such a magnetic attraction. [. . .] Every people—and to me, Indo's
are a people too—have a natural need of self-esteem. Sooner or later this
self-esteem has and will be expressed and anything that is blocking it, such as
adaptation, will have to give way, voluntarily or by force. (Boekholt 1980; my
translation)

In Boekholt, the activism and criticism which is so distinctive of the second genera-
tion Indo-Europeans is clearly visible.[9]

As mentioned, Marion Bloem was the first of the so-called second generation Indo-
European writers to make her voice heard in post-colonial Dutch literature and she
was followed by many. There were a number of important cultural manifestations as
well, of which the "Indische jongerendag" [Indo-European Day for the Youth] with the
title *"Ben je Indies?"* [Are you Indo-European?] in club Paradiso, Amsterdam, in 1984
can be considered a landmark. Three themes were discussed that day: history,
representation and "adaptation." There were keynote speakers, debates, workshops,
performances by musicians, bands and theatre-companies (Van Leeuwen 2008).

The "Indische jongerendag," in retrospect, can be interpreted as a generation-
conflict. The second generation expressed their critique of the first generation Indo-
Europeans, arguing that they had not prepared the younger generation to protect
themselves against racism and likewise that they had not taught them to develop
solidarity with other racial groups in the Netherlands. Discomfort about the alleged
easy adaptation of their parents, as well as their own interest in anti-racism origi-
nated from new developments and claims of the modern Dutch society. The multi-
racial society had extended in the Netherlands. New groups of migrants, such as
Surinamese and Antillean Dutch, had been expressing their cultural selves with "an
envy-invoking self-evidence" (Seriese; my translation). Indo-European young men and
women from the second generation were not able to articulate their specificity, as
they hardly knew about the lives of their parents and grandparents in the Dutch
East Indies and Indonesia. They were not the same as white Dutch, that much was
obvious, but they did not know why.

Because the second generation Indo-Europeans knew the price they and their
parents had paid for their alleged successful integration, many took a firm anti-racist
stand while expressing solidarity with other racial groups. With this orientation, they

are true exponents of the 1980s, which were marked by various dissident groups, such as the feminist, anti-racist, gay and squatters movement, to name but a few. In hindsight, their criticism on the first generation seems to have been unfair though. Persons such as Tjalie Robinson and Mary Brückel-Beiten were very self-confident about and proud of their racial background and were explicitly calling for not denying oneself. However, this knowledge about the first generation was not transferred to the second generation of Indo-Europeans. Who can say what would have happened if they had known their classics?

Closing Remarks

If we resume the expressions of three generations Indo-Europeans, what picture does emerge? The third generation may be described as depoliticized, with their commercial lifestyle embedded in urban culture. The second generation can be looked upon as activists, aware of racism and other forms of discrimination. The first generation is called the silent generation who has successfully assimilated and integrated, but certainly had their own opinion-leaders who eloquently expressed the quintessence of Indo-European identity and racial consciousness.

Throughout the post-colonial history in the Netherlands, Indo-Europeans have proven to be a vital community of several generations with its own complexities, subtleties and internal inconsistencies. Nonetheless, a general picture can be sketched. The first and the second generation have in common that racial consciousness has determined their way of being. On the one hand, the first generation was trying to ignore race, at least projecting themselves as such to the outside world, with the notable exceptions of people such as Tjalie Robinson and Mary Brückel-Beiten. The second generation, on the other hand, was very aware of racism and as such, racial consciousness was part and parcel of their thinking. In this sense, the burden of racist and colonial thinking of centuries still determined them. The third generation seems to feel free from this weight, in the sense that to them, racial consciousness does not automatically point to differences, but to similarities among racialized groups. To my mind, this is a conclusion that we can only be happy about. Indo-Europeans and Indo-European identity are not the same as they used to be in the Dutch East Indies. This does not mean, however, that we do not exist or that our identity is no longer important. Hella S. Haasse should have been reassured: Indo-Europeans are a thriving population-group in the present Netherlands. In the 1970s, the Indo-European magazine *Moesson* carried a motto that, in my opinion, is still valid today for all generations of Indo-Europeans: they are Loyal, Loud and Enterprising [*Trouw, Branie en Ondernemend*].

Notes

1. This article is based on two lectures by the author. Most of the material derives from "Kritische kanttekeningen voor iedereen die succesvol wil (laten) integreren. Pleidooi voor in- en uitburgeren" [Critical comments for everybody who wants to successfully integrate. Plea for settling in as well as settling out], keynote-lecture at the conference Studiedagen Indische Nederlanders VII, Pasar Malam Besar in The Hague, the Netherlands, June 2004. I also used "De Indische derde generatie. Breuken en schakels in de overdracht tussen Indische generaties" [The Indo-European third generation. Splits and links in the transfer between Indo-European generations], keynote-lecture at the conference Studiedagen Indische Nederlanders VI, Pasar Malam Besar in The Hague, the Netherlands, June 2001. I am grateful to Annette Förster for correcting my English.

2. Hella S. Haasse has received numerous literary prices for her work, amongst others the Constantijn Huygensprijs, the Annie Romeinprijs, de P.C. Hooftprijs and the Prijs der Nederlandse Letteren.

3. The symbolism of diaspora is not frequently used to describe the geographical dispersion of Indo-Europeans after the Second World War, but the term nevertheless comes to mind if we take into account that they have settled in over 80 countries, including envy-evoking and impressive countries of residence such as the Bahamas, Bermuda, El Salvador, Estonia, Mozambique, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Sri Lanka, Trinidad/Tobago, Peru, South-Korea and Iceland (Captain, "Blije" 26).

4. Identity refers to the dynamic process and outcome of attribution by the outside world of names to a certain person (ascribed identity) as well as the identification of a person by him- of herself (self-identification) (Captain and Ghorashi).

5. *Totok* is Indonesian for a European person living in the Dutch East Indies and therefore influenced by Indonesian culture and lifestyle, but not racially mixed.

6. With the name *Een Royaal Gebaar [A Generous Gesture]*, Marion Bloem was referring to the subsidies-program meant for Indo-European persons and organisations called *Het Gebaar [The Gesture]*, also called *Het Indisch Gebaar [The Indo-European Gesture]*. It was instituted as a symbolic form of compensation for the cold treatment of persons from the Dutch East Indies after the Second World War by the Dutch government. 350 million guilders were reserved for individual persons and 35 million guilders went to collective goals on behalf of the Indo-European community. It might as well be that the Dutch word for generous, "royaal," also makes a reference to the English word "royalty" as the request to make a "royaal" gesture was made to the Queen of the Netherlands.

7. Surinamese youngsters used to be criminalized in the 1970s and in the 1960s, Dutch girls were warned against the charms of Indo-European lovers.

8. Some well-known book-titles of Yvonne Keuls are: *Jan Rap en zijn maat [Jan Rap and his buddy]*, *Het verrotte leven van Floortje Bloem [The rotten life of Floortje Bloem]*.

9. Up until the present day, *Moesson* is alive and kicking, the only racially-based magazine in Europe that is thriving without financial support from the Dutch government. See also: www.moesson.com

10. There was a difficult relationship between Ralph Boekholt as the chief editor of *Moesson* and the second generation Indo-European activists (Van Leeuwen 142–44).

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"They Have Forgotten to Gas You": Post-1945 Antisemitism in the Netherlands

Evelien Gans

Introduction: The Identification of Jews and Gas

It is hard to determine how many fights took place between Jews and Gentiles in Amsterdam immediately after the Second World War. Barend de Hond, a Jewish market dealer and bricklayer, was taken to court several times because he did not tolerate people making antisemitic remarks. The man who told De Hond he hated Jews like poison ended up in the gutter with a broken jaw, not realizing that he was dealing with an amateur wrestler. Looking back during an interview, De Hond said that, after the war, antisemitism returned (Bregstein en Bloemgarten 322–23).[1] He knew, of course, that antisemitism had never disappeared—on the contrary. In the preceding years, the Nazis murdered more than 100,000 out of 140,000: 75% of all Jews living in the Netherlands—a considerably higher percentage than in any other occupied West European country (Brasz 351–52). Obviously, De Hond meant that Dutch antisemitism was back again. Actually, during the German occupation, anti-Jewish prejudice among the Dutch population had increased, a development that was recorded in the illegal press. After the liberation, prejudice burst into the open, getting a fresh impetus from the specific circumstances of Dutch after-war society (Gans, "Vandaag hebben ze niets"; Hondius, *Terugkeer*). Definitely new was the profanity "They have forgotten to gas you," the post-1945 anti-Jewish stereotype that represented Jews as being fit only to be gassed; a good Jew is a dead Jew. This exact phrase made another Dutch-Jewish survivor, the pickle conserver Emmanuel Aalsvel, attack a man who insulted him, which subsequently landed him in court, and after that, brought him to Israel (Aalsvel).

Since 1945, the remark "Ze zijn vergeten je te vergassen" [They have forgotten to gas you], has been popping up as an aggressive and vulgar antisemitic insult during escalating fights and quarrels in the streets, in the pubs, on trams and buses, between parking motorists, and in brawls on the telephone. Then, some forty years later, it went public—in a slightly different format, and in a most distinct cultural and political setting. At the end of the seventies, football hooliganism made its entry into the Netherlands. Supporters of the professional football clubs in the big cities (mainly Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag en Utrecht) fought each other, both physically and with provocative chants. In the eighties, specific slogans were directed against the Amsterdam football club Ajax: "Let's hunt the Jews" (Wij gaan op jodenjacht) and "Death to the Jews." Ajax had a Jewish imago, not so much because of its players (though some were Jewish), but mainly because of its location, supporters and popularity in the eastern part of Amsterdam, where many Jews had lived during the decennia before they were deported (Kuper, *Ajax, de joden*; Kuper, *Ajax, the Dutch, the War*). For their part, Ajax supporters turned the contemptuous title of "Jew's club" into an honorary one, crying, "We are Jews," "The Jews will be the champions," and carrying flags with the Star of David. They provoked their "enemies" by calling them "peasants," or inciting to bomb Rotterdam (a catastrophe which had befallen Rotterdam on 14 May 1940, during the German attack). The identification between "Jews" and "gas" presented itself when Ajax supporters were (and are) faced with hissing sounds, referring to gas finding its way into the gas chamber.

At the same time, a proper political element crept into the confrontations. Against the Israeli flag, carried by Ajax supporters, the backing of Feyenoord (Rotterdam's club) set Palestinian flags. From the mid-nineties on, the slogan "Hamas, Hamas, alle Joden aan het gas" (Hamas, Hamas, all the Jews to the gas) was raised at the galleries of Feyenoord and FC Utrecht. ("We gaan op jodenjacht," Kroniek). In 2003, hundreds of supporters of FC Utrecht were sent home without having watched their team play: upon their arrival at the Central Station of Amsterdam, they were yelling this same phrase. The slogan had also become popular among segments of Dutch Muslim youth, who identified themselves with the Palestinians in the so-called (occupied) territories. The football hooligans probably introduced the anti-Jewish rhyme, which the Muslim youngsters adopted—though the chemistry between the two groups is a subject for further research. In October and November 2000, in the wake of the second Intifada (the Palestinian uprising against Israel), several small and large groups of Moroccan boys and youngsters have been reported to chant the slogan, "Hamas, Hamas, alle Joden aan het gas" (CIDI Israel Nieuwsbrief). A period starts in which, in certain parts of certain Amsterdam neighborhoods, rabbis and other Jews who are recognizable as Jews, are at times being abused, molested, and sometimes physically attacked (Gans, "De strijd tegen het antisemitisme"). These manifestations proved that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict definitively had been

imported into the Netherlands, just like elsewhere in Europe. It also showed that, while the scene of the conflict may be located in the Middle East, a part of the script was composed of notions, terms and images that stemmed from the West—from Europe where the mass murder of the Jews, the Shoah or Holocaust, had taken place.[2]

In this article about the dynamics of contemporary antisemitism in The Netherlands, I focus on two after-war periods when antisemitism in the Netherlands appears to have increased. First, the years following the liberation in 1945, when Jewish survivors returned from concentration camps and hiding places. Second, the years from 2002 up to the present, when demonstrations against Israel became a social and political reality. What was the chemistry between Dutch "traditional" and post-Holocaust anti-Jewish stereotypes? How did "old" and "new" Dutch antisemitic stereotypes mingle with those circulating among immigrant, especially Muslim, communities? And what is the relationship between antisemitism, antizionism and criticism of Israel?

First, there is the question of how to define antisemitism without using it as a container for anything and everything considered offensive or objectionable concerning Jews. There is no simple answer. The most common definition "dislike of and prejudice against Jews *as Jews*" is broad, and multi-interpretable (Gans, "De almachtige jood"/"The omnipotent Jew"). There is also the possibility of making a distinction between Christian anti-Judaism and anti-Jewish feelings in general, on one side, and on the other, antisemitism. According to this approach, antisemitism is the willingness or will to act against Jews, over a longer period, in order to crush their supposed power. Keywords in this definition are: activism, the politicizing and institutionalization of anti-Jewish feelings (Levy 5). The advantage of this definition is that it brings antisemitism back where it came from: the term was coined in Germany in 1870, when antisemites called themselves antisemites openly and founded antisemitic parties. Also, Robert Chazan, author of several academic studies on medieval Jewry, makes a distinction between anti-Jewish feelings, views and hostility and (modern) antisemitism, but he is very convincing in showing that one is riddled with the other (Chazan 125).

In fact, reducing antisemitism to its political manifestation is highly restrictive with respect to a phenomenon that is extremely stratified. For the time being, the definition of historical sociologist Helen Fein still seems to be the most subtle and workable. She defines antisemitism as "a persisting, latent structure of hostile beliefs toward *Jews as a collectivity* manifested in *individuals* as attitudes, and in *culture* as myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and in *actions*—social or legal discrimination, political mobilization against the Jews, and collective or state violence—which results in and/or is designed to distance, displace or destroy Jews as Jews" (Fein 67). One way or the other, it remains of utter importance to substantiate time and again why (or why not) something or somebody should be given the label of antisemitic.

The History of Antisemitism

The history of antisemitism goes back a long way. From the genesis of Christianity, Jew-hatred has been evolving into an evolutionary, dialectical movement, partly based on a legacy from the past, partly on a new historical and social context (Chazan 135; Gans, "Antisemitisme: Evolutionair en multifunctioneel" 5). In different historical contexts, and in varying degrees, new anti-Jewish stereotypes and prejudices attached themselves to an arsenal of old ones, built up over the course of centuries: the murderer of Christ, the rich and materialistic Jew—greedy, arrogant and pushy—the cunning merchant, the coward, the traitor, the stranger and conspirator. The nineteenth century gave birth to a pseudo-scientific, racist antisemitism. Linking with other racial theories of the 19th century, this new concept of what was then, for the first time, defined as antisemitism, identified Jews with Modernity (both Capitalism and Socialism).[3] It was felt that "the Jew," the former pariah, seemed to profit from the new trends in economical, political and cultural life, which had to be conquered by non-Jews as well and to which the less fortunate fell victim—ranging from farmers to lower and higher middle class (Beller 115; Katz 320). Racist antisemitism left the Jew without the escape of conversion. Being a Jew was now considered something biological, a virus passed on from generation to generation. Subsequently, national-socialism incorporated both traditional and modern stereotypes and embraced the ideology that Jews had to be exterminated in order to save the world, the so-called redemptive-antisemitism (Friedländer 92). Not so much racist, but very effective (up to now), were the so-called *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, the 19th-century antisemitic forgery that pictures Jews as conspiring for world power. Finally, in response to the emergence of Zionism, the founding of Israel, and the Israel-Palestinian conflict, a form of anti-Zionism developed that merged with the hostile stereotype of "the (powerful) Jew" (Gans, "De almachtige jood").

Antisemitism—racist or not—was highly irrational in most ways.[4] If the accusation was that, in the press (a modern economic branch), Jews were represented in "disproportional" numbers (for example, 10% against a Jewish population of 1%), the fact that 90 % of journalists were Gentiles and that most Jewish journalists did not write as Jews, that is, motivated by specific Jewish interests, was ignored. Racist antisemitism was inspired by fear—and (goyish) envy. Hitlerism made no distinction between "good" and "bad" Jews: they should all be destroyed, be it those who were thought of as provisionally indispensable (working in the diamond industry, for example) the latest. The stereotypical Jew wears a Janus-face: he is pariah—and at the same time Satan, a parasite who doesn't accomplish productive labor—and simultaneously powerful and clever, conspiring among his own sort how to conquer the world and whom to bribe (Friedländer Part 1, 121; Part 2, 43; Gans, "Antisemitisme" 8). This double image of "the Jew" as both inferior and superior, is still present today: hating, despising or fearing the Jew and pitying, admiring or envying him (or her). The

powerful Jew, however, has more and more driven the haggler and coward to the background, attributing to the Jews a hardly concrete and physical power, but an abstract, universal, intangible and global one (Postone 93–94).

Yet, antisemitism should not be approached in an essentialist way, as a never dying, omnipresent, fixed phenomenon. The position of the Jews has been fluctuating in differing historical contexts; there have been periods and places where Jewish living conditions were relatively favourable. Nevertheless, antisemitism seems to be a light sleeper, to be roused easily, the more so because a fundamental characteristic of antisemitism is its great flexibility. In its huge reservoir of stereotypes, there are always some that "serve the purpose." They become particularly active when they can fulfill a social, political and psychological function, e.g., to avoid (political) responsibility, to create new ambitions, or to project fears and grudges. Modern antisemitism often has acted as a medium between divergent discontented groups in times of social transformation. For example, in Hitler's future biotope, Vienna, during the fin-de-siècle a declining aristocracy and lower middle class, plus the countless newcomers and outcasts of various nationalities could agree on one issue: their common dislike of the Jews: a case of so-called negative integration (Beller 115).

Antisemitism in the Netherlands before and during WW II

In the Netherlands, religious, social-economic and cultural antisemitism was, before 1936, never transformed into a program of a political party, not to mention politically institutionalized. Since 1796, when Emancipation, in the wake of the French Revolution, made the Jews full citizens on a political-juridical level, a slow, uneven but ongoing process of Jewish integration and assimilation took place. Typical of the attitude of many Dutch Jews were the two following statements from A.C. Wertheim and H. Polak respectively. Wertheim (1832–1897), a well-to do banker and philanthropist, and a high-ranking administrator of the Jewish congregation, put forward that Jews were "Israëlieten" [Israelites] in Church, but should be outside, in an undivided sense of the word: fellow citizens. H. Polak (1868–1943), the undisputed leader of the Dutch Diamond Workers Union, and a senior social-democrat, told an interviewer in 1928 that he considered himself a Dutchman among the Dutch, but also a Jew among the Jews. In reality, social distance between Jews and non-Jews diminished only very gradually. As typical as the two statements mentioned above, is the fact that, though Wertheim was chairman of the Amsterdam branch of the Liberal Party, he had to fight anti-Jewish prejudice for decades before he would become a member of Parliament. And Polak could not prevent an interviewer asking him if, because of his origins, he was not inclined to lie down under a date palm, being served meat and drink by female slaves. Though surely meant as playful and innocent, the question pinned Polak down as the lazy, lustful, oriental Other. In Western culture of the 19th century, the Jews were to a larger degree targets than (potential) perpetrators of

orientalism. The journalist who interviewed Henri Polak in 1928, twenty years before Israel was founded, showed traces of this anti-Jewish orientalism (Gans, "De kleine verschillen" 70–71; Gans, "Netherlands" 498; Kalmar and Penslar xvi). During the 1930s, under the influence of anti-Jewish policies in Nazi Germany, economic depression and the arrival of German-Jewish refugees, the image of the Jew as the Other was re-polished until it shone with a glare more striking and venomous than before. Mainly—but not only—in the Protestant and Catholic press, ambivalent feelings toward the antisemitism in the Third Reich dominated. On one hand, the systematic banishment of the Jews from German society, and anti-Jewish violence and persecution were severely denounced. But on the other hand, these newspapers stressed more than once that the German Jews had brought their misfortune upon themselves because of their unbelief and assimilation, their disproportional presence in the press and in the economic and financial world (Van Vree 310). Also in the Netherlands, Jewish overrepresentation was a delicate matter. Around 1930, Amsterdam had some 65,000 Jews, which meant nearly 60% of all Jews in Holland and almost 9% of the population of Amsterdam. In 1933, when four out of six aldermen were Jews (three of them Socialists), in Catholic circles this was condemned as "untactful," because the Jews were "a race apart." Amsterdam was an exception anyway. There were few Jews to be found in (high) political and administrative positions elsewhere; before World War II, there was only one Jewish mayor in the country (Van der Linden 290).[5]

Radical political antisemitism, however, was uncommon. Even in the party platform of the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging (NSB) [National-Socialist Movement], founded in 1931, institutionalized antisemitism was absent initially. From the beginning, however, Jews were seen as second-rate citizens, and a distinction was made between "Dutch-feeling" and "not-Dutch-feeling Jews." This cleared the way for a radicalization which was represented immediately by a virulent antisemitic segment within the party (Te Slaa and Klijn 249–56). In the beginning, Jews could become members, which they did in very small numbers. In the first elections in which it participated, in 1935, the NSB won a surprisingly high number—8% of the votes. From then on, the NSB radicalized on all points, officially embracing antisemitism in 1936. This radicalization, however, did not bring the party more votes—on the contrary. By the time of the elections of 1939, Dutch national-socialism had lost half its supporters. There is no reason to succumb to the force of negative interpretation: the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany met with much public indignation and led to organized protests such as mass meetings, attended by Jews and (mostly left-leaning) non-Jews. All the same, the Christian press gave more space to ambivalent and negative comments on Jewry and Judaism, the NSB vented its antisemitic propaganda and the Dutch government used this "latent" antisemitism as an argument to restrict Jewish immigration. In general, because of both negative and positive

"extra attention," Jews in the Netherlands were, often not intentionally, and only grad-
ually and relatively, set apart (Schöffer 86).

For the Nazis, pushing the Jews apart was deliberate policy. During the German
occupation (May 1940–May 1945), the Jews were first isolated, inch by inch, through
an endless series of anti-Jewish measures. Then, in May 1942, the deportations
began, Jews of foreign nationality being the first targets. Most Jews in "mixed"
marriages were exempted from deportation (though not from severe threats and
discrimination). The contrast between the image of Dutch tolerance and the high
number of Jewish deportees has created the notion of the "Dutch paradox" (Blom
149; Bregstein 45–47). Among the explanatory factors are: the ideologically
motivated, antisemitic SS leadership (not *Wehrmacht*) of the occupying force, the
traditionally law-abiding mentality of the majority of the Dutch population and civil
service (the Jews themselves included), the absence of both borders with non-occupied
countries and of inaccessible areas (which made escaping and hiding a very
risky enterprise), and last but not least, the paradox of the so-called pillarization
(verzuiling) of Dutch society in which several social and religious groups lived with,
but surely much more next to and apart from, each other. In other words, the Jews in
Holland might have been more integrated than elsewhere, but still less than they
(or others) thought.

After 1945: Shylock and Judas Revisited

As stated before, antisemitism increased during the war. From 1943 on, rumors
began to circulate about nervous, cowardly and stingy Jews in hiding, who acted as
though they had neither money nor properties in order to keep these for themselves,
and who denounced their hosts who thus ended up in concentration camps. In this
way, the old anti-Jewish stereotypes of Judas and Shylock adapted themselves to a
new historical context. When a stereotype—the idea that all or most people who
belong to a certain group share specific (mostly negative) qualities—becomes acti-
vated, the mechanism of collective liability lurks. It suffices for one member of the
group (or a few of them) to make a false step or commit a crime, in order to blame
the whole group. If one or some Jews in hiding behaved irresponsibly or worse, *the*
Jews in hiding or even *the* Jews ranked as traitors. More so, because this stigma
could be linked to the old, familiar image of Judas, who had sold his master for a
handful of pieces of silver (Gans, "Vandaag hebben ze niets" 316–25).

What had started as rumors, returned, after the liberation in 1945, in polemic arti-
cles in the press and in letters to the editor, with questions such as "How many Jews
didn't betray their hosts?" and comments about Jews digging up their money, driving
big cars, and capturing the best jobs. A sore subject was the position of the German
Jews who had taken refuge in the Netherlands during the thirties. The Nazis had
deprived them of their German nationality, but now, the ones who had survived, were

declared German again. Cynically enough, the Dutch authorities and a great part of the Dutch population, saw them primarily as Germans, and therefore as the enemy who should return to Germany right away. The proposal to offer them Dutch nationality met with much resistance. For that matter, even on the part of the Dutch Jews, there was much hostility toward the German Jews, based on irritation about the supposed dominance of German-Jewish immigrants before the war, and full-blown hatred because of their relatively powerful position in transit-camp Westerbork. This situation originated, however, from the fact that German Jews had been interned before the Dutch Jews. And so the most influential Jewish paper, with strong Zionist sympathies, *Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad* (*NIW*), called on its readers to practice Jewish solidarity instead of blaming German Jews as a group. The (Zionist) editorial staff was acquainted with the concept of collective liability. In the meantime, it regularly occurred that the negative image of German Jews as "German" and "strangers" mingled with the view that Dutch Jews, essentially, were strangers too, and shared, as Jews, the same bad qualities with their German counterparts, such as insolence and obtrusiveness (Gans, "Vandaag hebben ze niets" 326–31).

After the period of foreign (German) occupation, Dutch nationality and Christianity were cherished. Bordering on the image of the Jew as stranger was the accusation of Jewish ingratitude. Instead of showing evidence of their thankfulness, Jews took the support and solidarity they had experienced for granted. Moreover, according to one complainant, the Jews suggested they were entitled to extra support and pampering, pretending they had suffered so much. This can be considered a first manifestation of the envy of the ultimate victim. Conspicuously, this phenomenon had been predicted during the war, both by Jews and Gentiles. One of the Gentiles was writer and former resistance fighter Anne de Vries, who in 1946, wrote a highly negative profile of the overall Dutch attitude toward the Jews, not sparing himself either. He described, among other things, how "many of us" said how the Jews would pride themselves on their martyrdom and would jump the queue upon their return (De Vries jr 232; Gans, "De kleine verschillen" 566–77).[6] In 1994, I introduced the concept of goyish envy as a crucial component of antisemitism and ambivalent feelings toward Jews: the envy of Gentiles with regard to supposed Jewish talents, qualities and privileges (Gans, *Gojse nijd*). Goyish envy expresses itself in several categories of anti-Jewish stereotypes, but is particularly strong when it comes to the most prominent one in liberated Holland: that of social-economic nature. Practically all stereotypes emerging during and after the war include a materialistic element, as in the stingy Jew in hiding and the ungrateful Jew who did not pay off his debts. But there is also a cluster of stereotypes referring directly to the assumed Jewish social-economic position and attitude.

The stereotypes belonging to what I call, as a collective term, the Rich Jew, go back to the Middle Ages when feudal society in Europe broke down, bartering goods

became impracticable, and the emerging society was hungry for money. So was the Christian Church, which saw itself at the same time, however, forced to forbid its followers to practice banking and usury. Here the Jews offered a way out. As "unbelievers," they were exempt from Christian laws. In the same period when Jews, as a result of the Crusades, were being driven out of European trade with the East, and forbidden to own land or occupy posts in the government, they were maneuvered into the position of Europe's bankers and moneylenders. A small, privileged but vulnerable elite of "rich Jews" came into being, next to a mass of Jews who landed in the lower regions of the banking business, as pawnbrokers and the like. Also, after banking moved largely into Christian hands from the fifteenth century on, the Jew as usurer remained a firm image. Reminiscent of this is how, in a far later period, the French-Jewish banker Rothschild became *the* symbol of capitalism. Stereotypes often contain a grain of historical accuracy. However, this is forced out of its context, twisted, magnified and given a strongly negative connotation. Jews played an avant-garde role in both money dealing and modern capitalism, and it is nonsensical to deny a historical connection between money and Jews. In the same vain, labeling materialism an essentialist Jewish quality is molding historical reality into an image determined by economical and political self-interest (Gans, "Vandaag hebben ze niets" 339–50; Gans, "Gojse broodnijd" 209).

So, what role performed the image of the Rich Jew, who in reality, was mostly robbed not only of many of his family members, but also of his house, money and property? In her letter to the editor, a woman complained that she had suffered so much during the war—and still did now, because of the intolerant and selfish behavior of the remaining Jews: "If it is true that the Jews have suffered so much, why didn't they become better human beings? People who have lost all their family, still have a taste for chasing after furniture that once was theirs" (Gans, "Vandaag hebben ze niets" 342).[7] This is certainly an extreme example of antisemitism. At the same time, it is a useful passage because it highlights several motives at one time. It is an outstanding example of blaming the victim. Moreover, it represents the awkward Christian notion that suffering ennobles: the one who lost his family should not be interested in something earthy and trivial like furniture. Just as in the picture painted by Anne de Vries, the envy of the ultimate victim pops up. It is the writer and her family who are the real sufferers: victims of the so-called victims. But once and for all, it shows how one's own craving for material goods, one's own greed is projected on the Jew, the Rich Jew.

This article presents one part of the story. It should be stressed that Dutch post-war antisemitism was mainly of a social and verbal character; propositions to institutionalize restrictions on Jews in Dutch law did occur, but found hardly any political breeding ground. Besides, several public anti-Jewish accusations have been opposed, systematically and openly, by Jews and non-Jews—Zionists, socialists,

liberals, journalists and opinion leaders. The Dutch government, however, took a rather contradictory and opportunistic stand. On one hand, it played down the impact of post-war antisemitism. On the other, it used the phenomenon, just like before the war, as an instrument to argue against measures on behalf of the Jews: for example, in its stiff attitude with regard to immigration of Jews from the displaced persons camps. One could define this attitude—which also entailed the fallacy that Jews should not receive extra help, because this would be in accordance with the Nazi ideology that Jews were "different"—as a form of passive antisemitism (Essed 36; Hondius, "The Historical Background").[8] This was the period during which national unity and resistance against the Nazis was the dominant element in the Dutch public memory of World War II.

Antisemitism seems to have had two main functions in the liberated Netherlands. First, a psychological one, blaming the victim, because Jewish survivors, purely by coming back, reminded Gentiles of their own failure. But above all, antisemitism performed a social-economic function in an after-war society of scarcity and upheaval in which the population had become used to a situation were there were no Jews anymore, where the government worried about an empty treasury, and the stock exchange and life insurance companies feared bankruptcy, while Jewish survivors claimed back their money, houses, property, jobs and clients. Jews were seen as rivals with regard to material goods and attention from the Dutch authorities. Both motives, the psychological and the social-economic ones, found a solid stepping-stone in the old anti-Jewish stereotypes which are as tough as the Jews themselves (Gans, "Vandaag hebben ze niets" 353; Gans, "Gojse broodnijd" 198–200).

But, as was mentioned in the beginning of this article, the context of the liberation and the return of surviving Jews generated new stereotypes as well, such as the comment "They have forgotten to gas you." Those who uttered such a curse were, consciously or unconsciously, looking at the Jews through the eyes of the Nazis, internalizing the propaganda which had, during five years of occupation, suggested, sometimes stated openly, that a Jew was somebody (or even something) to be destroyed. Here, in 1945, lies the beginning of the verbal and mental association if not identification between the Jews and the Shoah in a perverse, that is to say, not historical and reflective but stereotypical and antisemitic way. The coupling of Jew and the Shoah manifested itself again as a Janus-faced stereotype, picturing the Jews both as (ultimate) victims of the Nazis and as Nazis themselves (Gans, "Over gaskamers" 143).

On one hand, in line with the insult in which Jews were still sent to the gas chamber, innumerable jokes arose, such as the one asking for the difference between a bun and a Jew: A bun doesn't scream in the oven (Gans, "Hamas, Hamas" 218). This genre of sick joke would gradually take over the traditional Jewish "Sam and Moos jokes" (Kuipers). On the other hand, also the equalization between victim

and perpetrator, the exchangeability between Jews and Nazis, originated after the war. The public prosecutor of Jewish descent, Mr. F. Hollander, who played a crucial part in the legal action against economic collaborators, was accused of having too harsh manners. Surprisingly so, the journalist in question added that persons in hiding, purified by anxiety and uncertainty, could be expected to turn up moved and humane. "Regrettably, one sees that many returned full of spite." Hollander was suffering from "Nazi-symptoms" (Verhey 196). Here again is an example of the notion that affliction ennobles, but also the identification between Nazi and Jew. This statement originates from 1954, but much earlier, similar comparisons were drawn— mostly in the context of Palestine, and later Israel. Soon after the liberation, the military, sometimes guerilla-like or even terrorist Zionist actions against both British troops and Arabs in Palestine had been called "Hitlerian" and "Goebelian." The Black Friar J. P. M. van der Ploeg wrote an extremely antisemitic booklet about the so-called Jewish Question in February 1940. Though he declared himself against both a theological vilification of the Jews and the racist ideology of the Nazis, he defined the Jews as a "vreemd volk" (alien people) which found itself in a serious state of decline on a religious, national and moral level. Van der Ploeg proved not to renounce racism altogether, listing negative, and indeed, racial Jewish features as noisiness, pushiness and lack of modesty. All this led to a plea for segregation of the Jewish minority and a *numerus clausus* in certain professions and appearances in the press, radio and television. Already before, but most vehemently after the founding of Israel, he manifested himself as an opponent of the Jewish state, which he saw primarily as a denial of the Christian claims to the "Holy Land" by a people that is exceptional in its rejection of religion and its "zedelijke ontaarding" [moral degeneration]. In 1949, he called Zionism not a "return" (to the Holy Land) but a "colonization connected with robbery and murder," and "a new Nazism" (Poorthuis and Salemink 477–79; 536–41). Van der Ploeg, who became Professor of Old Testament at the Catholic University of Nijmegen in 1951, certainly did not represent the Catholic majority which took up a more moderate, be it, initially, rather negative stand toward Israel (Gans, "De almachtige jood"). It would be the Shoah and Israel upon which Dutch (and not only Dutch) contemporary antisemitism would gradually focus. I will concentrate on these two characteristics in the rest of this article, jumping now, as announced before, from after-war antisemitism to 2002 when, again, an increase in antisemitism in The Netherlands was recorded.

Goyish Envy and Jewish Narcissism: The Dutch Fassbinder Affair

When more and more became known about the Nazi genocide of the Jews, antisemitism gradually became taboo, finding a counter pole in feelings of guilt and shame, and in philosemitism. During the sixties, the persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands was analyzed and presented to a broad public by (Jewish) historians

such as Jacques Presser, in his study *Ondergang. De vervolging en verdelging van het Nederlandse jodendom 1940–1945* (Ashes in the Wind. The Destruction of Dutch Jewry 1940–1945) and Loe de Jong, in his television serial *De bezetting* (The Occupation). The Shoah began to shift toward the centre of the Dutch commemoration of World War II. Just like, as a mirror image, Israel was embraced nation-wide, culminating, during the war between Israel and the Arab states Egypt, Jordan and Syria in June 1967, in an identification with Israel as David fighting Goliath (Van Vree, *In de schaduw* 57 and further; Gans, "De kleine verschillen" 842 and further). Anti-Jewish feelings, however, did not disappear into nothingness. How could they, after an age-old, self-evident, although with regard to its intensity, fluctuating existence? When, however, antisemitic incidents did occur in the sixties and seventies—and they certainly did—they were most often met by unambiguous and widely supported indignation (Bregstein).

A turn seems to have taken place in the eighties when the Shoah was becoming, more and more, the key element in the Dutch collective memory of World War II. Then the generation born after the baby boomers started to become serious participants in the public debate. Representatives of this generation raised their voices against the dominant narrative of World War II and the central position of the Holocaust. In this context, Jews were accused of monopolizing suffering. At the same time, here and there, the broad support for the state of Israel slowly began to wither away. First, under the influence of the effects of Israel's occupation policies after 1967, and then in 1982, because of its invasion of Lebanon, and the subsequent massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila in Beirut, executed by the Christian Phalangists, but under the watchful eye of the Israeli army (Leydesdorff, Mock, and van Weezel).

In 1987, advocates (mostly Gentiles) and opponents (mostly Jews) of the performance of German film director Werner Fassbinder's highly debated theatre play *Der Müll, die Stadt und der Tod* (The Dirt, the City and Death) clashed in what would develop into a national affair. Earlier, in Germany, the controversial play, written by Fassbinder in 1975, had caused fierce protests, mainly on the part of Jews and their Gentile sympathizers, and led to a sharp and profound debate on how Germany handled its Nazi past, the position of German Jews and the state of antisemitism. Performance of the play had been blocked several times and was never realized. A similar situation developed in The Netherlands (Heinink). Though Dutch of all ages interfered, the "fight on the ground" was carried on by the younger generation. An action group of Jewish youngsters "Alle Cohens aan dek" [All Cohens on deck], supported by somewhat older Jewish spokesmen, tried, verbally as well as physically, to prevent a rehearsal of the play using the argument that it was antisemitic. They appealed, among others, to its main character, who didn't have a name, but was simply referred to as the Rich Jew. The stage director (who had chosen the play as

his final examination at the Amsterdam Theater Academy) and his actors, supported by somewhat older sympathizing intellectuals, stated that, on the contrary, the play was showing the mechanisms of fascism. It presented "not a scheme of black and white, but shades in grey." Resisting the rehearsal meant obstructing freedom of speech (Gans, *Gojse nijd* 8).

In fact, at stake were two incompatible historical views and collective memories. To call the play antisemitic is highly debatable. It certainly was sloppily written, and connecting the Jewish personage to the stereotype of the Rich Jew was a delicate, even questionable thing to do. Moreover, the Jewish character, in all probability, referred to Ignatz Bubis, a Jewish survivor and a major active real estate developer in Frankfurt at the time. But the antisemitic texts in the play are expressed by the anti-semitic characters; they do not reflect the opinions of the author. In fact, Fassbinder made an interesting, though neither a very successful nor solid attempt to show a version of the Rich Jew "after Auschwitz," in its double function as both instrument of a new, social-economic development (demolition and real estate in a metropole like Frankfurt) and scapegoat. This was a Jew who can, relatively consciously or unconsciously, prosper in a society which is impregnated with guilt and will not so easily criticize the unpopular real estate developer because of his official status as a victim. This victim, however, remains at the same time, the despised outsider—all the more so because he reminds the others of a troublesome, guilt-ridden past. The threat always lurks that, ultimately, the aggression will be released against "the Jew" while those really responsible, the city administrators, keep out of range (Gans, *Gojse nijd* 38). In fact, one could conclude that Fassbinder had attempted to show the phenomenon which will be raised in the next paragraph: secondary antisemitism-resentment and envy toward the Jewish survivor who fares or seems to fare well in a guilty post-Holocaust society, profiting from its victim status and preventing a return to a normal past and present (Gans, "Ischa Meijer").[9]

That it is highly questionable to call Fassbinder's play antisemitic is not to say that the circumstances and conditions with regard to its rehearsal weren't highly prob-lematic, just as in Germany. Young Jews rebelled, in retroaction, against what they saw as the indifference or even collaboration of the Dutch population during the German occupation with regard to its Jewish compatriots. Simultaneously, they gave vent to the anger their (grand)parents had supposedly never expressed, caught as the latter were, or so they felt, in a subdued attitude. The theatre crew represented those who were fed up with what they called the dictatorship of Jewish suffering. Though they had good reason to deny that the play was anti-Jewish, they had, how-ever, not bothered to anticipate the emotions they could have known the play would stir up in Jewish circles (as it had done previously in Germany). The young and ambitious Dutch director-in-training definitely had foreseen just that. He spoke of "overgevoeligheid die aan joodse aangelegenheden kleeft als hars aan de

naaldboom" [the Jewish hypersensitivity which sticks to Jewish affairs like rosin to a coniferous tree] (Gans, *Gojse nijd* 36). According to him, one applied double standards. After having stated that, in the recent past, a population group like the (Dutch) Reformed had been offended as well, but surely would be considered to have a less emotionally charged past, he added: "Als de hoeveelheid leed het argument is—hoeveel respect ik ook heb voor dat leed—dan ben ik doodgeslagen" [If the argument is the amount of suffering—with all due respect for this suffering—I am beaten to death] (Gans, *Gojse nijd* 37). With this statement, he invented the after-Holocaust version of goyish envy—of the Jew as the ultimate victims—and the (supposed) privileges to come with it, like touching on themes a non-Jew shouldn't. Being fed up with what he saw as "the Jewish hypersensitivity"—he wanted to enforce "normalization" before everything else.

Opposite him stood those Jews who claimed to speak for all Jews, both for those who were murdered and who were alive. It was the context which made them suspicious. What drove them to action was the fury over the assumption that the Shoah had been the centre of attention long enough, and that the time for "black" and "white" was over. For their part, they felt that the recognition of their suffering, and of the failure of the Gentile population had only begun. Most of them, however, were sure of the antisemitic character of the play, without having read the text. In this respect, they looked with one eye only, not really interested in what Fassbinder had tried, however haltingly, to say. Opposite the goyish envy of their opponents stood (Jewish) narcissism—a mechanism according to which a (suppressed) minority group withdraws into a self-image which knows of two poles only: pride and suffering (Gans, *Gojse nijd* 46 and further).

Secondary Antisemitism

Secondary antisemitism is a term coined in Germany in 1961 by Peter Schönbach, a Frankfurter Schule co-worker of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Adorno himself elaborated on the concept in his lecture "Zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus heute," in which he also introduced the term "Krypto-Antisemitismus." The main thrust of both concepts was that, after "Auschwitz," the Jews embody, just by existing, the awkward, inconvenient memory of Auschwitz and of the national or European crime committed against the Jews. This led, as Adorno put it, to the ambiguous reasoning that "today one was not allowed to say anything against the Jews" (Man darf ja gegen Juden heute nichts sagen). In this way, the taboo on antisemitism functioned as an argument in favor of antisemitism: antisemitism not in spite of, but because of the Shoah. Elsewhere, it was formulated provocatively as follows: "The Germans will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz" (Schönbach 80; Adorno 115–16; Broder 125 and further). Secondary antisemitism does not relate to the Nazi past and experience itself, but to how these are recollected and handled—therefore the

term "secondary." Secondary antisemitism, indeed, was first of all referring to Germany, where it is still the subject of research and debate. Yet, the Frankfurter Schule concepts *Erinnerungsabwehr* and *Schuldabwehrantisemitismus* (antisemitism motivated by a defence of memory and denial of guilt) are mechanisms which are certainly not restricted to Germany alone (Bergmann, "Antisemitismus—eine Einführung"; Gans, "Iedereen een beetje slachtoffer").[10]

In the Netherlands also, as was shown above, during the years after the liberation, several manifestations of secondary antisemitism occurred, such as the accusations that Jews were wrongly claiming extra support, capitalizing on their grief, and other forms of blaming the victim. But though antisemitic incidents certainly did not disappear altogether, generally speaking, public opinion reacted strongly against it.

As suggested above, in the eighties, two opposite movements seem to have met, if not clashed: the ever-growing public and historiographic emphasis on the Shoah and counter voices such as those heard in the football stadiums, and though on quite another level, against the decor of Fassbinder's play. Some years before the commotion about *Der Müll, die Stadt und der Tod,* the filmmaker, columnist and self-proclaimed champion of free speech, Theo van Gogh, had begun his crusade against what he defined as the "commemoration-day industry." He became the embodiment of political incorrectness in the Netherlands. In a pamphlet written in 1984, he portrayed his (Jewish) colleague, cinematic director and writer Leon de Winter, as a Jew who marketed Jewish suffering. "Een vleugje Zyklon-B in een land dat zijn joodse ingezetenen bijna zonder een vinger uit te steken liet vermoorden, is altijd interessant. Vooral commercieel natuurlijk" [A whiff of Zyklon-B is always interesting in a country that barely lifted a finger as its Jewish inhabitants were murdered. Especially for commercial purposes] (van Gogh, "Een Messias Zonder Kruis"). The image of the Jew experiencing his vile lusts all the way to the concentration camp served to project Van Gogh's own obsessions. He toyed with the idea of a "cartoon about two copulating yellow stars in the gas chamber" and fantasized about De Winter's Treblinka love tryst (Van Gogh, *Folia*). In a society where criticizing or deriding Jews had become taboo, Van Gogh was both controversial and popular. In various circles, he was cherished as an *enfant terrible* who had the guts to make short of (self-)censorship with Jewish (and other forbidden) themes. He was alternately found guilty and acquitted of several charges of antisemitism. In 1994, when his sayings and stereotypes on Jews were put together, analyzed and called antisemitic, he suggested the author in question was, in her wet dreams, fucked by Dr. Mengele (Van Gogh, *Folia*).[11]

Probably a combination of factors—the repercussions of this last remark, the temptation of tackling a new taboo, the spirit of the age (increasing discontent in Dutch society with Muslim immigration) and the number of Moroccan and Turkish children in his son's primary school—caused him to switch focus. Halfway through the nineties, Van Gogh directed his energies increasingly toward another sensitive

subject: Islam. During the war in the former Yugoslavia, seven years before the populist politician Pim Fortuyn labelled Islam a "backward culture," Van Gogh expressed his amazement regarding the sudden outpouring of sympathy for Bosnian Muslims. "Since when does supporting that backward Islam serve our interests? [. . .] As a non-believer, I personally hope that Serbia will continue to harass our Islamic brothers for some time to come" (Van Gogh, "De Vooruitgang"). In his attacks on Dutch Muslims, Van Gogh followed the same path of provocation, sick jokes, and pornofication, as he had before toward Jews, calling them goat fornicators and pimps for the prophet. In spite of his changed focus, including sympathy for Israel, he still reserved a negative and stereotypical role for Jews. He depicted Amsterdam's (Jewish) mayor at the time, Job Cohen—in his eyes the personification of the multicultural model—as a collaborator who debased himself by meeting with Muslims and drinking tea in the mosque. Cohen was, according to Van Gogh, regarded among "Allah's butchers" as a "jood die je om een boodschap kan sturen" [a Jew you can send on an errand]. He was a "burgemeester in oorlogstijd" [a Dutch mayor appointed during the Nazi occupation] and "van nature een NSB'er" [a Dutch national-socialist by nature] (Van Gogh, "De boel"; Gans, "Over gaskamers"). After 1995, Van Gogh mobilized anti-Jewish stereotypes in a different way than he had done before. Now it was "the Jew" and "Moroccan lover" Cohen who cleared the way for "the Muslim."[12]

Though Van Gogh was by and large keen on calling his "enemies" Nazis, his favorite targets were Jews. In this respect, he had been following the same pattern as in the years after the war, creating a Janus-face of the Jew as "in the gas chamber" and as "a Nazi." In November 2004, after having directed the highly controversial film pamphlet *Submission* of the radical Islam critic Ayaan Hirsi Ali, then a liberal member of parliament, Van Gogh was brutally murdered by the Muslim extremist Mohammed Bouyeri (Gans, "Hamas, Hamas"). Soon after his violent death, the term "goat fornicator" surfaced as an addition to the Dutch language in the latest edition of the main Dutch dictionary, Van Dale (Gans, "Hamas, Hamas" 223; Gans, "Jews as Perverts").

In the meantime, the concept of "grey" in the approach to the history of World War II as an alternative for "black" and "white"—as formulated among others by the stage director of Fassbinder's play—had steadily won ground. Some time after Loe de Jong began publishing his prestigious set of studies on World War II (a sequel to his television series), several historians criticized him for monopolizing historiography with a simplified image of "good" and "evil." The historian Hans Blom, for example, stated that De Jong's oeuvre—and Dutch historiography on World War II in general—found itself under the spell of two related notions: the political-moral question of "good" and "wrong" and the perspective of collaboration and resistance. Blom argued in favor of different new research questions such as the issue of the mood and experiences among the population during the German occupation (as opposed to the elite) (Blom, *In de ban*). Blom's program generated various new and relevant

historical studies, but contained, inevitably, a potential vulgarization of historiography as well. The most extreme representative of the latter category up to now is the journalist and historian Chris van der Heijden who popularized the concept of "grey" in 2001, in his book on (the Dutch memory of) World War II, *Grijs verleden* (Grey past). In this publication—positively reviewed by Blom—Van der Heijden initiated an equalizing historiography of which the quintessence is that victim and perpetrator converge, people are at the mercy of fate, and individual freedom of choice is minimal (Van der Heijden, *Grijs verleden* 9; Blom, "Grijs verleden").

Van der Heijden's approach to the Shoah fits into the pattern of (historical) revisionism and secondary antisemitism. On one hand, he is, in a way, mystifying the Shoah, declaring it unfathomable, referring to it in terms of "that one inconceivable phenomenon." On the other, he denotes the view as to whether the Shoah constitutes the "heart of World War II" as a "template," and tries to play it down. While raising the question if "the murder of the Jews is indeed as unique as is always asserted," his only answer consists of devoting half a page to listing all mass murders and bloodbaths that have occurred in the history of mankind (Van der Heijden, *Grijs verleden* 406–07).

Exemplary are the two opening sentences of *Grijs verleden*: "First there was the war, then came the story of the war. The war was bad, but the story made the war even worse."

Thus, the suggestion is that public memory and historiography have represented the war as more extreme and terrifying than it actually was. The obvious question that arises is: for whom? Has "the story about the war" made the persecution of the Jews worse than it was?

Van der Heijden is, apart from a historian, a highly productive journalist and columnist. In one of his articles, "De oorlog is voorgoed voorbij" [The war is over for good], he announced that 9/11 meant the end of the dominant position of the Shoah in world—and Dutch memory. In this sense, both in line with the revisionist vision of the German historian Ernst Nolte (who stirred up the so-called *Historikerstreit* in Germany) and secondary antisemitism, Van der Heijden pleaded for a *Schlusstrich* (a final line) under World War II and the Shoah (Van der Heijden, "De oorlog is voorgoed voorbij"). Next to avoiding the theme of the Shoah, or relativizing it, he describes Jews in a schematic and stereotypical way. Van der Heijden is not so much interested in the (Dutch) Jews as victims, who, according to him, for the most part, submitted themselves resignedly to their deportation. He prefers focusing on Jews who were members of the so-called Joodse Raad [Jewish Council], which acted as an intermediary between the Nazis and the Jewish community (Van der Heijden, *Grijs verleden* 212 and further; 225, 230). While in *Grijs verleden,* Jews figure as meek lambs and partial collaborators, in a subsequent book, *Joodse NSB'ers* [Jewish National-Socialists], Jews are portrayed as full collaborators.

In the 1930s, a small number of Jews became members of the NSB, before the party officially included antisemitism in its program. During a couple of months in 1943, a handful of them received protection from the Dutch National-Socialist leader Anton Mussert—until they too were deported. Blowing up this case enables Van der Heijden, in his book *Joodse NSB'ers,* to underline the dual connotation that Jews can be "bastards" and NSBers "patriots." As it happens, a red thread throughout his work is the attempt to rehabilitate the Dutch national-socialists by trying to prove that their antisemitism was relatively innocent. This contradicts the sources. Though initially, Mussert agitated "only" against foreign and leftist Jews, he had internalized antisemitism firmly before the German occupation, speaking about "Jewish parasites" who would earn their "blood money on the European battlefield" and the like (Van der Heijden, *Joodse NSB'ers* 26 and further; Te Slaa and Klijn, 255–56; Gans, "Iedereen een beetje slachtoffer"; Beijen).

In a recent article, Van der Heijden quotes selectively from the autobiographical manuscript of a prominent Dutch NSB propagandist, Max Blokzijl, the first to be executed after the war. Blokzijl wrote his diary after the liberation, while in prison waiting for his verdict. Van der Heijden reproduces, without reflection, Blokzijl's own statement that he was not an antisemite. He characterizes Blokzijl's sayings about the "nationale onbetrouwbaarheid" [national unreliablility] of the Jews as a "critical attitude" toward Jews instead of identifying it as an anti-Jewish stereotype (Van der Heijden, "Die NSB" 28). He leaves out other blunt antisemitic utterances by Blokzijl such as the desirability of avoiding "een oligarchie van het joodsche grootkapitalisme" [the oligarchy of Jewish big business], and the observation that, now that the German occupation was over, it was again mainly Jewish artists who were performing in Dutch theatres and concerts halls. The press would soon also be dominated by Jews, thus Blokzijl (20–21, 28–29).[12] In Van der Heijdens publications, attempts to rehabilitate Mussert and his party (members) by playing down the weight of their antisemitic conviction, go hand in hand with eroding Jewish victimhood.

In his book *Israel: An irreparable mistake*, Van der Heijden joins the international ranks of those who simplistically condemn the establishment of Israel as a final but nonetheless tenacious spasm of colonialism. Historiography about the emergence of Israel abounds with controversies, such as whether or not colonialism was a factor. The arguments supporting this view include the support the Zionist movement received from "the great powers" and the movement's Western perspective, labelling Palestinian and other Arabs as primitive. The arguments refuting this view are that this support was capricious, that a mother country with armed forces was lacking, and that building the economy was dedicated to the ideal of a separate state. In Israel, the so-called New Historians such as Bennie Morris, Tom Segev, Ze'ev Sternhell, and Ilan Pappe, have systematically and fairly successfully challenged several Zionist myths (such as the one that said all Palestinian Arabs left voluntarily

in 1948 at the instigation of their leaders) (Silberstein). Van der Heijden, however, uses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to point to the parallels between the Second World War and the founding history of Israel: both had their "ontsporingen" [lapses], as happens when the moral functions for the benefit of politics instead of the other way around. Again, Van der Heijden is equalizing, brushing aside the fundamental differences between the Shoah and the Nakba [Catastrophe] for the Palestinians brought about by the Israeli War of Independence in 1948. Here, Van der Heijden's discourse comes to a close: the (Israeli) Jews function as perpetrators. It is hard for him to recognize that the Shoah was, historically, a major factor in the establishment of Israel. "After all," he writes, "by the time that Israel was founded, the Shoah had already happened" (Van der Heijden, *Joodse NSB'ers* 190–20, 24, 102).

Both Theo van Gogh and Chris van der Heijden felt misled by history, and publicly referred to their specific family history in relation to World War II. In 1984, Van Gogh sneered that he could "not boast deported Uncles and Aunts, Grandpas and Grandmas. Except for one executed Uncle 'Theo.'" In his youth, along with his family, he visited his uncle's grave annually. In later interviews, Van Gogh made clear that his family's involvement in the resistance had always weighed heavily on him, describing his mother as a little girl distributing ration coupons and his grandfather as bringing Jewish children to safety (Van Gogh. "Een Messias"; *Trouw,* 30 Oct. 1999). Chris van der Heijden declared on several occasions that he was "the child of parents who sided with the Nazis during World War II." As part of the group of "perpetrators with their children," he is one of those most closely involved, reading and writing about the war since he was a child (*NRC Handelsblad*, 3 Mar. 2001; *de Volkskrant* 11 Apr. 2001; van der Heijden, *Israël* 23; 104–05). Their backgrounds, opposite as they may be, are at the same time comparable because of the intrinsic intensity of their connection with the war record. Paradoxically, both men reproach(ed) others for clinging to the war unnecessarily, remaining themselves embedded in it up to their eyeballs. Though being two individuals, covering distinctly other genres, they each have (had) a significant impact on Dutch mentality and public opinion, and on the image of World War II. Van Gogh paved the way for a society in which insulting people is a right and saying what one thinks has become the norm (Dommering). Van der Heijden's equalizing concept of "grey" found its way into all kinds of, both popularizing and academic, interpretations of Dutch resistance during World War II, Dutch national socialism, the Shoah, and the position of the Jews during the German occupation and thereafter. Both are, in their own style, representatives of Dutch secondary antisemitism— though, recognizing this can reckon with much hesitation and resistance in Dutch society, academic circles included (Gans, "De strijd tegen het antisemitisme"; Gans, "It Is anti-Semitic—No, It Isn't"; Thijs 23).[13]

The most extreme form of secondary antisemitism, trivializing and denying the Holocaust was, from the outset, practiced particularly among neo-Nazis and the

extreme right. The incidental plastering of Jewish cemeteries with swastikas and similar actions of neo-Nazis and the like never stopped. But, being partly cornered as a consequence of jurisdiction against antisemitism and racism, they found, like elsewhere, a refuge on the world wide web, such as on the website of the Dutch branch of the neo-Nazi faction Stormfront (*White Pride/World Wide*). But also on mainstream Dutch internet forums such as *Fok!* anonymous chatters bring the existence of the gas chamber as an instrument of destruction up for discussion, stating these chambers were meant for delousing. "Volgens mij heb jij teveel naar Schindlers list gekeken [. . .]. De kerstman of de holohoax, geen verschil, brengen beide (voor de commerciele kapitalist en de gierige neus) geld in het laatje" [In my view, you watched Schindler's List too much . . .. Santa Claus or the holohoax, no difference, both earn the commercial kapitalist and the stingy nose some cash]. For the good listener: "nose" is here the code word for "Jew" (Fok.nl, 20 Dec. 2006).[14] The Internet is a crucial link in the chain of global dissemination of contemporary antisemitism.

The Fatal Triangle of Antisemitism, Antizionism and Criticism of Israel

The equation of "Jew" (or Israeli, or Zionist—the three are frequently indiscriminately interchanged) with "Nazi" mostly takes place when it comes to a position-finding toward Israel. Zionism is being compared with Nazism, the Star of David becomes a swastika, Sharon (Olmert, Netanyahu) is another Hitler. As mentioned before, this equalization had already taken place soon after World War II, but disappeared or went underground when antisemitism became taboo, the persecution of the Jews a central theme and Israel an enthusiastically accepted object of identification. The year 1967 was decisive in cultivating feelings of solidarity nation wide, but simultaneously it sowed the seeds of discomfort about the rising influence of Orthodox Jewry in Israel, and above all Israeli government policy toward the Palestinians in the occupied territories (Gans, "De kleine verschillen" 896–97). The Palestina Comité, founded in 1969, put, for the first time in the Netherlands, the position of the Palestinians on the map, while remaining, however, a marginal and controversial organization for quite some time. During the Jom Kippur War of 1973, the pro-Israel attitude of the Dutch government, supported by the majority of the Dutch population, led to an Arab oil boycott with The Netherlands as an exclusive target. But at the same time, many Dutch companies trading with Arab countries turned out to deliver non-Jew statements in which they guaranteed that their employees were not Jewish, that they didn't keep up connections with Israel, nor did they process Israeli products. In the end, this resulted in the creation of a government commission which prepared an amendment of the law in order to prevent this kind of antisemitic discrimination (Naftaniel, *De Arabische*; Witboek). At this same juncture, in 1979, the writer and former anarchist, Anton Constandse, said on television that the Israelis were the Nazis

of the Middle East, thus lifting the contested equation from the after-war period to the new era of the eighties (Bregstein 54).[15] I do not mean to deny that the founding of Israel in 1948 and its further development had, and still has, explicit negative characteristics. After 1948, the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians went through several phases, but up to now, Israel has remained by far the dominating party. While in so-called Third World countries, one identified with the Palestinian population, in the Western world, sympathy with Israel prevailed. Since the so-called Six-Day War in 1967 mentioned above, however, when Israel, pressed hard by the surrounding Arabic countries, overran Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian territories, which ended in a situation of structural occupation, this sympathy slowly diminished. Key moments in this process were the Palestinan First and Second Intifada [Uprising], beginning respectively in 1987 and 2000. Both population groups—Jewish Israelis and Arabic Palestinians—have been adopted, so to speak, by companions, co-religionists and sympathizers around the world. The conflict had been permanently globalized.

In a way, and on another level, the Shoah was also globalized. While the term Holocaust has become more and more a general term used (and abused) in order to name other, more recent genocides, and subsequently all kinds of violence, injustice and (mass)murder worldwide, Nazism has become the symbol of the ultimate Evil. In the case of Israel, the equalization of Zionism and Nazism is especially tempting, because if one does this, the former (ultimate) victims and perpetrators, Jews and Nazis, can be regarded to be quits (Gans, "Gojse broodnijd"). "Hitler was een aardige man vergeleken bij de joden in israel. Allemaal aan het gas die varkens en dan opvoeren aan de honden" [Hitler was a nice man compared to the Jews in Israel. All to the gas those pigs and then feed them to the dogs] (Friedmann 25). Thus, one example taken from five pages of hate mail reported to the Centre for Information and Documentation Israël (CIDI) in 2008, showed firstly that the Shoah and Israel have become the two most common points of attachment for post-1945 antisemitism. Secondly, it is one of many instances in which Israel, Jews or Zionism on one hand and Nazism on the other are being made interchangeable, on the internet and elsewhere. In December 2010, a small group of Dutch public figures (a priest who is an [art] historian as well, and three writers who have, respectively, a Reformed, a Catholic and a secular background) toured the Palestinian territories on the initiative of the humanitarian organization United Civilians for Peace. Shocked by what they saw of Israeli repression and the Palestinian plight, three of them were unable to resist the temptation to refer to "The Third Reich," "victims" turned into "executioners," "Dachau," "Endlösung" and "Nazi-Germany" (Thomése 94–95, 101–02, 104; NRC Handelsblad 22 Apr. 2011 & 25–26 June 2011).

Since its founding, Israel has been both extremely popular and loathed. It is not difficult to understand that the balance between the two has turned negative. Measured against each other are the arbitrary nature of the Palestinian suicide

attacks and the military superiority of Israel, which does not shrink from taking civilian victims and administering collective punishment, pushing the Palestinians into a corner economically and humiliating them psychologically. Since 1967, gradually, Israeli casualties have been more quickly dismissed by world opinion than the much greater number of those on the Palestinian side. The repressive, corrupt and violent character of the leading Palestinian organizations, the PLO and Hamas, pales in the shadow of Israel's arrogance and power. Moreover, with the entry of Avigdor Lieberman to the Israeli cabinet, an anti-Arab racist stand took a firm foothold within the Israeli government.

But, as the British-Jewish novelist and columnist Howard Jacobson rightly wrote: "If we do not properly describe what a thing is like and not like, we do not know what it is." Brutal as the Israeli policy of occupation is, it is "only reminiscent of the Nazis insofar as all atrocities remind us of the Nazis" (Jacobson). Jacobson's words can be read as a plea not to rank the repressive Israeli policy, implicitly or explicitly, with the antisemitic Nazi ideology and practice of systematic exclusion and extermination of Jewish men, women and children in death camps, gas chambers and mass shootings. And disastrous as the Nakba of 1948 and the violent Israeli invasion in Gaza in January 2009 (costing 1387 Palestinian lives, many of them children) are, calling them "Holocaust" is, in fact, manipulative (*Haaretz*, 9 Sept. 2009). Equalizing Nazism and Zionism, Jew and Nazi comes down to embracing a simplified formula in order to explain a world that is boundlessly confusing. It also acts as a release of a deeply rooted, troublesome emotion. For it appears that "the Jew" is also guilty of unspeakable crimes and this settles the balance—wipes out the sense of guilt, of unease and discomfort that the non-Jew feels toward the Jew. Since 1945, the West has gradually come to dominate the frame of reference defining what is "right" and "wrong"—but now the labels have changed. The ultimate victim of the Nazi—the Jew—has become the perpetrator and the Palestinian has become the Jew. Criticism of Israel, anti-Zionism (the denial of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state) and anti-semitism can function as separate issues, but they can also overlap. Intertwined, they form a "fatal triangle," just like Jew, Zionist, and Israeli (Gans, "De almachtige jood"; Gans, "Hamas, Hamas" 222).

On the afternoon of Saturday, April 13, 2002, the centre of Amsterdam was the setting for a massive pro-Palestinian and respectively anti-Israel demonstration entitled "Stop the War Against the Palestinians." The demonstration attracted much media attention because of the mass-movement character of the event and the unprecedented large number of ethnic minority demonstrators, but even more so because of the controversial quality of some of the banners and slogans. At the end of the afternoon, the demonstration got out of hand. A visibly Jewish man was beaten up. A group of Moroccan youths clashed with the police; there were nineteen arrests (Gans, "Hamas, Hamas" 214; Gans, "Over gaskamers").

On the *Marokko Community* website, the mood was euphoric, spreading the word that its people were finally making a difference. "I just got home from Amsterdam, and it was a fabulous day . . . everyone felt on top of the world. There were a lot of native Dutch people marching with us, along with people from all kinds of backgrounds." And: "The media are reporting that there were riots after a demonstration . . . but there was a demonstration with at the end a couple of small disturbances." A third participant cheered the "unity among so many cultures" but complained about "the Jewish press! Soeb7alnallah [Subhan Allah; Praise Allah!]! Now I've seen with my own eyes how they distort the facts!" (http://forums.marokko.nl/showthread .php?t=5438 13 Apr. 2002). The Amsterdam Antidiscrimination Bureau (Meldpunt Discriminatie Amsterdam) counted 75 swastikas that people had carried along. There were banners portraying Sharon with a Hitler moustache, "Israel: Nazi State," "Stop the Palestine Holocaust." Among the blatantly antisemitic variants, such as "Jews are Dogs," "Jews Out," and so forth, one appeared to be very popular: "Hamas, Hamas, all the Jews to the Gas" (Hamas, Hamas, alle joden aan het gas).

Why, of all people, do Moroccan youngsters draw parallels between Nazism and Zionism, and use such terms as "Sharon = Hitler" or "Jews and gas?" What is their connection to World War II and the Shoah? Ten thousand Moroccan soldiers fought in the French army against the Nazis; as prisoners of war, some of them were subjected to forced labour in the Netherlands, or were buried in Dutch cemeteries after having perished during the outbreak of the war in 1940. In Moroccan national history and memory, however, the colonial experience and the struggle for independence against France clearly prevail over that of the Holocaust (Obdeijn 145 and further, 210; Ribbens 75–106). Many "New Dutch," in particular those from countries with Islamic majorities, look to Arabic broadcasters and the Internet for their news and entertainment. Here, anti-Zionism and antisemitism are often paired. Holocaust denial, which used to be monopolized by the extreme right, is no exception either. But this is not the only factor. Engaging in antisemitism, paradoxically, actually points to their integration into Dutch society. Youngsters, many of whom feel connected and disconnected from two cultures [family country of origin and country of birth] and who experience anti-Muslim discrimination, may want to hit the West in its weakest and most vulnerable spot: its ingrained ideas of what is "good" and what is "bad."

This can be inferred, for instance, from the response of the Dutch branch of the Arabic European League (AEL) to the Danish Mohammed cartoons, which were perceived in the Islamic world as deeply hurtful. In one of the cartoons brought out by the AEL itself in 2006 (and again in 2009), as a response to the Danish case, it is suggested that the number of six million murdered Jews is far too high an estimate; it even goes so far as to insinuate that the Holocaust is a profitable "Jewish fabrication." But why was the ridiculing of Islam answered with a denial or trivialization of the Shoah? What does the Shoah have to do with the besmirching of Prophet Mohammed?

First of all, it is a form of integration for "New" Dutch to notice that the Jews and the (memory of the) Shoah form the soft underbelly of Europe—not in the least of The Netherlands—with its high number of deported Jews. In a paradoxical way, the West has declared its most spectacular failure sacred. It is quite feasible that the AEL reasons thus: if you befoul what we say is holy, we will take what you hold holy and drag it through the filth. Furthermore, the League makes it known that it is about time that the Jews be compelled to step down from their place in the hierarchy of suffering, relinquishing it to, for example, the Muslims in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, who find themselves the targets of discrimination by members of the non-Muslim majority: a form of racism, also called anti-Muslim hatred, or islamophobia (Gans, "De jood"). Thirdly, having been colonized in the past and being a vulnerable minority in the present are the pillars of the Dutch Moroccan position with regard to the Israeli-Palestinan conflict. Certainly since the Second Intifadah in 2000, Palestine and the Palestinians function as a projection field, as a symbol of the Western repression of Islam (Embacher 61–64). For Muslims in the West, it is both more self-evident and convenient to identify with the Palestinians (being suppressed by "the Jew") than with an underdog repressed by an Arab, an Islamic, dictatorship (Gans, "Hamas, Hamas" 223). It remains to be seen if this identification will shift in light of the so-called Arab spring, the uprisings by several population groups in the Arab world against their repressive governments, which started in Tunisia in December 2010.

Epilogue

After his brutal act, on that fateful day in November 2004, the assassin of Theo van Gogh, the Dutch Muslim extremist Mohammed Bouyeri left behind an open letter, stabbed into Van Gogh's lifeless body. The letter was addressed directly to Ayaan Hirsi Ali, but indirectly to the entire population of the Netherlands. It said that not only the renegade Muslim Hirsi Ali and the depraved West must pay, but also the Jews, who—according to the assassin—dominate Dutch politics. The same man—Job Cohen—who was made out by Van Gogh to be a National Socialist by nature was also shown no mercy in Bouyeri's view: "What do you think about the fact that Amsterdam has put into power a mayor who adheres to an ideology in which Jews must lie to non-Jews?" (De Kesel, "Tango met de Dood"). This side of the (murder) case received little media attention. It proved, however, once again, that for very diverse groups and individuals and from differing perspectives, antisemitism acts as a meaningful frame to analyze frustrating and threatening procedures in one's life, city, nation and the world at large. Put differently, antisemitism reduces the complexity of reality to a clear, unambiguous model.

Notes

1. I am emphatically using the term antisemitism without a hyphen, because nothing like Semitism ever existed. The term anti(-)Semitism was an invention or construction of confirmed antisemites who, at the end of the 19th century, transplanted the designation of semitic languages to a concept of social-political and racist Jew-hatred (Gans, "Hamas, Hamas"; Hirsh 16). I am alternately using the terms "antisemitic" and "anti-Jewish."

2. Since the American television serial *Holocaust* in the 1970s, use of the term Holocaust for the destruction of the Jews has become very popular. Holocaust, however, is derived from the Greek *holokauston* (a translation of the Hebrew word *olah),* which means *burnt offering*. There are many critics of this term (among whom is the author of this article), because it suggests that the genocide of the Jews had a religious and/or mystic connotation. Moreover, the Holocaust is used for all kinds of catastrophes and mass murders, hollowing the fact that it was meant originally to define the destruction of the Jews. Preferable is the Hebrew word *Shoah*, meaning simply *destruction*. It is not easy to hold onto this, however, because the term "Holocaust" has become utterly dominant (Gans, "The Shoah After the Shoah").

3. And some time later, modern phenomena such as avant-garde art, psycho-analysis, cinema and pornography as well.

4. For the parallels and differences between, on one hand, antisemitism, and on the other, anti-black racism and other forms of racism, see, among others, Adam; van Arkel.

5. The relatively recent discovery that the Jewish Samuel Jacob da Silva had become mayor of the village of Zwartewaal in 1924 brought an end to—also in historiography—the long fostered conviction that, before WW II, there had been no Jewish mayor at all. It must be said, however, that Da Silva and his family became Protestant in the year he was appointed burgomaster.

6. Anne de Vries regarded the article mentioned—"The hunted people" (Het opgejaagde volk)—as an action against antisemitism "to cure our people for good from that awful Jew-hatred" (om ons volk voorgoed van die vreselijke Jodenhaat te genezen).

7. The Dutch original: "Als het waar is dat de Joden zooveel geleden hebben, waarom werden het dan geen betere menschen. Menschen die al hun familie verloren hebben, hebben nu nog lust jacht te maken op meubilair wat't hunne eens was."

8. Essed speaks of *passive racism* as the complicity in racism coming from others, such as laughing at a racist joke. The same applies to antisemitism.

9. In the words of Fassbinder's person, the former Nazi Hans von Gluck: "He bleeds us dry, the Jew. Drinks our blood and makes out that we are wrong, because he is a Jew and we are to blame" (Hij zuigt ons uit, de jood. Drinkt ons bloed en maakt dat we ongelijk hebben, omdat hij jood is en wij de schuld dragen), in Fassbinder.

10. In Germany, literature on secondary antisemitism abounds. See, for example, Benz; Bergmann and Erb; Rensmann and Schoeps.

11. The author in question was myself, writing about Van Gogh in *Gojse nijd & joods narcisme*. With respect to the preoccupation with the supposed perversity and sexual otherness of the Jew, see Gilman. See also Leibovici.

12. The alliance between Jews and Muslims that is also mentioned on Dutch websites and blogs goes back to the Middle Ages (Cutler and Cutler).

13. In the meantime, on 28 October 2011, Chris van der Heijden obtained his doctorate with a highly controversial thesis *Dat nooit meer: De nasleep van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Nederland* (That never again: The aftermath of World War II in the Netherlands). For critical

reviews by historians, see Kieft, "Fouten na de oorlog" and "Dat nooit meer"; Havenaar; Hondius, "Modderige mierenhoop." For positive reviews, see Scheffer; Renders.

14. The text is a reaction from "Zaan_23" on the article "Britse Holocaust-ontkenner vrijgelaten" (British Holocaust-denier released).

15. A first version of Bregstein's article was published in *De Groene Amsterdammer* (20 April 1994); a later version in *Antisemitisme in zijn hedendaagse variaties*. Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2007. 102–32.

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Racism and "the Ungrateful Other" in the Netherlands

Halleh Ghorashi

In the June 2009 elections for the European parliament, the extreme rightist move-ment in the Netherlands, Partij voor Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV), was the big winner, and in 2010, in a unique political construction, the party became an informal participant in the government. Despite this, it is the rare voice in the Netherlands that would openly suggest that we are witnessing a growth in racist sentiments (Riemen).[1] Interviews in the media with the supporters of the PVV show that the rea-sons for their support are quite diverse, yet the anti-Islam rhetoric of the party seems to dominate. Here is a statement from one of the supporters referring to migrants: "Yes, I have had it. I understand that people take the chances we give them but we accept too much from them" (van Been 2).

A large number among the Dutch population are supportive of the harsh language used by politicians and others against Islamic migrants in the Netherlands. There seems to be resistance to use of the term *racism* to describe the clear expression of discriminatory sentiments. Instead, there are various types of reactions to recent developments. The first reaction is discomfort with the developments and leads to a kind of self-imposed ignorance (position of the innocent). The second reaction can be described as one of panic in which political and public discussions are mainly focused on the supporters of Geert Wilders, leader of the PVV. In the case of politi-cal parties, this panic has an extra edge to it: the loss of votes. This has led various parties to the partial adoption of Wilder's approach to migration and integration. The third reaction is criticism of the harsh tone used by Wilders, while showing sympathy for his supporters by focusing on the growing discomfort and insecurity among the "native" Dutch. In this chapter, I would like to show that all these reactions only touch

upon the surface of the situation and do not go deeply enough to uncover the basic assumptions underlying the developments described above. The main focus of my argument is on the Dutch approach to new migrants of (perceived) Islamic backgrounds as opposed to other categories of "migrants" who came to the Netherlands in the earlier decades, such as the Indo-Dutch and Surinamese.

The assumption underlying the reactions portrayed above is that Dutch society belongs to the native Dutch and that they have the right to feel discomfort about the growing "threat" caused by certain groups of migrants. A quite telling example is the statement of Prime Minister Mark Rutte in March 2011, after the results of the state elections, when he said, "We will make sure, ladies and gentlemen, that we give this beautiful country back to the Dutch, because this is our project."[2] Also, most of the studies on migrants presented in the media support this assumption. Take, for example, the same newspaper that reported the election results of PVV as its cover story juxtaposed with a story on "schrikbarende misdaadcijfers" (shocking crime statistics) based on data presented by professor of criminology Frank Bovenkerk. His data show that 55 percent of Moroccan-Dutch men in Rotterdam between 18 and 24 have had contact with the police at least once. He goes on to report that the chance of a repeat offence is 90 percent (van Been 4).[3]

The recent discussions on integration in the Netherlands are informed by feelings of discomfort and fear of the growing influence of migrants from Islamic countries on society.

In addition, we see increasing insistence that migrants distance themselves from "backward" elements of their own culture, which are assumed to be in contrast with Dutch culture. This is particularly true regarding gender equality and space for homosexuality. Public discussion implies that this distance will lead to cultural adaptation to Dutch society. Every reaction that acknowledges the insecure feelings of the "native Dutch" justifies the critique of migrant culture as well. Here we can observe a clear double standard: It is OK for the "native Dutch" to feel defensive and to protect their culture, but migrants are criticized for defending theirs. Migrants are seen as the ones who need to adopt or even assimilate into the new culture. Not many people would consider this asymmetric approach racist, since it is believed that the discussion is about culture and not about race (see also Schinkel on this). This begs the question of why the discussion of the culture of migrants focuses on how it needs to change, yet discussion of the culture of the "native Dutch" recognizes the reasons for a defensive attitude. This double standard has two dimensions. One, it is founded in a deeply rooted notion of the superiority of cultures. Although this idea of superiority of Dutch culture does not yet enjoy broad and open public support, it has become increasingly and openly acknowledged by certain politicians. In 2004, VVD-politician Bolkestein spoke at the Humboldt University in Germany about the advantages of embracing a Leitkultur in the Netherlands. This was part of a more

general, severe attack on "cultural relativism." Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Rita Verdonk both proposed that Dutch culture was better because of its equality and openness, as opposed to Islamic culture, which is defined as oppressive and violent. In other publications, I have elaborated specifically on gender related notions of this homogenized presentation of cultures (Ghorashi, "From Absolute"). Second, it is taken for granted that the natives of the country have the right to claim their culture, because they were here first, while the newcomers have to change their culture and assimilate into a new one. Verena Stolcke has referred to this culturist presence as "cultural fundamentalism," a term that she explains as a new form of exclusion rhetoric in the West based on a homogeneous, static, coherent, and rooted notion of culture. This time, it is not the race that needs to be protected, but the assumed historically rooted homogeneity of the nation: "racism without race" (Stolcke). In addition, a broader definition of racism (such as that of Philomena Essed, "Everyday Racism") could also provide a framework to grasp this new exclusionary rhetoric. No matter which choice is made, it seems that any reference to racism in the Dutch context elicits either an exaggerated and dismissive reaction in the public arena or complete silence.[4]

Fear or Outrage?

The spread of exclusionary rhetoric about migrants is often explained as fear of change attributed to growing diversity and insecurity in a global world believed to be heading towards a "clash of civilizations." I have followed this line of argumentation in my earlier work, as well (Ghorashi, *Paradoxen*). Fear freezes people and makes them reactive. It encourages them to protect their boundaries rather than open them up. This fear of change has been strengthened by a growth in violence in various residential areas and on the streets. Because these incidents of violence are extensively reported in the media (van Dijk, Vliegenthart) even people who have not faced any violence personally become fearful that it may happen to them in the future. In addition to the effects of negative media coverage of migrants, there have been several global and national incidents which have deepened the tensions within Dutch society. Conflicts in the Middle East along with various violent attacks, beginning with September 11, 2001, have contributed to a changing image of Muslims as dangerous representatives of an aggressive world power. The 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh corroborated that view. These changing global and domestic situations partly explain the growing tension and negativity toward Islamic migrants within Dutch society. But why do people who hate migrants—even if they hate some more than others—because they are fearful and defensive—not want to be accused of racism? Why is racism so adamantly denied in the Netherlands? To find an answer to this question, we need a different line of reasoning.

Paradoxically, it was the logic of one of the rightist opinion leaders appearing in a television interview that brought me closer to answering this question. He explained

that people like him are not afraid of the migrants, but outraged. The pundit claimed that the Dutch had done their best for different groups of migrants and had made efforts to accept them into society but that those efforts had been met with ingratitude by migrants who had taken advantage of Dutch hospitality. This illuminates the quote at the beginning of this paper in which one of the supporters of Wilders mentions that he has "had enough." The oft-heard voice in rightist discourse is that there will be no more special treatment for migrants. Migrants, they tell us, will no longer be coddled (referring to the word *knuffelen* in Dutch), as they supposedly had been in the 1980s. They see migrants as ungrateful of the tolerance and openness of Dutch society. As Essed and Nimako put it: the Dutch feel victims of their own tolerance now that ethnic minorities are so ungrateful. It is the general belief that the condition of openness and tolerance that is presumed to have existed in the 1980s did not lead to integration—read assimilation—of migrants into society. Additionally, the claim is that migrants are not doing their best to make something of their lives. They are, in fact, asking too much from society. Departing from this line of reasoning, it makes sense that none would want to hear that their arguments are racist. They see themselves as simply reclaiming their country. They are furious and they are only defending what is theirs: what's wrong with that?

In this paper, I analyze this line of argumentation in two different ways. First, I counter the assumption that migrants were coddled during the 1980s and that society has already done enough for them. Second, I analyze the grounds for the assumption that migrants should be grateful for all of the things they have received from Dutch society. By doing so, I will show that the whole notion of hospitality and coddling is connected to a categorical approach to migrants in which they have always been considered deviant from the Dutch norm and in need of special attention because of their inherent shortcomings. This approach presumes that Dutch society is a generous patron of poor, needy migrants.

In the following sections, I begin with a short description of Dutch history on migration issues. By doing so, I show that the claim of openness, generosity and tolerance toward migrants is situated within this specific history. After that, I use the work of scholars such as Harrel-Bond to explore the relationship between gift and gratitude. I end by connecting these elements in order to explain why the term racism, and scholars on critical studies of racism, have rarely been given a voice in the Netherlands.[5]

The Foundation of Migration Policy[6]

Until 1980, Dutch state policy toward new migrants (as opposed to the migrations from Dutch ex-colonies) was formed with the idea that the present migrants would one day return to their home countries. Historically, this had to do with the migration of so-called guest workers to the Netherlands at the end of the 1950s when there was a great shortage in the labor market. With the migrants' return in the back of

policymakers' minds, until 1980 policy was mainly aimed at maintaining the cultural identity of migrants rather than their integration into Dutch society. In the 1980s, the Dutch government shifted its policy regarding guest workers when it realized that migration, once viewed as temporary, had gained a more permanent character. The status of this group changed to "(im)migrant" (Lutz 99) and the focus of the policy changed toward integration. The disadvantaged position of the migrants in the Netherlands formed the main basis of the new Minority Note of 1983. The concept of "guest workers" no longer applied and the term "minority" was introduced as the official label for newcomers in the Netherlands. The Minority Note focused on creating an equal position for minorities in Dutch society. The new slogan was: "integrating while preserving one's own identity." The policymakers believed that minorities should be provided with insights, attitudes and skills to enable them to function in Dutch society.

At the end of the 1980s, this minority policy came under severe pressure. More attention had to be given to integration, with less attention to cultural background. This criticism formed the foundation of the report on *allochthonous* (non-native Dutch citizens) policy, in which the WRR (Dutch Council on Governmental Policy) advised the government in 1989 to put more emphasis on integration. In 1994, again advised by the WRR, the minority policy was replaced with an integration policy. In the report, allochthonous were again defined as "problem categories." On top of that, the focus shifted from groups that shared the same cultural background ("ethnic minorities") to individual representatives of the super category: "non-native" ("allochthonous"). The contradiction here is that the term allochthonous is not connected to any particular cultural background and hence individualizes, while categorizing at the same time. In the 1990s, the concepts of naturalization and integration were on everyone's lips, replacing the (partially) accepted notion of "preservation of own cultural background" in the two preceding decades. In 1998, the Law on the Naturalization of Newcomers came into effect. The focus on naturalization was instigated by the relatively new idea that migrants were here to stay. The mandatory character of this new law, however, gave rise to criticism, because it harkened back to forced assimilation (Entzinger).

Policymakers discussed and decided; papers and terminology were changed, yet the essence remained the same: whether people were labelled as guest workers, migrants, minorities, or allochtonous, they were, and remained, problem categories with a deviant culture. When looking at these developments around the issue of migration, we can conclude that categorical thinking, with its powerful socio-cultural and socio-economic components, has remained a crucial feature of thinking on migrant issues in the Netherlands. This means that the various policy shifts have never called into question or exposed the basic assumptions (that is, the socio-cultural and socio-economic non-conformity of migrants) underlying these policies.

"Allochtonization," Pillarization, and the Welfare State

In order to understand the present "allochtonization"—or culturalization—as a dominant discourse in Dutch society, it needs to be situated in the context of two historical phenomena: pillarization and the welfare state.

The construction of pillars—"own worlds"—along lines of religious denominations and political ideologies has long been the dominant framework for dealing with differences in the Netherlands. Studies about the pillar system are so diverse that it is impossible to include an all-encompassing overview of them in this paper. Still, a short outline is necessary for my further argumentation. Political scientist Pennings calls pillars "separated institutional complexes of religiously or ideologically motivated institutions and members, which are marked along the same boundaries in different social sectors" (21). He describes pillarization as "the process in which after 1880 Catholics, orthodox Protestants and social democrats have gradually institutionalized their mutual differences" (21). Despite the variation within the pillars, the "own worlds" concept persuaded the members that the boundaries of the pillars were clear. In addition, most social activities were organized within individual pillars. This dichotomy between "us" and "them" stems from an essentialist approach toward one's own group and that of others, something which has latently shaped the way in which new migrants have been approached in the Netherlands.

It is very likely that the habitus of pillarization continued when the new migrants came to the Netherlands, which contributed to the assumption that their cultures were entirely different from that of the Dutch. Sociologist Koopmans holds that the relationship between Dutch society and its migrants is strongly rooted in the pillarized tradition. The pillarized system, which in the early twentieth century was a successful pacifying element in the conflicts between local religious and political groups, has been reintroduced as an instrument of integration (Koopmans 166, 167). The influence of this pillarized history on migrants is most clearly witnessed in migrants from Islamic countries. Policymakers and academics considered this group to be a new kind of pillar. Here we encounter contrary processes: after the welfare state had made pillars redundant by taking on roles once held by the community, a new discourse started to grow about the creation of a new pillar in the relatively de-pillarized Netherlands. Logically it seems misplaced to think of a new pillar in a country that has struggled to prove that it is a de-pillarized society in which the emphasis is on individual autonomy against pressure by a group. In actuality, however, the influence of pillarization did not suddenly disappear due to the realization that it was no longer necessary: the effects of pillarization on various social fields continued, albeit in a less explicit form. Thus, the forms and patterns of pillarization were present and could enable, or even stimulate, the development of a new pillar. Yet, the field of tension sketched earlier shows the confusing situation that recent migrants from Islamic background faced. The habitus of pillarization translated into minority

thinking. It left—and even created—space for these migrants to preserve their own culture, especially when it was still generally assumed that they would return to their home countries. At the same time, this space for group formation on a cultural or religious basis formed a foundation of uneasiness and discomfort for the Dutch majority population. At a time when the majority was believed to be freed from the limitations and pressures of the group, there is a new group in the society which claims its rights: a group believed to be traditional in many ways. The increasing aversion to the existence of this new pillar (with predominantly traditional ideas) focused on the suppression of the individual freedom of members of the group.

Thinking in terms of pillars affects more than Islamic migrants alone. To a certain extent, it has demarcated thinking about cultural differences and ethnic boundaries. This has led to the increase of cultural contrasts that make it virtually impossible to consider the individual migrant as separate from his or her cultural or ethnic category. Categories are indispensable for providing an insight into the world, but as soon as these categories change into dichotomies, they have a limiting effect. Constructing and dealing with differences vis-à-vis migrants has been done in various ways throughout history. Consistently, however, migrants—even those with a non-Islamic background—have been considered a deviation from the Dutch standard.[7] This demonstrated that the obstinacy of the pillarized habitus has both shaped and preserved the culturalization component of categorical thinking.

Another development, which informed the deficit-component of categorical thinking, was the rise of the welfare state. The basis of this development was an increasing tendency toward the principle of equality, resulting in discontent about existing inequality. In its early stage, this dissatisfaction regarding the "unsociables"[8] went hand in hand with a tendency to isolate these groups in order to restyle them into decent citizens (Lucassen). As a result, all citizens were entitled to equal opportunities, but in some cases it was more important to first liberate them from their socially disadvantaged position. It had become the essence of the welfare state to worry about disadvantaged groups and to see to it that their disadvantaged positions were eliminated. This need caused an increase in the number of welfare organizations in the Netherlands. Apart from that, the rise of the welfare state in the Netherlands reduced the need for individuals to become part of a group in order to survive. This resulted in more space for the individual to develop and demand autonomy. Simultaneously, these developments contributed to the creation of government-dependent categories of people that needed to be helped out of a disadvantaged position. The regulating effect of striving for equality has been a growing uneasiness toward those who are considered social deficits or as a kind of lower class, as well as a fixation on reshaping this disadvantaged category (Lucassen). The often-unintended result is that even active and capable people are easily reduced to helpless creatures.[9] Moreover, striving for equality can, at times, quickly change

into uneasiness, not only about inequality but also about difference. That which is different is looked upon with distrust and is sometimes too easily placed into the "disadvantaged" category. Despite the positive effect of the welfare state on personal space and the struggle against the social divide, it has also been an important breeding ground for categorical thinking about migrants as groups that are in a socially disadvantaged position.

Clearly, this combination of deficit-thinking—stimulated by the welfare state—and the tendency toward culturalization—fuelled by the history of pillarization—have been persistent factors of categorical thinking in the Netherlands. Even if the cultural background of migrants was seen as positive in the 1980s, thinking about that background remained categorical because migrant cultures were primarily considered as something completely different, or as deviating from the standard. The paradox here, though, is that the rise of anti-migrant hostility at this moment coincides with the dismantling of the welfare state, and the rising insecurity brought about by neo-liberalist reforms.

So What Has Changed?

In the era that is now commonly called the "post-Fortuyn" period, we have seen new modes of categorical thinking arise. We see, for instance, that the emphasis on the negative consequences of cultural contrasts or culturalization has gained much greater prominence and is now much in evidence in the "Islamization" of the discourse. The Dutch public sphere is filled with a wide range of utterances from politicians and public figures showing their disgust or discomfort with Islam and Islamic migrants. Examples of this are the film *Fitna* (in 2008 with anti-Koran passages) made by Geert Wilders, then a member of parliament and an informal part of the government from 2010–2012, and the launch of the new political movement Trots Op Nederland (Proud of Netherlands) in 2007 by the former minister of integration, Rita Verdonk, who warns us against the loss of Dutch norms and values. Even the proclaimed high quality media do not hesitate to join the crowd in this tirade against Islam. Hardly a day goes by without discussion or some presentation in the Dutch media concerning Islam. But what is different now compared to previous decades, other than the increased attention to Islam in the public sphere? What has changed considerably since 2000 is a shift in tone, demanding, "We should be able to say what we think." Baukje Prins calls this period the era of "the new realism." The new realist is someone with guts; someone who dares to call a spade a spade; someone who sets himself up as the mouthpiece of the common people and then puts up a vigorous fight against the so-called left-wing, "politically correct" views of cultural relativism.

In retrospect, the culturalist statements made by Frits Bolkestein in the early 1990s can be seen as the start of the period of new realism. Pim Fortuyn took it to the next level by radicalizing new realism into a kind of hyperrealism in which "the

guts to tell the truth" became an end in itself, irrespective of the consequences (Prins). Once a scholar and publicist, Fortuyn's impact was remarkable when he was chosen as the leader of the newly established party, Leefbaar Nederland (Liveable Netherlands), and succeeded in greatly increasing the party's popularity among the Dutch. This, together with the prominence he gained in the media, shocked old-school politicians. His success with the Dutch public was greatly enhanced by the events of September 11, 2001. In the minds of many, the potential enmity of Islamic migrants that Bolkestein discussed in the 1990s changed from speculation to fact. This made it easier for Fortuyn to say things that had been implied earlier, but had never been made explicit. In a February 9, 2002 interview in *de Volkskrant*, Fortuyn used phrases such as "Islam is a backward culture" or "the real refugees do not reach Holland"––comments that unsettled the foundation of Dutch politics.

The dominance of this hyperrealism, when combined with the September 11 attacks and the assassinations of Fortuyn in 2002 and Van Gogh in 2004, has caused thinking in terms of cultural contrasts to be linked to feelings of fear and discontent. As a consequence, migrants and, hence, migrant cultures, in particular those with an Islamic background, are now viewed with aversion and mistrust. These views are being translated into policy and public debate. Ayaan Hirsi Ali deepened the gender component of this new realist discourse. Ayaan Hirsi Ali is probably one of the time's most controversial politicians. In her public appearances, she chose to be con-frontational, referring to Islam as fundamentally women-unfriendly. In the film *Submission,* she again chose a tack of confrontation by showing the verses of the Koran written on the naked body of a molested woman. Many prominent––mainly white Dutch––figures in the Netherlands supported Hirsi Ali and the media gave her fame. Primarily white mainstream feminists and middle and upper middle class white males supported Ayaan's position, calling her the pioneer of the third feminist wave in the Netherlands.

This line of approach has grown and hardened in the public sphere in the Netherlands. The dominant pattern in these debates is strongly rooted in the sup-posed superiority of European culture, which rates migrant cultures as inferior. Yet, in spite of a clear distance from past discourses, I argue that the assimilative, hard approach of new realism would never have acquired such a following if the basic assumptions of categorical thinking had not already been present in the dominant discourse on migrants. What happened, in fact, was that the hitherto silent negative feelings with respect to migrants could finally be expressed in public. In the following section, I will elaborate on the differences between the soft and hard approaches.

The Building Blocks of the Soft Approach
Since the 1970s, categorical thinking combined with an essentialist approach to cul-ture has become characteristic of public discourse in the Netherlands. Until the new

realist discourse began dominating public space, migrants were seen as groups with a completely different culture who needed to be tolerated. The main objective of the resigned regime of tolerance was pacification. The idea was to accept the fact that the other is different, but to refrain from establishing an intrinsic connection. This type of tolerance was typical of the era of pillarization. The pillars tolerated the existence of one another, but in general did not look for interaction. During pillarization, respect for the "walls" between the pillars had become more important than respect for the content of the pillars (Ghorashi, *Ways to Survive*). This form of tolerance was also applied to the so-called new Islamic pillar. People who were believed to belong to this pillar were tolerated out of custom because earlier cases had shown that this attitude would result in pacification. However, what had been successful during pillarization would not work for this new group of migrants. The problem revolved around their connection to Dutch identity, which had not been a point of discussion during the time of pillarization, but which would have to be created for the new Dutch. Tolerance without involvement and interaction could not create enough opportunities for the new migrants to establish an emotional interaction with Dutch identity, and therefore, social pacification.

Simultaneously, a different sort of tolerance was present during this period, which was based on a simplified definition of cultural-relativism. The other culture was different by definition, but all cultures were equal in principle. Departing from this idea, everything the other said or did was accepted because it was different, whereas all deviating behavior was explained as originating from this cultural otherness. At first, this approach may seem to have been a positive one, but its most noteworthy characteristics appear to be indifference and passivity. This type of multiculturalism, defined by McLaren as leftist-liberal multiculturalism, defines otherness as essential and as something interesting and exotic.[10] In that sense, this approach is an essentialist one as well, and can be defined as categorical thinking. As a result, "allochthonous" people are often extolled in practice, mainly because they are allochthonous. If migrants are largely seen as completely different, this does not result in an increasing trans-ethnic involvement and interaction, but rather in a blind spot toward the manifold possibilities and talents of migrants.

Categorical thinking (incorporating the essentialist approach toward migrant culture and the belief in their disadvantaged position) in the era of the so-called soft approach has resulted in a lack of discussion surrounding the basic assumptions concerning the role and position of migrants in Dutch society. This implies that migrants have never been approached and treated as full members of society. It has resulted in both an increase in negative feelings regarding migrants and in a weak or even non-existent emotional connection between migrants and Dutch society. This source of uneasiness and mutual misunderstanding has been a powerful breeding ground for the rise of today's hard approach. Despite strong criticism in the past with

respect to integration, the origin of "hyperrealism" is to be situated historically within the era of so-called political correctness.

Both the hard and soft approach are rooted in terms of cultural contrasts and in the conviction that migrants have shortcomings that they need to overcome. There have been shifts in tone (from soft to harsh), in focus (from socio-economic to socio-cultural), and in outlook (from optimistic to pessimistic). These shifts, however, have had little bearing on the substance of the approach to migrants, since what remained consistent in both the positive and negative approaches was the assumption that migrants are completely different from the Dutch (they have not been considered as full citizens) with particular cultural characteristics that are incompatible with Western society. Those characteristics are seen as deficits that must be countered as clearly and strongly as possible. It is this basic understanding of the position and the situation of migrants within Dutch society that informs the justification of the present outrage of the dominant group toward migrants. This attitude fits perfectly within the historically rooted categorical thinking on migration that I elaborated on earlier.

Migrants as Dependants of the State

The deficit component of the categorical approach to migrants related to the effects of the welfare state created a tacit understanding of the position of migrants in the Netherlands. It has been assumed that they need help in order to participate fully in Dutch society. This construction of categories in society that are in need of help is countered by categories of people who provide help. This kind of category construction leads to a hierarchical relationship between the giver and the receiver. It also develops a strong sense of expectation of gratitude from migrants. Those not seen to be appropriately grateful are considered manipulative. This line of argument is especially developed in refugee studies. Leading figure in the field of refugees Barbara Harrell-Bond's study of aid organizations, for example, describes some of the images related to refugees. "The documents I obtained from agencies emphasized images of helpless, starving masses who depend on agents of compassion to keep them alive" (Harrell-Bond 147). This image "of helpless refugees, desperately in need, reinforces the view that outsiders are needed to help them. [. . .] The standard image of the helpless refugee also reinforces the view of their incapability, motivating people from all walks of life to offer their services" (150). Refugees and many migrants become a category of people who are dependent on governments and organizations, and who are thus a burden on their host societies. These studies of the hierarchical foundation of providing help base their analysis on Marcel Mauss's work on gift-giving (1925). In his work, he shows that there is always a notion of reciprocity attached to any gift. He shows "that the act of giving is not simply mechanical; the gift defines the status and power relationships which exist between

the giver and the one who receives it" (Mauss in Harrell-Bond 149). Thus, even if there is no direct expectation of something in return, gratitude is always expected.

I have often experienced this sense of expectation in terms of gratitude during my life in the Netherlands. I came to the Netherlands in 1988 as an asylum seeker, but gained citizenship in 1994. Since my academic work has been on migration and integration issues, I have been an active participant in Dutch public debates since the end of 1990s. These public activities accelerated when it was announced that I would occupy the chair of Managing Diversity and Integration in 2005. Since then, I have made many public appearances on the issue both in the media and from various public podia. As a result of my somewhat critical analysis of Dutch society, on various occasions I have been confronted by complete strangers who write to tell me that I should be more grateful for the opportunities that Dutch society has given me. By saying that, these people create a hierarchical position between me as a grateful receiver of help opposed to Dutch society as the provider of that help. In addition, they also use this hierarchical condition to de-legitimize both my position as a scholar and my critical analysis of the society. Any claim on my part to be considered a full citizen and not a second class-citizen who always has to be careful about what she says because she needs to be grateful backfires. This claim can again be used as another example of what I am accused of: as ungrateful for the help I have received. There is no way out of this vicious circle as long as the assumption of help provided related to gratefulness remains intact. The migrant or any other recipient of help remains the loser.

I use this personal anecdote to show the visibility of the dominant pattern of the new negative and exclusionary rhetoric against migrants. The supporters of this hard line exclusionary rhetoric think of themselves as victims rather than aggressors. They are believed to be victims of the physical, spatial, and cultural violence of the migrants. They only defend what is theirs, goes the argument. From this line of reasoning, they will not accept being called racist because they consider themselves to be people who are of good will and intention. Dutch society has an international reputation for being generous in charity based on its available budget for development issues. They also believe themselves to have been charitable toward migrants, since it is their tax money that has been used to support the dependent groups in the society, which are mainly considered to be migrants. However, various studies show that over-subsidizing has a way of *making* people dependent where they could have been entrepreneurial and responsible for their own lives (Harrell-Bond, Ghorashi "Refugees"). Yet, this does not impact the assumptions informing the Dutch feeling of outrage when all "their" charitable efforts toward migrants remain not only unanswered in the form of gratitude, but answered in the form of growing assertiveness and violence. The only thing happening now is that they (the Dutch majority) *are not taking it anymore*. Thus, the framework through which discriminatory acts toward

migrants are justified is not defined as racist but as a natural attitude of defence. Using the term "racism" is then seen as a weapon that is used by those ungrateful, spoiled migrants and their supporters to silence their opponents.

Through this analysis I have tried to show that the categorical foundation of the discourse toward migrants in the 1980s—even that with a positive connotation—was the breeding ground for the growing negative discourse toward migrants. The culturalist approach of viewing migrants as being absolutely other in society, combined with the deficit approach of seeing migrants as dependents of the welfare state, has served as a strong foundation. In the 1980s, migrants were tolerated as absolute others because they were not seen as a threat to the state and were not assertive enough to claim equal citizenship. When the culture and religion of migrants transitioned from being viewed as not only different but also dangerous after 2001, we observe how thin the boundary has been between the charity-like positive approach and the protective negative approach toward the same migrants now. This explains why so many well-intentioned and highly educated Dutch citizens have chosen to blame migrants themselves for the dominant negative discourse in the society. The fact remains, that both in the times of positive and negative rhetoric, new Dutch citizens have always been considered absolute others in the society, to be tolerated as long as they do not pose a threat, in which case they are threatened with expulsion. What remains consistent is that migrants are responsible for the positions taken by the dominant majority. The irony here is that migrants are considered (fully) responsible for the actions of the majority, yet are not considered full participants in Dutch society. It is this justification process rooted in the historical past which allows the majority to shirk responsibility for their actions and refuse to acknowledge their exclusionary rhetoric as racist. This is exactly how majorities end up being right all the time; in addition to having numbers in their favor, they also have the means and access to the public space to provide, reinforce, and dominate the image of the other which suits them the most.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have shown the main reason for the allergy toward the concept of racism in the Netherlands. I started by showing the historical rootedness of the present harshness toward migrants. To do that, I focused on the categorical approach to migration in the 1980s as the foundation for the present Islamization of the discourse. In addition, I showed that the idea of the superiority of Dutch culture is linked to the notion of helping the needy and its connection to the idea of gratefulness. I argued that this specific attitude toward charity is connected to the basic assumptions of a welfare state and so seems to fit quite well within the thinking that categorizes migrants as people in need. The conclusion of my paper is that there is not a disruption but rather a connection between the present hard and negative rhetoric

and that of previous decades. The source of the connection is in the manner through which culture has served as an absolute category of otherness. In addition, categorical thinking within the context of the welfare state provides the foundation for the Dutch image as charitable and open: an image that justifies the present outrage against migrants as being so ungrateful. It is this process of justification linked to the self-image of the Dutch which makes it almost impossible to accept the notion of racism as part of their image. This resistance will stay intact as long as this historically rooted categorical grounding is not challenged. As long as the superiority of Dutch culture is unquestioned and unexamined as the foundation of the dominant discourse concerning migrants—even those who are second and third generation and have Dutch nationality—there can be no space to acknowledge racism in the Netherlands. Without that, the society is not able to prepare itself for the consequences of growing racism. Even more problematic in the long run is that, as long as there is no acknowledgement of racism in the Netherlands, there can be no strong movement against racism.

Notes

1. Interesting also is the controversy around the planned lecture of Von der Dunk in the province house of North Holland. The lecture was cancelled because of the link which was made between PVV and World War II: http://opinie. volkskrant.nl/artikel/show/id/8356/Het_nieuwe _taboe_op_de_oorlog, last visited 28 Apr. 2011.

2. "We gaan er gewoon voor zorgen, dames en heren, dat we dat prachtige land weer teruggeven aan de Nederlanders, want dat is ons project." http://sargasso.nl/archief/2011/03/03/rutte-dat-prachtige-land-weer-teruggeven-aan-de-nederlanders/, last visited 28 Apr. 2011.

3. For more on negative representation and criminalization of migrants in the media, see van Dijk.

4. For an example of this, see the piece by Meindert Fennema in the Dutch newspaper, *de Volkskrant*, 3 Dec. 2008 entitled, "Racisme zonder ras is gevaarlijke onzin": http:// religionresearch.org/martijn/2008/03/13/

de-volkskrant-fennema-racisme-zonder-ras-is-gevaarlijke-onzin/, last visited 27 July 2009.

5. For an extensive analysis on this, see Essed and Nimako.

6. Parts of the arguments presented in the following four paragraphs were first published in Ghorashi, *Paradoxen*.

7. For more on this see Lutz, Schuster and Willems, Cottaar and Van Aken.

8. See Rath.

9. For a specific analysis of the impact of the Dutch welfare state on refugees, see Ghorashi, "Refugees" and Hollands.

10. It is important to note that McLaren's analysis is not a critique of all forms of multiculturalism but a critique of essentialist forms of multiculturalism. He does identify a critical form of multiculturalism.

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Race, Color, and Nationalism in Aruban and Curaçaoan Political Identities

Michael Orlando Sharpe

This chapter focuses on the development and instrumentalization of race and color based Aruban and Curaçaoan nationalisms within processes of decolonization and reconstitution in the context of Dutch sovereignty and Dutch liberal democracy. I argue this instrumentalization of race and color as markers of national identity takes place within an overall framework of white supremacy. The following will describe the current political construction of the Dutch Kingdom and examine Aruban and Curaçaoan national myths of origin along with a brief history of Dutch colonialism and slavery including the 20th century relevance of oil refinement on these islands. Next, there will a discussion of the significance of the 1954 Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands or *Statuut* and the key role of Curaçao's labor unrest of 30 May 1969 or "Trinta de Mei" in the development and deployment of racially and color based Aruban and Curaçaoan nationalisms as "invented traditions" and "social engineering." The chapter will conclude with an examination of the ways in which these notions of race and racism are reified in the Netherlands today.

This discussion centers on developments around the Netherlands Antilles prior to its dissolution on 10 October 2010. Before 10/10/10, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was made up of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba. The Netherlands Antilles was a federation of the five island states of Curaçao (administrative capital), Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius, and St. Maarten. The current Dutch Kingdom consists of the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao, and St. Maarten. The smaller former Dutch Antillean islands of Bonaire, Saint Eustatius, and Saba have been fully integrated as "special municipalities" of the Netherlands (Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations; "Nederlandse Antillen opgeheven").

The Dutch Leeward islands of Aruba, population 103,484 (Central Bureau of Statistics of Aruba 1), Curaçao, 130,627, and Bonaire, 10,791, are located just off the coast of Venezuela and the Dutch Windward islands of Saint Eustatius, 2,292, Saba, 1,349, and St. Maarten (Dutch side), 30,594, are located just easterly from Puerto Rico (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles 15). As members of the Dutch Kingdom, the populations of these islands are legal Dutch nationals with Dutch/European Union passports. Hence, the total population of the Netherlands Antilles (175,653) and Aruba (103,484) in 2006 was approximately 279,137. In 1986, Aruba obtained *status aparte* from the Netherlands Antilles making it an integral self-governing part of the Dutch Kingdom, but independent of Curaçao and the Netherlands Antilles. Although Aruba was scheduled to become fully independent from the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1996, this idea was rather unpopular among its population. The notion of independence proved unpopular as people reflected on the poverty and political chaos of Suriname after its independence from the Netherlands in 1975 as well as other newly independent states in the region. Hence, Aruba remains a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Initially, the Netherlands Antilles was to be dissolved on 15 December 2008, with Curaçao and St. Maarten as separate countries similar to Aruba's *status aparte* within the Kingdom, and Bonaire, Saba, and Saint Eustatius as "special municipalities" of the Netherlands. But this was postponed and, as mentioned earlier, finally realized on 10 October 2010. In light of Aruba's secession from the Netherlands Antilles in 1986, these Dutch islands remain in a state of negotiation and flux around their dissolution and reconstitution as states and national identities, where race, ethnicity, and language are employed as claims to "authentic" national identity. Legacies of racism have played an important role in the construction of these identities. Dutch (up until more recently) is the official language with Papiamento, a Portuguese Creole combining Spanish, Dutch, English, and African influences, serving as the lingua franca of the Dutch Leeward islands of Aruba, Curaçao, and Bonaire. English functions as the vernacular of the Dutch Windward islands of St. Eustatius, St. Maarten, and Saba. These are multicultural and multiracial societies with varying degrees of historical influence from Africa, indigenous Indian Caribbean peoples, Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere.

Founding Facts and Myths

Following 19th century French observer Alexis de Tocqueville, political scientist James Hollifield (*L'Immigration;* "Immigration and Integration") has written about what he calls "national founding myths" or "national models." These "national founding myths" typically refer to essentialist narratives about the founding of the nation that are in some way supposed to be representative of the identities and values of that nation. These national founding myths can be seen in examples ranging from

French universal republicanism and the English monarchy to the American Revolution and the Japanese national myth of descendancy from the sun goddess and the enduring concept of Japanese ethnic homogeneity. Aruba's or Curaçao's are no more or less justifiable than their European or Japanese counterparts. The "national founding myths" of Aruba rely on a Euro-mestizo, light skinned, more Latino Papiamento speaking "real Aruban" rhetoric of nation that, despite recent research showing the contrary (Alofs and Merkies; Alofs), supposedly has little or nothing to do with slavery or blackness (and often excludes its own black population). This is articulated in opposition to a proudly black slave descendant "Nos bon yu di Korsow" (We the good children of Curaçao) "Curaçaoan" rhetoric of nation that refers to its "native" black slave descendant population to the exclusion of white, lighter skinned, and some foreign black descendant members of its society. The national founding myth of Aruba has to do with the island being settled by an alleged marriage of the "advanced" Europeans (Spanish and then Dutch) and noble Amer-Indians giving birth to the Papiamento speaking "real Aruban" nation in the absence of blacks or slavery. In contrast, in Curaçao, after the near elimination of the indigenous population and importation of African slaves, an oppressive and racist pigmentocracy emerged. Valiant former slaves who engaged in slave rebellions and their descendants created a "Nos bon yu di Korsow" bloodline and a Papiament<u>u</u> (note different spelling) speaking culture and island nation. This black island nation gained its own voice in the 1960s and continues to fight for that which is owed them.

Despite having the same Dutch colonizer and being in close proximity to one another (just about 117 kilometers or 73 miles), Aruba and Curaçao have related but different experiences with colonialism and slavery. As previously noted, Curaçao was a major slave depot and thus had a much larger number of slaves, Dutch and other Europeans with most of its native Indian population decimated or deported. A segmented and somewhat segregated society emerged with a black Catholic majority, white Protestants, Jews, and mixed race people in some ways positioned between blacks and whites. In contrast, although there was a brief gold rush in the 19th century, Aruba was for the most part left to itself due to the perception of less productive land. This enabled Aruba to retain more of its native Indian population, which eventually mixed with Europeans to become the Euro-mestizo Catholic majority. In 1848, the islands of the Netherlands Antilles were separated from Suriname, and Curaçao became the administrative capital with the rest of the Dutch islands as its dependencies. Much of the history of government in the Dutch Caribbean has been one of centralism and dependence (Baker 2, 13, 136). The fact of the preponderance of political decision making in the Netherlands and lack of local political enfranchisement up until World War II has been noted (Oostindie and Klinkers 61). Although Dutch racism in the Caribbean takes form in many ways including Dutch business and later Dutch administration, like the master-slave narrative in other post-colonial

Caribbean societies, Dutch racism is a key factor in Curaçaoan and Aruban political development.

Oostindie argues:

Colonialism was, of course, responsible for the entire colonial project in the Dutch Caribbean. Without Dutch colonization, there would have been no repopulation of the Dutch Caribbean, no "black Curaçao," no mestizos on Aruba, no pa'riba di brug and no pa'bao di brug neither would there have been plantations in Suriname and hence African slaves, Maroons, Asian contract workers and, consequently, perhaps, no colour differentiation and no ethnic tension. However, once these all too obvious observations have been made, more specific questions need to be asked. (Oostindie, Paradise Overseas 67*)*

Ideas and practices that have emerged from colonialism, racism, and slavery remain relevant. This is illustrated in references to the people of the Dutch Caribbean colonies as unintelligent, childlike, and obedient. In 1901, the socialist Van Kol spoke in the Dutch parliament and referred to the Dutch Antilles as a "destitute colony" and the people of the islands as "truly a kind-hearted, childlike people" (Van Hulst 98). There remains in Caribbean segmented societies a demonstrated acceptance of a "white somatic ideal" that is illustrated in the notion of color and hence social advancement though having children with someone as white as possible (Van Hulst 95). As Curaçao was a major slave transshipment port, a notion persists that any poor performance of Curaçao and/or Curaçaoans is due to the fact that they were not part of the more fit or intelligent slaves exported to other parts of the Caribbean or the Americas (Member of Lower House of Dutch Parliament). This is sometimes cast in contrast to the now more stable and more affluent Euromestizo Aruban (Member of Lower House of Dutch Parliament). Dutch colonial history and the positioning of Aruba and Curaçao in Dutch colonial mechanizations help to explain the use of race and color in Aruban and Curaçaoan nationalisms.

The Color of Oil

A key aspect of a period of Aruban and Curaçaoan economic emancipation in the 20th century and pathway to their subsequent nationalisms has to do with the capacity to refine oil for a period of time. The discovery of oil in Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela and the opening of the Panama Canal in the 1910s were the major catalysts for a period of economic success. Aruba and Curaçao's close proximity to Venezuelan oil and their legal connection to the Netherlands produced prosperity and economic emancipation. Their deep harbors, unlike the more shallow harbors closer to the Venezuelan oil fields, were conducive to receiving large oil tankers. In the 1920s, Lago Oil Company (Esso/Exxon) and Isla Oil Company (Royal Dutch Shell) began to refine Venezuelan oil and ship it from Aruba and Curaçao to world markets.

Additionally, the oil companies were concerned about the impact of the instability of several successive Venezuelan governments on the regional oil industry. This prompted the location of the oil refineries on the comparatively stable Dutch islands, which were protected by Dutch law and military. Aruba and Curaçao soon became areas of vital strategic importance. After a long period of neglect by the Netherlands, by the 1930s, Aruba and Curaçao once again became of relative importance to the Netherlands because of the wealth produced by their oil industries. Native Dutch were sent from the Netherlands to the colonies. By 1936, Dutch became the only language of instruction in the schools to both assert Dutch influence as well as prepare the children of the native Dutch for higher education in the Netherlands. The Papiamento that was spoken by the majority populations was sidelined with punishments being doled out to children speaking it on school playgrounds (Van Hulst 96).

During World War II, US owned Lago (Exxon) became a primary source of fuel and eventually the world's largest oil refinery (Baker 24). Many came to take advantage of this economic opportunity. After the opening of the oil refinery in 1919, the population of Aruba grew from 8,200 to 51,000 and that of Curaçao tripled to 102,000 in 1950 (Van Hulst 99; Kalm). Exxon and Royal Dutch Shell actively recruited foreign labor from Suriname and the Dutch and British Windward islands, many of whom were black, as well as native (white) Dutch managerial staff from the Netherlands. Some argue that this was done because locals, whether Euro-mestizo on Aruba or black on Curacao, were perceived as lazy and others contend these foreign laborers were easy to control. Lago and Isla quickly became the most important employers on these islands and wielded enormous economic and political influence. On Aruba, by agreement with the Dutch government, Lago (Exxon) had to provide its own medical facilities, recreation, and school for the children of its employees (Green, *Migrants in Aruba* 24). As the "foreign" populations grew on both islands, race and ethnicity were used against these groups to establish "authentic" claims to membership and belonging. Particularly, the various English speaking black West Indian workers from (former) British colonies including Trinidad and Tobago, British Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla, St. Vincent, etc., as well as the Dutch Windward islands that came to Aruba and Curaçao (Alofs and Merkies 57; Green, "Migrants in Aruba and Curacao" 322) in the wake of industrial modernization, were generally not taken to be native "real" Arubans nor Yu di Korsow or "Children of Curaçao", "real" Curaçaoans (Alofs and Merkies; Oostindie, *Paradise Overseas*). Curaçao, even more so than Aruba, further developed its pigmentocracies where power and status became merged with gradations of skin color. As the Dutch islands gained autonomy under the Charter, reflections of their racialized societies became part of their self-conceptualization and were projected in their national constructions, e.g., Aruba's self-promotion as a Euro-mestizo population in contrast to Curaçao "native" Afro-descended identity (Sharpe, "Globalization and Migration"). Residential and social

segregation that separated whites and nonwhites persisted in both Curaçao and Aruba. Oostindie notes the segregation of the majority "native" Curaçaoan black population from the white Dutch, Jewish, and light skinned communities and the role of the Exxon and Shell oil companies in the legitimation and continuation of these practices (Oostindie, *Paradise Overseas*). Van Hulst points to the ways in which Shell and Exxon reinforced segmentation and racism by separately housing "foreign workers," particularly non-white workers in accommodation not on par with white workers. He argues that the homes, shops, and schools of Shell and Exxon's non-white and white personnel were fenced off and guarded and "blacks and mulattos were not allowed to enter these areas." He contends social contact with local Curaçaons could ruin a career (96). Exxon and Shell recruited the foreign laborers for purely utilitarian reasons and did not foresee them being incorporated into the local society and polity. The legacies continued today serve as markers that help to define membership and belonging.

Race and Class and the Emergence of New Democracies

The 1954 Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which represents the official end of colonial relations, took effect during a period of the decline and end of oil sector expansion, which resulted in increasing unemployment in both Curaçao and Aruba. As suggested (Sharpe, "Globalization and Migration"; Sharpe, "Curaçao, 1969 Uprising"), many would argue that the majority black population of Curacao experienced its racially segregated society and the government of the white, Protestant led Democratic Party as a semi-dictatorship. This culminated in the May 30, 1969 "trinta di mei" revolt in which the Netherlands intervened militarily in Curaçao under the Charter. Although some view this as a labor revolt, others see it as a revolt against racism and oppression that ultimately resulted in Curaçao having its first black Governor Ben Leito and first Prime Minister Ernesto Petronia, and the opening of opportunity for black working class Curaçaoans and Antilleans (Van Hulst 98; Sharpe, "Curaçao, 1969 Uprising"). The events sparking the "trinta di mei," in Willemstad, the capital of Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles was the result of a labor dispute between workers and management that was couched in a racialized class hierarchy with remnants that persist today. This uprising, in which there were injuries, loss of life, and millions of dollars in property damage, was one of the manifestations of the May Movement that came to fruition in 1969 and mobilized striking workers. Wilson "Papa" Goddett and Amador Nita of the original Frente Obrero Liberashon (FOL) were active in the May Movement. This event is widely regarded as pivotal in a transition from a mostly non-black minority ruling elite to a majority black dominated sometimes anti-makamba (anti-Dutch) populist politics.

As indicated in Sharpe's "Curaçaoan 1969 Uprising," the above mentioned labor dispute was between the Curaçao Federation of Workers (CFW) and Werkspoor

Caribbean (WESCAR), the main contracting company within Royal Dutch Shell. Although the labor disputes between WESCAR and Shell are often cited as immediate reasons, there were many influences including the black power movement then being realized in the United States. The Antillean government report concerning the causes of the uprising suggests that they should be understood within the larger context. Some of the causes cited in the report include ongoing labor disputes and underlying societal disparities such as wage differentials, structural unemployment, inadequate social provisions, dissatisfaction among young intellectuals, poor police work, and premature involvement of the Dutch military (Anderson and Dynes 167). The report pointed to socioeconomic and closely related racial tensions in Curaçao society. Oostindie writes:

> The May 1969 rebellion has been interpreted as a watershed in post-Charter Curacao, before that date, so the argument runs, politics was an affair of a small, predominantly non-black local elite. May 1969, in so far as it can be seen as racial conflict, presumably set the conditions for the emancipation of the black majority both in politics and beyond. (Paradise Overseas 126)

Van Hulst notes that soon after the uprising, Papiamentu and black culture were taken much more seriously (98). Despite allegations of abuse of power, clientelism, and fraud, Fronte Obrero remains an important political player often mobilizing a nationalist anti-makamba (anti-Dutch) sentiment (Oostindie, *Paradise Overseas* 126–27).

The following will now discuss the situation in Aruba and the ways in which Aruba responded to the events in Curaçao. All sides have invoked race and color in the project of the national constructions of Aruba and Curaçao within the context of the protection of Dutch liberal democratic post-colonial sovereignty. Oostindie and Klinkers assert that Aruba had wanted separation from Curaçao and the Netherlands Antilles since at least the 1930s. While the notion of secession began with Henny Eman, Sr. in the 1930s, this was passed down to his son Shon Eman, and then his son Henny Eman, Jr. who was the leader of the Arubaanse Volkspartij (AVP) during the 1970s. Although the AVP pushed for separation, it was Betico Croes' Movemiento Electoral di Pueblo (MEP) that broke away from AVP and dominated Aruban politics during the 1970s and 1980s. Elected and unelected Aruban political elites responded to the Trinta de Mei Curaçao revolt of 1969 with suspicion and associated it with the "black power" movements of the 1960s that they perceived might endanger power interests anchored in their self-projected Euro-mestizo Aruban identity. Aruba's separation from Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles was in part predicated on the premise that it was not black and should not be dominated by the administrative centralism of black Curaçao. A notion of Aruba as different and possibly better off than Curaçao in relation to its color and racial identity was acted

upon in this. Blakely speaks to the notion of color and modernity in relation to Dutch civilization:

> *An underlying hypothesis in the present study is that the psychology of racial bias became more pronounced in the modern period because of the rise then and broad appeal of the concept of progress in Western civilization at the very same time that that civilization achieved physical domination over the rest of the world. One result was that the subjugated peoples were defined as 'backward,' and therefore inferior. The fact that most of these peoples were 'colored' encouraged the notion that there was a logical connection between this and their relative status. The obvious distinctions also provided an appealing basis of inclusion and exclusion regarding the idea of civilization.* (xviii)

This color and race distinction is still deployed today and was used in this instance to help rationalize Aruba's *status aparte.* Some would highlight the tendency of the color of political elites, e.g., prime ministers, to remain on the lighter side (Euro-Mestizo) of the color spectrum. Similar to Curaçao, it is of note that Aruban political actors will employ an anti-Makamba (anti-Dutch) disposition when politically opportune or advantageous.

Today, tourism is one of the main income sources for Aruba and Curaçao. But the kinds of tourists they seek to attract betray their different relations to histories of racism, resistance, and racial identity formation. Aruba and Curaçao sit in two different markets for overseas tourism, respectively Aruba for the United States and well off Latin Americans and Curaçao, much more, for the Netherlands and Europe. As I write this from the United States, one can observe the countless television commercials and placards in subways and other venues advertising Aruba as "One Happy Island" and as a "friendly" vacation destination. Aruba has a sizeable, multigenerational, formerly English speaking black West Indian descendant population from whom the Carnival, that serves as an annual tourist attraction, originates (Razak) as well as a more recently documented older resident African descended population (Alofs and Merkies; Alofs). Despite these facts, up until recently, the Aruban advertisements seldom depict a single person of African descent or even with dark skin. These commercials present palm trees and blonde or white American tourists and usually a "spokesperson" who in some way represents an authentic Aruban who is anything but of African descent or black. In the Netherlands, the advertisements for Caribbean holidays more often target Curaçao, and in those ads, one may observe palm trees, blonde and blue eyed tourists, a few people of African descent, and relics of the Dutch past and present in the form of the Dutch colonial architecture of the capital of Willemstad, e.g., Fort Amsterdam. Old racial hierarchies are invoked in the more recent advertisements with Wendy Van Dijk, a popular white Dutch actress, sometimes used to promote tourism to Curaçao. She portrays the character

"Lucretia" by actually putting on black face and an affected accent in the tradition of the American minstrel show. It seems "Lucretia" is supposed to attract more tourists from the Netherlands by playing on the Dutch racist stereotype of a black woman from Curaçao, i.e., uneducated, loud, rolling eyes, etc. (see "Lucretia Tour"). Hall has written about how images and language work as "systems of representation." What has been manipulated and projected as the "native" Euro-Mestizo–(mixed European and Amerindian descendants who as the majority have now come to be identified as "native") and non-black national identity of Aruba as opposed to the "native" black and, in a way more Dutch, national identity of Curaçao is illustrated in these commercials and advertisements.

For all intents and purposes, as two very small islands in very close proximity, one could see the logic of having the Dutch islands of Curaçao and Aruba as part of the same political unit with a shared political identity. Gellner argues the basic idea of nationalism is that the state and nation should be congruent. The islands of Curaçao and Aruba have many things in common. They share a Dutch colonial heritage of varying degrees of slavery and modern political and legal linkages to the Netherlands and Europe, cultural connections with Latin America and the United States, lie about 20 minutes from one another by plane, and are limited in size and capacity in terms of geography, population, and natural resources. Arubans and Curaçaoans (along with the nearby former Dutch Antillean island of Bonaire) share the distinction of being the world's only speakers of the Papiamento language. However, as previously noted, for much of their more recent histories, there has been rather intense rivalry between the smaller Aruba and the larger Curaçao as the administrative capital of the Netherlands Antilles. This inter-island rivalry over the negotiation of power, scarce resources, and the attention of the Netherlands has more recently been disguised and manipulated through the lens of racial and color identity. Green writes:

> There is no doubt that in Aruba and Curaçao both the natives and the migrants use color and ethnicity as socio-political tools to be pulled to the foreground and pushed to the background depending on the circumstances. ("Migrants in Aruba and Curaçao" 333)

Both Green ("Migrants in Aruba and Curacao" 330) and Oostindie (*Paradise Overseas* 59) write that race seems to be more important in Aruba and ethnicity and color appear to be more prominent issues of concern in Curaçao. This is consistent with the larger emphasis on "race" in the US and on "ethnicity" in Dutch public discourse (Essed). I contend, along with Essed's seminal work on black women in the Netherlands and US, that the race and color hierarchy on Aruba and Curaçao exists within a similar framework "based on the same ideology of white superiority" (248).

Constructions of Nationhood

Despite their shared language of Papiamento, only spoken by a little more than 400,000 people, these two islands have recently found new innovative ways of nationalistic differentiation by writing the Papiamento language differently. Oostindie has observed the recent phenomena of highlighting of a specifically Aruban Papiamento "that is supposedly more latino in spelling and pronunciation, against the Papiament*u* of Curaçao" (*Paradise Overseas* 130). Hobsbawm's and Gellner's respective notions of nationalism as "invented tradition" and the product of "social engineering" help us to understand these realities. Brubaker's analysis of how nationalism begins and persists with different actors advocating and legitimizing their policy preferences by linking them to definitions of the nation is instructive here. Along with the decades long desire of several Aruban political actors on the right as well as the left, it should be noted that Aruban political activist "Betico" Croes of the MEP party is normally credited "as the father of the Aruban nation" because of his realization of Aruba's *status aparte* in 1986 as well as, along with others, the more recent invention of Aruba's seal, flag, and hymn. January 25, Croes' birthday, is one of Aruba's official holidays. This is arguably indicative of Hobsbawm's notions of "the putting on of national costume" and "invented tradition" as well as Gellner's "social engineering." Hobsbawm writes about how nationalism was invoked in the once pending *status aparte* or secession of Aruba from the administrative centralism of Curaçao as the capital of the Netherlands Antilles:

> All movements seeking territorial autonomy tend to think of themselves as establishing "nations" even when this is plainly not the case; and all movements for regional, local or even sectional interests against central power and state bureaucracy will, if they possibly can, put on national costume, preferably in its ethnic-linguistic styles . . .. Aruba plans to break away from the rest of the Netherlands West Indies, because it does not like to be yoked to Curaçao. Does that make it a nation? (177–78)

These ideas of nation and nationhood are represented in the previously mentioned commercials advertising tourism and tell us a lot about how these former Dutch colonies and current self-governing parts of the Dutch Kingdom continue to project their national images in racialized terms. Alof and Merkies' work *Ken Ta Arubiano?* (Who is Aruban?) and Razak's analyses of the de facto segregation of Aruba's black West Indian descended formerly English speaking migrant communities in San Nicolas, Aruba, still referred to as "Chocolate City," speak to the racialized and color exclusion around national identity in Aruba. Oostindie notes the distinction and de facto segregation of the black descendant community of San Nicolas and the Euro-Mestizo orientation of the capital of Aruba Oranjestad in the Papiamento vernacular to denote who is an "authentic" Aruban as *"pa'bao di brug* (aan deze zijde

van de brug)" (from this side of the bridge) or "*pa'riba di brug* (aan gindse zijde) (from that side of the bridge) (*Het Paradijs Overzee: De "Nederlandse" Caraiben* 125). He points out what he notes as the once quite visible "semblance of apartheid" or de facto segregation at the "Esso Club" (for the Exxon higher managerial staff and their families) in Aruba (Oostindie, *Het Paradijs Overzee: De "Nederlandse" Caraiben* 124). These analyses summon the racial, color, and ethnic dimensions around who has a claim to authentic "real" "Arubanness" (Green, "Migrants in Aruba and Curaçao" 324). Green's "Migrants in Aruba and Curaçao" illustrates how this claim has been articulated in terms of occupational and residential segregation, linguistic differenti-ation, and discouragement to marry persons of African descent. Oostindie notes the significance of color in Curaçao in a "deeply embedded" "color class hierarchy as well as the issue of whether someone is a *landskind* (a native of the land) or Yu di Korsow (Oostindie, *Paradise Overseas* 59). These notions of "national founding myths" and claims to authenticity around race and color remind one of the discourse between the Dominican Republic and Haiti in terms of self-representation of white and indio in relation to blackness (Oostindie, "The Study of Ethnicity" 8).

Aruba's and Curaçao's more recently invented "nationhoods" or semi-nationhoods based in large part on race, color, and more recent linguistic differentiation were used to rationalize and legitimatize more autonomy within the political and legal framework of Dutch sovereignty and Dutch liberal democracy. It is of note that recent referenda on the Dutch islands indicate demands ranging from more autonomy or voice to further integration into the political and legal structure of the Netherlands but not independence from the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Oostindie, "Dependence and Autonomy" 619, 611). Arubans and Curaçaoans are aware and fearful of the fate of poverty and instability associated with Suriname's independence as well as their own higher standard of living relative to their neighbors. They want the mobility and secu-rity afforded by their Dutch/EU passports and ties to the Netherlands. It is of note that by July 2008, the Netherlands Antilles Prime Minister de Jong-Elhage was con-demning "racist violence" against Dutch from the Netherlands resident in Curaçao when "race" riots broke out over the island council agreeing to greater Dutch control over island finances in exchange for writing off Antillean debt. Aruban and Curaçaoan political elites continue to effectively negotiate the retention of their island statuses as parts of the Dutch Kingdom, with Dutch nationality and citizenship, full mobility, and Dutch development aid (Sharpe, "Globalization and Migration").

Epilogue: Racism Travels
The narratives of Aruban and Curaçaoan nationalisms around race and color began with colonialism and slavery but manifested themselves in the 20th and 21st cen-turies within the context of decolonization, the establishment and decline of the Exxon and Shell oil refineries, the impact of what was perceived by Aruban politicians

as a black power movement in Curaçao's "Trinta de Mei," and Dutch worries about unwanted international accusations of neocolonialism. These notions of nationalism or semi-nationalisms interactively travel to the Netherlands, are reconstituted and return migrate to the islands. Ironically, in the 2000s, there has been a more recent influx of native Dutch on both islands that has resulted in partially separate native Dutch communities that have added to a long tradition of de facto racial and class segregation in Curaçao that is less visible in Aruba. Sara Vos and Sander Snoep attempt to speak to this ongoing situation in their 2010 documentary film *Curaçao*. The colonial and post-colonial struggle around recognition for Arubans and Curaçaoans and other post-colonial peoples continues with power differentials being manipulated in association with race, color, and ethnicity within the Dutch liberal democratic context.

The unprecedented 2002 expression of deep regret and sorrow, by Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, for the fates of the Antillean and Surinamese victims of the transatlantic slave trade with the inauguration of the national slavery monument in Oosterpark, Amsterdam, encapsulates the Netherlands' historical relationship with its overseas territories. Additionally, it says much about the current immigration discourse with the former and current descendants of its colonial Caribbean possessions now residing in the Netherlands ("Dit is Onze Bevrijdingsdag" 1, 5). The irony is that the Queen's gesture would normally be witnessed by hundreds if not thousands but, probably fearing the potential for civil unrest or violence before the Queen, only a select few were allowed into this historic event and venue prompting demands from Antillean and Surinamese bystanders chanting in the Dutch language, "Wij willen naar binnen!" or "We want in." This illustrates the past and contemporary dynamics around colonial history, slavery, race, class, voice, inclusion and exclusion in all parts of the former and current Dutch Kingdom.

By 2009, there were some 134,744 Antilleans and Arubans living in the Netherlands, making them one of the main ethnic minority groups after the Surinamese (338,678), Turks (378,330), and Moroccans (341,538) (Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, Voorburg/Heerlen). Grosfoguel argues that colonial histories preceding colonial migration reproduce a "coloniality of power" in the metropoles or the reproduction of old racial and ethnic hierarchies. He contends the existence of a "new racism" or "cultural racism" where the metropolitan culture views the "ethnic minorities" difficulties in integrating with the dominant society as a problem of their own beliefs or cultural habits (Grosfoguel 196, 190). Notions of race and coloniality are now being reconstructed in the Netherlands where, despite their Dutch citizenship and Dutch nationality, Curaçaoans and Arubans are perceived as foreigners or "foreigners with a Dutch passport" (Van Niekerk, "Paradoxes in Paradise"; Van Niekerk, *Premigration Legacies*). It is of note that Dutch elementary school books mention Suriname but there is little attention paid to the Dutch Antilles and Aruba.

Curaçaoans and Arubans are sometimes blamed for poor Dutch (some contend a consequence of the Dutch themselves pushing for Papiamento in the event of the long term goal of independence). Curaçaoan and Aruban youth are sometimes maligned in the Dutch media through an association with anti-social behavior, criminality, teen pregnancy, violence, etc. The high visibility of Antillean youth in criminality and other statistics is added proof of their marginalized position. In 2005, the Dutch political party D66 helped to draft legislation with the former right leaning anti-immigrant Minister Rita Verdonk, former Minister for Immigration and Integration, of the VVD to have troubled, specifically Antillean and Aruban youth, who either committed a crime or were not employed within a few months, deported to their home islands. This was eventually found to be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and not to be feasible because of the Dutch nationality and citizenship of Antilleans and Arubans. However, these efforts reflect a general sentiment of some powerful voices within the Netherlands.

Since the early 2000s, a program has been developed under the auspices of the Netherlands Ministry of Justice to monitor and provide assistance specifically to "at risk" Antillean youth. It is now particularly targeted to 22 municipalities with more than 3% Antillean and Aruban population. The program was initially set up under Verdonk and now known as the 22 Antillean cities. The Dutch government was criticized by the Antillean and Aruban governments, the Stichting Overlegorgaan Caribische Nederlanders (OCAN) (Consultative Body of the Caribbean Dutch), the official governmental consultative organization representing the Antillean and Aruban minorities in the Netherlands, as well as others for bills referring to an establishment of a database designed specifically for tracking "troubled" Antillean as well as Aruban youth. This was taken off the table by the end of 2008. Notions of race, racism, and coloniality are reified as Dutch political actors often lump these groups together in an atmosphere that emphatically declares there is no racism.

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De la Rey, De la Rey, De la Rey: Invoking the Afrikaner Ancestors[1]

Melissa Steyn

The Afrikaners in South Africa, descendants of Dutch settlers and some mixed European origins, have had the regrettable distinction of being custodians of overt systemic racism. Just as the rest of the world was shocked by the Nazi holocaust into turning its back on the institutionalization of racist organizations, Afrikaners designed and enforced what would become the Apartheid era (1948–1994). As a state system of white supremacy that was responsible for extreme human rights abuses, Apartheid was declared to be a crime against humanity by the United Nations.

The end of white rule and the advent of democracy in 1994 have represented a decisive watershed in the history of Afrikanerdom. As can be expected, reactions have been divided on the new dispensation, yet one can say that the overall tone has generally been rather subdued. As I have argued elsewhere, this is "a whiteness disgraced" (Steyn, "Rehabilitating" 143–69). While many have been making adjustments and getting on with their lives, there have been indications, including a subversive *Boeremag* plot against the state and a growing tide of emigration, that not everybody has been comfortable with the change. The generation of young people who were either not born or too young to have been participants in the Apartheid era have reached adulthood and are struggling to define a place for themselves among a range of options (Steyn, "Rehybridising" 70–85). When the singer, Bok van Blerk, recorded a song in 2006 about General de la Rey, the Afrikaner hero of the Anglo South African war, it became the most successful South African debut album ever, spreading like wildfire, and achieving something of the status of an Afrikaner anthem (see Groenewald). Replete with iconography invoking Afrikaner history and suffused with suffering, the song promises that the Boere are "a nation that will rise again."[1]

Reactions to this phenomenon have been diverse, ranging from those who see the song as an attempt to recuperate the history of the Afrikaners to find a place of self-respect, to those who see the song as a virtual incitement to treason. Afrikaans radio stations in neighboring Namibia banned the song for fear of importing the political controversy.[2]

This chapter will first present a brief account of "Afrikaner identity" shaped through the trajectory of Afrikaner history in South Africa, defined in contradistinction to the various groups who impinged upon them, spatially, physically, and psychologically.[3] Then, turning to contemporary postapartheid South Africa, it will reflect on the *De la Rey* phenomenon, and what that may signify about how some young Afrikaners are constructing what it means to be Afrikaans in postapartheid South Africa.

Historical Overview of the Afrikaners in South Africa: 1652–present
Early settlement
Official South African historiography, always written from the perspective of the white settler population, has marked 1652 as the beginning of South African history (Worden, *Making of Modern South Africa* 9). This was when the Dutch East India Company (VOC), with Jan van Riebeeck at the helm, established an outpost at first only intended as a refreshment stop for ships en route to trade in the East, at the southern tip of Africa and named it the Cape of Good Hope (Sanders and Southey 60; see also Witz). It can be surmised that most of the men who landed at the Cape were down at heel. Giliomee observes that "[few] inhabitants of the free Netherlands would sign up as sailors or soldiers except out of dire necessity" and that Jan van Riebeeck called the first batch of Europeans that disembarked at the Cape "weak and ignorant people" (Giliomee 5; see also Giliomee and Mbenga 4). As early as 1657, however, company employees were being released from the VOC's service.[4] These men, known as free burghers, were allowed to establish farms and would increasingly penetrate the area beyond the immediate settlement, thus impinging on territory belonging to Khoikhoi herders (Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa* 10).[5] As in most colonies where European women were scarce, there was a measure of miscegenation and intermarriage, practices that were initially tolerated.[6]

Despite the influx of German and French immigrants, the VOC was actively engaged in making and keeping the colony Dutch, following what Giliomee calls a "policy of forced cultural assimilation" (Giliomee 10–11, 42–45). Dutch was the official language of the VOC-administrated colony, and for more than a century, the Reformed Church was the only denomination in the Cape colony, this despite the fact that in the Netherlands it enjoyed the membership of only half the population (Giliomee 5). For instance, Germans in the colony were only permitted to establish a Lutheran Church in 1780 although, as Giliomee explains, "by then, the principle of one language and one church for the European community had become well

established." (12). Yet despite efforts at forging a Dutch identity for the colony's burghers, a new social identity was starting to emerge among the white settlers, as observed in 1770 by Admiral J. S. Stavorinus, a visitor to the Cape:

> *Although the first colonists here were composed of various nations, they are, by the operation of time, now so thoroughly blended together, that they are not to be distinguished from each other; even most of such have been born in Europe, and who have resided here for some years, changed their national character, for that of this country. (cited in Giliomee 51; also cited in Giliomee and Mbenga* 70)[7]

According to Morton, slavery "was beyond question an established feature of Boer society" (5). In addition to the coerced inclusion of indigenous people such as Khoikhoi into the colony's labor force, slaves were being imported to the colony from 1658. Tannenbaum emphasizes the implication and reach of a slave society: "If we are to speak of slavery, we must do it in its larger setting, as a way of life for both master and slave, for both the economy and the culture, for the family and the community" (cited in du Toit and Giliomee 7). It was in this context of a slave society that a labor order stratified along the lines of "race" took root, informing what it means to be "white" in South Africa, shaping the white imagination and expectations of entitlement (cited in du Toit and Giliomee 7). In 1743, it was remarked of the Cape colony: "Having imported slaves, every common or ordinary European becomes a gentleman and prefers to be served than to serve [. . .] The majority of farmers in the Cape are not farmers in the real sense of the word [. . .] and many of them consider it a shame to work with their hands" (cited in du Toit and Giliomee 7).

During the 18th century, trekboers, ostensibly in search of land and labor, increasingly penetrated the regions north and east of the Cape colony where they came into contact, and conflict, with the Khoisan and Xhosa inhabitants (Penn 6, 9).[8] Slave raiding was also a common occurrence (see Eldredge 93–126). For Nigel Penn, colonists' adherence to the "European belief in a fundamental dichotomy between civility and savagery" informed the eventual destruction of Khoisan culture, a campaign that "approached the genocidal after 1770" (Eldredge 6). Penn also makes an interesting connection between the Dutch mother society and tenets of the emerging identity in the colonial setting: "The rise of the Dutch nation-state also played its part in creating influential narrative models: just as the Netherlands had been won from the sea by the creation of strong dykes and canals, so Dutch society [in the Cape colony] erected strong barriers between itself and that which threatened its identity" (7).

However, Penn adds (in reference to Foucault's notion of "heterotopias") that the narratives and myths exported from Europe underwent alteration in the colonial setting: "The frontier was the site of constant battle between different versions of what constituted Dutch identity; in the ensuing struggle, new myths emerged" (7). It is fair to say that Dutch ethnocentrism and racism, which must be considered

in the broader context of European colonialism and racism, (see, for instance, Magubane, *Race and the Construction*) created racial hierarchies from the very outset in the colony, which evolved into a "hierarchy of legal status groups that established the basis for a racial order" that long outlasted the era of formal Dutch rule (Davies 21).

The British first invaded the Cape colony in 1795 and again in 1806 during the Napoleonic wars, when their rule became permanent. The territory was formally ceded in 1814 when the Anglo-Dutch treaty was signed. Over two centuries of bitter conflict were put in motion. The contours and consequences of British imperialism and chauvinism on Afrikaner self-conception were profound and far-reaching (see, e.g., Magubane, *The Making of a Racist State*). British rule saw the introduction of policies that infuriated many of the colony's Afrikaners. Ordinance 50 of 1828 ended the indenture of Khoikhoi and the colony's slaves were emancipated in 1834.

The Great Trek and the South African War

In 1836, an organized migration of Afrikaner pastoral farmers into the interior to escape British rule, the Great Trek, began. By 1840, about 14,000 Afrikaners had left the Cape (Saunders and Southey 80). While not necessarily representative of all Trekkers, the explanation for the Trek provided by Anna Steenkamp, the niece of Trek leader Piet Retief, is interesting insofar as it points to at least one discourse circulating among the Trekker community at the time, and illustrates discourses of racial superiority which had by then been firmly established as an integral part of the European settler identity (see Steyn, "*Whiteness*" chapter 2): "[the slaves had been] placed on an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God, and the natural distinction of race and religion [. . .] wherefore we rather withdraw in order to preserve our doctrines in purity" (Giliomee and Mbenga 108).

The Great Trek and its iconography have occupied a prominent place in the Afrikaner consciousness. For many, the exodus from the Cape was reminiscent of that exemplary exodus, the Israelites' exodus from Egypt to the "Promised Land." The evocation of the Biblical exodus was used to suggest that, like the early Israelites, the Afrikaners were a divinely chosen (white) people with a divine duty to fulfill.[9] Some historians have identified Paul Kruger, president of the (Boer) South African Republic or Transvaal, as originally propagating the myth of the Afrikaners as "God's chosen people" in the 1880s, although others have traced evidence of this discourse to mid-19th century trekkers (Giliomee and Mbenga 152).[10] Certainly this myth was promulgated by 20th century Afrikaner nationalist leaders such as D. F. Malan, National Party leader and prime minister from 1948–1952: "The last hundred years have witnessed a miracle begin which must lie in a divine plan. Indeed, the history of the Afrikaner reveals a will and a determination which makes

one feel that Afrikanerdom is not the work of men but the creation of God" (cited in Moodie 1).

In 1852, Britain recognized the independence of the South African Republic or Transvaal with the recognition of a second Boer republic, the Orange Free State, following in 1854. A turbulent period of British annexation, conflict, and Boer repossession followed, culminating in the South African War (formerly called the Anglo-Boer War). It is generally accepted that British interest in the Witwatersrand's gold fields and a concomitant desire of the two Boer republics to preserve their autonomy factored into the outbreak of the war in 1899.[11]

Historical accounts vary, but approximately 88,000 men fought on the side of the Boer republics, with 450,000 men serving on the British side (Thompson 142). Significantly, some Afrikaners, especially those living in the Cape who were British subjects, supported the British (Worden, *A Concise Dictionary* 14), while other Afrikaners, although British subjects, left the Cape Colony to join the Boer army, an act which constituted treason. When the British annexed the two Boer republics in 1900, the Boer commandos resorted to guerrilla warfare (Thompson 142). The Peace of Vereeniging, signed on 31 May 1902, ended a war that saw Britain emerge victorious and left enormous destruction in its wake. The British scorched earth policy had razed about 30,000 Boer farmsteads, and about 28,000 Boer civilians had died in 44 British concentration camps (Thompson 142–43; Saunders and Southey 49).[12] In all, almost 10 percent of the Boer population lost their lives during the war (Giliomee 264).

Along with the Great Trek, the South African War would become a staple in Afrikaner cultural and nationalistic symbolism. The heroic exploits of the Great War's *bittereinders* (those that fought until the "bitter end") such as the Boer generals Christiaan de Wet and Koos De La Rey were regaled, and the "Boer warriors" were revered as *volkshelde* (heroes of the nation) and considered emblematic of Afrikaner heroism and tenacity. However, as Sol Plaatje, whose diary of the Siege of Mafeking is "the only existing record of the South African War penned from a black vantage" (Comaroff 4) observed: "It was defined, by an uncanny white man's mode of reasoning, that the war was a white man's business in which blacks should take no part beyond merely suffering its effects" (Plaatje, *Native Life* 230). Yet, black South Africans participated in the war as among other things (unarmed) attendants of Boer fighters (known as *agterryers*) (see, e.g., Giliomee 356; Labuschagne), as combatants (Plaatje writes, for instance, of the Cape Boy contingent who fought on the side of the British during the Siege of Mafeking) (*Native Life* 236), and as dispatch runners (in Plaatje's words, "that unacknowledged hero") (*Native Life* 236–38).

The extent that black people's experiences of the South African War were excluded from both official historiography and war commemorations in the decades following

the War is revealing, perhaps indicative of the attempt to create the Afrikaner as the unitary, hero-martyr protagonist of South African history. According to Saunders and Southey, "[i]t is likely that almost as many Africans died in such camps as Boers" (Saunders and Southey 49). It is estimated that there were more than 80 camps where black people, mostly women, children, and old men, were interned. The internees were war refugees, people affected by the British scorched earth policy and servants of Boer families that had been interned (Anglo-Boer War Museum 3). Archival records of these camps are less comprehensive than those of the Boer camps, but at the time of publication of the War Museum's booklet on the black concentration camps, the existence of 66 such camps had been confirmed (2). The incomplete records point to 115,700 black internees and record 14,154 deaths, although the actual death toll might have been as high as 20,000 (2). As in the case of the Boer camps, the deceased were predominantly children, although it has been observed that the deprivations suffered by black internees were "even worse than those documented for the Boer internees" (2). Stanley and Dampier observe poignantly how during post-War commemorative practices at so-called white camps "many black people were 'present' beneath the ordered surface, including often in mixed-race graves; but in most places, there was no sign they had ever been there. The surface appearance is of everything being white, Boer, and with *het volk* in their ordered burial places, but what lies beneath is considerably more unruly and improper in 'race' terms" (99–100). Antjie Krog comments on how Afrikaners have "privatised" the war and its suffering: "[The war] became more and more manipulated, privatised actually—it was only the Boers' war, it was only the Afrikaner's pain and misery, and so it was used as an ogre to say everyone was against us [. . .] big world powers wanted to destroy us [. . .] and we even had to make unjust laws for the sake of our self-preservation" (cited in Stanley 1).

Nevertheless, for the Afrikaners, the trauma of defeat and loss, and the memory of the concentration camps left its mark, and became a crucial trope in later attempts to stoke Afrikaner nationalism. In the later period from the 1930s onward, particularly, one could detect what Giliomee calls the "return of history," a surge of interest in both the heroic and tragic dimensions of the war following three decades of public silence on the subject (432).

In 1910, South Africa became a union comprising the former British colonies the Cape and Natal and the two former Boer republics. The peace deal between the British and Boers excluded black South Africans from citizenship, a terrible betrayal of the African people's trust in the British Crown, and leading to the formation of the African National Congress in 1912.[13] At the time of unification, some hoped "that Boer and Briton would fuse into a single, prosperous, White South African nation that would be able to face the 'black menace'" (Magubane, "Whose Memory" 259–60). But unification, and the accompanying modernization of the state, also left many

Afrikaners with a sense of being unanchored.[14] As Jan Smuts, prime minister of the Union 1919–1924 and 1939–1948, explained:

> the Act of Union [. . .] has been the cause of a whole set of new changes in South Africa. Old Governments were swept away, old landmarks to which people looked were swept away, and the result has been in a certain sense that the people have lost an anchor so to say. No doubt that is one of the causes of the unsettlement that has led to the crises through which we have passed. (cited in Swart 5–6)

Opposed to Louis Botha's government's plans to annex South West Africa from the Germans on behalf of the British Allies during the First World War, a group of republicans who believed they could re-establish independence from Britain, including the South African War stalwarts De la Rey and De Wet, planned an ultimately unsuccessful rebellion in 1914. It was in the run-up to the rebellion, in September 1914, that De la Rey was shot and killed in a police roadblock (cited in Swart 24). His death, which many believed to have been an assassination, added to his stature as a Boer martyr.

It is important to take note of the cleavages, anxieties, and opposition to Afrikaner-Anglo assimilation as it is against this background that the National Party ascended to power with an Afrikaner nationalist program that sought to unify, fortify, and promote the interests of the Afrikaner population. Rallying points worth mentioning were the economic responses to the so-called *arm-blanke vraagstuk*[15] (the problem of impoverished white Afrikaners in the wake of the Depression); the 1938 *Eeufees* (centenary celebration) of the Great Trek; and the promotion of Afrikaans, a creolized Dutch,[16] as the *volkstaal* in preference to Dutch. At the time of the South African War, many in the Netherlands were sympathetic toward the Afrikaners' anti-colonial struggle (Roskam). This changed, however, at the time of the Second World War when some Nationalist leaders observed parallels between Afrikaner Nationalism and the National-Socialism of the Nazis (Roskam). With anti-British sentiments rife among the Afrikaners, many ordinary Afrikaners also expressed sympathies with the Nazis at the war's outset.[17] Yet, according to Roskam, an enduring sense of connection between the Dutch and their step-descendents remained:

> The only people in South Africa that mattered for the Dutch were the Afrikaners or perhaps the whites in general. Despite the post-war sensitivity on the political level over Afrikaner Nazi sympathies, the Dutch government actively encouraged emigration to South Africa, by subsidising it.

Afrikaner Nationalism and Apartheid

In 1948, the National Party, initially under D. F. Malan, came to power and enjoyed the support of the majority of Afrikaners for three decades (Thompson 187). It was under

National Party rule that the racial discrimination of pre-20th century (and pre-industrial) South Africa (see Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa* 74–80) was codified in repressive and discriminatory legislation, and brutally enforced (see Foster), oppressing and causing untold suffering among the black majority population. Symbols of Afrikaner nationalism permeated the public realm and institutions such as the *Afrikaner Broederbond*, *Nasionale Pers* newspapers, the *Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniging* (FAK), and the *Voortrekkers* (a youth organization reminiscent of the boy and girl scouts, that entrenched the Afrikaner Trek heritage) were vehicles for disseminating National Party ideology and Afrikaner conservatism, and education was informed by *Christelike Nasionale* principles. The nationalist social engineering project was supported by racial domination, the Afrikaner's access to state power, and cultural mobilization in the form of a politicized and racialized *volksbeweging* (national movement), which pulled in organizations from across the social spectrum (see Davies 18–43). During this period, the so-called Dutch churches, most notably the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) or *Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk,* and its *dominees* (ministers) played an integral part in bolstering the National Party government by providing theological justification for its segregationist policies.[18] As early as 1915, a resolution accepted at a DRC conference in Bloemfontein (attended by D. F. Malan, himself a DRC minister) in effect articulated a vision for the ethnicization, nationalization and politicization of the church (Giliomee 385). It stated that the DRC was obligated "to be national in character and to watch over our particular national interests, to teach the people to see in their history and origin the hand of God, and furthermore to cultivate among the Afrikaner people the awareness of a national calling and destiny, in which the spiritual, moral and material progress and strength of a people is laid up" (Giliomee 385).[19]

While there was little outright opposition to apartheid in the Afrikaner segment of the population, there were exceptions, such as the Rivonia treason trial defence attorney and South African Communist Party member Bram Fischer and Dutch Reformed Church anti-apartheid minister Beyers Naudé. There was also a degree of dissidence[20] among the Afrikaner literary establishment with writers such as Breyten Breytenbach and Andre Brink representing the *Sestigers* ("1960-ers") literary movement.[21] In the late-1980s, the Voëlvry movement entered the South African music scene. Fronted by a group of young white Afrikaans musicians that envisioned a less restricted (and restrictive) "Afrikaner identity," Voëlvry generated an Afrikaner counterculture. In their (Afrikaans) lyrics, set to rock music, members satirized, mocked, and criticized the apartheid government and Afrikaans conservatism, and subverted Afrikaner cultural symbols such as the Dutch Reformed Church (Grundlingh, "Rocking the Boat?" 483-514). Significantly, theirs was a re-articulation of "Afrikaner identity" rather than an all-out rejection of it (Grundlingh, "Rocking the Boat?" 483–514). As the late Johannes Kerkorrel, whose stage name alludes to the church organ used in

DRC services ("Adri"), explained at the time: "It is as if we are Voortrekkers again, breaking away and looking for a new future, finding new boundaries, building bridges and experimenting" (cited in Grundlingh, "Rocking the Boat? 500). However, as Grundlingh explains, despite the movement's popularity (and its relative success at irking the National Party government), it would be a mistake to overestimate Voëlvry's political reach and impact: "It failed to evolve beyond protest music, lacked wider connections and did not inspire their followers to express themselves in unambiguous and meaningful terms" ("Rocking the Boat?" 498). Nevertheless, as a movement led by young men in their 20s and early 30s, Voëlvry can be seen as expressing the disenchantment at least some members of a younger generation felt with the cultural apparatus that set them up for two years of compulsory military conscription into a racialized conflict they increasingly saw as futile to defend a system they were coming to question ("Adri").

Postapartheid

While support for the nationalist government during the heyday of the apartheid era increasingly included English-speaking white South Africans, and while segregationist and supremacist attitudes and methods preceded Afrikaner rise to power in 1948, Afrikaners still carry the major moral burden for instituting and maintaining the system of apartheid (Steyn, *Rehabilitating*). The regime engaged in a bitter border war, conscripting about 300,000 young white men to fight against external forces constructed as the supposedly "coterminous threat of communism and black nationalism" (Baines). It maintained an increasingly brutal internal state of emergency from 1985–1990 and attempted to bolster the failing economy in the face of international sanctions and a growing international groundswell anti-apartheid movement, including many active organizations in the Netherlands.[22] By the end of the 1980s, the leadership finally recognized that the system could not be sustained and that it had no option but to negotiate with the movements representing the oppressed black majority, most notably the African National Congress. This is recalled in a speech made by F. W. de Klerk in London in 1997, in which he reflected on the decision to relinquish white, Afrikaner-led power, during South Africa's political transition (and tellingly still excluding the majority African population from "the nation" in his reference to "national sovereignty"):

> The decision to surrender the right to national sovereignty is certainly one of the most painful any leader can be asked to take. Most nations are prepared to risk war and catastrophe rather than to surrender this right. Yet this was the decision we had to take. We had to accept the necessity of giving up on the ideal which so many generations had struggled for and for which so many of our people had died. (cited in Visser; also cited in Giliomee 656)

The predicament at the demise of the era of Afrikaner-dominated rule can be seen as analogous to the period after the South African war, when Afrikaners lost sovereignty and were in crisis over reconciliation with the prevailing British. Davies correctly points out that "whilst the material gains of the apartheid era remain and have been consolidated, the foundations of any revised nationalist or group ethos, or ideological, political or programmatic axis, are in flux" (71). Much of the literature on present-day Afrikaners, and much of the polemics in the Afrikaans press, concerns in some sense or another the question of a redefinition, re-negotiation, sometimes a questioning, of Afrikaner identity in the post-apartheid context (see Steyn, "Rehybridising" 70–85; see also Visser).[23] Indeed, all white South Africans are confronted by the necessity of coming to terms with their new positioning in the society since the demise of the white supremacist rule. Some have experienced this as a liberation, and many Afrikaners are discovering new possibilities for identification. For many, however, this includes experiences of loss of privilege and control, and lack of identification with the new order; for some even sulky, racialized interpretations of societal challenges such as crime and the economy, and more extremely, a thinly-disguised desire for the new order to fail. A right-wing Afrikaner group, the *Boeremag*, is still on trial for plotting the overthrow of the government. Certainly, the rate of emigration for white South Africans is high—approximately one in five has left since 1995, while the country's white population has seen a decline of 16.1% in the period 1995–2005.[24] On the extreme right, outrageously, a fringe group is reviving the Afrikaner-Dutch connection by petitioning Geert Wilders, the leader of the Partij Voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV), to assist "white Afrikaner refugees" to attain Dutch nationality on ancestral grounds. The leader of this group, Lara Johnstone, claims to be descended from a Bosman who left Amsterdam in 1707![25]

In *Knowledge in the Blood: Confronting Race and the Apartheid Past,* Jonathan Jansen contemplates "Afrikaner identity" in post-apartheid South Africa. He is especially interested in how apartheid ideology has been transmitted to and has shaped present-day white Afrikaner youth. As the first black Dean of Education at a historical bastion of white Afrikanerdom, the University of Pretoria (the "heart of whiteness") (2), Jansen immersed himself in Afrikaner culture and society, getting to know students and parents in both formal and informal settings. Jansen notes how "Everywhere around me, I witnessed a community struggling to come to terms with loss and change" (7).[26] Within this context, cultural activism has acquired a new role. As Davies puts it:

> *Afrikaner cultural activists are today faced with a very different task from that which confronted their predecessors. Long past the apogee of a cohesive ethnic identity, cultural politics has become the new battleground and the yardstick by which the success of any post-apartheid grouping is to be measured [. . .] there is an*

increasing focus on more abstract and intellectual disputes concerned with perceptions of marginalisation, entitlement and belonging, as well as clashes over institutional and symbolic power. The basis of both inclusion and exclusion is now concerned with the drawing of cultural boundaries although the boundaries remain the subject of considerable debate, most especially with regard to race. (72)

One of the major claims made as part of this cultural activism is that Afrikanerdom is under threat and that, as a cultural grouping, they should be entitled to special protection. These claims are made especially in relation to language survival, and the interpretation and memorialization of Afrikaner history, symbolized by issues such as place and street names. While such a "post-nationalist" refocusing on a "culture" which needs to be left intact may seem innocuous, it does the work of preserving racialized identification and organization (Steyn, *Rehabilitating*).

The meaning of events in the history of Afrikaners, the import of which had previously been directed by the apartheid state and various instruments of Afrikaner nationalism, are being revised in the post-apartheid setting. In his analysis of the centenary commemoration of the South African War, Grundlingh observes that the less restrictive and prescriptive post-'94 context "provided Afrikaners with an opportunity to re-evaluate a particularly dramatic period in their history and to rework it, relatively free from previous political agendas and restraints, into a more kaleidoscopic whole without necessarily translating this into a fixed leitmotif for the future" ("Reframing Remembrance" 15). Against this observation, however, one might want to consider the meaning(s) behind the immense popularity of the Bok van Blerk song "De La Rey" and Deon Opperman's "Ons vir Jou," a Boer War musical with De La Rey as its central character,[27] as well as the nature of the representations of "Afrikaner history" and historical figures such as De La Rey in popular culture (see, e.g., Visser 14–15). Linked with the re-energizing of the symbolically charged self-identification, *Boer*, these seem rather to indicate a politically charged re-mythologizing of Afrikanerdom drawing on familiar tropes of the ancestors as heroic and tasked with fulfilling a God-given destiny (especially in the case of the men) and/or victims (especially in the case of the women and children) and/or a people besieged by enemy groups.

Role of Popular Music

In line with the shift from the political to the cultural as the major site of Afrikaner struggle for power, it is telling that Afrikaans as a medium of cultural expression has been gaining popularity. Afrikaans literature now sells better than its English counterpart (Davies 122); there is a burgeoning market for Afrikaans music, which increasingly draws on international and hybrid sounds; a growing "festivalization of Afrikanerdom" in the arts festival scene has provided the setting for "ethnic nesting" (Davies 121). Coetzer notes that there are more than 80 Afrikaans language music

festivals annually, from the 5,000-capacity *Klein Karoo Nationale Kunstefees* in Oudtshoorn, the largest festival event of the year, to small town events catering to several hundred (Coetzer). While discourses about marginalization and the threat of the extinction of Afrikaans feature prominently, there is little or no consensus on the meaning of the cultural phenomenon. As Lewis puts it:

> Scholars and reporters have criticized the annual Afrikaans-language KKNK festival for perpetuating the principle of the laager, or circle of wagons, creating an exclusionary, white cultural festival—a Boerefees—each year in Oudtshoorn, South Africa. The 2008 festival had its share of nostalgic, sometimes disturbing performances of whiteness, but simultaneously enacted a nuanced questioning of exactly what the imaginings of this imagined community of white settlers in Africa are, or can be. These acts, circling around issues of land, identity, heroes, whiteness, brownness, and belonging, articulated the diversity of what it means to be an Afrikaner in contemporary South Africa. (654)

A significant feature of this cultural expansion is how pop music has increasingly sidelined other forms of art and intellectual debate on the meaning of Afrikaansness (Davies 121). Popular music, it seems, has been filling the vacuum of leadership young Afrikaners, especially, feel in the new dispensation.

The Song *De la Rey*

Jansen's account of the confusion felt by young white Afrikaners—especially the young men who feel targeted by policies of racial redress such as Affirmative Action—in finding their place in the new dispensation while still largely caught up within an old ideology passed on through the teachings of home, school, and church, speaks to the climate in which the *De la Rey* song and video were released. The catchy song calls upon the Boer War hero to lead his people out of desperate circumstances.[28] To most Afrikaners and those familiar with traditional Afrikaans folk music and *luisterliedjies* (light popular songs), De la Rey's melody is permeated with familiarity.[29] There is something profoundly paradigmatic about the melody. It recalls the canon of Afrikaner folk songs (many profoundly patriotic); it conjures up memories of singalongs around campfires at Voortrekker camps and the songs from the FAK (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge) songbook that almost all Afrikaner children (certainly until 1994) were taught at school. It effectively connects the Afrikaner listener with a past, and a past self. Former Voëlvry member Koos Kombuis, who famously "resigned" from the Afrikanerdom (and also publicly changed his initially critical opinion of De La Rey after meeting Bok van Blerk), expresses this rather perplexing experience of nostalgia as follows:

> Ja, wanneer ek die liedjie "De La Rey" hoor, wil ek teruggaan Sondagskool toe, wil ek weer die Kinderbybel lees, wil ek sommer vandag weer by die army aansluit

en die kakies en al die ander k-goeters sommer in hulle moere gaan skiet. Hoekom? Watter meestersimbool is hier aan die werk? Wat gaan aan met hierdie liedjie, en hoekom doen hy sulke vreeslike soetsappige, simpel dinge met ons onderbe-wussyn?

(Yes, when I hear the song "De La Rey," I want to go back to Sunday school, I want to read the Children's Bible again, I even want to join the army again today and just shoot the kakies and all the other k-things to hell. Why? What master symbol is at work here? What is going on with this song, and why does it do such terribly syrupy, stupid things to our subconscious?)

The music video[30] rekindles images of the dire suffering of the Afrikaners in the war: wounded soldiers in sodden trenches, women and children desperate in concentration camps, farms and homesteads burning, and of course, the rescuer galloping on his steed to come and save his people in their time of need. The lyrics assert the tenacity of the Afrikaner people, a nation "that will rise again." The images of victimhood, persecution, and injury rejoined by heroic struggle replay the familiar tropes of Afrikaner historiography, "the belief that this [Afrikaner] identity had emerged through struggle" (Penn 10), the Afrikaner as the heroic protagonist of South Africa's past,[31] the sense of moral purpose of the Afrikaner people, the sense that there is an Afrikaner identity that can be believed in.

The song's popularity has been extraordinary, perhaps amounting to a social movement. It was the first Afrikaans song ever to sell 122,000 copies in less than six months, indicating, among other things, that its appeal went beyond the Afrikaans youth (Krog, "A New Ancestor"). Van Blerk concerts were filled to capacity and it became an anthem at rugby events. Retief reports that Bok van Blerk parties became a craze, when *De la Rey* would be played on *repeat* for the entire evening (Retief). The fever was such that the current generation of young Afrikaners has been called the *De la Rey generation,* or alternatively, the *Bok generation*. Yet there is little agreement over what both the song and the cult-like reaction signify. Some commentators see the song's popularity as expressing the freedom afforded to young Afrikaners by the distance from apartheid, allowing them to celebrate their culture, and to develop a "Proudly Afrikaner" consciousness (Coetzer). Antjie Krog writes that, in the post-apartheid era, "Afrikaners, who have so easily appropriated the land and the continent found themselves in a new kind of post-colonial dynamic and are still reeling and deeply resentful about the incoherence of their lives" (*Begging to be Black* 126). If she is right, a part of the appeal of a song like De la Rey might be in the fact that it is so unabashedly unambivalent in its subject matter, tropes, and melody. It is the resumption of an imagined past coherence: this is the Afrikaner. As one defender of the song on the LitNet website writes: "Ons is wie ons is, ons is wie ons wil wees" (We are who we are, we are who we want to be).[32] Others have pointed out that the

song has often been accompanied by displays of allegiance to the old order: the singing of the old South African anthem; the waving of the old South African flag, and even the "Vierkleur," the flag of the old Transvaal Republic and a right wing symbol; the passion that resembles the "singing of an ancestral tribal anthem" (Russel). It has even been dubbed the first struggle song of the "new Boere-Afrikaners" (Retief).

De la Rey and Bok van Blerk certainly do not represent the sensibility of all young Afrikaans musicians. Many white, and specifically, Afrikaner musicians take the route of musical hybridity and lyrics that rather problematize Afrikaner identity while not compromising a critical posture to the current context. As noted by Ballentine: ". . . white musicians have stressed the need for self-reinvention in music that is ironic, unpredictable, transgressive. These songs play with malleable identities; token of a disdain for fixed or essential identities, they are hopeful signposts towards a more integrated future" (105).[33] And there are young Afrikaner musicians who question the rationale of a song like De la Rey. For instance, Bertie Coetzee, a twenty-something Afrikaner and lead singer of the Afrikaans band Zinkplaat (pelted with bottles at one concert by an audience impatient to see Bok van Blerk), has written:

> *Ek kon nog nooit verstaan hoekom ons so moet veg vir Afrikaans as taal en vir trots vir Afrikaans nie. Ek kan nie verstaan hoekom 'n song soos "De La Rey" nodig is nie en ek kan nie verstaan hoekom mense die ou Suid-Afrikaanse vlag waai as hulle dit hoor nie. Al is die bedoeling om vir jou ma te wys jy is lief vir haar, is dit nie goed genoeg nie [. . .] Ek kon nog nooit vestaan hoekom ons so graag tot iets wil behoort sodat ons ander mense uitsluit nie, en soveel so dat dit selfs kan oorgaan in haat en massamoord.*

> *(I've never been able to understand why we must fight like this for Afrikaans as lan-guage and for pride in Afrikaans. I can't understand why a song like "De La Rey" is necessary and I can't understand why people wave the old South African flag when they hear it. Even if the intention is to show your mother you love her, that isn't good enough [a reason] I've never been able to understand why we so want to belong to something that we must exclude other people, and so much so that it can even turn into hate and genocide)[34]*

Nevertheless, Van Blerk himself attributes the extraordinary appeal of the song to the need his generation of Afrikaners feels "to be proud of who we are, and where we come from, and our language, this whole Afrikaans thing."

> *We grew up with the guilt of apartheid, being told, "You are wrong—apartheid is on your heads." We don't want to say sorry any more. This is a democratic South Africa and we have moved on. We keep on being told that if we have a white skin, we can't get a job. You walk into an interview and are told, "Sorry." People are fed up. The younger generation says "enough." (cited in Russel)[35]*

In line with the "cultural turn" in Afrikaans youth discourse, Van Blerk protests that his music is apolitical, and has dissociated himself from the waving of old South African flags at his concerts and the possibility of inciting violent uprising. Yet the deep politicization of the cultural in the current context is evident in the stated goal of restoring Afrikaners' "proud place" in history, a goal which sits comfortably with the possibility that he may be inspiring a new Afrikaner unity and a rise of Afrikaner nationalism. He maintains that the song expresses the burden Afrikaners carry (*"Dit verwoord vir die eerste keer iets wat almal op die hart dra"*).

This points to its appeal to what has been described as a *"gatvol* [fed up]" mood (Groenewald) in Afrikaans youth music, reflecting a level of defiance and refusal to accept the terms of subjectivity which some young Afrikaners feel they have inherited along with the new order, much as the Voëlvry artists of the 80s rebelled against the "given" that the apartheid system had determined for them. Other titles, such van Blerk's as *Dis tyd om te trek* (It's time to trek, i.e., leave/move away)[36] and Klopjag's *Ek sal nie langer jammer sê nie* (I won't say sorry any more)[37] reflect this refusal. The imagery of the music video of *Dis tyd om te trek*, another song that invokes the tropes of Afrikaner history, is instructive in showing how colonial and apartheid era apocalyptic tropes of *swart gevaar* (black threat) still inform the collective imagination. The rebellious tone and broad-based heightened emotion that *De la Rey* aroused prompted the then minister of Arts and Culture, Pallo Jordan, to issue a statement in Parliament warning right-wing Afrikaners not to think that it is a "struggle song" that sends out a "call to arms" (Ministry of Arts and Culture).

While it may not, for the great majority of its fans, be a call to arms, *De la Rey* surely does represent the reworking of Afrikaner symbolism for new purposes, what Van Heyningen calls "an old mythology [. . .] redeployed to reinforce a new mythology of suffering for new political purposes" (513). The trope of the 1899–1901 war is redeployed in such a way that it is able to touch the nerve of inherited guilt and shame which the young generation does not want to own. The war represents a historical episode in which the Afrikaners held the moral high ground, and De la Rey himself has been remembered as a politically moderate leader who commanded widespread respect. This has prompted the prominent Afrikaner cultural commentator, Antjie Krog, to argue that these are the children of perpetrators coming to terms with the double bind of understanding their parents' culpability in the past and yet also their alienation in the present. De la Rey, Krog argues, is an honorable surrogate father "assisting children to deal with their guilt in such a way that they can at last begin to integrate into the new society in which they feel they actually belong" ("A New Ancestor"). Krog maintains that the meaning the song holds for Afrikaner youth is deliberately misunderstood by English speakers, who need the stereotype of the rebellious, intransigently racist Afrikaner to deflect attention away from their own vulnerability in the new political dispensation.

Krog's interpretation does not square with the more widely held judgment that foregrounds the element of Afrikaner youth resentment against the current situation. Another respected and outspoken Afrikaner, Max Du Preez, emphasizing the metonymic character of the song, is much more forthright in how the sentiment is linked to the loss of white political power:

> When they sing about how nasty the British were to the Boer women in the concentration camps and "general come and lead us because we will fall around you," they're not thinking about the British, they're thinking about blacks. Their enemy is now black [. . .] The kids standing in the pubs in Pretoria with their hand on their heart, and their wild eyes, go outside and they get into their BMW convertibles. They're not suffering. It's an imagined suffering. (Carte Blanche, "De la Rey Lives Again")

Conclusion

Many different histories have been produced on "Afrikaners," and these tend to vary in the extent to which they identify with, or are critical of, their subject. This is not something that must be ignored—who writes when and to what end is significant.[38] Afrikaners have, for example, been variously described as "reluctant early settler" (De Klerk 3) and "white invaders" (Thompson chapter 2). The controversies in interpreting Afrikaner people's experiences, sentiments, and actions have dogged their history since the first Dutch settlement at the Cape through to the contestations about how their current positioning within postapartheid South Africa should be interpreted—as victims of race discrimination, even genocide, through to white supremacists who cannot make peace with loss of political power. The wide appeal of the song, de la Rey, indicates that something was stirred within the youth of this population group. Of course, there is no one unified experience, nor can there be one coherent interpretation of the multilayered and complex social phenomenon this song brought about. Nevertheless, it clearly does reveal energetic ideological labor being undertaken as young Afrikaners attempt to redefine who they are and come to grips with the new realities in South Africa—a context where the descendants of European settlers eventually lost the struggle of political domination over the "natives"—yet another revolution of wheels set in motion more than 350 years ago.

Notes

Note: I would like to thank Gina-Mari Fourie for her assistance with the research for this chapter.

1. The video may be retrieved at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nlHqKJyo3GQ>.

2. See <http://www.freemuse.org/sw17578.asp>.

3. Even from the brief account which follows, it should be clear that there is no singular Afrikaner identity, nor an untroubled, unbroken line of identification; but a complex account of the processes of identity making is beyond the scope of this inevitably sketchy chapter.

4. For a description of the relations between the VOC and the free burghers, see Schutte,

5. The result of this pastoral expansion was protracted conflict between Dutch trekboers and the Khoikhoi, and two Dutch-Khoikhoi wars (1659–1660 and 1673–1677) which saw the Khoikhoi of the Cape Peninsula and surrounding areas defeated. See Saunders and Southey 61.

6. For a fuller explication, see Fredrickson 94–135.

7. That said, the emerging Afrikaner group was marked by significant social and economic cleavages. For a discussion, see du Toit and Giliomee 4–10.

8. Penn notes that "[o]ne of the most interesting debates in South African history centres on the myth-making power of the frontier experience itself, with generations of historians believing that it was on the frontier that a distinctive South African identity emerged." See also pp. 10–12 for Penn's discussion of Martin Legassick's seminal paper "The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography," presented in 1970 in London. In this paper, Legassick challenged South African historians' tendency "to think that 'by and large, slavery, Calvinism, and the frontier between them suffice to explain' present-day race attitudes in South Africa." Legassick argued that an understanding of the frontier as "distinct and isolated from a parent society" was incongruous and that racial attitudes were in fact brought to the frontier from the parent society. As Penn explains, Legassick's paper "was a call to abandon the frontier and search elsewhere for the historical origins of modern South African racial segregation."

9. S. G. M. Ridge (1987) notes: "Unlike their English neighbours, who were also 'emigrants,' they seem seldom to have thought of 'home' as somewhere behind them. Instead they struggled for years to find a new home and a new unity as a people. They used Israelite metaphors to explore what they were doing." Cited in Steyn, "*Whiteness*" 29.

10. Susan Rennie Ritner tracks this discourse to as early as the 17th century: "The notion of being a 'chosen people' very early penetrated Afrikaners who settled South Africa in the seventeenth century. For the majority who were nomadic cattle-farmers, identification with patriarchical, nomadic Israel of the Old Testament was easy; and after the Great Trek into the interior to escape the liberal colour policies of their British rulers, the Bible seemed to provide a mirror-image of their lives—captivity, exodus, the promised land—reinforcing the belief in their divine mission in South Africa." Susan Rennie Ritner. "The Dutch Reformed Church and Apartheid." *Journal of Contemporary History* 2.4 (October 1967) 18n2.

11. For discussions of the South African War, see Saunders and Southey 159–60; Worden, *A Concise Dictionary of South African History* 1998) 144–46; Giliomee,chapter 8; Thompson 132–46.

12. There is a tendency to regard the British concentration camps as a forerunner of the Nazi death camps. However, one should not gloss over the important differences between the South African War's concentration camps and the death camps of the Second World War. Stanley and Dampier observe: "Goebbels's decision to call the Nazi death camps 'concentration camps,' to deflect criticisms of the Nazi ones onto the earlier British founding of camps that were apparently 'the same.' The result is that

now every time the South African camps are mentioned, most people's minds leap to those later and very different events unleashed by the Nazi state and the iconic force and prismic power of these." See Stanley and Dampier 94.

13. In *Native Life in South Africa* (1916), Sol Plaatje poignantly articulates the disillusionment experienced by many black South Africans in the aftermath of the South African War: "And when the burden loaded on our bent backs becomes absolutely unbearable we are at times inclined to blame ourselves; for, when some of us fought hard—and often against British diplomacy—to extend the sphere of British influence, it never occurred to us that the spread of British dominion in South Africa would culminate in consigning us to our present intolerable position, namely, a helotage under a Boer oligarchy" (365).

14. For reflections of the patriarchal, charismatic, and somewhat idiosyncratic leadership style that characterized the republics, see Swart 1–30.

15. Interestingly, a recent investigation into present-day "wit armoede" (white poverty) by the Helpende Hand Fonds (Helping Hand Fund) of the trade union Solidarity (*Solidariteit*) recalls the 1932 Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question in South Africa. See "Verbreek die Stilte: Die Storie van Wit Armoede in die Nuwe Suid-Afrika" (Break the Silence: The Story of White Poverty in the New South Africa), 30 Nov. 2009 <http://www.helpendehand.co.za/wp-content/uploads/dokumente/wit-armoede-afrikaans-teks.pdf>.

16. In the process of establishing and "purifying" Afrikaans as the volkstaal of the white Afrikaner, the historical origins of the language within the "colored" community of the Cape was edited out. Attempts to reclaim the language as the creative child of the slaves, San and Khoi who were obliged to learn Dutch to be able to function after Dutch settlement have been gaining some ground, such as in the "Afrikaaps" movement. See, for example, *Afrikaaps* at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a5oCAZCHYhQ&feature=related>.

17. For a discussion of the impact of fascism on Afrikaner nationalism and South Africa, see Furlong.

18. The official policy of the Dutch Reformed Church during the apartheid era is articulated in the 1948 document "Racial and National Apartheid in the Bible." See also Ritner 17–37.

19. Giliomee observes that the notion of a *volkskerk* (a church of the people) has its roots in the Cape colony. See Giliomee 454.

20. For a social psychological study of Afrikaner dissidents (for the period 1982–1985), see Louw-Potgieter. The author draws on social identity theory to consider group formation among Afrikaner dissidents.

21. Of the impact of the literature produced by the *Sestigers*, Giliomee writes: "this literature helped to change the political imagination of the Afrikaans reading public in subtle yet profound ways" (554). See also Rich 54–73.

22. Readers may find a summary of some of these organizations on the Memory Programme website of the Nelson Mandela Foundation at <p://www.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/aama/country/category/netherlands/>.

23. Visser focuses on two prominent Afrikaner responses in the wake of 1994's political transition: "a disposition towards diaspora and efforts at redefining Afrikaner identity in post-apartheid South Africa" (1). According to the author, present-day Afrikaner diaspora has taken three main routes: the internal migration of right-wing Afrikaners to the all-white town of Orania (for its inhabitants, the materialization of the idea of a *volkstaat*); a type of "inward, metaphysical migration" which has seen some Afrikaners retreat into gated communities and others withdraw psychologically; and large-scale emigration to countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (2–4).

24. This is according to a report released by the South African Institute of Race Relations in 2006. See van Aardt.

25. See the *Independent on Line*, "SA Family Seeks 'Repatriation' to Netherlands." <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?art_id=vn2010 0425075353274C815607>.

26. Not too surprisingly, Jansen's analysis of post-apartheid Afrikaner identity has been met with some derision. Perhaps a case of discomfort at whiteness being "made strange" by a black observer? For an example of criticism levelled at Jansen's book *Knowledge in the Blood* (2009), see, for instance, Johannes Comestor. "Jansenistiese bloedskennis." at *LitNet,* 12 Jan. 2010 <http://www.litnet.co.za/cgi-bin/ giga.cgi? cmd=cause_dir_news_item& cause_ id=1270%20&news_id=76744& cat_id=159>.

27. Of the musical's protagonist, playwright Deon Opperman told the actuality programme Carte Blanche: "The central character you choose for a big musical, a big story like this, is crucial. And what makes him interesting is he fits into that universal metaphor that exists in warriorhood, which is the reluctant warrior. It was also explored by Mel Gibson in 'The Patriot.'" 30 Nov. 2009 <http://beta.mnet.co.za/ carteblanche/Article.aspx?Id=3570>.

28. The translated lyrics:
On a mountain in the night
we lie and wait in the darkness
In the mud and blood I lie, cold
grain bag and rain cling to me

And my house and my farm
burned to ashes,
so they can catch us
But those flames and that fire
now burn deep, deep within me

Chorus:
De la Rey, De la Rey
Will you come to lead the Boers?
De la Rey, De la Rey
General, General,
As one man we'll fall in around you
General De la Rey

Listen, the Khakis are laughing!
A handful of us
against their entire great might,

our backs against the cliff face
they think it's all over

But the heart of the Boer
lies deeper and wider,
This they'll still see.
At a gallop he comes riding,
The Lion of the West Transvaal!

Because my wife and my child
Lie in a camp, dying,
and the Khakis' blood
flows over a nation
that will rise again

General De la Rey
De la Rey, De la Rey
Will you come and rescue the Boers?

29. Here one might want to consider the European influences in Afrikaans music. Many traditional Afrikaans folk songs inherited their melodies from Europe (not forgetting that *Sarie Marais,* one of the most well-known Afrikaans folk songs, took its melody from the American song *Ellie Rhee*). In 1924, Du Toit called these European ballads "neutralised foreigners." (Du Toit, cited in Burden) Reflecting on Laurika Rauch's popular song *Stuur groete aan Mannetjies Roux*, Muller writes: ". . . Afrikaner nostalgia for the past is indexed not only by the farm with its simple way of life, suffering through depression and drought, and the fond remembrance of Springbok rugby legend Mannetjies Roux, but also by Mozart's C major piano sonata KV 545. Afrikaners seem to experience no incongruity at this [. . .] We traverse the cultural imaginations of the frontier farm and Afrikaner rugby prowess with Mozart shadowing, perhaps guiding, our progress. How does one explain this?" (34).

30. The video can be found on YouTube, at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nlHqKJyo3G Q>.

31. In particular, a historiography that stressed a shared Afrikaner experience was put to service of Afrikaner Nationalism in the early and mid-20th century (Worden, *A Concise Dictionary* 14).

32. Barend Uys. "Ons is die De la Rey-generasie." 25 May 2010 <http://www.litnet.co.za/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_ item&cause_id=1270&news_id=10160&cat_id=166>.

33. See also Andries "Roof" Bezuidenhout. "From Voëlvry to De la Rey: Popular Music, Afrikaner Nationalism and Lost Irony." 25 May 2010 <http://www.litnet.co.za/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&cause_id=1270&news_id=11123&cat_id=170>.

34. Bertie Coetzee. "Ek sien twee pole verder uitmekaar uit te trek, en in die middle, hier sit ek." 25 May 2010. <http://www.litnet.co.za/cgibin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&cause_id=1270&news_id=9985&cat_id=166>.

35. However, data released by the Commission for Employment Equity in 2009 paints a different picture. The South African Institute of Race Relations notes that despite the implementation of broad-based black economic empowerment and affirmative action policies, the South African workplace still exhibited apartheid-era disparities that disproportionately favored whites and men. In 2007, white men accounted for 58%, and white women for 10%, of top management, while 50% of white men, and 15% of white women, were in senior management. Whites also accounted for 58% of the professionally qualified and those in middle management. See Kgafela. For the year 2008/2009, there was an unemployment rate of 27.9% among black South Africans, 19.5% among Coloured South Africans, 12.7% among Indian South Africans and 4.6% among white South Africans. See South African Institute of Race Relations, *South Africa Survey 2008/2009: Employment and Incomes,* available at <http://www.sairr.org.za/research-and-publications/south-africa-survey-2008-2009>.

36. See video at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lv3PbuPVj68>.

37. See video at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41z4U8_tJMQ>.

38. For a summary of the different and changing approaches in the writing and understanding of South Africa's past, see Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa* chapter 1.

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2. Black Bodies, White Fantasms

Diving into the Wreck: Exploring Intersections of Sexuality, "Race," Gender, and Class in the Dutch Cultural Archive[1]

Gloria Wekker

Psychoanalysis can (. . .) be seen as a quite elaborate form of ethnography — as a writing of the ethnicity of the white Western psyche.
Mary Ann Doane 211.

Introduction

In this article, I am embarking on an oceanic journey that I have postponed for quite some time, daunted by the murkiness and the cold of the water. In borrowing Adrienne Rich's richly resonating title for her collection of poems "Diving into the wreck" (Rich), I am interested in the widespread but un-(der)explored ways in which race has nestled itself in the Dutch cultural archive, that storehouse of what Edward Said in a general European framework describes as

> a particular knowledge and structures of attitude and reference, [. . .] [and], in Raymond Williams' seminal phrase, "structures of feeling" [. . .]. There was virtual unanimity that subject races should be ruled, that there are subject races, that one race deserves and has consistently earned the right to be considered the race whose main mission is to expand beyond its own domain. (Said 52, 53)

I want to explore the forcefulness, passion and even aggression which race in the Netherlands elicits, while at the same time elusiveness and denial reign supreme. I am intrigued by the ways in which race pops up in unexpected places and moments, as the return of the repressed, while the dominant discourse stubbornly maintains

that the Netherlands is and always has been colour-blind and anti-racist. Denial and disavowal, the simultaneous affirmation and denial of a thought or desire, are important modes to deal with race. The concept of disavowal speaks of deep ambiguity with regard to race: repressed material can make its way into the conscious on the condition that it is denied (Wright 90).

In this chapter,[2] I will focus on the ways in which black people, but especially black women, were and are envisioned in the Dutch cultural archive, by bringing various popular and literary representations of black women to the surface, together with some personal experiences with gendered and sexualized racism. Little research about these volatile concoctions, as part and parcel of the cultural text, has so far been done in the Netherlands, although some work needs to be mentioned: for instance, Nederveen Pieterse's 1990 study of images of blacks in Western popular culture, Allison Blakely's historical work on the role of race in the modern Dutch nation (1993), Elmer Kolfin and Esther Schreuder (2008), who traced black figurations in Dutch art (and Rebecca Brienen in this volume). The journey before me is to explore the ways in which race became part of the Dutch cultural archive, how it acquired gendered, sexualized and classed meanings during more than four hundred years and how these complex configurations have become intertwined with dominant regimes of truth, which keep on manifesting themselves to this day. I understand racial imaginations to be part of the Dutch psychological and cultural make-up; these imaginations are intertwined with the deepest desires and anxieties of many Dutch people. I will seek to uncover some of the elements of the dominant discourse constructing black women in the Netherlands. bell hooks argues that within U.S. racist discourse, black women are not exclusively depicted as inferior; there is also and often simultaneously jealousy and unspeakable yearning involved (hooks). Is the oscillation between extreme attraction to black women and rejection, inferiorization and relegation to an abject category,—a dominant assemblage constructing black women in the U.S.A.— also pertinent in the Netherlands or do we find a different configuration here?

Systemic and Virulent Psychic Residues of Race

> *To achieve a more adequate and more*
> *emancipatory understanding of difference,*
> *[. . .], we must insist upon the centrality of*
> *history in our analyses.*
> Moglen 204.

Let me first explore the ways in which, in the Dutch context, shared, often unreflected fantasies with regard to race continue to shape the ways in which "we" and "they" are constructed and perceived, while dominant common sense has it that "race" was thoroughly absent in the Netherlands. By engaging with a few varied case studies,

taken from TV, public and everyday life and the literary imagination, I hope to show in this chapter, that race, given all its disparate manifestations, must have been firmly implanted in the cultural imagination, in order to be able to leave such systemic and virulent psychic residues.

The above sketch of the problem seems to call for a psychoanalytical approach. I am mainly interested in psychoanalysis as an ethnography of the *white* psyche, as the concepts of self and other that came into being in psychoanalysis were dependent on the politics of colonial relations. As a "scavenger theorist and methodologist" (Halberstam 13), I prefer to adopt not just a psychoanalytical, but an interdisciplinary framework, actively exploring alternative *grand narratives* in which race, class, gender and sexuality are taken into account (cf. Morrison, *Playing*, Abel et al., Lane, Campbell, Khanna). I will thus be making use of insights from gender and sexuality studies, discourse and narrative analysis, postcolonial theory and psychoanalysis.[3] As I pointed out earlier, little research about everyday narratives representing black women has so far been done in the Netherlands (but see Essed, *Alledaags*, *Everyday*, "Everyday"). While my own work on female black diasporic sexuality has started to look at the representation of black women in Dutch discourses (Wekker, *Politics*, *You Are of Color*), I am for this article also relying on experiential narratives from, racially differentially positioned, Dutch male and female friends. All of these disparate sources point to what could realistically be designated as submerged knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is not part of dominant regimes of truth. Just as Richard Dyer maintains that race is never not in the picture in modern life (1), so sexuality is never not in play when it comes to representing black women, although there are also other representations vying for attention.

Representational regimes of the sexuality of different groups of women do not come into being independently from each other; they are relational (Wekker, *Politics* 250). In contemporary Dutch multi-ethnic society, Islamic women are represented as sexually backward and oppressed, but dominant representational regimes of Islamic women in the West have undergone radical changes from hypersexuality, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to current asexuality (Lutz). Black, that is to say African Diasporic, women are generally seen as "too liberated," with a rampant sexuality, doing it indiscriminately with men and with women, doing it for money, "going where their cunts lead them" (de Wit). Asian sexualities, e.g. the representations of Indo[4] and Thai women, different as they may be, have in common that submissive and ultra-feminine femininities are constructed, longhaired, attractive in traditional ways. White female sexuality seems to be the neutral, normative variety. Thus we see not only a relational structuring of these representations, but there is also a hierarchy operative.

In the next section, 3, I will show three prevalent manifestations of contemporary racism directed at (mostly) black women in the Netherlands. I will read the treatment

of these variously classed black women, fictional and real life-material ones, in light of the repressed colonial archive. Next, in section 4, I will undertake an historical excursion into the Dutch colonial past and speculate about the ways that not only in the colonies, but also in the metropole, a subjectification took place in which sexualized race was centrally deposited in the collective unconscious. I will subsequently, in section 5, present an analysis of the novel *Negerjood in Moederland* by Surinamese-Dutch author Ellen Ombre (2004). I am reading this novel as an illustration of the set of associations, that, as I argue, frequently accrue to black women, no matter what their class background is.

Everyday Narratives of Race and Black Bodies in the Netherlands
Narrative # 1, "suppose she brings a big negro home . . . ."

In November 2008, I was watching a Dutch daily TV show at prime time, "De Wereld Draait Door."[5] The white, male co-host, journalist Martin Bril, is lovingly talking about his two teenage daughters, expressing his expectation that one of these days the oldest one will bring a boyfriend home. Under loud laughter and acclaim, he voices his biggest fear: "suppose she brings a big negro home . . .."

While I do a double-take at the statement, there is no sign whatsoever, either among the audience in the studio or with the other host at the table, Matthijs van Nieuwkerk, of any inappropriateness in uttering this. I imagine that if someone would have made a remark about its racism, the response would have been to ridicule and summarily dismiss it and the claimant. In the first instance, I am struck by the way that "humor" allows Bril to have his cake and eat it, too: the—frankly, remote—possibility that he would be called on his racism is skillfully deflected by his humorous presentation. One way to read the situation in a bit more complicated manner is the following. One could argue that the "humor" arises out of a paradox: the audience is bound by shared images about blacks, images that develop at a very early age.[6] No one dares utter them and then all of a sudden, there is the cheekiness and the audacity of the co-host speaking the unmentionable out loud. The fragment shows, in its simplicity, some important aspects of the everydayness of the gendered and racialized construction of sexuality and the sexual construction of race, with the figure of the mythical "big negro"—and "big" is surely not only pertaining to his height here—still largely intact.[7]

According to a Fanonian reading, what Bril, probably unconsciously, is playing on, is "negrophobia" on the part of white men and women. The phobia associated with blackness is a phobia of sexual anxiety and fear revolving around the image of the black male who is envisaged as possessing an enormous penis. The white male's simultaneous fear and desire in relation to a sexual potency he can never achieve is for Fanon, following Freud, the inevitable by-product of cultural development (Fanon, Doane 216). For both Freud and Fanon, civilization is achieved by the

sublimation of sexuality and since blacks (according to the 19th century revision of the Chain of Being where black people were placed closer to the pole of animality and sexuality) freely indulge in sexuality, they do not only not develop neuroses, but they become the canvas on which the civilized white man projects his fears and fantasies.

Finally, I see this episode as one example of many more that, taken together, may suggest how limited and persistent the stock of images, scenarios, relations and of interpretations is, when it comes to representing black men and women. We need to consider the shared racial and sexual fantasies in the Dutch archive, based on four hundred years of colonial relations, to make sense of everyday, casual chains of signification like these.

Narrative # 2, "why don't you call her mother?"

Sandrine, a thirty-five years old, black playwright and mother of two children in Amsterdam, tells the following story:

> My children do not really look like me; they look like their father and are even lighter than him: white, blond, blue eyes. One day, I went to the playground with my four-year-old-daughter. She fell of the swing. She was crying and screaming and I rushed forward. Another, white, mother got to Elleke before I did. While I tried to comfort Elleke, the other woman kept trying to push me out of the way. At first I did not pay attention to her or to what she was saying, but all of a sudden it sank in that she was shooing me away, saying "why don't you call her mother? Have her mother come here!" I started screaming at her, I could not believe this was happening to me. I was seen as the nanny of my own child, as the domestic worker.[8]

In a similar scenario evolving in the U.S., professor Rhonda Williams, walking in the park with her white lesbian lover's child, is seen by the other white mothers as a nanny, not as the mother of the child (Williams, "Living" 136). There are many variations to this tale of color differences in a nuclear family and the ways in which they are interpreted in the North American and Dutch archives, which do not show fundamental differences in this respect. Dutch research shows that, depending on the age of the family members involved and the circumstances, a white father and his adopted daughter of color, or a white mother and her black adopted son may be misseen as inter-racial lovers with an appreciable age difference, which is, of course, more acceptable in the case of the older white man and his Thai daughter than for the white mother with her Columbian son (Wekker et al., *You Are Of Color* 50–51). There is a different, gendered, valence to the person of color in these configurations: the Thai daughter might easily be taken to be a call girl, semi-prostitute or an import bride, while some agency and desire might be ascribed to the son. White

women in this configuration, through their positioning at the intersection of age, gender, race and sexuality, cannot generally claim much respectability. In any case, my research suggests that the only person who does *not* get problematized is the white male.

What these various family narratives show is that the dominant regime of truth with regard to families is that family members should have the same phenotypes, the same skin color. If they do not and the light-skinned or white child is small, the black mother is transformed into a nanny; when the child is an adult, sexuality inexorably enters the picture and an interracial sexual relationship is constructed. A white child thus supposedly has a white, upper-class mother, who is working outside the home, and she has for the time being a black woman to look after her. When it comes to young, black children with white mothers, experiential evidence indicates that the dominant script is that the children are assumed to be adopted. It is noteworthy that the cognitive dissonance caused by these multiracial dyads is "solved" by assigning a dependent, subordinate role to the blacks, both to the children and to the mother: they are adopted and she is hired as a nanny. Thus, agency is granted to whites. In dyads where the blacks are adults, again agency is given to the whites, who, after all, choose to have an exotic lover.

Curiously, knowledge about the intense interracial 'mixing' on which colonial societies like Suriname and the Indies were built, i.e. the underlying sexual privileges that enabled white men to often have parallel white and black families, did not become part of the cultural archive of white Dutch people. I would conjecture that the fractured, white Dutch psyche cemented only those bodies of knowledge into the archive that were favorable to the own group and disavowed those facts that were unfavorable, that spoke of violence, of forced sexual contacts and of injustice. What all these family narratives, finally, have in common is a silent, heteronormative contract.

Narrative # 3, "insulting an officer in function."

In October 2004, I got on the subway in my neighborhood, the South East of Amsterdam, to go to a meeting, at noon, with the builders of our soon-to-be finished new apartment. Still talking on my mobile phone with my office, I walked from my home to the subway station and realized there that I had managed to leave my bag at home and so I did not have my public transport pass, but I also did not have money to buy a ticket for the two stops that I needed to travel. I was not too perturbed by the situation, because I knew that chances were relatively slim for me to be stopped on this short trajectory. On my way out at the station of destination, Ganzenhoef, however, I was stopped by several controllers of the municipal transport system (Gemeentelijk vervoersbedrijf, GVB; Municipal Transport Company), who wanted to record my personal data so that I would eventually pay a fine. This took appreciably

more time than I could afford and I made some irritated remarks about the slowness of the process. The GVB officer in charge called in some police officers, who were waiting just outside of the station. When they wanted to forcibly move me into a space under the escalator, I resisted the three police officers who were handling me and when they persisted, I called them "fascists." I was then taken in an armored police van to the nearest police station, Bureau Flierbosdreef.

Upon my arrival at the police station, a gendered scenario unfolded, because two men were removed from a cell and I, apparently the only female detainee, was put into it and given a blanket. I had to hand in my shoes, my watch and my mobile phone. Pretty soon, a police officer came to ask everyone in the holding cells what we wanted to eat: fried rice or fried noodles. I declined, but the offer of food seemed to signify that I was in there for the long haul. All the time, whenever a police officer showed up in the corridor adjoining the cells, I kept protesting against this treatment, adding that I had urgent matters to attend to, but there was no urgency at all in starting the processing. The police treated everyone as if they were jobless, anyway, of no account and with nowhere to go. One officer commented with a smirk on his face that they had the right to hold me for six hours, without my having access to a lawyer.

A good while later, a deputy prosecutor came to process my case and told me that I was being detained for "insulting an officer in function" and that I would have to pay a fine of €220. It was only at this point that I told the officer that I was a university professor and that I had missed an important appointment. I was immediately released—by then it was past four p.m. In the new circumstances, uplifted by class, an officer called my partner, since we had been supposed to meet each other at the new apartment at noon. Fate would have it that upon my leaving the police office, the prosecutor gave me an incorrect form instructing me to pay a much smaller fine: only €22, which I did. I never heard anything about it again.

Noteworthy about this deeply humiliating scenario is, first, that in the South East of Amsterdam, ninety-five percent of the population is black, thus everyone in the subway and everyone in prison was black, while all officers featuring in this story, of the GVB and of the police, were white and overwhelmingly male. The South East was at the time one of two neighborhoods in Amsterdam were people could be frisked at random for carrying fire arms, which, coupled with the disproportionate gendered and racialized division of public labor, makes for an explosive situation in encounters between authorities and citizens. Second, in this narrative, the main theme is not sexualization of me as a black women, but criminalization: I evidently was seen as a troublesome black woman, badly needing disciplining. No matter what class position I imagined I occupied, in its intersection with race and gender, I was, in the eyes of the white police officers, by definition lower class, jobless, having no urgent matters to attend to, of no significance at all. In this situation, however differently the

co-constructing axes of gender, race and class might have weighed in for the police officers and me, it played out in a manner in which my assumed class position was trumped by the unearned privileges of their gendered and racial positionings. Third, for the longest time, I have been reluctant to talk—outside of my inner circle—or write about this experience, out of a misconceived sense of shame, that this event would badly reflect on me. I connect my reluctance to W.E.B. Dubois' (1903) insights about the survival value of "double consciousness" for blacks in any white dominated society. In particular, it points to the *couleur locale*, the imbricatedness of each local "double consciousness"-system with local dominant ways of (not) dealing with race. In the Dutch situation, where there is virtually no oral transmission of knowledge about racism between or within generations of black people, where more or less sophisticated discourses with regard to race and racism are severely lacking, a prominent reaction among blacks (and whites alike) is to deny the seriousness of the racist event, to belittle it, to hold it up to impossible definitional standards, to analyze it to pieces, so that it evaporates into thin air (Essed, *Alledaags*, *Everyday*). Among Afro-Surinamese people specifically, there is, in addition, an attitude that prescribes that one should "be above" discriminatory treatment, that one should somehow have the power, the strength of mind, not to allow others to discriminate against one. Ironically, this places the burden of survival, of picking up one's pieces, with the aggrieved party. We are, thus, dealing in the Netherlands with a situation in which subjects and objects of racism keep each other in a delicate balance and where the same evasive discursive repertoires with regard to race are shared. It is a system where both whites and blacks are overwhelmingly invested in denying and disavowing racism. I connect this syndrome, which I have called *Innocence Unltd.* (Wekker, *forthcoming*) to the strong Dutch attachment to a self-image that stresses being a tolerant, small and just ethical nation and that foregrounds being a victim rather than a perpetrator of (inter-)national violence.

In this section, I have shown three commonly occurring examples of racism which deal with black (men and) women in everyday encounters and discourses in the Netherlands: sexualization, relegation to the category of domestic servant/nanny, in general inferiorization, and criminalization. I make no claims about the frequency and the distribution of these events in the myriad micro encounters that Dutch society knows on a daily basis, but they do conform to patterns that have been pointed out in the literature (cf. Essed, *Everyday* 232–36, Lubiano, Williams, *Seeing* 29–43, Williams, "Living" 140). It is mostly the quiet racism that blacks encounter on a daily basis, and that whites often are ignorant about. I read these configurations in light of deep-seated patterns in the cultural archive. In the next section, I will explore how particular bodies of knowledge pertaining to sexualized racism, but perhaps more importantly the principles conjugating this racial grammar, were deposited and cemented in the cultural archive.[9]

History and Sexualized Racism

It is beyond the fifty degree longitude that one starts to become conscious of what it means to be European (Malleret 1).

In order to get access to this submerged continent, we need to take cognizance of the Dutch cultural imagination, which is based on an archive that has strong reflexes to belittle, deny and erase four hundred years of colonization of its overseas territories, among which South Africa, Indonesia, Suriname and the Dutch Antilles were its most noteworthy possessions. In the Netherlands, there have been several efforts, emanating from different circles and at different levels, to open the debate on the nature and the consequences of its colonial history. Thus, for example, six of the windows in the Dutch historical canon refer to colonialism, slavery, and multiculturalization, yet still this history has not been systematically worked through at a national level, much less that debates and discussions about current Dutch multicultural society are profitably informed by insights about Dutch Empire.[10,11]

The task at hand, the exploration of sexualized racism in the cultural archive, is complicated by two things: first, the compartmentalization of the discipline of history in a metropolitan and a colonial counterpart, has so far in a Dutch context by and large precluded keeping the two in one analytical field (Stoler xi). This means that Dutch national history and colonial history have long been studied in "splendid isolation" from each other, thus making it very difficult, for instance, to study the genealogy of a white Dutch psyche in the context of colonialism. Furthermore, the differential material weight given to the possession of the East Indies, the jewel in the Dutch crown, is directly correlated with the size and the scope of the bodies of knowledge that were produced, pertaining to the other colonies. Nevertheless there are some promising trajectories, from different disciplines and genres, that can be undertaken to get closer to the set task.

In her award winning novel *Beloved*, Toni Morrison offers a literary reading of what happened to the white psyche, during slavery. In line with my own project, she uses psychoanalytic insights as an approach to an ethnography of the white psyche. She describes it in unforgettable images. In the following passage Stamp Paid, a former slave, is focalizing:

White people believed that whatever the manners, under every dark skin was a jungle. Swift unnavigable waters, swinging screaming baboons, sleeping snakes, red gums ready for their sweet white blood. In a way, he thought, they were right. The more colored people spent their strength trying to convince them how gentle they were, how clever and loving, how human, the more they used themselves up to persuade whites of something Negroes believed could not be questioned, the deeper and more tangled the jungle grew inside. But it wasn't the jungle blacks brought with them to this place from the other (livable) place. It was the jungle

whitefolks planted in them. And it grew. It spread . . . (U)ntil it invaded the whites who had made it. Touched them every one. Changed and altered them. Made them bloody, silly, worse than even they wanted to be, so scared were they of the jungle they had made. The screaming baboon lived under their own white skin; the red gums were their own. (198–99)

What Stamp Paid is illustrating here, is that in fixing the Other, one fixes oneself as the Other of the Other (Moglen 205). While black men and women are struggling to throw off the images that whites have made of them, white men and women are equally bound to and implicated in these representations which stem from their own irrational anxieties and fears. Their own desubjectifaction and dehumanization is sealed by these images (208). Thus, what I remarked upon earlier in narrative # 3, that is, the balancing act between perpetrators and victims inherent in acts and processes of racism, keeps both parties—when racism remains submerged, not-spoken, with either or both parties in denial—fixed.

Elsewhere, Toni Morrison has again addressed what slavery did to the white psy-che. In an interview with Paul Gilroy, she states:

Slavery broke the world in half, it broke it in every way. It broke Europe. It made them into something else, it made them slave masters, it made them crazy. You can't do that for hundreds of years and it not take a toll. They had to dehumanize, not just the slaves but themselves. They have had to reconstruct everything in order to make that system appear true. (Gilroy 178)

Zooming in more closely on sexualized racism, historian and sociologist Rudolf van Lier in his study on the Dutch colony of Suriname, *Samenleving in een Grensgebied* (1977, 1949) repeatedly draws attention to the psychological content and the con-sequences of the system of slavery, with its oppression and dehumanization of the enslaved. He is especially interested, in Toni Morrison's words, in "the dreamer of the dream" (*Playing* 17), what the system did to the subject of the racialized discourses constructing blacks as inferior, intellectually backward, lazy, sexually insa-tiable and always available, and the white self as superior and full of entitlement. Generally, like in other plantation colonies, van Lier describes colonizers in Suriname as being characterized by

a very tenuous connection to the country, an animus revertendi (the spirit to leave as fast as one could, once one had amassed enough riches, GW), a weak tra-dition, weak social control by law or mores, the secular character of the group, orig-inating from a Christian motherland, the quick social mobility of a few persons, while simultaneously a strong hierarchy was maintained, shadowing the class soci-ety overseas. (37)

After 1775, when a serious economic crisis hit the colony, absenteism among plantation owners rose, the number of white women also declined dramatically and these white families were replaced by white directors and managers, who preferably were single. It was official company policy of the Society of Suriname, the owners of the colony, that its employees were discouraged from marrying women from the Netherlands. They were threatened with being dismissed, if they expressed such a desire. Like in the Indies, where "local women were enlisted to provide the services that allowed civil servants and planters to maintain a European standard of living and 'acclimatized to the tropics at little cost'" (Stoler 45), sexual relations between European men and local women were thus encouraged by the state in Suriname, too. Notwithstanding the official prohibitions on "carnal conversations" between white men and black women, as recorded in the West Indian *Plakkaatboek*, or the Placard book (Schiltkamp en de Smidt), these men had free sexual access to enslaved and freed black women, whether against or according to the latter's will, and the widespread institution of so-called "Surinamese marriage," concubinage arrangements of various kinds, blossomed. No wonder that van Lier describes this frontier society and the interaction among its inhabitants, after 1775, as typically male and controlled by men: an extremely individualist, hierarchical, race and gender-inflected society.

Among the striking psychological traits of the colonizers that van Lier mentions are, from the colonizers' youth on, an unlimited hubris, pride, an extravagant feeling of self-worth, an excessive fear for the "multitude of slaves," coupled with cruelty towards them and a loss of respect for the value of human life (38, 39). Indeed, van Lier speaks of a universe in which sadism on the part of the masters and masochism from the slaves—which is not very strongly supported by evidence—kept each other in balance. The system of slavery was an environment that was conducive to the emergence of psychopathological personalities. Even in normal personalities it led to psychopathologization (45).

A third, encompassing and hailing perspective is offered by those postcolonial scholars who indeed place metropole and colony in one analytical field and who understand the emergence of the nineteenth century metropolitan bourgeois self as a racialized self: "race became the organizing grammar of an imperial order in which modernity, the civilizing mission and the 'measure of man' were framed" (Stoler 27). Thus, race is not only a constituting presence in the colonies, but even more principally in the metropole, where all kinds of class, national and sexual differences are thought of in terms of race. While it is not possible within the confines of this article to give these new understandings their full due, these insights led scholars to ask different sets of questions: How would it be possible to think of the white psyche under slavery, that system of madness, that pathological psychic and libidinal economy, instilled and set in motion in personality structures at very young ages, as containable and quaranteenable to the geophysics of the colonies? Globalization, the travel

of people, ideas, images and personalities was the order of the day as much from the sixteenth century on, as it is today, with other forms and intensities. The Netherlands was a diasporic space (Brah) from the early days of colonialism, when the cultural archive of the Dutch was filled, from various sites, with images in which blackness was suffused with sexuality. Knowledge of the Other got transmitted to the metropole by travel and narratives of colonial citizens; by photography and racial images on all kinds of colonial products, soap, cocoa, coffee, sugar; by the world exhibitions of "savages" in which a sexualized other and an asexual self could be constructed. (Nederveen Pieterse 188–210, Moore and Wekker 249–50). At the same time—and this is habitually overlooked in traditional approaches to historical knowledge production—these "knowledges" found fertile and looping ground in the metropole, where ideas about a healthy, vigorous, bourgeois body, full of self-mastery and self-control, were already predicated upon racialized, sexualized other bodies. One of Stoler's main points is that the ever-threatened, anxious superiority of the white self needed to be stabilized, that anxious white identity needed to be strengthened incessantly; which is connected to the excessive physical and psychic violence perpetrated against blacks (Stoler). This volatile concoction of putting the self in a superior position, a position reinforced by the sexualization of the Other (among other strategies) is still at the heart of Dutch racism. At the same time, it is the least acknowledged dimension.

While there is a widespread self-flattering understanding that insists that the Netherlands is "naturally" and historically non–racist (see the chapter by De Leeuw en van Wichelen in this volume), some of the most immediate expressions of racism are overlooked. Images of black—in the sense of African derived-bodies, male and female, are daily, automatically and immediately aligned with sexuality. In the next section, which presents an analysis of the novel *Negerjood in Moederland*, I will discuss a case in which a black female protagonist is, indeed, sexualized and criminalized, but also how, in this representation, racialized, sexualized discourses strongly determine the intimate relationships between marriage partners, and, finally, how they play a role in white male bonding.

Negerjood in Moederland

In *Negerjood* (2004), Surinamese-Dutch author Ellen Ombre tells the story of the Surinamese Dankerlui family, that has migrated to the Netherlands in the early 60s, consisting of the Afro-Surinamese father, Jewish mother, their son Richenel—who is largely an absent presence—and daughter Hannah, who is 12 years old when they settle in Amstelveen, one of the posh suburbs of Amsterdam. It is significant that the family chooses to settle in this suburb, an unusual one for Surinamese families and indicative of their aspirations for a better life than they actually get. Father is a public servant, who, although the specifics never become entirely clear, has lost

appreciable status in the professional sphere by the migration to the Netherlands and as a consequence is treated as a second class citizen by his wife at home. His hobby is to collect books in second-hand bookstores, but his wife does not allow him to keep these in the house, condemning him to a life in the cellar, where he spends his leisure time reading and smoking. The mother is a complaining, unhappy, domineering housewife, eager to see her daughter married at the youngest possible age, so that she does not come home pregnant. Hannah depicts herself as her father's daughter, she is eager to learn and ambitious, while she shares a keen interest in Jewish matters with her mother. When she is 14, she starts working in a Jewish home for the elderly in Amsterdam, becomes a member of a Jewish youth club and starts to frequent the American Hotel, home to bohemians, intellectuals and rebels. It is here that she meets a white Jewish anthropology student, Chaim, who starts courting her, even though she is 13 years younger. The narrative jumps back and forth in time and chronicles, with Hannah as focalizer, her coming of age, her marriage to and breakup with Chaim, who eventually becomes a professor in anthropology.

This rather transparent *roman à clef* is the portrait of an upper-class mixed marriage of a black woman and a white man not unlike that of Ombre herself. It brilliantly shows this marriage's wear and tear, inflected by race politics, over the years. Especially noteworthy in the framework of sexualized racism, is a scene, when Hannah and Chaim after having seen the movie *Apocalypse Now*, walk on the Rembrandtplein, arms about each other's shoulders. Suddenly a police van grinds to a halt and Hannah is addressed by two policemen:

> *'You, get in, yes, you!' They roughly took ahold of her, one on each side.*
> *'Why, what is the matter,' she asked alarmed.*
> *'Shut up! Get in!'*
> *She was pushed into the bus. She resisted. A third policeman who was sitting in front, next to the driver, came to his colleagues' help. The arrest caused a crowd to gather.*
> *'Serves her right, let them go whore around in the Red Light district,' somebody shouted, 'the city is going to the dogs.'*
> *'She is my wife,' Chaim shouted, bewildered.*
> *'I bet,' one of the officers responded, 'that's what they all say'*
> *(Ombre* 114*, my translation, GW)*

In the nightmare that follows, Chaim has to wait outside the van. He beseeches her not to put up any resistance, because they will knock all her teeth out of her mouth. In this moment of crisis, he seems to think first and foremost of her beauty that should not be destroyed, while Hannah, on the verge of fainting, is interrogated in the van. When Hannah mentions her profession, community worker, the feverish

enthousiasm of the policemen to arrest her dissipates and she is released, after a threat not to show her face in this neighbourhood any more. Hannah runs all the way home, where she hides under the dining room table, while Chaim calls the police. He thinks that Hannah should get over it, after all, the square where the incident took place has become a meeting place of prostitutes, who are addicted to heroin. The policemen were just following orders to clean up the square and of course when they saw a black woman . . . The next day, the two policemen came to the house to apologize. Hannah is at a loss for words and only becomes angry when they have left. She calls Chaim at his office. He asks:

> 'Aren' t you relieved?'
> 'Relieved? Those sons of bitches. . . . . They should pay for this.'
>   He asked why. She was going too far. 'Pay?? Pay for what? Are they supposed to stand on their hands? What the hell did they do wrong?' Annoyed, he pointed out that they had not harmed her. Things could have gone differently. Ok, so they had seen her as a prostitute: But what was wrong with prostitutes, anyway? He had done what he could. She had to stop obsessing about the incident, stop nagging about it. 'Are you still there. Say something?' 'What shall I say?' 'Thank me, at least, I would say. I have had to be on the phone for hours to arrange this. Or do you think that I do not have anything better to do?' (Ombre 118, my translation, GW)

I will make two remarks about this fragment. First, it is important to keep in mind that this is a narrative, a representation of a mixed marriage by the author. Her literary imagination induces her to make particular choices and not others, to represent a woman like herself, a man like her former husband and the micro-politics of a mixed marriage in particular ways. Thus, the truth value of the work is not at stake. In this light, it is striking how the themes of sexualization and criminalization return in this narrative, just as criminalization was a major theme in narrative # 3 that I cited above. Essed (Alledaags, Everyday) has noted earlier that the experience of many black women in the Netherlands is that they are being seen as a prostitute. In this passage—until she mentions her profession—again, like we saw earlier, it does not matter at all to which class Hannah belongs. In combination with the location and her white male companion, the policemen perceive her as a sex worker. Chaim's presence signifies and heightens Hannah's being read as a prostitute. Class dissipates in view of the combined package of her gender/race and her sexualization/criminalization. Again, we recognize how class falls out of the picture, as we saw in case study # 3, when white officers are arresting blacks. It is only in the last sequence when, through the intervention of Chaim, the policemen come to apologize, that her class status is acknowledged. For many white people, there is an automatic equivalence between being black and being lower class; these two axes of signification are closely related,

quasi-identical. Retaining the connection between whiteness and class superiority, i.e. securing white superiority, requires automatically assigning blacks to lower-class status. In the anxious white mind, which is operating according to the nineteenth century racist logic that black people are closer to the body/sexuality on the body/mind, sexuality/rationality scale, and on the basis of projection, one of the secure ways to accomplish white superiority is to keep the chain of associations between lower-class status, blackness and sexuality, which for women comes together in the figure of the prostitute and for men, as we saw in narrative # 1, in being overendowed, intact. Thus, it is understandable that this complex figuration shows itself both in real life as well as in literary artefacts.

Second, it is striking that Chaim is represented as essentially understanding the policemen and thinking that they acted correctly. At the very least, he thinks that it wasn't a big deal. This is all the more noteworthy since Chaim is both a professor of Social Sciences and Jewish and, on both counts, the reader suspects that he knows about processes of in- and exclusion. The narrator thus suggests that knowledge of racism, and the experience of belonging to a threatened group are no guarantees for the understanding of everyday racism, let alone for antiracist action. It is worth contemplating whether the narrator wants us to understand that Chaim's way of coping with this intolerable situation, is to distance himself psychically from Hannah and, in order to be considered as one of the good old white boys, to deny the racism. Thus, it can be concluded that a form of white male bonding on the basis of sexualized racism is being represented here and that even one's closest kin can go along with that strategy, to secure their own safety. The operative mechanism is that someone who in one or more major respects deviates from the normative, unmarked position, is invited to go along with the dominant discourse which proclaims egalitarianism, i.e. to deny the racism, the sexism or the homophobia present, even though s/he might be targeted her-/himself. In *Terrorist Assemblages*, Jasbir Puar explains how this works for affluent white gay men, who, in exchange for acceptance by dominant, heterosexual, society, are encouraged to embrace an Islamophobic discourse. The fact that, in the Netherlands too, a poll of the readers of the largest (mainly white) gay magazine resulted in the election of the rising, extreme-right, racist PVV as the most popular party, calls for a similar analysis.[12]

Conclusion

My analysis has only just started to scratch the surface of this enormous terrain, that has laid fallow for such a long period, and, disconcertingly, the difficulty was not lack of pertinent material, but its abundance. We are confronted with the tenacity of forces which have shaped the white Dutch psyche over a long period of four hundred years of colonialism. Projection, denial and disavowal with regard to race are main mechanisms driving that psyche, while sexualization, criminalization and relegation

of black women (and men) to an inferior, dependent status are the main images that are available. The connection with sexuality is made, no matter what the class background is of black women (and men). Some of the mechanisms that bell hooks, Toni Morrison and other black American authors have described for the representation of black women in USA, are also operative in the Netherlands. Yet, there is also a specificity to Dutch racism, which needs further exploration but includes the Dutch inability to seriously work through and come to terms with its colonial past, its strong attachment to a self-image that stresses being an innocent and just, small ethical nation, being a victim rather than a perpetrator of violence; the lack of strong emancipatory, anti-racist movements, which I connected to the specific nature of black Dutch "double consciousness"; the Dutch fascination with the black female body, and a specific kind of Dutch whiteness, which establishes itself by rekindling ancient and derogatory images about blacks.

We need to work at making an inventory of the stock of images, scenarios and scripts, involving black women (and men), and to see to it that the sexualized chains of associations are no longer the only ones circulating.

Notes

1. With thanks to my colleagues, friends, PhD candidates and my niece Fenneke Wekker who were willing to talk with me and explore this new research topic. A special thank you to Frances Gouda and to the excellent editing work done by Isabel Hoving. I also wish to thank prof. Nina Lykke and my fellow scholars at GEXcel at Linköping University, Sweden, where I wrote the first draft of this article during a short sabbatical in November and Dcecember 2009. GEXcel is the "Centre of Gender Excellence – Gendering Excellence: Towards a European Centre of Excellence in Transnational and Transdisciplinary Studies of Changing Gender Relations, Intersectionalities and Embodiment."

2. This chapter is part of a bigger book project, provisionally entitled *Innocence Unltd*., and it explores race and its intersections in the Dutch cultural universe (Wekker, forthcoming).

3. As far as psychoanalysis is concerned, I seek my inspiration in the many theorists who, since the 1930s, have explored the potential of the problematic field of psychoanalysis for the exploration of colonialism and racism. The master project of psychoanalysis has been the theorization of sexual difference, which was taken to be the foundational psychological and social drama of "our" culture, and in its early years it did not problematize whiteness, but rather universalized, and "naturalized" it. From the late 1930s and 1940s onwards, however, and especially in the 1950s, important (though not always uncontested) psychoanalytical studies of colonization began to appear by scholars of whom many lived in the Caribbean, in Africa or in the black European Diaspora (Wulf Sachs 1937, Lillian Smith 1949, Dominique-Octave Mannoni 1950, Aimé Césaire 1950, Suzanne Césaire 2009, Frantz Fanon 1952 and Albert Memmi 1957, etc.). After the 1980s, when Fanon's work also became a source of inspiration for the booming Anglophone postcolonial scholarship, psychoanalysis was no longer seen as necessarily in support of colonialism, as Christopher Lane states. Psychoanalysis could even serve as an important analytical contribution to the critique of colonial discourse and racism—though not without thorough revision. Psychoanalysis, according to Doane, "unshaken in its premises, cannot be *applied* to issues of racial difference but must be radically destabilized by them" (1991: 216).

4. 'Indo' refers to the descendants of white Dutch and indigenous people from the East Indies, who during the four hundred years of Dutch colonial rule of Indonesia formed a separate stratified layer in the population (see Pattynama 1997). Around and after the Independence of Indonesia (1949), they were forced to relocate to the Netherlands. See the chapter by Esther Captain in this book.

5. DWDD, or "De Wereld Draait Door," is a play on words. Literally, it means `The world goes on turning," while metaphorically it indicates that the world is going crazy. In an interview Bril later gave, he stated that his daughter now had a boyfriend, a Russian, who was much less scary than the big negro, whom, he added, he was wary of because "he might hurt his daughter" (Dagelet). Journalist Martin Bril, who was much beloved, died in April 2009. Not surprisingly, in none of his obituaries there was any mention of this episode.

6. I do not know of research in the Dutch context that establishes at which age children start to notice race differences, although experiential evidence suggests it to be between 4–6 years. In an American context, Patricia Williams movingly describes the process by which her 4-year old son is introduced to race difference in kindergarten (Williams, *Seeing* 1–14).

7. According to Jan Nederveen Pieterse (172), though, the USA is more sexually preoccupied with black men, while Europe usually focuses more—albeit ambiguously—on black women. Here, inevitably, the almost hysterical white male obsession with the figures of Josephine Baker, and more recently, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, come to mind. A sustained comparison of the reception of and the widespread fascination with these two figurations in France and the Netherlands would

yield important insights about the white male Imaginary. I will have to postpone that exercise, also due to space considerations, to the project *Innocence Unltd.*, see note 2.

8. From an interview with FW, in August 2009.

9. In Wekker, "Gender," I have given another example and analysis of the systemic inferiorization of black women in public life in the Netherlands.

10. The statement by Prime Minster Jan Peter Balkenende in November 2006 that "we should return to the VOC mentality"—pertaining to the mentality of the United East Indian Company, the body governing the East Indies during colonial times—is exemplary in this regard.

11. Possibly the first such debate in the Netherlands took place on May 20, 2011, at the noteworthy symposium "Shared Cultural Heritage: Theory and Practice in Mirror Image," at the Moluccan Musem in Utrecht. Not only did academics, curators and artists focused on postcoloniality interlocute at this symposium, but also Dutch national history and the histories of the Dutch East Indies and Suriname and the Antilles were brought in one analytical plain, seeking to map the traces that Dutch colonial history has left both in the Netherlands and in these former colonies.

12. Readers of Gay Krant choose the PVV as the most popular party: http://www.gk.nl/index. php?id=9&a=bericht&bericht=8446&markeer =pvv (last access on May 31, 2011).

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Types and Stereotypes: Zwarte Piet and his Early Modern Sources

Rebecca P. Brienen

On a recent December afternoon outside of Miami, I watched a white sailboat displaying a Dutch flag glide gently into a small marina. What made this boat stand out among the others was not the flag, but the fact that it was carrying three costumed figures: Sinterklaas or Saint Nicholas, the gift-giving saint of Dutch tradition (upon which the American Santa Claus is based) and his two Zwarte Piet (Black Peter) helpers.[1] A Dutch and American crowd, which included me, my two young daughters, and my husband, viewed the Sint and his helpers from the balcony of a club house. Both children and adults broke into Sinterklaas songs and waved enthusiastically at the costumed figures below. My husband took pictures, careful to frame the figures against the palm trees, manatee warning signs, and tropical waters, so family members back in the Netherlands could also marvel at the incongruity of this manifestation. As the red-robed, bearded, and bishop-like Sint and his merry, dancing attendants disembarked, I could not help but wonder what the non-Dutch affiliated audience of boaters and passersby could possibly make of this spectacle, especially the two Piet figures, played by white women in blackface with dark curly wigs (fig. 1).

As a North American, a participant in the festivities around the Sinterklaas holiday, and a scholar of early modern Dutch art, I have always found the Zwarte Piet phenomenon both fascinating and unsettling, particularly since many of the images that support it are close to the stereotypical representations of blacks propagated by the hugely popular minstrel shows in the United States and Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (fig. 2). I was nonetheless acutely aware that any critique of these happy, go-lucky, and somewhat naughty Zwarte Pieten would not be welcome at this Sinterklaas party for Dutch expatriates and their families in South

Figure 1   M. W. Brienen, *Sinterklaas, Zwarte Piet, and a Manatee Sign*, December, 2009. Digital Photo. Collection of author.

Figure 2   Roland Hols, *Dutch Sinterklaas Flag*, 2009. Collection of author.

Florida. While there is criticism in the Netherlands of Zwarte Piet, many Dutch adults defend the demeanor and "black" appearance of this clown-like figure, declaring that no harm is intended—Piet is, after all, beloved by children, to whom he distributes goodies as part of the Sinterklaas festivities on December 5th.[2] This holiday is a traditional family ritual for many in the Netherlands: in November parents take their children to view the arrival of Sinterklaas by boat with his many Zwarte Piet helpers, and later adult family members play the parts of the Sint and Piet during the celebration in the home. It is clear, nonetheless, that what is taken by many to be an integral part of Dutch culture in the Netherlands may appear highly artificial, peculiar, and even racist when performed abroad. It is for these reasons that my contribution to this volume explores the popular figure of Zwarte Piet and his problematic visual history.

Zwarte Piet is, of course, not an isolated phenomenon; the images and performances of this figure are part of a larger body of representations that make up the historical image of the black in Dutch visual culture. Exhibitions and publications since the late 1980s, including "Wit over Zwart" (White on Black) at the Tropenmuseum in Amsterdam (1989–90), curated by Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Allison Blakely's seminal book from 1993, *Blacks in the Dutch World: The Evolution of Racial Imagery in a Modern Society*, and the recent "Black is Beautiful: Rubens to Dumas" show at the Nieuwe Kerk in Amsterdam (2008), have done much to both recover and bring attention to the complexity and importance of this long marginalized material. A number of visual types/stereotypes associated with blacks in western art may be addressed via

Sinterklaas' helper and his representational history: the black as servant or slave; the black as foreign and exotic; the black as gift giver; and the black as entertainer (Erickson; Pieterse 124–66). This chapter focuses on the earliest images of Zwarte Piet, nineteenth-century book illustrations, and their important connection (both formally and conceptually) to early modern paintings that include black servants and slaves. Is it is my intention that this art historical discussion will contribute to the difficult and often heated debate (addressed by others in this volume) on the extent to which Zwarte Piet and his imagery may be considered part of a racist discourse.

Research demonstrates that the current visual form for Zwarte Piet draws heavily on the iconography established in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by means of illustrations in Dutch children's books and song collections, beginning with Jan Schenkman's c. 1848, *Sinterklaas en zijn knecht* (with multiple editions into the twentieth century), F.G. Bos's *Groot Sint-Nicolaas boek* (c. 1886), and later works such as A.B. Tienhoven's 1928 *Sinterklaas kapoentje,* among many others. Schenkman is generally credited with launching the "modern" version of the Sinterklaas celebration: he created some of the most famous songs and introduced the idea of the steamboat required to ferry Sinterklaas from his home in Spain to the Netherlands. He may also be credited with both introducing the figure of Sint's "knecht" or servant to Dutch audiences and, most importantly for this essay, establishing that this figure was a black youth (Boers-Dirks 8; Booy 25–26). As many scholars have pointed out, *only* in the Netherlands and Belgium did Sinterklaas's attendant become African, rather than demonic and/or dirty from climbing down chimneys, both of which are more typical of the Germanic tradition (Booy 8–15; Hofstede 369).

In early editions of Schenkman's *Sinterklaas*, Zwarte Piet appears either hatless with loose, striped trousers and a shirt that recall the clothing of West Indian or Turkish slaves or in elegant, courtly dress (figs. 3, 4).[3] He consistently assumes a subservient but physically active role—peering through windows, carrying heavy packages, helping Sinterklaas stuff naughty children into sacks, and packing books.

It is quite probable that Zwarte Piet was understood to be Sinterklaas' slave by mid-nineteenth century audiences; slavery still existed in the Dutch colonial world and for readers his blackness could have connected him to Surinam, where slavery was abolished only in 1863.

The nineteenth-century images of Zwarte Piet addressed above are not, it should be noted, negative or exaggerated with respect to his racial phenotype. Over time, however, illustrators added to and altered the visual tradition for Zwarte Piet, responding to the hardening of racial categories and hierarchies that occurred during the nineteenth century. Blacks in early twentieth-century popular culture in the west are frequently pictured as stupid and eager to please: a diminished or child-like mental capacity is suggested by foolish grins, wide open round eyes, and a subservient demeanor (Pieterse 152–65; Jahoda 131–63). "Scientific" arguments put forth by

Figure 3 *St. Nikolaas and his helper*, illustration to Jan Schenkman, *Sinterklaas en zijn knecht*, ca 1848. Color lithograph. Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague.

Figure 4 *Sinterklaas and his helper in the bookstore,* illustration to Jan Schenkman, *Sinterklaas en zijn knecht*, ca 1850. Color lithograph. Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague.

Figure 5 *Wm. H. West's Big Minstrel Jubilee: Billy Van, the Monologue Comedian,* 1900. Color lithograph poster. Minstrel Show Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

influential theorists on race in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries included the idea that blacks were arrested in terms of their development and were therefore ruled by base desires and impulses, rather than reason, as well as the idea that blacks were not members of the same species as white people, but were rather closer to apes. Opinions like these were used to justify slavery, colonial rule, and segregation into the twentieth century (Jahoda 63–96). In images that support these beliefs, blacks have exaggerated features, from comically large lips, to huge, flat noses, to elongated arms, which make them look bestial and ugly, as compared to a white Greco-Roman ideal of beauty, intelligence, and physical perfection.[4] The American minstrel shows of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which whites (and blacks) performed as "black" musicians, comedians, and entertainers were also part of this racist discourse, and promoted the stereotype that African Americans were "happy-go-lucky dancing, singing, joking buffoons" (Dormon 451) (fig. 5).

Although the illustrations to Schenkman's book, discussed above, do not make Zwarte Piet into a figure of disgust, there are some telling changes to his imagery that appear in the first decades of the twentieth century. The cruder facial features, a solid (monotone) black skin color, and thick, prominent, bright red lips (fig. 6), that

Figure 6 *Sinterklaas and his helper in the bookstore,* illustration to Jan
Schenkman, *Sinterklaas en zijn knecht*, ca 1900. Color lithograph. Koninklijke
Bibliotheek, The Hague.

are present in this illustration to *Sinterklaas en zijn knecht* from around 1900, for
example, may be linked to the black face tradition of the minstrel shows and the
stereotypes of blacks addressed above.

The golliwog (also spelled golliwogg), a black doll that is both beloved and reviled
in Great Britain is also a product of this period. Introduced as one of the main char-
acters in a children's book, *The Adventures of Two Dutch Dolls and a Golliwogg*
(London 1895), the golliwog is the 1893 invention of the American-British painter
Florence Kate Upton, who illustrated the book using an old black "nigger" doll from
the United States and two wooden Dutch dolls as models (fig. 7) (Lyttelton 9–10).

In Fred Langeler's illustrations to Tienhoven's *Sinterklaas Kapoentje* from the late
1920s, Piet has taken on a visual form that is rather close to that of the golliwog: a
round-eyed, big lipped, clown-like caricature of a young black man (fig. 8). However,
unlike the suit and bow tie of the golliwog, which are directly indebted to minstrel-
show iconography, here Piet wears the clothing of a "Renaissance" courtier, including
a feathered, beret-like hat, a brightly colored doublet with a lace collar, paned trunk
hose, and tights.[5] The exaggerated racial characterization, courtly costume, and
cheerful countenance of the attendant in Langeler's illustration are the favored visual
form for Zwarte Piet today, both in the Netherlands and abroad.

Zwarte Piet's racial identity was indisputably shaped during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, but one should not overlook the significance of the

Figure 7   Florence Kate Upton, *Golliwog and his Friends,* illustration to
The Adventures of two Dutch Dolls and a Golliwogg, 1895. Color lithograph.

Figure 8   Freddie Langeler, *Sinterklaas and his helper at the bakery,* illustration to
A.B. Tienhoven, *Sinterklaas Kapoentje,* 1928. Color lithograph.

early modern contribution to his iconography. First, the often elaborate clothing he wears is directly inspired by representations of blacks in European paintings: from images of black attendants in portraits and still lifes, to representations of the black magus in epiphany scenes (Boers-Dirks 11–12; Booy 30–32). As such it is of particular importance to investigate the meaning of these figures upon which Zwarte Piet is based—in terms of race, gender, and as signifiers of both courtliness and colonialism. The Dutch "Golden Age" of artistic growth and commercial wealth, overseas expansion, and involvement in the Atlantic slave trade is not coincidentally also the period in which blacks begin to take a more prominent role in Dutch visual culture. Can consistencies (or stereotypes) also be traced from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries forward?

Those who would look for images of Sinterklaas with Zwarte Piet in early modern Dutch painting or print culture will be sorely disappointed. We find signs of Sinterklaas's presence in Jan Steen's 1665 *Sint Nicolaasfeest* in the Rijksmuseum, among other treatments of the holiday, although the saint himself does not have a sustained presence in Dutch art until the eighteenth century, beginning with *cent-prenten* or penny prints (Boer-Dirks 5–7).[6] The Catholic origins of the Sinterklaas holiday were not looked upon kindly by Protestant ministers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the holiday never died out, as a visit to the Netherlands around December 5 will easily demonstrate. The closest that we come to the "modern" version of the celebration is the very unusual scene from 1703 by Matthys Naiveu called *Sint Nicolaasfeest*, which places a somewhat threatening figure of Saint Nicholaas on horseback in an outdoor, urban setting, joined by one (or perhaps two) helpers in courtly attire (Boer, "Het Sinterklaasfeest"). A young white boy leads the Saint's horse; another boy stands directly behind the horse and holds out what appears to be a hat (presumably to catch goodies) (fig. 9) (Dzidzaria 43–44; Blakely 40). The comic and irreverent qualities associated with Zwarte Piet today are not expressed by either one of the boys pictured here, but rather by the clowns from the Commedia dell'arte whose dancing figures dominate the foreground of the painting. Note that the smallest of these three performers is a young black boy, who kneels behind the others.

Although Schenkman is generally credited with introducing a helper figure for the Dutch Sinterklaas, the existence of this painting nonetheless suggests that for at least one Dutch artist in the early eighteenth century, it was appropriate to picture the saint with an attendant. While the status of the second boy standing behind Sinterklaas' horse is unknown, it is curious to note that he displays the wide nose, full lips, round eyes and face, and closely cropped hair seen in Dutch images of children of African ethnicity from this period, but not the dark skin (Kolfin 83). Although the young black Commedia dell'arte figure wears the courtly costume today associated with Zwarte Piet, he is not directly associated with Sinterklaas in this image.

Figure 9   Matthijs Naiveu, *Sint-Nicolaasfeest,* 1703. Oil on canvas. Private Collection.

Whether or not Naiveu wished to picture a "black" helper for Sinterklaas, this painting suggests that he was familiar with the works of art that would ultimately prove so influential on Schenkman and his illustrators, namely portraits from the early modern period in which the main figure is accompanied by an attendant, quite frequently a finely dressed pre-adolescent black boy. Some of the earliest manifestations of the black attendant or page type in European art may be found in Venetian painting of the sixteenth century, where African boys provide courtly splendor and mild exoticism to the scene. Two well-known examples of this phenomenon include

Figure 10   Adrian Hanneman, *Princess Mary Stuart with a Black Attendant*,
ca 1650. Oil on canvas. Mauritshuis, The Hague.

Paolo Veronese's 1573 *Feast in the House of Levi* and Titian's ca. 1525 portrait of
Laura de Dianti with a black servant. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
portraits of women and men that include black pages became popular in both the
Netherlands and Great Britain, especially in courtly circles, in particular because of
the influence of Flemish painter Anthony van Dyck.[7]

Among the portraits by Dutch artists with black ancillary figures we find Jan
Mijten's numerous paintings of women associated with the Dutch court and Adriaen
Hanneman's *Princess Mary Stuart with a Black Attendant* (ca 1650) at the
Mauritshuis (fig. 10).[8]

Hanneman's painting is somewhat unusual because of the fancy, exotic dress
worn by the princess, but it clearly demonstrates the artist's familiarity with van

Dyck's aristocratic oeuvre, including his 1634 *Henrietta of Lorraine*, which also includes a black page. In Hanneman's work, however, the page wears an orange striped silk outfit of pants and a long-sleeved shirt while in Van Dyck's painting he wears the costume of a Renaissance courtier. Although richly dressed, the young black man in each image represents a servant (or, more probably, a slave), who functions both as a foil to the main figure and a status symbol. In paintings like these, the page's small size, deferential—even reverential—body language, both establish and augment the importance and primacy of the white figure. When the page is the companion of an aristocratic woman, as here, his actions are highly gendered: he offers her beautiful objects, fruits, and flowers, or he assists with her toilette. When he is paired with a man, the black page leads horses, holds important documents and maps, carries helmets, and otherwise reflects the man's more worldly interests.

In Hanneman's image, the page not only looks up at Mary Stuart in an admiring fashion, but he enhances her beauty by attaching a pearl bracelet around her wrist (a motif seen also in the work of Mijtens from this period). Black pages do not simply function as an exotic (sometimes specifically colonial) other to the primary figure; they also function on an aesthetic level by bringing pictorial "variety" and a bit of color and liveliness to the scene (Otte 7). As Marysa Otte points out, this was specifically recommended by artist and theorist Samuel van Hoogstratten (1627–1678) in his 1678 *Inleyding tot de Hooge Schoole der Schilderkonst.* In his discussion of "finishing touches," Hoogstratten makes adding a black figure equivalent to adding an animal in a painting: "Variety [. . .] and finishing touches give things a luster: so to me also any form of animal or plumed fowl, decorate the work: so the eye also finds pleasure sometimes by maidens to add a Moor" (as quoted in Hochstrasser 210). Given Dutch involvement in the slave trade during this period and into the mid-nineteenth century, the aesthetic pleasure created by using the black as a "bijwerk" is anything but politically innocent.

Mary Stuart's pale, enamel-like skin is contrasted with her page's deep brown skin tones; the contrast of dark and light skin seen in such images also contributes to the association of beauty and desirability (especially when the figure portrayed is a woman) with whiteness (Hall 211; Dabydeen 26). This aspect is especially evident in Nicolaes Berchem's ca 1660 *Moor Presenting a Parrot to a Lady* in the Wadsworth Atheneum, where both the elaborately and exotically dressed "moor" and his music-making companions offer a distinct contrast to the main female figure (fig. 11).

She is a perfect, yet nearly emotionless, blonde, who stands remote and statue-like above him, her body clad in a closely fitting icy blue and white dress. The moor (labeled as such because of his eastern-inflected dress) and his companions are painted using a much warmer, more colorful palette; they move and sway in an unrestricted fashion, suggesting both freedom and a childlike spontaneity associated with blacks and other marginal figures. These figures may have been understood as

Figure 11   Nicolaes Berchem, *A Moor Presenting a Parrot to a Lady*, 1660s. Oil on
canvas. Wadsworth Athenaeum, Hartford, CT.

comical to contemporary audiences, but here the moor's physical maturity and ardent
gaze suggest that he could become the woman's lover, a possibility not embodied by
the black page because of his youth and clear position of servitude.

Recent research has done much to recover the history of blacks living in the
Netherlands from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries (Haarnack and
Hondius 88–107). Black servants and slaves are documented in Amsterdam and
at the court in The Hague as late as the stadhoudership of Willem V (1748–1806),
but they never formed a large proportion of the Dutch population. In the Netherlands,
Elmer Kolfin notes that between 1660 and 1700, black pages reached their height of
popularity as pictorial "attributes," but because the actual number of black boys

living in the Netherlands was much smaller than the number of people who wanted themselves pictured with one, a generic pictorial type developed (Hochstrasser 210; Kolfin 83). Kolfin characterizes this type as representing a boy around age ten who displays a "large rounded forehead, large eyes, plump cheeks, a small, broad upturned nose and a doll's mouth. In short, all the characteristics adults find attractive in small children" (83). Despite Mary Stuart's high status as both a princess and the widow of Willem II, the page in her portrait is clearly one of these stock, oft repeated, figures. Given the strong possibility that Schenkman and his artists determined that Sinterklaas's attendant should be modeled on the black figures in these paintings, it is worth saying a bit about the status of skin color during this period, which influenced the pictorial rhetoric of these images. Early modern Europeans often expressed an unfavorable view of the dark skin of sub-Saharan Africans, but Ernst van de Boogaart has nonetheless demonstrated that the Dutch did not automatically associate black skin with evil or other negative attributes (33–50). Visual as well as written evidence from the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries indicates that there was intellectual and aesthetic space for the positive assessment of black skin (Brienen 253–57). Representations like the seventeenth-century portraits considered here do not make the skin of the black servant ugly or one dimensional in terms of tone, color, or texture. These figures may have been types, but they were not intended to be racist caricatures.

The largely respectful attention to skin color seen in the images featuring a black page is all the clearer when one compares them to a rather appalling painting from 1632 by Christiaen van Couwenbergh (1604–1667), a painter active in Delft and The Hague whose work is associated with the Dutch followers of Caravaggio. This work, since 1970 in the collection of the Musée des Beaux-Arts in Strasbourg, displays the sexual assault of a naked black woman on a bed by three white men. Her skin is very dark and lacks any variation in tone; the point here is not beauty or even desirability.[9] She is a masculine, animal-like creature who cries out for help and fights off her attackers, although her chances of success are slim at best. It is unlikely that this disturbing, highly theatrical image represents an actual occurrence or even used a real black woman as a model. This painting was probably considered comic by contemporary audiences and may reproduce a scene from a lost play. The standing man appears amused as he engages the viewer and gestures towards the scene; the naked man holding the struggling woman on his lap grins at her distress, possibly because her attempt to get away is very much at odds with early modern stereotypes about the oversexed nature of Africans in general.

Among the small group of paintings from this period to reproduce the features of a living person of African ancestry is Michiel van Musscher's 1687 portrait of Thomas Hees, who served as Commissioner for the States General to the governments of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli (fig. 12).

Figure 12   Michiel van Musscher, *Thomas Hees (b. 1634/35), resident and commissioner of the states general to the governments of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, with his nephews Jan (b. 1670/71) and Andries (b. 1662/63) Hees and a servant*, 1687. Oil on canvas. Mauritshuis, The Hague.

Boer-Dirks has suggested that this image (note the gun on the wall) may have formed a direct source of inspiration for the artist who created the earliest illustrations for Schenkman's book (fig. 3) (12). Although Boer-Dirks does not address the black figure in van Musscher's painting in great detail, it is worth pointing out that unlike the anonymous pages clothed in courtier's finery in the paintings discussed above, the young black man here has been identified as a slave named Thomas, whom Hees may have added to his household (by gift or purchase) during one of his many trips to North Africa (Boer-Dirks 12; Haarnack and Hondius 94). Wearing gray

livery, a two-part turban with a large gold tassel, pearl earrings, and a "decorative" slave collar, Thomas is granted a sensitive portrait likeness by van Musscher. His non-European origins, the color of his skin, the eastern-inflected exoticism of his turban, as well as the long, elegant pipe that he hands to his master, nonetheless demonstrate that Thomas functions here primarily as a manifestation of Hees's worldliness—like the open atlas on the table, the richly colored Persian carpets, and the weapons hanging on the wall. He is at once a historical figure, a possession, and a framing device that enhances the authority of the primary figure.

Scholarship on Zwarte Piet has tended to emphasize the connection to the early modern page (whether real or as a type) as the central pictorial influence, but it is clear that other types of black figures may also have been important for the development of the visual tradition for Sinterklaas's helper. Before the iconography of Zwarte Piet became more or less fixed and homogenized in the second half of the twentieth century, there was considerable variation in his appearance. His costume could be historical (European "renaissance") as well as exotic and "Moorish;" images show Piet wearing large gold hoop earrings and various types of soft boots; his head is adorned with fezzes, beret-like hats, and complicated turbans, often with feathers. The illustrations discussed above showing Piet kneeling or offering treats, suggest that the artist may have had additional visual sources in mind, namely images of the black king bearing gifts for the baby Jesus in epiphany scenes. The visual tradition of the black magus developed in Germany and then spread to the Low Countries in the fifteenth century; later he became an established type in Spanish and Spanish colonial art of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[10] This attractive, dignified, and elegant figure is usually the youngest of the three kings and often is dressed in the most exotic fashion. As demonstrated by Abraham Bloemaert's *Adoration of the Magi* in Musée des Beaux-Arts, Grenoble from ca 1623, the black king is usually arrayed in "Moorish" finery that includes a turban, ornate jewelry, and costly silks and flowing garments that drape and decorate his body (fig. 13). The black king may be understood in a positive light as a means of "integrating the inhabitants of the non-European world into the Western Christian universe," but there is nonetheless a somewhat troubling sense of loss of prestige, as the black king lays "down his wealth and power at the feet of the Christ child" and by extension the west (Erickson 119).

Having tried to explain the reasons for my reservations about Zwarte Piet to my older daughter, I sympathize with parents who find it comforting to elide Piet's highly complicated visual history and instead tell their children that he is black because he comes down chimneys. But that is not how popular images present him (see the packaging for chocolate letters or children's Sinterklaas flags, for example). Nor is it how the makeup is applied when the character is performed. The chimney fable fails to account for Piet's thick outline of red lipstick and head of shiny black curls, all of which demonstrate a connection to the caricatures of blacks (including the goliwogg)

Figure 13   Abraham Bloemaert, *Adoration of the Magi*, 1623. Oil on canvas.
Musée des Beaux-Arts, Grenoble.

that spread in the wake of the minstrel shows. Zwarte Piet's skin color is not ideologically empty; his complexion is dark because in European visual culture from the Renaissance forward, black skin has traditionally been associated with exoticism, servitude, and entertainment. Certainly dark skin need not be linked with these attributes today; indeed one may argue that Zwarte Piet's role has transformed in significant ways over the past few decades. In terms of his behavior, he has evolved from a scary, somewhat stupid and subservient speaker of bad Dutch to a figure of fun, nearly on equal footing with Sinterklaas (although feminized because he is frequently played by a woman). Piet nonetheless still fills the same role that black figures did in early modern paintings: he is colorful, visually lively, subordinated, and he brings gifts to and entertains a majority white audience. He remains a problematic but beloved product of a racist tradition.

Notes

1. The first draft of this essay was written in 2008. I thank the editors for their helpful comments and suggestions to earlier versions of this work. Saint Nicholas is identified as the 3rd century bishop of Myra (but see the chapters by Jordan and Smith below on his origins) and his feast day is December 6th.

2. For a highly personal critique of Zwarte Piet, see Bal; Bal's essay draws heavily on her text for Anna Fox's *Zwarte Piet* (1999). In Barend Hofstede's essay "Persona non Grata," he cites a 1986 survey conducted by *Trouw* suggesting that Dutch women are particularly invested in maintaining the holiday and its key figures in their "traditional" form (364). In Eindhoven in August 2008, the protest march and performance piece of two artists (specifically mentioned as "buitenlandse" or foreign in the article), which addressed the Zwarte Piet phenomenon in a critical way was met with anger and threats. The protest did not go through as planned. It was to have formed a complement to the exhibition "Be(come) ing Dutch" displayed in the Van Abbemuseum, which received an onslaught of negative reactions from the public regarding the project. See "Felle reacties op protestmars tegen Zwarte Piet." *ED* 28 August 2008 and Joy Smith's essay in this volume.

3. Boer-Dirks also addresses these early colored lithographs in her essay, based on her examination of an incomplete copy of the book in the NBLC (Nederlands Bibliotheek en Lektuur Centrum) (9-10). Booys connects Zwarte Piet's clothing to the East Indies, calling it: "een soort Nederlands-Indisch tropenkostuum: een witte lange broek, wit jakje met oranje-rode stroken afgebiesd en een oranje band om zijn middel . . . Hierdoor lijkt hij meer op een matroos of een slaaf dan op een dienaar" (26). See also the images in Elmer Kolfin's study of the imagery of

slavery in Surinam, *Van de Slavenzweep en de Muze*.

4. See, for example the illustrations to Charles Carroll's highly racist work, *The Negro A Beast*.

5. This is often referred to as representing a "Spanish" costume in the literature, although the style seems too generic to warrant this identification. For recent images of people dressed up as Zwarte Piet, see www.Flickr.com.

6. Boer-Dirks also discusses images of the saint that were imprinted on cookies in the seventeenth century, with evidence drawn both from cookie presses still in existence and contemporary attacks by Protestant ministers on the celebration of the holiday, which mention such cookies (4).

7. Many scholars, including Elisabeth McGrath, David Dabydeen, Marysa Otte, Angela Rosenthal, and Julie Hochstrasser, among others, have contributed to the growing literature on the black page in early modern portraiture. My analysis here is informed by their work.

8. Hanneman spent nine years in England, possibly as an assistant to Anthony van Dyck, and when he returned to The Hague in 1637, he brought his own version of Van Dyck's much sought-after aristocratic style with him. See Rebecca Parker Brienen. "Dressing Up like the Cannibals? Adriaen Hanneman's Portrait of Princess Mary Stuart in a Tupi Feather Cape."

10. The painting is in the collection of the Musée des Beaux-Arts, Strasbourg.

11. For an introduction to this material, see Jean Michel Massing. "The Black Magus in the Netherlands."

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The Enunciation of the Nation: Notes on Colonial Refractions in the Netherlands

Joseph D. Jordan

I do not get why you are being so negative and annoying . . . [. . .] Let us be happy together. Let us be optimistic.Let us say: The Netherlands can do it once more! That VOC mentality! Looking beyond borders! Dynamic! . . . Right?![1]
—Prime Minister of The Netherlands (2002-2010), Jan Peter Balkenende

Introduction

Our ears and eyes stumbled. Our skin crawled. Our body remembered. We split apart.

I remember in full that moment which has come to signify—in my humble opinion—an enunciation of the nation: the incitation by the Dutch Prime Minister quoted above.[2] During the General Deliberations on Prince's Day the former prime minister of the Netherlands uttered our epigraph in response to the members of parliament's critique of the ruling party's budgetary plans. In that fleeting episode, my ears collected tones and pitches which gathered before my eyes in gestures. As avatar of the nation, Balkenende's enunciation was an appeal to the minor characters on and off stage—royalty, politicians, citizens—to follow his lead in happiness and optimism of a bygone epoch. Possibly, *to* a bygone epoch? What better way to motivate the Dutch than resurrecting the past glory of their Golden Age? According to some Netherlanders, the Dutch Golden Age emerged with the foundation of the Dutch Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (East India Company, henceforth VOC) in 1602. Other Netherlanders would argue it started in 1609 with the first year of the Twelve Year Truce between the Republic of Seven United Netherlands and Spain. During this

period, a few minor skirmishes ensued between the two countries; it was a period marked by relative peace such as that partially described by Kant. That is to say, when we follow a Kantian spirit, it will tell us that the Twelve Year Truce—while only temporary and thus no guarantee for perpetual peace (Kant 3)—signalled an epoch wherein the development of science and commerce took precedence over military preparedness (Wood 64). As a result, the nation entered a Golden Age as well as so-called world history. Here I imagine Hegel's Zeitgeist (as successor of Kant's spirit) to benevolently nod toward the Netherlands and affirm its place *within* universal History. But more importantly, and almost always understated, the violent force of colonialism plunged the Dutch into a Golden Age—a period that Susan Buck-Morss states "was made possible by their dominance of global mercantile trade, including, as a fundamental component the trade in slaves" (Buck-Morss 823). Given the occlusion of colonialism's role in the Dutch Golden Age, I wish to meditate on the enunciation of the nation typified by—though certainly not limited to—Balkenende's proclamation, on this narrative technique that infuses the nation with fumes of fortune, pristine potentialities, and an honorable History. Perhaps a pensive pause is the only adequate response to such brawny rhetoric, since the bravura belies a self evident posturing. Indeed, his pronouns betray him. One is obliged to ask *who* comprises and is excluded from the "us" in the enunciation? Furthermore, I find "it" ethically suspect: a perpetuation of a VOC mentality begs the question of which aspects of the VOC ought to be repeated—with or without a difference—in Balkenende's call for action. Is "it" an attempt at achieving peace or techno-financial advancement? Whose borders and which peoples must be subjected to violation to restitute the embarrassment of former riches? Since his mandate lacks specification, questions such as these lurk in the undertones of enunciation.

In the course of this chapter, I develop the enunciation of the nation as a concept in order to approximate the colonial logics of Dutch nationalist discourse, with particular reference to the Dutch Saint Nicholas tradition. The enunciation of the nation is embedded in power, and power, however conceived, lies at the very heart of societies structured in dominance (Hall 1980). As such, Dutch nationalist discourse cannot be ignored if we want to understand how inequality is re-produced, re-worked and re-imagined through national cultures by subjects in a country such as the Netherlands which prides itself on liberal values.

From Nation to Enunciation

I note that Ernest Renan poses the question why Holland is a nation and furthers that it is "through an act of heroic resolution" (Renan 12–13). As such, I observe an alignment between the Prime Minister's heroic resolve as it resounds with the heroism of the nation's originary moment. Proceeding from this point, it becomes possible to begin a conceptualization of the enunciation of the nation as the protagonist's quest

for origins, an affirmation of the "truth" of history. Arguably, the connotative qualities of the heroism evoked seek to protect and secure that "moment of their greatest perfection, when they emerged dazzling from the hands of a creator" (Foucault 143). One could argue that I am similar to the Prime Minister, insofar as my pursuit could be regarded a quest too. However, I am in search of those slippages which erode the boundaries of fixed identities, since, "what is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity" (Foucault 142).

How do nations deal with such disparity? I contend that an enunciation of the nation circumvents this disparity through a navigation, a conventional emplotment[3] of particular subjectivities and historical instances to create a coherent story. For my notion of the enunciation of the nation, I am indebted to Homi Bhabha's notion of dissemination, with which he attempts to write against the historical certainty of the concept of the Western nation. Dissemination constitutes a kind of double-writing that seeks to address the fluctuating temporalities of a nation in the process of narration (Bhabha 212). More specifically, there is a "conceptual territory where the nation's people must be thought in double-time" and the people are split into *objects* of a nationalist *pedagogy*, and *subjects* in their *performativity* of narrating presence in(to) the nation (Bhabha 208-209). On the one hand, the pedagogy lurks in the self-generative force of tradition which designates a state of becoming unto itself (Bhabha 211). In this sense, the pedagogic aspect can be understood as solipsistic insofar as the continuous self-generative loop unto itself appropriates discontinuities in narration, yet represents them as sameness. Everything else must remain outside the loop and cannot be said to exist, because everything that does exist, does so by the grace and sole purpose of tradition. Thus, the enunciation of the nation cannot give an account of difference beyond its own principles, but may only—if at all—assimilate difference, even when mentioned in passing. On the other hand, the people's performativity interrupts the self-generative force of the nation by inscribing the Self as personal rather than national (Bhabha 212). It is within the regime of a tradition's performativity that difference has the upper hand, even if misunderstood by those who profess its sameness. In brief, I conceive of Bhabha's use of dissemination as a complex interplay between the tension of national pedagogy and performativity wavering around temporalities between nation and subjecthood.

Crucial to this concept is a critique of Benedict Anderson's notion of homogenous empty time. Bhabha rejects the mimetic relation that Anderson establishes between a readership and the texts read, which facilitate the imagination of a homogenous empty time. The homogeneity assumed is one of subjects and objects collapsing into a static unit which is subsequently *localized in space*. This critique enables Bhabha to inaugurate that fundamental split in time, which allows for postcolonial readings of resistance. Furthermore, according to Henri Bergson, "time, understood in the sense

of a medium in which we make distinctions and count, is nothing but space" (Bergson 91). Bergson's critique of a positivist and empirically measurable notion of time by means of representations leads me to question in particular Anderson's understanding of homogenous empty time as *a spatialization*. Seemingly, the enunciation of the nation configures a slippage into a liminal moment in which nation-ness extends its universal legitimacy over its political subjects. That is: the enunciation of the nation historically *displaces* the colonized and the colonial in order to set forth a neat, grand narrative of progress. As such, I aver that History is much less about time than it is about space and the oscillation between particular coordinates that make up the constellation of the nation-space. Both analepsis and prolepsis[4] function as technē[5] that produce this homogenous empty space as they become the means of navigation between these coordinates: "the difference of space returns as the Sameness of time, turning Territory into Tradition, turning the People into One" (Bhabha 213). What is crucial to understanding this last point, is that any act of unification requires some prior multiplicity for it to be unified.[6] The enunciation of the nation colonizes space and naturalizes it as time; it assimilates difference and represents it as sameness. The enunciation of the nation is above all things a synechdocal proposition: lose yourself and become part of the collective that represents nation. At once a commandment and an invitiation that could be spoken and/or written during an event that may be spectacular—as is evidenced by Balkenende's mandate on Prince's Day—but need not be limited to such formal occasions. As will be shown later, there is ample evidence to suggest that liberal democracies' oppressive means operate as much through spectacle, as they do through the mundane and everyday. While the representative capacities of national holidays cannot be ignored, the enunciation of the nation traverses a nearly omnipotent infrastructure of subjectivities to be almost everywhere, almost all the time: the nation definitely has its use for unusual suspects.

In Balkenende's enunciation of the nation, the articulation of an "us" as synonym of the Netherlands harks back into a supersession of the originary moment of the Dutch nation. The purpose of the analepsis is to flash the nation back in history and, through reflexivity, make the present contingent with the past. To flash back is to search for a moment of departure, which in our case is signified by the VOC. As a sign, the VOC reveals an ambivalent epochal metonymy by pointing backwards to the Golden Age of the Dutch. In addition, it could be argued that the enunciator seeks to inject the present with a dose of ghostly repetition, allowing the archaic to emerge in the midst of modernity (Bhabha 206). Consequently, the VOC as sign is stranded in the clearing, pointing forward and articulating the modern nation in a narrative of teleological progress. The use of spatial metaphors to describe time is no coincidence: it is in fact an indication that we are talking about the navigation of space.

Still, the self-contained epic qualities of our Don Quixotic[7] Prime Minister are not to be shrugged off as mere fabrications, as Benedict Anderson reminds us. Instead he proposes that we conceive of the nation as an imagined political community, both inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson 6). Upon elaboration Anderson notes that "[c]ommunities are to be distinguished [. . .] by the style in which they are imagined" (ibid.); it is this imagination that delineates the borders of the nation-space since "no nation images itself coterminous with mankind" (Anderson 7). Thus, I come to understand that the enunciation of the nation uttered by Balkenende is an appeal to the Dutch imagination whereby imaginary borders are erected around the nation-space, to create a fantasy of unique, heroic entrepreneurship. The enunciation of the nation poses a tentative "right" that I knew was wrong, as Bhabha notes that the "narrative address of the nation turns the reference to a people" (Bhabha 209). My imagination is not contingent with the borders of the Dutch nation-space, the cultural landscape. The "us" and the "Netherlands" the Prime Minister referred to became a problem of knowledge since the homogeneity assumed functioned as a clearing, purifying the autochthonous soil of its always-already "allochthonous" presence. I bring to your attention a Dutch divide between its autochthonous and allochthonous polity. Since the advent of decolonization in Dutch colonies from the 1960s, and the mass migration of ex-colonized people to the Netherlands, nationality has become an highly ambivalent feature in Dutch public discourse. *Autochthon* literally means "self soil" as opposed to *allochthon* which connotes "Other soil." Both terms denote origins located in the soil, which is quite peculiar considering the fact that the Netherlands, as a rule, employs *jus sanguinis* (right of the blood) rather than *jus soli* (right of the soil) as a social policy to determine citizenship. But all this talk of blood and soil only perpetuates notions of cultural belonging—through figurative and literal language—that further the terror and territorialization (or "territorial paranoia" as Bhabha would call it) of essentialist conceptions in the face of human difference. As Renan argues, "one does not have the *right* to go through the world fingering people's skulls, and taking them by the throat saying: 'You are [not?] of our blood; you [do not?] *belong* to us!'" [my emphasis and query] (Renan 15).

The Saint Nicholas Tradition

It is time to extend my hospitality to the main characters of my chapter, namely, Saint Nicholas (*Sint Nicolaas* or *Sinterklaas*) and Black Pete (*Zwarte Piet*). The one finds himself in surplus of historicity: he is, probably falsely, assumed to have been born as Nikolaos, Bishop of Myra; he is known as the patron saint of children, sailors and merchants, defender of the innocent and slayer of pagans. Exploiting the porousness of cultural borders, the mythical figure of Saint Nicholas firmly grounded himself in the Western imaginary (around 400 A.D.), and thus too, the Netherlands (around

1000 A.D.) (see especially the chapter by Joy Smith in this volume for a careful account of Sinterklaas' origins). The dark Other has ambiguous origins and assumes a different form, depending on the duo's nation of residence. Previously I addressed the importance of the VOC as proxy for the Golden Age within the Dutch nation-space.[8] Although the Netherlands also had a West India Company Schama tells us that the Dutch eventually perceived of the WIC as a questionable enterprise, after generating so many losses and yielding very few profits from its slave plantations (Schama 1987: 252).

> [The WIC's] perennial need for subsidies during the whole period of its existence did nothing to remove the impression that it was a rash and expensive speculation that could become a millstone round the neck of the Republic. Dutch willingness to accept the expulsion from Brazil but retain the West African possessions taken from the Portuguese, as well as strategic entrepôts in the Antilles and at Curaçao, suggests just how eager the ruling patriciate was to cut losses from its imperial adventures in the west. (ibid.)

When we bear this in mind, it should not come as a surprise that the enunciation of the nation does not include the WIC, as the WIC seemed to be unable to overcome its monetary ordeals. Due to its financial debts in 1674 the WIC was disbanded, only to be resurrected briefly once more in 1675. This is in contrast with the VOC, which managed to serve the nation until 1798 and only disbanded due to the ensuing wars between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. So the nation must look towards the East, where profit can be found. However, the VOC pales in comparison to the symbolism of Saint Nicholas and his jolly servant Black Pete. As an annual celebration, the Saint Nicholas tradition is well-rooted in Dutch soil, and in the two calendrical weeks leading up to the 5th of December images of Saint Nicholas and Black Pete flood the media and retail outlets. Saint Nicholas and his hordes of black servants overrun the streets of Dutch cities, towns and villages, to which they arrive by sea. Consequently, within this tradition that welcomes all children, autochthonous as well as allochthonous, Netherlanders are the objects of its nationalist pedagogy, recipients of the joyous gift-giving tradition.

Yet there is dissension. Small fissures ran along the borders of the nation-space as fractions of the Dutch polity posited the question of the Foreigner; not a question articulated as such, but a performative "question-of-being" (Derrida 3) which erodes the fixity of authochthony. I would like to suggest that the dissenters remembered Fanon. They were indignant; they demanded an explanation. Something happened. Overnight, a supplement[9] trespassed the boundaries of the identities of Saint Nicholas and Black Pete and proposed a new meaning: the representation of white superiority and black inferiority, the white master owning a plethora of black slaves. The Netherlands, bastion of self-proclaimed (and unquestioned) tolerance, suddenly

found itself accused of racism and the debasement of blacks through essentialist stereotyping. For example, novelist Astrid Roemer argues

> *If the racial-colonial-imperial connotations are removed from the tradition then I would happily join in the celebration. [. . .] Briefly: I preferably celebrate the feast with only 'Black Petes' (to demonstrate the exploitation of the South through caricature) or only with 'Sinterklazen'; the combination Saint Nicholas and his (black) servants remains uncanny and thus unacceptable. [my translation] (Roemer 166)*

Unfortunately, in 1970, Roemer was given notice of termination from her teaching position in secondary school after refusing to participate in the Saint Nicholas celebration (see Roemer 1998). Of course, Roemer's discharge is not the only manner through which the nation decided to write back. We contend that, in order to strengthen its borders, the nation aims to transform its traditions into customs which protect the homogeneity of the nation-space. The nation It/Self narrates its enemies as ungrateful guests; this is particularly remarkable in a nation such as the Netherlands which prides itself on its *history* of hospitality.

Several historians have looked into the origins of Black Pete and found that initially, the multiplicity of names[10] of Saint Nicholas' dark Other referred to the devil who was often depicted as a black, hairy, horned figure in contradistinction to the white Saint. Other historians also attributed to Black Pete pagan origins which predated the Saint Nicholas tradition. The multiplicity suggests, at least, that Black Pete is part of a chain of signification which makes him, as a cultural form or logic, peculiar to the West. What is important to me is that this logic is re-worked, re-imagined and reproduced through the Dutch nation-space and its attendant individuals, thus acquiring inflections that are specific to the Netherlands. At the same time, this logic constricts and constructs the Dutch social imaginary, delimits the condition of possibilities to think otherwise about Black Pete as an effect of this logic. Black Pete is not only reproduced through the Saint Nicholas tradition, but reveals as sine qua non of the Netherlands' problematic understanding of tolerance, hospitality, progressivity and pleasure that implicate and strengthen this cultural form from out-with this tradition. Equally important is that this nationalism cannot simply be understood as archaic or outdated, as nationalisms and racisms are very much a part of our present. Nor are they to be understood as manifestations of the extreme right, the uneducated, the working class, or the vagabonds of society. It would be epistemologically convenient for some, but a political error to assume that nationalism and racism are the prerogative of the "underbelly" of society.

In *Op zoek naar Zwarte Piet* (*In Search of Black Pete*), Frits Booy, historian of the National Saint Nicholas Committee Foundation, becomes the questing protagonist and protector of the origins of Black Pete. He discusses various potential origins, stressing the tradition's pagan and Christian influences, while dismissing other

origins as being too far-fetched. According to Booy, Black Pete could not be related to the possibility of Saint Nicholas having purchased the freedom of an Ethiopan slave who subsequently showed his gratitude by accompanying the saint (Booy 15). Nor could Black Pete be related to a dark[11] mercenary hired by the Venetians to battle against Turkey, his dagger and helmet residing in the Venetian Saint Nicholas church. Despite the fact that these two theories were put forward by academics conducting research on Black Pete, Booy judges these links as far-fetched due to the absence of concrete evidence in the archives, or the geographical distance between the Netherlands and these potential origins. For Booy, it seems much more feasible that the doubtful historical character of Nikolaos, born in Asia Minor in the Greek colony of Patara in Lycia, manages to find his way to the Netherlands as Saint Nicholas. In his eyes, the saint is clearly not subjected to the restrictions of cultural fluidity that immobilize his servant, Black Pete. A popular Dutch conception has it that Black Pete is so because he is in fact a white chimney sweep who has been blackened in the course of his labors, an argument which Booy himself embraces. To further the confusion, Booy then locates the first appearances of the current Black Pete in 1848, in a children's book by Jan Schenkman, an Amsterdam schoolteacher. We are surprised to discover that Black Pete's attire resembles that of an Indo-Dutch tropical outfit in which he "looks more like a slave or sailor" (Booy 25–26), a fact that Booy himself attests to the imaginative sensibilities of that *Zeitgeist*. Subsequently, Booy stipulates that in the second publication (in 1850) Black Pete resembles a Moorish slave-servant from the *Spanish* courts with a broken shackle on his ankle (Booy 26–29).[12] (For other accounts of Black Pete's origins, see also the chapters by Brienen and Smith in this book.) This alludes to the Dutch perception of the *Exodus* epic and the Spanish brutalities in the West Indies: in their appropriation of the biblical *Exodus* metaphor, the Dutch felt themselves as victims of Spanish enslavement (Schama 104–105). Therefore, the West Indian Company's assumed mission was to intervene in the Spanish cruelties in the Caribbean, whilst in reality replicating those same practices. Finally, Booy conclusively argues that the recent critiques launched at Black Pete by often allochthonous groups are backward and go against the nature of the Saint Nicholas tradition. He stipulates: as long as Black Petes do not act subservient and foolish, speak incorrect Dutch[13] and fumble about—behaviors stereotypically accorded to Black people in the Netherlands—, but instead behave appropriately, there should not be a problem (Booy 45). A *peculiar* proposition that I read thus: Black people ought not to feel offended and call "us" racist when Black Pete—despite his dark skin and attire associated with slaves—behaves appropriately, because inappropriate behavior is the purview of Black people. If we follow this argument to its logical conclusion, Black Pete possibly becomes the model citizen that should serve as an example for Blacks in the Netherlands. According to Booy, as long as Black Pete does not conform to stereotypes of blackness, there

should occur a *mis*recognition of Black Pete's implication in racist stereotyping, which precludes a critique from the allochthonous. From out-with the nation-space, we observe the spasms of Booy's rhetoric as he simultaneously *disavows* race and slavery in order to celebrate the figure of Black Pete, yet *reinforces* race and slavery through the indirect acknowledgement of racial stereotypes and *historical* evidence. In the face of obvious references to colonialism and racial stereotyping, the nation's eye "records and flicks away" (Davis 2005: 1) images deemed superfluous. One is reminded here of Raymond Williams' statement:

> But in certain areas, there will be in certain periods, practices and meanings which are not reached for. There will be areas of practice and meaning which, almost by definition from its own limited character, or in its profound deformation, the dominant culture is unable in any real terms to recognize. (Williams in Bhabha 213)

I think Williams' statement is insightful, as it helps us observe in the rhetoric of Booy a logic of discrepancy at work as an extension of the enunciation of the nation. A logic of discrepancy would describe any kind of inconsistency, or what might appear to be a contradiction of particular social formation, yet not disrupt its coherence. Rodolphe Gasché draws on the work of Derrida to describe such instances as naive inconsistencies that actually enable particular authoritative results (Gasché 126). In this instance, Booy's recognition of racial stereotyping and references to blackness and slavery actually furthers his enunciation, as he does not address the disparity between the ideas proffered in his text. He addressed them in passing and moved on to grander, more pleasant issues. Consequently, the constellation which makes up the Saint Nicholas tradition contains some unconnected dots, which if connected explicitly, would reshape the dominant meaning of the constellation.

The Immanence of White Supremacy

At the time of my first investigation into the Saint Nicholas tradition, it was mid-November of 2007 and all the shoes had been filled.[14] Too early for presents of course, but the shoes were filled with the feet of eager applicants—primarily autochthonous—who applied for the role of Black Pete. In Amsterdam alone, the official *Saint in Amsterdam*[15] website reported that 600 Black Petes had been recruited and the organization could unfortunately not accept more applicants; the recruitment of Black Petes for the 2008 celebrations was well underway. This year, undoubtedly, a mass enactment of Black Petes will be repeated as a collective salutation of the nation's allegiance to *white supremacy.* My understanding of the term white supremacy is mainly informed by the theories of bell hooks and Charles Mills, who continue to elucidate the complexity of "interlocking systems of domination which define our reality" (hooks in Jhally). The invocation of such terms clang unheard

within the Dutch nation-space. These words cannot be strung between those beaming epochal beads, between those neatly arranged coordinates of tolerance and hospitality, emblems in the nation-space. Yet, the enunciation of the nation, premised on the logics of discrepancy and disavowal, analepsis and prolepsis, holds the white supremacist social imaginary together in a liberal-democracy such as the Netherlands. The term white supremacist capitalist patriarchy is a necessary lever to widen our understanding of the nation-space and to confront the issues of race and racism. The objections raised by those firmly entrenched in the nation-space insist that neither race nor slavery can be considered as integral to the Dutch Saint Nicholas tradition; the legacy of colonialism is flicked away. Consequently, we are made to believe that voices in discord with the nation's beliefs are superfluous; this is congruent with notions of white supremacy. Central to Mills' definition of white supremacy are notions of *personhood* and *respect* which derive from Kant's "moral and political universe" (Mills 68–69) in which each person is deserving of respect. Always under way, subjects find themselves located in the "meanwhile," "the space of the nation's anomie" (Bhabha 229), where exists a different social universe, namely, the *Herrenvolk* Kantianism that constituted a *dark ontology*.

During the Enlightenment, the Herrenvolk Kantianism implicitly stipulated that "all persons are equal, but only white males are persons" (Mills 70). The endorsement of slavery and colonialism functioned on the premise of this dark ontology, where "persons give each other respect but give disrespect to subpersons, who in turn, to show that they know their place in the scheme of things, are normatively required to show deference to persons" (Mills 72). Or articulated differently by Frantz Fanon:

> *Ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. (Fanon 1967: 110)*

In *Black Skin, White Masks* Fanon illumines the complexities involved with the lived reality of the racial epidermal schema inherent to the dark ontology: Black Pete must be black in relation to white Saint Nicholas. Earlier we noticed how Roemer rejected the portrayal of white mastery and black serfdom because Black Pete has to assume a mode of servility in order to exalt Saint Nicholas through deference. According to Booy, such a statement is backward because people ought to perceive of Black Pete as the friendly helper of the old saint (Booy 45). Booy's thought can be understood as the logic of the nation-space producing an awkward metalepsis[16] in meaning. That is to say, that the effects of the portrayal of the black as servile eclipse the cause, namely, white supremacist. As such, white supremacy cannot be acknowledged in the nation-space and is subject to disavowal. Disavowal has to be understood as a logic that purposefully navigates around locations that would introduce an inassimilable incoherence into a concept. Accordingly, backward does not refer to a redundant

location left behind in the nation's wake, but a location that is expelled into a dark ontology. The dark ontology is like dark matter, it can only be detected by inference of acknowledged presence. Within the nation-space, this presence consists of the signs that herald the progress of a People as One, because its internal refractory logic does not permit the acknowledgement of an inferred presence. Others excuse the submissive character of Black Pete on the grounds that black people are no longer enslaved, and thus fail to realize that white supremacy evolves: "it would be a mistake to identify one particular form of white supremacy (e.g. slavery, juridical segregation) with white supremacy as a family of forms and then argue from the nonexistence of this form that white supremacy no longer exists" (Mills 101). This furthers my understanding of why white supremacy yet resonates as immanent within the nation-space; it is a force of re/enactment which fuels the self-generation of the nation, in which the empirical or ontical dimension is misrepresented and misunderstood, and further obfuscates its colonial ontology.

The Nation's Phobic Intrusion

For my present purposes, the scheme of things as mentioned by Mills includes the Saint Nicholas tradition and the theatrical replication of its dark ontology. In the nation-space, do those who do not show deference to the Saint Nicholas tradition constitute the "They" which enunciators of the nation annually speak of? Consequently, do "They," by positing the "question-Being or Being-in-question" (Derrida 3) that puts the national into question, become subpersons? Inversely, do those who respect the Black Pete tradition thus attain full personhood? It is pertinent to foreground the fact that many blacks in the Netherlands oppose those who question the enactment of Black Pete. This is not a mere endorsement of the figure in question, but a proactive rebuttal of arguments that seek to underline the problematic nature of tradition accounts. Accordingly, we observe that the racial misrecognition as proposed by Booy is adopted by blacks, and a dismissal thereof would be premature. White supremacy, bell hooks reminds us, also refers to the internalization of racism by blacks, and "it does not just evoke white people. It evokes a political world that we can all frame ourselves in relation to" (hooks in Jhally). Such a performance often bewilders those who oppose Black Pete as it places their questions into question.

In "Bonding over Phobia," David Marriott approaches the theme of racial misrecognition from a black identity already constructed as white: "If the act of identification produces a fractured doubling of self, how can we distinguish what is interposed from what is properly desired?" (Marriott 418). Essential to his exploration of this question is the idea of a phobic intrusion, a penetration that inserts a seemingly white racial *imago* into the black unconscious (ibid.). In this instance, the phobic intrusion could be described as the nation signifying "the people as an a priori historical presence, a pedagogical object" (Bhabha 211). Moreover, blacks with

Dutch citizenship are reinscribed as default white Dutch, that is, they are interpellated by whiteness, and as such, expect deference from other Black people, whilst remaining black in relation to white Netherlanders. Consequently, the performativity of blacks in the Netherlands springs from a split subject always-already intruded by a white imago due to unavoidable identification with white culture. Marriott states

> underlying this psychohistory of racial hatred is a conflict the legacy of which blacks will never be able to throw off—they cannot love themselves as black but are made to hate themselves as white. The dangerous split in black identity between black abjection and white superegoic ideal thus registers as a failure of the black ego to accept the reality of its abjection. (Marriott 423)

This statement tears apart a simple understanding of the situation and seemingly suggests a reversal of the positions posited earlier: blacks in the Netherlands who question the portrayal of Black Pete as racist are potentially hating themselves as white and are unable to synthesize the splitting of black identity. However, I note that blacks critical of Black Pete voice a hatred of the black ego towards the always-already intrusive white imago which is a part of the self. Thus, a synthesis does not occur because the black self rejects the hatred of the white superego towards the self. Remarkably, according to Marriott's logic, it can perhaps be argued that blacks in the Netherlands who show deference to and respect the Black Pete tradition—possibly, black Netherlanders proper?—potentially love themselves as black and exhibit a state of equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is sustained by a love for Black Pete from the position of whiteness through the nation's intrusion. For the latter group a young white boy yelling "Look at the nigger! . . . Mama, a Negro!" (Fanon 113) might disturb the equilibrium due to its overt racist character or simply because one is identified as not being coterminous with the nation, whereas "Look at the Black Pete! . . . Mama, a Black Pete!"—a common experience for blacks in the Netherlands especially during the Saint Nicholas festivities—possibly sustains the synthesis of the black ego with the reality of its abjection as self. Marriott continues in a Fanonian spirit when he speaks of the belated black unconsciousness to underline the normalcy of this aggressive synthesis, because the intrusion by the nation "violently evacuates the subject [. . .] leaving an empty space where before there was arguably a self" (Marriott 426). The voice of self is lost. The nation intrudes the object and through ventriloquism performs a disavowal of mourning and "in these circumstances, having a 'white' unconscious may be the only way to connect with—or even contain—the overwhelming and irreparable sense of loss" (Marriott 426). Consequently, the intrusion of Black Pete "offers the medium to connect with the lost internal object, the ego" (ibid.). This analysis of the problematic psychological effects of the aggressive address of black Netherlanders allows us to understand the vehement rebuttal of the existence of white supremacy, as a protective plea from a

person to a *person* for *respect*. That is, respect for the medium which haunts the ego that is forever lost. Superfluously, we recollect an anonymous black youngster's rationale for his enactment of Black Pete during the Saint Nicholas festivities: *What does it matter? I am a Black Pete anyway*.

Herrenvolk Sovereignty

However, the psychic dimensions should not deflect us from the issue at hand, because they are part and parcel of the hierarchical positioning of black as *less* or *evil* in the dark ontology. When the categorization of bodily features encompasses a racial epidermal schema, we can observe the process of racialization: the "process of investing skin color with meaning, such that 'black' and 'white' come to function, not as descriptions of skin color, but as racial identities" (Ahmed 46). Colonialism was the force that produced race as its self-legitimating *episteme*, and consequently, it produced colonized bodies as already racialized, "as objects, as things to be known, seen and regulated" (Ahmed 48). Thus, we are dealing with the violent sovereignty of white supremacist capitalist patriarchy: "to exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power" (Mbembe 12). In "Necropolitics," Achille Mbembe draws attention to two readings of sovereignty, which I shall call an Enlightenment sovereignty and a *Herrenvolk* sovereignty drawing on Mills useful distinction. The Enlightenment sovereignty refers to the production of general norms, in a community of equal autonomous subjects, who are capable of "self-understanding, self-consciousness and self-representation" (Mbembe 13). In such an imagined community, recognition is extended to all the members of the nation and the exercise of reason makes one a fully moral agent and a political subject (ibid.). The public sphere in this society is governed by reason and recognition.

By contrast, I aver that the *Herrenvolk* sovereignty is exercised in a community of subjects, but due to white supremacy, some members are recognized as "more equal," belonging more to the nation than others; the autochthonous and allochthonous divide in the Netherlands springs to mind. Those recognized as more equal and belonging have a wider access to the public sphere and in the process of self-institution and self-limitation enjoy greater freedom than those who are deemed not to belong. In such a society, sovereignty expresses itself as "the generalized instrumentation of human existence" (Mbembe 14) which includes the appropriation of the Other, of eating the Other and the commodification of Otherness (hooks 21). Clearly, the Saint Nicholas tradition is an institution through which Dutch nationness perpetuates its self-creation and race is socially administered by specific social and imaginary significations (i.e.: white supremacy). The phobic intrusion of Black Pete in the public sphere is subject to the reason of implacable sovereignty and consequently rendered invisible. Hence, Judith Butler insists that an aggressive reading of the

visible is necessary, because "the field of the visible is racially contested terrain" (Butler 17). Some go as far as to announce that "some people *think* we are offending them, but that is *absolutely not true*" (Van Tongeren in Levine, my emphasis). Here, the white witness refuses to offer atonement and his reason marginalizes the experiences of displacement of the already-intruded. The sovereignty of nation-space produces a hierarchy of subjects wherein those in the upper echelons are unwilling to show respect to their fellow subjects. Furthermore, the visible is violated by *Herrenvolk* sovereignty because white supremacists decide what qualifies as visual evidence (Butler 17). Consequently, "within this racist episteme [. . .] no black person can seek recourse to the visible as the sure ground of evidence" (ibid.). Specifically, it is Van Tongeren who positions himself as the authority of what might be deemed as offensive to black citizens. His misrecognition of Black Pete as inoffensive simultaneously produces the misrecognition of blacks in the Netherlands as equal subjects and their claims as illegitimate. The enunciation of the nation is complicit in this governing of blackness each and every time it is invoked to protect Black Pete as an innocent amusement for its subjects. Of course, I borrow the term innocent amusements from Saidiya Hartman, whose *Scenes of Subjection* proffers invaluable insights in the constitutive relation of domination, violence and enjoyment as they pertain to the colonial configuration of blackness in liberal-democracies. While it is not in my interest to conflate the Dutch Black Pete with the American Sambo, Cuff or Zip Coon—indeed, the empirical specificities matter—it seems that "the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess of enjoyment" (Hartman 21) is still at work here. But my concern is not with Black Pete as such; instead, following Hartman's suggestion that during slavery "the rights and privileges of white citizens [were] undergirded by the subjection of blacks [and] that enjoyment in turn defined the meaning of subjection" (Hartman 25), I am concerned with the continuation of this particular logic in the enunciation of the nation in our present.

Conclusion

If the nation is indeed an imagined community, then its enunciation will necessarily draw on a limited identification with a particular people and historical events, and on notions of sovereignty. As aforementioned, these cannot be thought out-with structures of violence and dominance and, in the case of the Dutch Saint Nicholas tradition, pleasure. Further inquiry ought to investigate whether this pleasure in fact derives from the tradition itself as "merely" a repetition compulsion of representations and performances of blackness predicated on colonial subjectivities, or from the denial of black claims to equality in the face of de jure citizenship. The various examples exhumed were not meant to provide my reader with a catalogue of ignorance or denounce specific rhetorical strategies. I have demonstrated the logics of the

enunciation of the nation, particularly in reference to its spatialization of time and its navigational technē. The articulations served to illumine the logics of disavowal and discrepancy at work, which are necessary in the reproduction of structural inequality. It does not suffice to say that Black Pete is essentially racist or that the dominant nationalist reading of the tradition is innocent, whether proffered by individuals or groups. Black Pete is one of many means by which whiteness colonizes and mediates Blackness in the public sphere. What the enunciation of the nation reveals is that particular meanings are systematically repressed and subjugated, yet are constitutively related to the dominant reading of which Black Pete is a sinister example. But this systemic repression is contingent on colonial relations whereby hegemonic and hegemonizing Europeanized notions of what counts as legitimate, prevail over the political demands made by marginalized non-Europeanized voices. I am compelled to think of this as racism.

Notes

1. An extract from the Algemene Beschouwingen [General Observations] 2006.

2. The concept of the enunciation (of the nation) is developed in Homi Bhabha's work, see for example his chapter "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation" in *The Location of Culture*. I will discuss the concept in depth in the next subchapter.

3. Here I borrow the term emplotment from Hayden White's *Figural Realism* (1999: 9), in which he details the chronicling of events into a story, in which cultural tradition sets the parameters for narration.

4. Analepsis and prolepsis are both spatial metaphors, which I respectively and generally understand as flashbacks and flash forwards, whereby a scene is interjected from the past or future to help situate a particular narrative from the vantage point of the present.

5. By technē I refer to the skill and knowledge of how to use analepsis and prolepsis to produce a homogenous empty space on the basis of experience, without being knowledgeable of its general principles, or knowing that and knowing why the thing produced exists. For a more elaborate notion of technology, see Martin Heidegger's "Question Concerning Technology" (1950). What concerns me in this paper is the status of enunciation as a discursive device, that facilitates the ontical dimension of nationalism that posits colonialism as its constitutive outside. To deepen our understanding of this phenomenon I think it will be necessary to chart and traverse the space from the manifestations of enunciation, to the conditions of their possibility in a liberal-colonial order, that is, their ontology proper.

6. For an extended discussion of spatial multiplicity and unity under the auspices of time, confer Henri Bergson's *Time and Free Will* (2001).

7. While Balkenende is nationally understood through the figure of Harry Potter, I take him to be akin to Don Quixote, since his means of inference-making is based on a chivalric code informed by the romances about the Dutch Golden Age (cf.: Sylvia Wynter's "On Disenchanting Discourse: Minority Literary Criticism and Beyond"). Balkenende does not cast spells— he is enchanted by the enunciation of the nation.

8. Although it needs to be pointed out that Black Pete as recognized in The Netherlands also exists in Belgium.

9. According to Derrida, the supplement indicates and reveals a point of originary lack in the meaning that receives priority; the meaning that is placed on the outside is actually constitutive of the meaning on the inside. See Derrida's *Of Grammatology* or Jonathan Culler's excellent explanation in *On Deconstruction*.

10. Ruprecht, schwarzer Kaspar, schwarze Peter, zwarte Piet, Pieterman, Le More, Pere Fouettard, Schmutzli, Kwampus and Leutfresser (see Allison Blakely's *Blacks in the Dutch World*, particularly his list on page 45).

11. It is pertinent to note that Booy uses the adjective dark (donker) instead of the commonly used black (zwart) to describe people of African descent. I am reminded of Fanon's note on how frames of reference change overnight: from dark man to Black Pete. A significant difference.

12. Booy notes that he finds it remarkable that Moors and devils were depicted identical in drawings and carnival performances (cf.: Booy 29).

13. Black Petes speak Dutch with a stereotypical Surinamese accent as commonly performed by Dutch, though this may fluctuate; at times, the attire as performance of black caricature is considered to be sufficient by Dutch nationalists.

14. Saint Nicholas leaves presents in children's shoes.

15. See http://www.sintinamsterdam.nl for more information.

16. I borrow the notion of metalepsis from Spivak, who in *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* defines it as the substitution of effect for a cause.

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The Dutch Carnivalesque: Blackface, Play and Zwarte Piet

Joy L. Smith

The Dutch Saint Nicholas celebration [Sinterklaasfeest] is a yearly event. On the eve of December fifth, the great saint, dressed as a bishop in a white robe-like garment, a red cloak, and a large staff, travels throughout Holland on a white horse, leaving toys for children. He rides onto rooftops with his trusty helper, known as Zwarte Piet [Black Pete] who enters into attics or slides down chimneys, fulfilling the assigned role as the nimble and athletic servant for the Saint.

The celebration is a much bigger affair than just one night, however. A good two weeks before December fifth, "Sint," as he is affectionately known, simultaneously arrives into various cities in the Netherlands with much fanfare, a parade, in fact, surrounded by his helpers, who throw candy and pepernoten (tiny, round spice cookies) to children, while performing gymnastic feats. Saint Nicholas is the patron saint of Amsterdam, and on his arrival from Spain,[1] the streets are closed and Sinterklaas is greeted by the mayor of the city. For several weeks leading up to December fifth, stores are filled with iconic imagery of Sinterklaas and Black Pete which features pitch-black skin, ruby-red, exaggerated lips and wooly dark hair. Schools become institutional outlets for the celebration, with gift exchanges and visits from Black Pete or Saint Nicholas.

In addition to the Sinterklaasfeest, Christmas is also celebrated in the Netherlands, but it is a much more subdued, less commercial affair than in the United States. The real fun, the celebration geared around children, involving a carnivalesque public performance, with activities in school, as well as familial bonding rituals, such as writing and exchanging poems, giving and receiving small gifts and eating sweets, is celebrated on the evening of December fifth.

Over the last few decades, one aspect of the tradition, in particular Sinterklaas' helpers, has come under fire. Though most of the population seems to have no problem with the tradition, for some the problem turns on the relationship between the saint and his black servant, the historical connotations of this relationship, and perhaps most disturbing, that Black Pete is performed in blackface suggesting derogatory, stereotypical, African phenotypic features.

Black Pete is a fun-loving, childish character who plays the fool, but in earlier times, he was also a scary figure who would threaten to take naughty children back to Spain in his toy bag. He is performed by adults in blackface who wear colorful garb, large gold earrings, and a curly or wooly, dark wig, topped off by a large hat that sports a feather that adorns his nineteenth-century Spanish Moor costume, reminiscent of a court jester's outfit. As a child growing up in the Netherlands, assuming the role and costume of Black Pete, and donning the blackface mask in a public performance, is almost a rite of passage. Its importance lies in the ubiquitous nature of it and the affective dimension of Dutch cultural identity tied to the tradition, heard in the most common refrain and defense, "It's our culture." This call to Dutch cultural tradition, the supposedly unchanging, authentic nature of the holiday ritual, is continually invoked in strenuous attempts at defending this social practice against any kind of criticism.

Intermittent attempts at self-reflexive critique have sparked controversy. For Pete is a pariah for some, and, as I argue here, has turned into a symbol of Dutch national identity for others. The defense of an authentic, eternal piece of Dutch culture, what Black Pete has come to represent, is at issue here. Despite attempts to address this blackface, subservient aspect of the tradition since the late nineteen-sixties, Black Pete, performed in blackface, has stubbornly remained an integral part of the celebration.

The Sinterklaas ritual, its yearly repetitive performance, is a social practice that includes theater, carnival, masquerade, and excess–forms of play. It is a common assertion in Dutch society that because Black Pete is a fantasy figure, designed as part of a children's party, he is simply not that important, and thus does not merit criticism. People who are against this aspect of the tradition are thought to be taking a playful part of culture too seriously.

However, there has been much academic work supporting the viability of play as a worthy object of inquiry. Specifically, poststructuralist concerns with identity and gender, most notably Judith Butler's theories of the performative, have emphasized the subversive and transgressive aspects of play. These theories describe the ways in which the playful turn, in acts and critical theory, may undermine hegemonic roles and move forward social movement agendas (Butler; McClintock; Garber). In the realm of race and postcolonial theory, mimicry, minstrelsy, and racial and ethnic cross-dressing have yielded knowledge that goes beyond the colonized—colonizer binary,

producing a "necessary critique" of cultural domination that explores the complexity of spaces of social contact and desire (Lott, "White"; Rogin; Sieg, *Ethnic*).

Concepts and tropes of play are, I think, suitable to the Sinterklaas celebration with its carnival beginnings, festive components and an emphasis on bodily pleasures (Bakhtin 368-474). Black Pete is a carnivalesque figure, an embodiment of the fool who exemplifies humor, excess, and parodic farce. The figure's position as a playful part of popular culture does not lessen its importance as a cultural tradition, or as an object to be examined in Dutch society. The Sinterklaas celebration is a much-loved tradition encapsulating desire and anxiety, fun and fear. It includes personal, family rituals that encompass the private sphere, and yet it also includes a ritualistic, public dramaturgy that reinforces social cohesion. With every enactment, the reiterative, symbolic work of Dutch identity through play—fantasy, masquerade, and the ludic—goes into the work of performing national identity.

Despite the many protests against Black Pete being performed in blackface from different critical spaces over the last four or more decades (Helsloot 249–71), Black Pete has become even more firmly entrenched in the popular imaginary in the twenty-first century. This study seeks to illuminate why these criticisms fail to provoke Dutch reflection on xenophobia from the Dutch majority, or subvert racist discourses, and why they have had little effect on how the tradition is practiced. On the contrary, the continuation of Black Pete as a widely embraced festive figure of play enhances the tenacity of the conservative national imagination of citizenship and belonging, of blackness and whiteness.

On Pleasure and Subjection

As a result of the controversy over the representations of Black Pete in blackface, attempts have been made to move away from black-faced performances. A 1993 local Amsterdam entrance parade [De Intocht], the large celebration of Sinterklaas' arrival into the city, was the first attempt to use colors such as red, blue, and green in addition to the traditional blackface Petes, and it was met with mixed reviews (Helsloot 259).[2] In another, more recent case, acceptance for these different colored Petes during the yearly national arrival celebration seemed to have diminished. This became apparent following the yearly televised broadcast of the National Sinterklaas arrival festivities that occurred in 2006. The national arrival is different from local Sinterklaas parades in that not only is it televised, but it is also simultaneously presented as a children's news program *The Saint Nicholas Journal* [Het Sinterklaasjournaal], which includes an announcer whose job it is to narrate various aspects of the event to children viewers. This is a playful imitation of an adult news program called *The Journal* [Het Journaal].

In that particular year of 2006, the children were told that the steamboat carrying the group of Black Petes from Spain had passed under a rainbow, and that they

turned various colors. Blackface was not a part of this performance, and the Dutch public was not at all pleased. After the broadcast, the network was overwhelmed with a deluge of "vicious and racist mail," and this conscious attempt at bringing Black Pete into the twenty-first century, was immediately deemed a failure (Fatah-Black). The reaction reflects a strong resistance to what is perceived as an unnecessary or politically correct insistence to change an old, time-honored tradition.

Another attempt to address this aspect of the celebration seemed to work against change. In 1998, the local administration of the Bijlmer, the predominately black, south-east section of Amsterdam, issued a request to adapt the school festivities to the population. In response, different grade schools in the neighborhood used red-, yellow-, and blue-faced Petes, rather than the typical black make-up. The children at one school were reported to react with fear, because they were unaccustomed to these different figures (Helsloot 261). Yet, I am unconvinced that the children's fear can be wholly attributed to the different and unfamiliar colors used.[3]

The fact that black children rejected these colorful Petes, I believe, has made this incident strong ammunition against change for some. I was once told by a Dutch person, during a discussion, that using different colors for Black Pete was not a good solution to the problem because "it scared the children." Whether he believed this to be a real deterrent, or meant only to provoke, this scene was invoked. The children's reaction of fear was repeatedly referenced in newspaper opinion pieces during debates about Black Pete. Since the children who did not like the change in color were black, as a result, this incident has gained a special kind of status as a useful occurence in the rationale for not changing the blackface performance of Black Pete.

An even more common assertion about the Sinterklaas tradition is simply that it is "our culture." The "children will fear them," and the "our culture" responses are statements delivered as unassailable facts meant to end any discussion. Claims to cultural relativism, both an argued innocence and benevolence dismissing the pointed racial component to the tradition, are assertions that belie a sense of entitlement about continuing the blackface aspect despite criticism. These kind of claims cut off sincere engagement in a conversation or debate about the tradition.

As an African American living in Amsterdam, during the first few years of my stay I experienced a strong, almost visceral reaction to the ubiquitous darky iconography that appeared in stores and schools, as well as in a plethora of images on television, and, of course, the yearly parades. I was immediately reminded of American minstrelsy, a denigrating form of comedic entertainment based on stereotypes that were belittling to black people, in which the practice of blacking up was central. Performed on the public stage, it was as brutal as it was successful. In fact, it was the most popular form of nineteenth-century entertainment in the United States. With the

exception of the Moorish costume, representations of Black Pete are often indistin-guishable from these American Sambo images, with the bulging eyes, ruby-red lips and wooly hair. Black Pete's child-like, dim-witted, buffoonish demeanor—during per-formances—is eerily similar to those derogatory minstrel stage figures.

As a result of my own cultural background, I recognized the aesthetic similarities, while noting the differences in the tradition, and was repelled by it. I was, at times, vocal in my criticisms to Dutch people about Black Pete being performed in black-face. I thought the defensive reactions, by the majority of Dutch people with whom I spoke, were a result of my delivery, but I soon found that this was a familiar experi-ence among expatriates who dared to question the tradition. Many had similar sto-ries of aggressive Dutch reactions to complaints or criticisms about Black Pete in blackface.[4]

The celebration is confusing for many foreigners.[5] We are asked to believe Dutch explanations, denials, and dismissals about the blackface aspect of the tradition, and what blacking up, and the entire Black Pete aesthetic, represents. We are told to believe it is only chimney soot, or that these characters are merely imaginary, part of a very old tradition of medieval European carnival figures and that they have always been performed this way. We are not to associate them with something disturbingly familiar and modern: blackface, darky fun and frolic.

In the Netherlands, the term "blackface" is absent, as is any well-known sus-tained critique of racist imagery in the country, although there is a long history of such imagery in the Netherlands (see Blakely). The term blackface is commonly understood to be linked to the theatrical convention of *American* minstrelsy. Cultural studies theorist Jill Lane, however, has written on Cuban forms of blackface perform-ance in her book *Blackface Cuba, 1840–1895.* She asserts that blackface, in and of itself, cannot be reduced to American or British minstrel performances. The practice of blacking up is a performance convention that "may be invested with substantially different social, racial and aesthetic meanings in its various contexts" (Lane, "Nationalism" 23). While she explicates on a particular historical context and tradition in her work, she still finds American minstrelsy examinations theoretically useful for other contexts. Minstrelsy and racial cross-dressing studies, while dealing with the particularities of each case, have given researchers some important insights for comparative understandings of blackface performances—an attention to social relations, racial representations, identity production and domination (see also Moon).

In 2007, a year after the rainbow Petes were summarily dismissed, things were back to usual, with black-faced Petes and a suspenseful tale sure to please. On November seventeenth, *The Saint Nicholas Journal* broadcasted the national arrival festivities that took place in the province of Frisia (Friesland). The ship was met with the usual crowds and enthusiasm, as the spectacle of the Saint, and dozens

of adults masquerading in blackface as Black Pete, made their way down the crowded streets. The carnival-like atmosphere blurs the line between performers and spectators, as the group of Black Petes throw candies and cookies to the participants and interact with the children, many of whom are dressed in Black Pete costumes and have donned blackface themselves. The Saint, atop his famous white horse Amerigo, winds through the streets of Friesland surrounded by his adoring helpers, who perform acrobatic feats, and charm the children.

The announcer narrates the street theater as two Black Petes, in a not quite rebellious act, manage to climb onto Sinterklaas' horse, after he has dismounted, without being noticed. They are later seen galloping through the streets with wild abandon. Much of the comedy at this point is derived from the break with all protocol, the irresponsible, even ludicrous sight of the two Black Petes off the job, no longer adhering to their servant roles as they assume the Saint's hierarchically superior position on top of his special horse. After spotting an irresistible allure, the fugitive Petes stop at a neighborhood playground. Before going off to play, as children would, they haphazardly tie the horse, Amerigo, to a pole. As a result of their irresponsible and carefree acts, the horse is inevitably lost. Sinterklaas is reduced to the probability of riding a very ordinary, gray police horse, requested in poor and broken Dutch by another Black Pete, who has been sent to find the two runaways.

This is a typical Black Pete scenario: childlike, irresponsible, always the clown, he provides duty-bound assistance and amusing antics that tend to transgress the usual boundaries, part of the topsy-turvy world of the carnival fool. He is the outsider who can say and do inappropriate things, he pokes fun and causes trouble, and this is why he is so loved. The historical context and the communities involved in these performances matter. Yet this kind of fool character in the European carnival tradition is not static, or bounded to European culture. The black servant, who does not know his place, and the black clown whose humor is derived from taking on (white) airs are well-worn tropes of the very same kind of representations that accompanied blackface minstrelsy performances of old elsewhere in the world. Theorists of carnival and transgression, have noted that while carnival may appear to be a time of social inversions, and when sexual mores are often forgotten, it is, actually, not a time of full release from status and power in a community. Entertainment and pleasurable events are also important sites for acts of subjection. In fact, carnival has, at times, been a socially sanctioned period of harassment against certain, often less powerful (minority) groups. It is a time when lines of power, in terms of class, gender and ethnic or racial groups, may appear to shift, yet they are, often, re-confirmed (Roach, Schecner, Stallybrass and White).

In her influential book, *Scenes of Subjection*, Saidiya Hartman makes the case for white pleasure and its reliance on black bodies as the fundamental organizing principle for slavery, and discusses the attendant art forms that would follow, such as

minstrelsy. She calls for attention to be paid to aspects of enjoyment in dominance and submission. She writes,

Rather than glance at the most striking spectacle with revulsion or through tear-filled eyes, we do better to cast our glance at the more mundane displays of power and the border where it is difficult to discern domination from recreation. Bold instances of cruelty are too easily acknowledged and forgotten, and cries quieted to an endurable hum. By disassembling the "benign" scene, we confront the everyday practice of domination, the nonevent, as it were. (42)

Hartman reminds us to look at the "border" between pleasurable acts and power, and how amusement often masks violence and subjection. This emphasis on enjoyment captures an important element in the case of Black Pete. So much of the denial and disparagement that comes with critical examination of this figure is rooted in the incredulity about a social practice involving children. Black Pete is tied to the innocence of youth: he is a fantasy figure, childlike and beloved by Dutch children, an example of what Hartman ironically calls "innocent amusements."

Hartman's work makes explicit the unsaid in the Black Pete controversy—race and slavery—and ties it to pleasurable events. Hartman places the enslaved, fungible body and the possibilities for all kinds of pleasure, including the unspeakable, at the root of slavery. She argues that this dynamic of pleasure and subjection would fuel later forms of blackface minstrel entertainment. She reminds us that the projected qualities of childishness, such as slow-wittedness and buffoonery, provided the basis for an argument around black sentience—they feel no pain, when beaten, separated from kin, raped, etc.,—that would confirm black social abjection and slavery.

These festival-like performances that make up the Sinterklaas celebration, while having very old European roots in carnival, have taken on modernity's ideologies surrounding race, and as Hartman argues, these ideologies are not only apparent in heavy-handed obvious violence. This kind of racial violence is, in fact, at its most effective in the more playful, celebratory arenas of enjoyment. Black Pete is seductive, very entertaining to children, and he holds a special place for the adult population as well. The enjoyment in this childhood reverie is what the Dutch find so captivating about the tradition, and it goes a long way toward that sense of nostalgic, unreflective love for it. The importance of pleasure in the affective dimension of this celebration cannot be underestimated.

The dominative tendencies, therefore, are difficult to recognize despite the fact that they play a role in these amusing antics during the yearly broadcasts. Sinterklaas rides on a horse while Black Pete walks, runs and jumps, the Saint speaks impeccable Dutch, while Pete stumbles through the language, the Saint is noble and takes his yearly duties seriously, while Black Pete is irresponsible, and

does all the heavy lifting when delivering toys and sliding down chimneys during the Sinterklaas season.

Given Hartman's understanding of an economy of pleasure involved in the domination of certain individuals or communities, Dutch dismissals of all this ruckus around a "little children's fantasy figure," would, in fact, seem to substantiate the importance of this figure of play in culture and politics. This is why it is useful to elaborate on pleasurable and playful things and their use, at this historical moment, in identity negotiations and nationalist assertions in current-day Dutch society.

Reinventing Tradition

While Black Pete is a much beloved figure, he is also an ambivalent one with a history not known by many in the Dutch population, who take his current-day blackface form as an unchanging given. The ambivalence about Pete stems from a long and at times disturbing history. Until recently, the figure of Black Pete was not only Sinterklaas' dutiful helper, associated with gift-giving, but he was also a scary and threatening personage, a stern disciplinarian who was to keep children in line with the threat of switches or carrying bad children back to Spain in one of Sinterklaas' toy bags. With this legacy, he is both lovable and frightening, and that ambiguity may reflect the disparate beginnings and the various traditions from which this celebration arises.[6]

Today's Sinterklaas partially stems from European carnival and winter solstice rituals that marked the shorter winter days, and were celebrations of fertility and feasting rituals that spanned Scandinavia and Britain down through Southern Europe. The figures of Saint Nicholas and Black Pete are a combination of Roman (Saturn), Christian, Greek Orthodox, Germanic (Germanic myth of Wodan on a horse dragging his dark slave Eckhart on a chain through stormy skies) and Nordic elements (Odin and the ravens) as well as Pagan influences that did not fully survive Catholicism or the Protestant Reformation.[7]

Dutch author Tony van Renterghem's study, *When Santa Was a Shaman*, explores the European, Pagan roots of the American Saint Nicholas figure, and Christmas tradition, which also has its ancestry in the Dutch Sinterklaas celebration. Instead of following the hypothesis that the mythic saint of children and sailors from Asia Minor was once thought to be an amalgam of two actual bishops, Renterghem attributes the probable roots of the Saint to two Pagan water deities (96).[8]

Author Phyllis Siefker echoes Renterghem's argument about the Christian appropriation of Pagan figures in her study of Saint Nicholas, *Santa Claus, Last of the Wild Men*. She makes the case, through studies of folklore and art, that the Saint Nicholas figure is not even actually derived from the legendary Saint Nicholas, but is instead a descendant of a wild-man fertility god from prehistoric times. This Pagan figure has been performed in various forms and guises for centuries. This wild-man god became

the Herne/Pan nature-troll, fertility figures known throughout Europe by different names but with similar masquerading guises: fur-clad, with horns, or a sooty, brown or darkened face, or, in other variations, he dons a troll mask or wears a goat's head.

Whatever his guise, Siefker makes the point that these wild-man festivals were central to village rituals during the Middle Ages (64). Feasting and sexual license characterized these celebrations meant to mimic the earth's seasonal rhythms. Masked personages, usually wearing fur, phallic staff in hand, and at times horned, remnants of a pagan past of winter festival, fertility rights and folk rituals, are fully in view to this day. Many of these masked rituals are still performed yearly in places such as the Dutch Wadden Islands, and areas in Austria and Hungary, for example (Blakely 43; Renterghem 125).

With the Church's attempts to appropriate these Pagan figures, slippages were bound to occur. It was not a clean or easy process, and the Christian and Pagan saints and gods would often come together as a pair: a Saint-like figure and their Pagan helper. These Pagan personages were, at times, relegated to subservient companions tied to conscience and impressing social mores—good and bad behavior lessons for children—who brought the threat of punishment by carrying whips or sticks. The saint/Pagan duo would not always keep their distinctive places, however. They would sometimes meld into one figure, though in some locations in Europe, a troll-like figure would manage to elude the saint and become the sole gift giver (Seifker 17–26, 156–57).

Historian Allison Blakely, like Renterghem and Siefker, also ascribes a fusion of Christian and Pagan rituals to the Sinterklaas tradition that leads to the Black Pete personage's splitting from the Saint and his subsequent debasement into a servant role and association with the sinister, or Satan (40–46). The white saint would come to signify enlightened Christianity, while Pete would remain a Pagan figure of darkness. There is not one definitive moment of separation between the saint and the Pagan helper given the disparate origins of these figures (Seifker 155–64). Seifker documents the Catholic church's crusade against Paganism and Pope Gregory's conscious and systematic attempts to literally demonize wild man Pagan figures during his reign from 590–604 (65–66). At times separate and unequal, in other periods intertwined and, or indistinguishable as one figure, like two sides of a coin, Saint Nicholas and Black Pete represent a whole—they reflect a human need for light and dark, good and bad.

While the two figures have been firmly separated in current-day Dutch culture, Pete's present role of naughty, fun-loving helper belies the simple labeling of him as devilish, or a centuries-long representation of evil. "Black" represented the unknown, and at times, frightening qualities of otherness, as well as the untamed and forbidden (wild man) in us all. This liminal quality captures the ambiguity of this character,

both beloved and feared. With the splitting of Sinterklaas into two distinct figures, the "Black" in Black Pete became a marker for what was not illuminated and seen, not acceptable, yet desirable, long before he was associated with the devil, or performed as a modern blackface character.[9] Yet in this hierarchical splitting into Christian and Pagan, Saint and devil, there came to be a more modern symbolism. In the nineteenth century, the term black would come to mean alterity in terms of black bodies during modernity, and all that would imply.

Undoubtedly, there were successive and intermittent moments and sources when the Dutch character of Black Pete began to resemble the blackface, stereotypical caricature of today.[10] Some moments are more important than others and various sources emphasize the importance of Dutch school-teacher, Jan Schenkman, and his influential and popular children's book, *Saint Nicholas and His Servant* (1850) [*Sint Nicolaas en zijn knecht*], for modern-day celebrations. Art historian Paul Faber acknowledges Schenkman's many contributions to this tradition, and credits him for the current-day celebration of Sinterklaas (Faber, *Sinterklaas*). Schenkman's *Saint Nicholas and His Servant,* drawing on older stories and traditions, created new elements such as Black Pete coming into houses through the chimney to leave gifts. He also invented the idea of the steamboat that would carry Sinterklaas and his newly imagined slave/servant to Holland from Spain.

According to Faber, Sinterklaas was a lone gift-giver in the Netherlands for centuries (9). It was Schenkman, who first introduced Black Pete as Sinterklaas' helper in this book. Drawing off of the old German Pagan tradition of the nature/troll-like helper, Schenkman re-imagined the figure as an exotic servant/slave for the saint. Faber attributes a second edition of the work published in 1855, as the first time the Black Pete figure is represented as a dark-skinned Moorish page, or black slave or servant (9).

Schenkman, writing in the middle of the nineteenth century, was undoubtedly influenced by the times in which he lived when he conceived of Black Pete as a black slave/servant. Dutch trading in enslaved Africans spanned the period from the early seventeenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century and involved both the Black African, Atlantic slave trade and the Indian Ocean, Asian slave trade (Blakeley 4-8; Vink, "Freedom" 29–30; Vink, "Trade"). By 1838, most countries had officially abolished slavery, and in places like the Netherlands and the United States, abolition was the subject of vigorous debate (Vink, "Freedom").[11] The move to include a Moor, or black slave/servant, in the Sinterklaas tradition is embedded in the systems of exchange and commodification as well as the circulation of images during the nineteenth century. That is what gave it its power, and continues to do so.

Black Pete, once a liminal figure of fertility and winter angst, was now, during modernity, imagined as a black body, codifying the social relations of the time: black serving white. It is not surprising that representations affirming superior notions of

whiteness, and derogatory ideas of blackness, would assert themselves during the calls to abolish slavery in the nineteenth century. This is similar to the dynamics of minstrelsy performances hitting their zenith during the mid-nineteenth century in the United States, as slavery was heading toward its demise. The referent of black bodies for Zwarte Piet, the current-day blackface masquerade, and the dynamic between saint and servant, has become deeply ingrained, and is now viewed as a very old and authentically Dutch aspect of the Sinterklaas tradition.

The splitting of Black Pete from Sinterklaas, and his slide from a Pagan fertility figure, a ludic, carnivalesque figure, and fearful disciplinarian, to that of a debased black servant or slave, is a long road. It is a journey whose later stages would come to mirror modern classifications and hierarchies that included man's dominion over nature, the Western splitting of the mind and body, and race ideologies, supposedly confirmed through science and religion, of white over black. Fertility rights, libidinal pleasures, and the fear and angst of the unknown, of the long dark winter nights, personified by a mysterious Black Pete, would be usurped within modernity's logic of colonialism, slavery and scientific racism. These nineteenth-century dualities and imaginings have taken on the guise of timelessness and are clung to in the present day.

The Politics of Belonging

In this section, I want to explore the Sinterklaas celebration's affective role in citizenship and how notions of national belonging have come to be enmeshed in blackface performance at a time of political change and upheaval in contemporary Dutch society. While an in-depth review and discussion of the decades-long debate about Black Pete far exceeds the scope of this chapter (but see Helsloot), in 2008 there were two events, an art exhibition, and the founding of a "populist" movement, that illustrate some of the themes and on-going dynamics surrounding discussions of this tradition. These events expose a prevalent anxiety around momentous changes in the make-up of the Dutch population at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. They exemplify the way tradition works within Dutch society at this historical moment.

On the website for the van Abbe Art Museum, there is a section devoted to a project called "Becoming Dutch."[12] What is described is a four-year-long project, begun in 2006, devoted to a multifaceted approach to Dutch culture. Two international artists living in the Netherlands, Annette Krauss from Germany and Petra Bauer from Switzerland, became curious about the Sinterklaas tradition. Krauss was exposed to the tradition in a more personal way through her young daughter's involvement in the obligatory and ubiquitous cultural initiation rites played out in activities in the Dutch school system. Interest led to inspiration and armed with knowledge on Jacques Rancière and the political possibilities of art, Krauss and Bauer designed the three-part artistic project called "Read the Masks: Tradition is not Given."[13]

The first stage of the art project consisted of an exhibition held at the van Abbe Museum in Eindhoven opening on May 24, 2008. The second act would consist of a planned, mock protest march to be performed on Saturday, August 30, 2008, and that was also to be filmed. The final project would be a film that would include the preceding work and the public reaction to it, as well as the artists' own explorations of the Sinterklaas tradition historically. The final film debuted March 8, 2010 at the Rietveld (art) Academy in Amsterdam, as part of a larger, international program on race entitled "Black Power by Any Means Necessary."

The 2008 "Read the Masks: Tradition is not Given" art exhibition was playful and confrontational. It included silver, glossily-colored signs reminiscent of gift wrapping. It was pleasing to the eye, and a visual seduction that, once having pulled viewers in, would then question tradition as unchanging and innocent. On the back of these signs, also printed in bold black lettering, was information about the march and other activities exploring the yearly Sinterklaas event. Silver-colored postcards were also part of the show. They were printed with the provocative statement "Black Pete no longer exists" [Zwarte Piet bestaat niet meer], and were designed for viewers to have something to take away with them. They also included information about the second part of the project, the staged protest march that was to occur in August.

Given the exploratory nature of the Becoming Dutch website, and the progressive larger project of critically examining Dutch society, it would be impossible to surmise the controversy and chaos that erupted when the August mock protest march, the second part of the "Read the Masks" project, was formally announced. It was, per-haps, to be expected that there would be some complaints about the mock demon-stration, given the popularity of the Sinterklaas celebrations. Instead, there was a deluge of criticism, mostly rude, often hateful and sometimes extreme. Krauss and Bauer received death threats for taking this next, more public step in designing this critical exhibit. Bringing this criticism of Black Pete to a more public realm—the streets—crossed a line. The march never materialized. The museum canceled that aspect of the project as a result of the pressure and violent threats. Even Krauss felt there was no choice, but to cancel, after having received disturbing phone calls. She was scared and shaken by the violent response.

Rather than hold the march, a compromise was struck between the artists and the museum. There would be a formal debate, on November 11, 2008, about the Sinterklaas tradition in general, and a more specific discussion about the unreason-able outrage that seemed to be generated as a result of the artists' proposed proj-ect. One reading might find this a productive use of a violent situation, an opportunity for heightening awareness around the debate while confronting censorship in the form of an extremist grassroots assault against an art exposition. In a country locked in very public, rhetorical battles about freedom of speech as a Dutch cultural value that is now threatened in the face of an encroaching Islam, I am, however,

unconvinced that the greater public recognizes the hypocrisy in reactions to a mock protest march that was canceled under threat of death.

Indeed, on November 12, 2011, four people were forcibly arrested for protesting against the Dordrecht Sinterklaas arrival parade, followed by five more people the next day during the Amsterdam arrival. The protesters believed they were exercising their right to free speech by wearing t-shirts with the words printed on them: "Zwarte Piet is Racisme" [Zwarte Piet is Racism]. The way in which one of the demonstrators describes the Dordrecht arrest is very different from how it has been portrayed in the mainstream media.[14] In their account a policeman suddenly starts pushing one of the activists and within moments they are surrounded by four to five policeman who take them down, push their knees into their necks, heads and backs while spraying pepper spray in their eyes. The police describe the protestors as creating a nuisance. The activists may have brought more attention to this issue, but given the negative reaction to the protesters by the general public, critical reflection on the meaning of the black-face performance has not improved since the Van Abbe Museum debacle of 2008.

The idea that artful criticism of a children's party, an exhibition that takes the form of a protest march, would rise to the level of the threat of violence, shows, I think, that the artists' claim of the seriousness of play is justified. The van Abbe debacle also makes clear the power of play in relation to nationalist sentiment and domination. Despite the fact that this centuries-old tradition, including Black Pete himself, has been the subject of numerous reinventions, the van Abbe incident, and the 2011 protests are illustrative of how blackface performance, associated with children's innocence, is almost rendered immune to critiques.

In another instance, a speech marking the founding of Rita Verdonk's reactionary movement, demonstrates the depth of feeling that fuels a defense of the Sinterklaas tradition, its importance to national identity, and the resistance to changing it. In an announcement made by the former conservative government official on April 3, 2008, Rita Verdonk, the former minister of Immigration and Integration [Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie], invokes the Sinterklaas tradition as part of her long-winded manifesto marking the founding of her new movement Proud of the Netherlands [Trots op Nederland]. In it, she laments the current state of social affairs in the Netherlands,

> *This culture, our traditions, our individuality, we are proud of these things. That is Holland!*
> *But this culture and those freedoms are in danger.*
> *To begin [with], there is a strong stream of "put downs" that would have us already for years believe that our culture doesn't exist, and that finds those values and norms inferior in comparison to other cultures.*
> *They bring up for debate the Sinterklaas Holiday. And they want slavery monuments everywhere in order to paint us as bad . . .*[15]

The space between the "our" and the "they" of which Verdonk speaks, is what interests me here. The national "our" that is continually invoked and juxtaposed to an, at-times, ill-defined "they" throughout the rather long tirade, are attempts at creating and enforcing boundaries while denying them. Verdonk makes a direct link between the need for a *lost* (stolen perhaps) national sense of pride, and the Sinterklaas celebration. In the above lines, she implicitly discounts any right to question the tradition. The Sinterklaas tradition becomes one example in a list of perceived attacks on a culture and its authentic or native population, "us." She then adds the Dutch National Slavery Monument, for good measure, as an identifying sign of those outsiders critical to the tradition: black immigrants from the former Dutch colonial countries. The Afro-Surinamese population took a leading role in establishing the monument.

In reality, not all former colonial citizens are voicing discontent at the tradition. Many may have as much nostalgia for it as the white autochthonous Dutch population, while some may simply be weary of attempting to discuss something that is overwhelmingly, and belligerently, embraced. Many Afro-Dutch people do not make connections between derogatory stereotypical performances, which enact unequal social relations, and historical structural inequalities that continue to exist in the Netherlands in education, work and housing. Many immigrants believe these other social ills to be more important and worthy of time and attention. (See also the chapter by Joseph Jordan on black citizen's responses to Zwarte Piet).

It must also be noted that Black Pete, as the controversial and problematic figure in the tradition, is not specifically mentioned in Verdonk's speech. She refers to the Sinterklaas tradition in general. People who are critical of the criticisms surrounding Black Pete often frame their defense in this way. This is a slippery semantic move that stirs strong emotion and a sense of nostalgia in the threat of losing the entire tradition, and it actually signals the end of any real reflection or discussion about the offensive aspects of the tradition. Instead, an all-or-nothing strategy takes the focus almost entirely off of the social practice of blackface, and creates a dreaded sense of loss about the Sinterklaas event. It is as unlikely that the Sinterklaas celebration will be banished from the Netherlands, as it would be to do away with Santa Claus in the United States. This all-or-nothing strategy, with regard to the holiday, however, is an emotional ploy that serves to marshal belligerent nostalgic impulses that, as we saw in the van Abbe Museum incident, can turn into the threat of serious violence.

Verdonk's conservatism is no longer marginal. Her views on the importance of the Sinterklaas tradition to Dutch identity, and her derisive and dismissive attitude toward debates about the topic, are very common and mainstream, representative of much of the population, and most likely why she was invited to participate in a 2008 children's movie that centered on the Saint Nicholas festivities. A controversial figure, both admired and ridiculed, Verdonk is but one example of a larger move to the

right within Dutch society and Europe in general. As is discussed elsewhere in this book, there is a disturbing trend toward extreme conservatism, evidenced by the politically very successful far right wing PVV party (the Party for Freedom [Partij voor de Vrijheid]), led by controversial politician Geert Wilders.[16]

In this extreme conservative discourse, the Sinterklaas tradition becomes one example in a list of perceived attacks on Dutch culture and its authentic or native customs, values, and population. An unacknowledged nativism, coupled with a strong belief in Dutch exceptionalism, along with an inability to admit to any kind of racial component to intolerant tendencies, is a common Dutch stance.[17]

The pervasive view that the Netherlands is somehow above experiencing the same problems of negotiating plurality as any other country comes together with a strange denial around race that permeates Dutch society. It is as if there is a mandate to be a post-racial society in the midst of a continued and severe social segregation around housing, work and education. These areas are viewed as personal choices, dependent on one's talents and abilities, and not influenced by structural or historical processes. Avoidance of open discussions about race is the norm, as historian Dienke Hondius explains in this volume: "Rather than a heavy taboo, there is a lighter but widely agreed upon general consensus about not mentioning skin color, not naming racial issues, Ras, daar doen wij niet aan—'We don't do race'"(40).

This denial around race—the lack of awareness—makes it difficult to name it, discuss it, and consequently to question or fight against racism. The willful ignorance surrounding race issues, and its importance, becomes the defense against discussing it. If it is not acknowledged, then it cannot exist. This means visible minorities' realities are unheard and denied, and further marginalization ensues. Whiteness and race are the unsaid, perhaps unconscious aspects of xenophobia and nativism.[18] The social relations played out in the Sinterklaas hierarchy and ritual become a reiterative performance in constructions of whiteness, the nation, and group boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.

As sociologist Nira Yuval-Davis explains, in her article "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," discussions of citizenship and national identity emphasize the role of imagination and temporality, former and future generations, and this is instrumental in terms of national belonging. A reinventing of the past, with regard to traditions, and the nation, is often done with an eye toward forming and restricting future possibilities (202–203). This renders the nation unstable, given the reiterative and the performative nature of the state as always in a state of becoming. Yet this is masked when there is an appeal to the past and the pedagogical dimension of the nation state, as timeless, with a particular, authentic character—values and culture—that is invoked.[19] At the same time, however, it may be feared that the possibility of an inclusive future, in which black citizens take part, is closed.

The politics of belonging around the Black Pete aspect of the Sinterklaas tradition makes this social practice "a referential sign [the minstrel mask] that indexes whites power to exclude" (Sieg, "Beyond" 196) others not only in representation and mis-representation—masquerade and racial cross-dressing—but in terms of status, belonging and citizenship in the nation state. Whiteness, like the nation, is a highly unstable category, fuelled by a constant, almost overwhelming anxiety and in need of constant reiteration. For the formerly colonized and immigrant laborers in the Dutch nation-state, the coercive nature of colonial mimicry (Bhabha 85–92), its internal ambivalence, as well as the attempts at control and domination, are made literal as well as symbolic in the expectation of an uncritical embracing of the blacked up performance of Black Pete as part of the Sinterklaas holiday.

Dutch nativism and whiteness are performed in the appropriation of imagined qualities of the other through racial cross-dressing. In slipping on another's fantasized attributes and features, one's own identity is affirmed, and boundaries are made rigid even as appropriative desire is enacted. In this case, however, Dutch national identity is performed through a tradition that is largely an unreflective celebration of a stereotypical caricature of blackness and a master-slave dynamic.

Despite dismissals, denials and protests to the contrary, the tradition's invocation in nationalist rhetoric and the absolute refusal to find an acceptable aesthetic compromise for the figure, confirms this children's party to be a political player at the current time. While debates on the Black Pete controversy have gone under the rubric of misunderstandings, and criticism against it has been diminished as minority and foreign propaganda against the tradition, in the current state of cultural anxiety about the disappearance of culture and immigration of visible minorities and Muslims, it is not surprising that struggles over national identity, the future of the Netherlands, as Yuval-Davis warns, would be fought over the past. The turn to authenticity, at this particular juncture in contemporary culture, not only invades the calls to stop criticizing Black Pete, but it also can be seen to include ideas about the authentic culture and values of the Dutch nation-state that are currently perceived as under threat.

I have argued that in twenty-first century Dutch culture, the Sinterklaas tradition has become a rallying point for cultural authenticity. Dutch nativist culture and (white) national identity is implied in and against growing anxiety about the nation and what the future holds in terms of national identity. The van Abbe Museum incident, and Rita Verdonk's movement bring a new interpretation to the relevance of an old tradition—that of national identity and boundary maintenance. A repetitive and pleasurable dalliance in "innocent amusements" allows for an acting-out of the past, while simultaneously remaining blind to a social practice rooted in slavery.[20]

Notes

1. The patron saint of Amsterdam is the same figure who transformed into the American Santa Claus. The early cult of Saint Nicholas was located in Asia Minor. This third century figure was believed to have been a Greek bishop who resided in Asia Minor. The center of the cult of this Saint was in Myra, the capital city of Lycia, what would now be considered Turkey. He is also known as Nicholas bishop of Myra. His remains were believed to have been moved from Myra to the Italian city of Bari. In the fifteenth century, Bari was part of the Kingdom of Aragon and later Spain until the nineteenth century. This is a possible reason for why Sinterklaas arrives into the Netherlands from Spain.

2. According to John Helsloot, in a poll issued by the Dutch newspaper *de Volkskrant*, two thirds of black people of Surinam and Antillean descent approved of the use of different colors for Pete as compared to about one half of the white population in Amsterdam. In the same article, Helsloot describes several initiatives on the local level in the 1980s and 1990s to address not only the black representation of Pete, but that also questioned the relationship and hierarchy of the Saint and his servant. This chapter suggests that over the past two decades the openness to any critical reflection on the tradition has been severely diminished. Yet, in 2013, there seems to be a change, due to interventions by black activists, other opinion makers, a remark by a consultant related to the UN, and a more general critical Council-or-Europe-report (www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Netherlands/NLD-CbC-IV-2013-039-NLD.pdf). While these critical interventions were met with massive protests by these who vehemently dismissed all criticism of Black Pete (no less than two million people liked a Facebook page supporting Black Pete), it was also said that, at least, the issue was now finally being addressed openly and explicitly.

3. During a yearly Black Pete concert on television in 2007, a tie-in with the popular Jetix children's Sinterklaas series which featured the traditional black-faced Petes, I noticed several very young children shrinking away in fear from the very performers they came to see. The blackface Petes were scary to some children. Apparently, whether appearing as red-, blue-, or black-faced, Black Pete is both beloved and a bit feared, even today.

4. Indeed, the international expatriate on-line magazine, *Expatica*, has a yearly debate on its website devoted to the blackface aspect of the Sinterklaas tradition. Foreigners living in the Netherlands express their frustration as much about Dutch reactions to the questioning of the tradition as about the tradition itself. See *www.expatica.com*.

5. For a humorous and typically confounded reaction to this tradition by an American, see David Sedaris' article "Six to Eight Black Men." See also *Christmas in Holland: Zwarte Piet Revolution,* a video by the comedy troupe Boom Chicago which has a satellite club in Amsterdam.

6. As the title of this section suggests, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's influential study *The Invention of Tradition* is an important guide for approaching any supposedly timeless and authentic cultural practice. See also Mieke Bal's interrogation of the Sinterklaas tradition through an analysis of photographs of Black Pete viewed in and against the European tradition of portraiture 110–51.

7. For information on the changing nature of Sinterklaas and Black Pete through the centuries, see Blakely 39–73; Renterghem 47, 89–125; and Pieterse 27–44. This is also covered in a broader European context in Siefker.

8. For the debate on the original bishop(s) on whom Saint Nicholas is sometimes said to have been modeled, see Jones, Sevcenko, Seifker.

9. In fact, Siefker makes the argument that Saint Nicholas in fact has changed over time from a devilish figure to one of light. The etymology of the name Nick would seem to substantiate this given that Nick in old English was the name for the devil. See also Blakeley 45 and Renterghem 105.

10. Renterghem 90–91, for example, credits the Dutch revolutionary war against Spain, in the sixteenth century, as a time of reinvention for Zwarte Piet to wearing Moorish attire.

11. For an in-depth look at the intricacies of the Dutch debate on slavery see Marcus Vink's article "Freedom and Slavery." Also see Vink's "The Oldest Trade," on the topic of the often over-looked, "uncharted" and understudied area of Indian Ocean, Asian slaving.

12. Van Abbe Museum, "Becoming Dutch." Nov. 2008. <http://becomingdutch.com/introduction/?s=d>.

13. Much of the information in this section came from interviews I did with Annette Krauss in 2008 and 2009.

14. In the mainstream paper *Elsevier*, in an article published on the thirteenth of November, the demonstrators are accused of being disruptive. <http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Nieuws/Nederland/322206/Activisten-opgepakt-bij-intocht-Sint-in-Amsterdam.htm.> In an article on Monday, November fourteenth, two of the protesters are interviewed and they give their side of the story where they assert police brutality. <http://nos.nl/op3/artikel/313172-actievoerders-zwarte-piet-vertellen-over-arrestatie.html> For more information on the arrest and current debates in the Netherlands about Zwarte Piet see the Zwarte Piet is racism website <http://zwartepietisracisme.tumblr.com/>. I am grateful to Huub van Baar and Amy Abdou for bringing the website coverage of the 2011 arrests to my attention.

15. *Die cultuur, onze tradities, onze eigenheden, daar zijn we trots op.*
  Dat is Nederland!
  Maar die cultuur en die vrijheden lopen gevaar.

Om te beginnen is er een sterke "weg-met-ons" stroming die ons al jaren wil doen geloven dat onze cultuur niet bestaat en die onze waarden en normen zelfs minderwaardig vindt ten opzichte van andere culturen.
  Ze stellen zelfs het sinterklaasfeest ter discussie. En willen overal slavernijmonumenten om ons als slecht af te schilderen . . ..

This section is from a proclamation written by Verdonk, also given as a speech, that appears on the *Trots op NL*-website, entered under the title, "Nieuwe beweging, andere politiek, beter Nederland!," April 15, 2008 <http://www.trotsopnederland.com/index.php?pageID=3&messageID=26>. Some of these same lines were also published in the April 4, 2008 edition of the *Spits* newspaper. The translation that appears in the text is my own.

16. For articles that attempt to explain the intricacies of this new kind of nationalism see Sunier and van Ginkel 107–24; and van der Veer 111–24.

17. For a review and critique of research and public policy on minorities in the Netherlands (including academic research) see Essed and Nimako 281–312.

18. For an examination of the hidden notions of nativism in Dutch national identity and what that means to citizens, see Essed and Trienekens 52–72.

19. For more on the tensions between the pedagogical and the performative dimensions of the nation, see Joseph Jordan's chapter in this volume. See also Imre 255–82.

20. I am very grateful to Isabel Hoving and Philomena Essed for their editorial comments on this article.

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Between "Dutch Tolerance" and "Moroccan Normality": Benali's *Bruiloft aan zee* as Challenge to an all too "Happy Multiculturality"

Liesbeth Minnaard

At the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, after a decade in which harsh indictments of the supposedly failed multiculturalism of the Netherlands have become mainstream, and, in their wake, xenophobia and racism, the times when the Netherlands defined itself as a tolerant, multicultural nation seem almost forgotten. This past, however, is still very recent. A closer look at the days before the shift helps to understand the complex history of the Dutch negotiations of race and ethnicity.

In the time span between 1996—the year in which several writers of migrant background published their first writings—and 2001—the year of the National Book Week on "Writing between Two Cultures"—the Dutch literary field went through a phase of extraordinary openness: it celebrated a "happy multiculturality." In these years the interest among publishers, reviewers and readers alike in what was called multicultural or ethnic literature was not only of considerable intensity, but also remarkably positive-tuned. Dutch literature seemed to embrace its multicultural richness in a similar way as Dutch society of that time boasted its (self-acclaimed) multiculturality and tolerance. This chapter takes one of the celebrated specimens of this multicultural literature, the novel *Bruiloft aan zee* (1996) by the Moroccan-Dutch writer Abdelkader Benali, as its central object of research. It offers a critical reading of this novel in the light of the broader "happy multiculturality" discourse and demonstrates how this novel critically confronts the idea of an *all too* happy, *all too* tolerant Dutch self-image. In the time before the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, when tolerance was still considered a Dutch virtue, this novel's representation of cultural transgression explores and challenges the racist nature of the Dutch boundaries of

tolerance. Dutch norms and a very particular, stereotyped idea of "Moroccan normality" are questioned and negotiated to make a plea for cultural criticism rather than for cultural tolerance. A close analysis of the novel's narrative structure will show how *Bruiloft aan zee* works to manipulate and disrupt stereotypical and racist patterns of readers' expectations. It demonstrates how the novel both subtly and abruptly moves away from the well-meaning ("tolerant"), but deeply problematic ("essentialist") acceptance of "cultural customs" in the name of a racist multiculturality. It argues that instead the novel points towards a more gender-sensitive, critical assessment of family and cultural traditions after migration.

About the Boundaries of "Normal" Behavior

To analyze the discursive strategies that underlie the eye-opening, anti-racist disruption of multicultural tolerance that *Bruiloft aan zee* brings about, I make use of Jürgen Link's fascinating theory on "normalism" as laid out in his study *Versuch über den Normalismus. Wie Normalität produziert wird* [*Exertion on normalism. How normality is produced*]. Before turning to Benali's writing, I will first elaborate on this theory on normalism as well as on its usefulness for a critical discussion of the Dutch discourse of tolerance and multiculturality of the 1990's. In the introduction to his study Link decisively distinguishes between "normality" and "normativity," two categories that in his opinion are often mistaken for one and the same. His interest concerns normality, or what he calls the categorical normalist imperative: the imperative to be like other people, the imperative not to deviate too much from the dominant group in society. Normality in this sense plays an important cultural role; as a discursive practice it sustains the injunction to conform to and to incorporate oneself into the field of the normal. Normality, according to Link, is not a set norm, but more something like an unspoken rule based on general consensus. It is a culture- and subject-constitutive category that propagates "common sense" and that takes homogeneity as its basic condition. In the everyday, the normal is the situation in which there is no need for intervention, in which everything remains more or less within the boundaries of the acceptable.

Normality can be seen as a gradual continuum between the normal and the abnormal, a continuum that is only susceptible to gradual change. Its actualization depends on as well as prescribes what Link calls "boundaries of behavior" ["Verhaltens-Grenzen"] (21). The negotiation of these boundaries of behavior—and thus the determination of normality—moves between attitudes of tolerance on the one hand and the experienced necessity to intervene on the other. Normality does not result from the application of a particular norm, but from behavior that is considered average, that is in tune with the behavior of others and with what these others consider normal. It justifies itself with the pragmatic assumption of a lack of alternatives: "What else? What should be when not normality?" ["Was sonst? Was soll

sein, wenn nicht Normalität?"] (Link 17). Whereas normativity defines ethical, juridical or religious norms that one is supposed to adhere to *by principle*, normality is supposed to provide pragmatic behavioral norms that are "best for all" in a given situation.

In liberal, secular societies like the Netherlands in that particular period, in which normativity had become more and more tabooed as being equivalent to conservatism and rigidity, normality was supposed to represent a more open-minded and flexible alternative set of guidelines for society. Although after the turn of the millennium normativity gained ground again, in the form of a government-initiated debate on Dutch norms and values, the situation in the 1990s was rather different. At that time the large increase of refugees and migrants seeking a safe and/or more prosperous haven in Western Europe brought about a considerable transformation of Western-European ethnoscapes. In this new situation no ready-made answers were at hand. The ethical frame of normativity demanded help for people in need from countries of great prosperity. Simultaneously, however, the so-called floods of migrants—mind the metaphor—were experienced as an intolerable pressure on the boundaries that determine normality. It is for this reason that Link considers the subsequent public call for a stop to migration as a symptom of fear for the abnormal: fear that the system (that sustains normality) will collapse under these extraordinary circumstances. Hospitality to migrants was supposed to overstretch the negotiable boundaries of normality.

This discrepancy between norm and normal here is, however, in no way typical for the public discourse on multiculturality of the 1990s. Rather it constitutes an exception in the Dutch discourse of tolerance of that time, that tries its best to avoid radicalization and to propagate what could be called pillarized homogeneity—as paradoxical as the expression may seem. This term pillarized homogeneity refers to what I will call "Dutch normality," the state that tolerates cultural difference as long as it remains within the set, dominant boundaries of behavior. Both this difference and these boundaries of behavior are defined in racist terms. On the one hand cultural particularities are considered as intrinsic or natural aspects of a particular, non-dominant culture. On the other hand they are seen as fundamentally inferior to particularities of the dominant culture. Thus "culture," here, becomes synonymous to "race." In its perceived capacity of a fixed, inherent feature it works to establish a "natural" hierarchy of differences.[1] The dominant Dutch culture accepts and even institutionalizes cultural difference as long as it does not disturb the status quo of its "Dutch normality." This means adjusting the boundaries of tolerance to a situation in which alien, non-Dutch cultural customs are taken as an exception, because they are so fundamentally different.

The idea of tolerance—under the normalist guise of live and let live—is central to a racist make-up of society. Dienke Hondius, however, has argued in her study

Gemengde huwelijken, gemengde gevoelens [*Mixed marriages, mixed feelings*] that the actualization of this tolerance is of a particularly passive character. Cultural difference is not discussed, but the topic is rather evaded. Hondius claims that passive tolerance does not differ that much from passive intolerance. Central to both is the lack of a true negotiation of difference and of an active discussion of cultural particularities that might be irreconcilable with traditional norms and values of Dutch society. Because cultural difference is considered as essential, stable and absolute, no space is left for intercultural exchange. In respect to multiculturality passive (in)tolerance tends to avoid discussing cultural customs that might (over-)stretch Dutch boundaries of behavior, for instance particular gender practices in Islamic cultures. Normality, "Dutch normality," in this sense constitutes a gray-zone of cultural relativist "gedogen" [permitting/tolerating]. It does so either from a passively tolerant stance that allows the cultural Others their (assumedly inferior) cultural traditions and respects their (essential) cultural particularities, or from a passive intolerant position that in fact rejects cultural Otherness but prefers to avoid an actual discord (let be discussion). Both stances suppress a possibly felt need for intervention and favor the strategy of evasion.[2] This strategy of evasion fits perfectly within what Link names normalism: the mechanism that tries to rebalance cultural disruptions (and overlooks cultural difference) in order to hold on to the well-known safety of a "normal" status quo. Dutch normality can be maintained, also in the age of globalization, as long as "we" do not enter into a discussion about cultural essences and cultural differences. This refusal to engage with cultural differences reinforces the idea that these differences are essential and absolute, ungraspable and non-negotiable, and natural to that particular "other culture." Thus it strengthens racist notions of "cultural" difference.

Literature possesses a potential for challenging this status quo. As a cultural product that distinguishes itself by its aesthetic difference, it can offer an alternative mode of reflection on the workings of this racist ideology of normalism. Aesthetically challenging literature plays with, questions or even crosses given boundaries of behavior. It maps possible examples of transgression that, according to Link, provide us with "application models for denormalizations" ["Applikations-Vorlagen für Denormalisierungen"] (58). The imagined situations of transgression work to stretch the boundaries of behavior and prompt the reader to reflect on normalism and on the dominant view on normality. This does not automatically mean that literature can bring about actual denormalizations on a social level. Literature offers its readership, that will vary in its personal attitude towards this socially dominant construction of normality, imaginary denormalizations as possible patterns of identification. In the following I will focus on the denormalizations that Benali's *Bruiloft aan zee* performs. Or, in Link's terms, I will focus on the narrative representation of "(ab-)normal journeys" ["(nicht) normale Fahrten"] (58).[3]

The Ab-Normal Journey of Benali's *Bruiloft aan zee*

What can be said about normalism in Benali's *Bruiloft aan zee* and how does this imaginary normalism relate to the novel's Dutch context of writing and reading? What kind of denormalizations does the novel perform and to what effect? And what about the patterns of identification that the novel offers its readers?

Central in the novel's context of writing and reading in the 1990s is a relatively positive discursivity of Dutch multiculturality. Tolerance is—contrary to nowadays— still a key word and Dutch integration policy still provides laws and facilities for the preservation of migrants' own language and culture.[4] In the mainstream literary field multiculturality is a relatively new phenomenon that expresses itself in a broad inter- est of the predominantly white participants in this field in Dutch writers of non-Dutch ethnic backgrounds.[5] Benali belongs to a group of "migrant writers" who successfully entered the literary arena in the second half of the 1990s. He is one of the few of these writers who after their hyped rise to multicultural fame managed to actually consolidate a position in the mainstream literary field.[6] Benali had his debut with the novel *Bruiloft aan zee* that was nominated for the renowned Dutch *Libris Literature Prize* in 1997. With his second novel, *De langverwachte* [*The Long-Awaited*] (2002), he made his name, especially when now he actually won this *Libris Prize*. Since then Benali has published a broad range of literary and essayistic texts and has become an appreciated *Dutch* (instead of a migrant) writer, a writer whose work is no longer considered marginal.[7] The chapter by Bos and Trienekens in this volume explains how racism operates through differentiation between Art with a capital A and art with a lower case. Migrant artists are often placed in the second category.

The successful *Bruiloft aan zee* in a certain way catered for the tolerant white Dutch reader interested in the background of his/her "culturally other" fellow-Dutch.[8] With its light-hearted story about a migrant wedding at the sea-side in the Moroccan country of origin, the novel seems to provide insight in the cultural customs of a migrant community. Its ironic mode of narration makes this a pleasurable, by times even hilarious reading-experience: this "migrant writer" offers a postmodern parody of the culture of his birth. By use of constant detours, the breaking up of linearity, and spontaneous and seemingly arbitrary intermezzi, the novel departs from the realist mode that is often expected of literature of migration. Its narrative frays in several directions and does so in a breath-taking speed. For the reader not to lose track it is best to hold on to the central narrative thread in the novel: the story of the quest for the runaway groom.

The story opens with a narrative image of its two main focalizers: Lamarat Minar, the subject of the quest, and the Moroccan taxi driver Chalid who drives him to his destination. Lamarat, a rather inconspicuous Moroccan-Dutch young man, visits his (parents') country of origin to be present at his sister's wedding. His sister, Rebekka, is going to marry their uncle Mosa, who is not much older than his niece and still lives

in the region of origin, Iwojen. The marriage with his niece, however, now gives him the chance to migrate to the Netherlands. Thanks to his brother who offers his daughter in matrimony Mosa can pass through the gate to the North.

The story begins on the day that the planned wedding will finally take place. However, uncle Mosa panics and disappears shortly before the official ceremony, when the wedding guests have already arrived. At the moment that the bridegroom's disappearance is noticed, Lamarat—until then an observing and not particularly involved guest at the wedding—is involuntarily drawn into the center of the story's action. He takes the reader with him, who is invited to share in the consternation of the father and family at the moment of detection. The perplexed father commands his son to find and bring back his uncle as soon as possible, without any of the guests noticing. What is at stake in this assignment, so much is clear, is the protection and maintenance of the family honor. In the particularly local and traditional Moroccan setting of the story, this honor has suffered from a sustainable loss of credibility by the family's migration. Although migration to the north in itself is valued as an economical achievement, it is simultaneously thought to incorporate the risk of a loss of cultural norms and values. The wedding was supposed to reconfirm the family's cultural credibility in the region of origin. It is for this reason that the father puts all his hopes on Lamarat, to avert "the wind of scandal and shame" (WS 186).[9]

The narrative structure invites the reader to identify with the quest for the runaway groom and with the wish for the wedding to take place as planned. The fact that Lamarat appears rather lost in the Moroccan land and culture he primarily knows from his father's stories, somehow facilitates the identification of the (non-Moroccan) Dutch reader with Lamarat and simultaneously enables the maintenance of a distance towards the local Moroccans. As second-generation migrant Lamarat is a visitor, a "foreigner" (46 *et passim*), a boy "from the north" (48), who seems helplessly out of place in the Iwojen landscape. The reader joins him on a more or less equal footing of detached involvement in his quest for the disappeared groom.

The strongly directive narrative structure produces an interesting paradox. In the context of the story the disappearance of the groom constitutes the central moment of denormalization in terms of Link's theory. The quest that determines the novel's central story can be considered an (ab-)normal journey, aimed at maintaining a certain state of normality that is threatened by this denormalization. From the perspective of extra-textual "Dutch normality," however, the arranged marriage itself might well serve as a moment of denormalization, as an instance of over-stretching the Dutch boundaries of behavior. Following the flow of the story means stretching the boundaries of behavior in the name of multicultural tolerance. As a "tolerant" Dutch reader one has to ignore possible doubts about the marital agreements between the two brothers over the girl Rebekka and, instead, accept the father's attempt to hold on to his tradition of origin after migration. Objecting to this state of affairs would

require reading against the grain, reading against the narration offered by the novel's main focalizer Lamarat. Whereas readers with a Moroccan (or other immigrant) back-ground, who are well acquainted with inter- and intracultural tensions and familiar with the social conflicts within the Moroccan migrant community, might be more apt to adopt such a critical reading strategy, a reader less familiar with these will be tempted to follow the narrator's lead.

In the narrative discourse of *Bruiloft aan zee*, normality is a category that is closely intertwined with honor. The father's aim to restore the family honor forms the accel-erating spirit of the story. This honor—the family honor—is strongly gendered. In the Netherlands the father struggles with the erosion of his position of patriarchal power. His desperate attempts to bring more Moroccan culture as well as more Islam in his house are of little effect. However, despite his declining status the father succeeds in arranging a marriage between his brother and his daughter, a patriarchal triumph to be celebrated with a traditional wedding party. In the father's expectation the mar-riage will re-establish the estimation and respect for his person both within the fam-ily and in the left behind homeland. He takes for granted that the reinstatement of his patriarchal power would require an act of patriarchal violence on his daughter. When he meets his brother to settle the final agreements, he encourages him in a fatherly tone to be patient with his daughter who, as he tells Mosa, cried about her fate for weeks in a row. In his (traditional) eyes Rebekka's disquietude, however, is an unavoidable part of the honor-consolidating process. It is up to Mosa to reassure his future bride and to give her the attentiveness that will help her come to terms with her fate.

During their first encounter, one year before the wedding, Mosa obediently gives his best: "an ice-cream cone, a kiss and a gold necklace, each of them accompanied by a hug, until she had no choice but to say, 'Yes, but I want to be independent. Yes, but you have to treat me with respect. Yes, but how do I know you aren't lying?'" (WS 105). Although these questions clearly echo the discourse of women's emancipation and testify of some doubt in respect to the truthfulness of his intentions, in the end Rebekka gives in to the pre-arranged agreement. Under the pressure of her father and mislead—as the reader realizes—by Mosa's calculated declarations of affection, Rebekka puts away her doubts, dries her tears and reconciles herself to a dream of romantic love. The reader witnesses how the girl changes hands in a male-to-male-transaction in which she doesn't have a voice. The almost-complete absence of Rebekka's perspective and opinion on the agreement (except for the lines cited above) holds the assenting reader back from identifying with her position, although the reader might recognize her predicament and sympathize with her "underdog position."

Rebekka's motivations to conform to her father's will are not directly accessible, but can only be derived from the ironic remarks by the external narrator. The narrator repeatedly undermines both Rebekka's (more or less enforced) dream of romantic

love as well as the father's positive perception of the preservation of the family honor with the help of Mosa. In an ironic mode he explicates his doubts about the event by referring to the father's (as well as Rebekka's) ignorance about the bridegroom's secret life of sexual pleasures in the red light district of Iwojen's border city Melilliar:

> What if the father had known about Mosa's trips to Melilliar? [. . .] Would he have dared to marry off his daughter, as she looked on from her crib, would he have dared to put her and her unsullied reputation in Mosa's hands? We don't know. But the father talked about his brother and tickled his son until he collapsed into giggles. (WS 19)

Paradoxically the use of this irony has a strangely re-assuring effect, as it gives the situation a certain light-heartedness. The representation of the father as rather simple and pitiable works to produce a mild willingness at the side of the reader to stretch the boundaries of acceptable behavior and to allow this (dethroned) patriarch his last victory. This assenting attitude, however, requires that one overlooks the consequences of the deal for Rebekka.[10]

Rebekka's in/voluntary involvement in the wedding-agreement mirrors Mosa's own ambivalent feelings about the wedding. His decision to accept the proposed wedding arrangements appears similarly half-hearted, the result from external social pressure to exchange his life of poverty in Iwojen for a life of diligent prosperity in the land of "golden streets":

> But how can you avoid so much attention when everybody is always asking, 'when will you be heading north?' After all, he had a brother there, someone who could help him with money, a job, the trip over. And not just to any old country in Europe—not Spain where those dirty Franco dogs spit on you, not France, not Deutschland, but the best country in the whole wide world: Ollanda! Only a fool would pass up a chance like that. (19)

The ironic narration depicts how Mosa, reluctantly, gives in to the pressure of his very traditional social surroundings and agrees to marry his niece Rebekka. His bride's "northern origin," however, troubles him, not his dishonorable reputation or his dishonesty towards his brother and future bride. Women from the North are stereotypically known as dominant and demanding, as immune for the traditional power divisions of patriarchy. In addition to that, the marriage will mean that he has to say goodbye to his favorite prostitute, Chatischa.

Mosa's second thoughts rise to a climax on the day of the wedding, when Chalid the taxi driver rebukes Mosa for his decision:

> "I hear you've decided to head out for Europe after all, you crazy guy. At any rate, the girl you're marrying will be your ticket to Ollanda. This country might be

hek-o-hek, so-so, but you couldn't persuade me to go to a country where the women boss you around and walk over you [. . .]."

Words like that hit hard. They made you wonder about the motives of your friends. [. . .] First you wish me luck and kiss me on cheek and the forehead, but once you're through slobbering, your true mentality comes to the fore: you're nothing but a bunch of hypocrites luring innocent people into a trap. And it was true—no one envied him. (30–31)

Mosa feels trapped and betrayed. Full of self-pity he flees to Chatischa. He forgets about his fearful fate—ending up in the claws of a western woman—in the comfort of the prostitute's arms (and doped by excessive alcohol consumption). Here Lamarat finds his delirious uncle, who he now brings back to his waiting bride.

De/Normalizations

At first sight, the narration offers this outcome—the return of the groom to the bride—as the positive conclusion of the search. The "dishonorable" denormalization is put straight again: Mosa's return enables a happy ending. Lamarat's quest has been successful and the assenting reader, directed by the novel's main focalizer, is relieved with him: the promised wedding by the sea can take place as planned. Some of the more critical readers, however, reading against the grain of the dominant narrative thread, might worry about Rebekka's fate. The scene of the crying Rebekka and the cynical warnings of the external narrator do give reason for a certain discomfort.

At a closer look the positive appreciation of the dénouement appears highly problematic. The desire that propels the narrative forward is the desire for harmony, the desire for a restoration of the disturbed status quo. Absorbed by this desire the assenting reader puts away his/her feelings of ambivalence about the father's patriarchal project. In the fervor of the story (and by the force of its narration) this reader "forgets" about moral objections to arranged marriages and uncle-niece liaisons and gives in to the offered experience of relief. After all, who would not prefer an "all's well that ends well" interpretation (in which also the bride is spared a disappointment)?

And thus it happens that the moral rejection of this practice by principle, is over-shadowed by the acceptance of and even longing for what is narratively brought forward as a "Moroccan normality": a stereotypical patriarchal normality that in dominant Dutch discourse is associated with traditional Moroccan culture. The wedding is supposed to re-install this particular Moroccan normality. It will not only confirm the father's adherence to its rural cultural traditions, but it will also turn uncle Mosa's up till then rather ab-normal biography into a normal one. By means of his marriage to Rebekka, his life of unemployed idleness and sexual excess will move within the boundaries of the normal: Mosa will enter into the work&wife matrix of

social respectability. These are two reasons why the story's denormalization should be made undone.

However, one would expect that not all readers buy into this stereotypical notion of a homogeneously traditional and patriarchal Moroccan normality. A more critical, resisting reader would contrarily approve of the denormalization: the disappearance of the groom offers Rebekka a way out of a marriage to an uncle she hardly knows. It prevents the consecration of a marriage that according to Dutch (and progressive Moroccan) moral (and juridical) standards is considered abnormal. However, a such-like reversal of the dominant pattern of reading would, as a consequence, make the whole quest for the groom superfluous, and deem its story irrelevant. The central narrative-propelling desire does not allow for these kinds of critical, story-annihilating doubts. The reader has to read against the grain of the speedy story and embark on the unmistakably ironical comments of the external narrator in order to question the patriarchal plot of the presented "Moroccan normality" that has become the dominant image of Morocco in the Netherlands.

This aimed for "Moroccan normality" in *Bruiloft aan zee*'s central story seems extremely close, when, almost at the end of the novel, Lamarat indeed returns with the retrieved uncle at his side. However, in this moment the narrative suddenly disrupts its own dominant pattern of expectation and undermines the pattern of identification—with Lamarat and the father's wish—it has previously installed. It is Rebekka, the formerly passive, assenting bride-to-be, who all of a sudden takes over the direction of the story. She resists the happy ending of the "Moroccan normality" that the narrative is heading for and to which she has initially agreed herself. In the crucial and meant-to-be relieving moment of return, Rebekka approaches her brother and uncle before they get to the feast. In a renewed instance of denormalization she re-routes their journey home aimed at the concluding, normalizing wedding. Rebekka realizes that the fulfillment of her naïve fantasy of a romantic wedding by the sea is out of the question. Not only the required romantic conditions—"a roaring fire, a huge bowl of punch, guitar music everywhere" (WS 169)—fail, but also the fuddled state of mind and body of her future husband leaves much to be desired. In a furious temper and determined to realize at least a small aspect of her dream-wedding, she tells her brother: "Come on, [. . .] we're going to the sea. And remember: we're taking that scuzzbag with us" (170). At this moment the awaited conclusion of the quest—a return to the patriarchal normality of the father's wish—all of a sudden becomes insecure. Why not return to the waiting family and wedding guests to get the ceremony over and done with? What about the family honor? What is this enraged bride intent to do with this "scuzzbag"?

These questions not only come to the reader's mind, but also occupy the members of Rebekka's family, who by that time have been alarmed by the raised sound of her voice. In a scene of cartoonesque quality, father, mother and grandparents set off

in pursuit of the threesome, thus heading for the sea as well. In a chaotic as well as hilarious scene they run towards the sea "until between their feet and the sea there was only a young man [boy, LM], a young woman and a victim" (177).[11] The used formulation of "boy, woman and victim" for the threesome at the sea is striking. Anticipating the "maturation ritual" to come, Lamarat and Rebekka, brother and sister, are distinctively represented as boy and woman, child and adult. Lamarat remains the boy-child, who still falls under the paternal guidance of the family patriarch, and who, by contributing his bit to the restoration of the normality that the story initially propagated, becomes complicit in its patriarchal ideology of family honor. Rebekka, who initially also obeyed to the father's will and agreed to the arranged marriage, crosses the threshold to adulthood in the moment that she independently chooses to change the course of events against her father's explicit will.

In terms of the discourse of the novel's central narrative thread, Rebekka's act of female independence constitutes a second denormalization. Her intervention not only harms the family honor, but also reshuffles the traditionally gendered power relations. In terms of the pattern of reading against the grain her intervention causes relief, as the resisting reader welcomes her hoped-for resistance. Rebekka's condensed rage about her status as chattel, as object of exchange in the male-to-male-transaction, hits the runaway Mosa in a symbolic role, as male representative of a patriarchal system. Rebekka disrupts this transaction by violently altering the wedding ritual.

In the light of the dominant narration the alternative wedding performance constitutes the ab-normal apotheosis following on the normalizing quest and chase. The bride takes center stage with a symbolically charged act of violence in revenge for Mosa's sexual deceit and disloyalty. She cuts a piece of his penis—the top of a Merquez sausage—and then dryly comments on her violent act: "And now, my dear man and husband, it's off to the water with you, or what's left of you, so you can wash away your drunkenness along with the blood of the sacrifice" (180–81). Rebekka's act of vengeance turns the traditional ritual of the defloration of the bride around. It is the bride who self-righteous and decidedly directs the alternative ceremony that is described in rather ironic terms that now work to confirm the resisting pattern of reading. Rebekka becomes an adult woman through her active and independent intervention in the story of an "(ab-)normal journey." Her intervention—an irreversible denormalization—radically resignifies the blood ritual of a traditional wedding:

Rebekka turned and tugged at her bridegroom, who had lost not only his blood, but also his honor, his strength, his everything that makes a man a man:

The wedding by the sea, the wedding by the sea.

And they only came out of the water when the wedding night had been celebrated to her satisfaction. (181–82)

The blood of Mosa's emasculation symbolically substitutes the blood that for the wedding guests should have proved Rebekka's pre-matrimonial virginity.

Within the narratively encouraged, assenting reading the violent ritual functions as a disruptive moment of insight. It breaks the spell of the compelling, quest-like stream of narration heading for the normalizing wedding and all of a sudden forces the assenting reader to reconsider his/her position. The unexpected violence awakens the awareness that the longed for wedding in fact collides with the moral disapproval of arranged, uncle-niece alignments. For the resisting reader who had doubts and worries about the patriarchal undertaking all along, the dénouement comes as a relief. Retrospectively, after the eye-opening alternative ceremony, resisting reading might seem to lie at hand. This, however, was not the case throughout. The strongly directive narration, focalized by Lamarat, is hard to resist, especially for readers used to the imagination of Moroccan normality as homogeneously traditional and patriarchal. It is only at the very end of the story that the assenting reader is suddenly forced to change and question this stereotypical perception.

In what way does this disruptive novel now encourage us to reflect on the discourse of tolerance of the 1990s? Both marrying off practices and cultural customs of honor are heavily debated in the Netherlands of the twenty-first century, within different circles. The Dutch discourse on multiculturality strongly focuses on issues in which culture, gender and honor intersect in problematic ways, as for instance honor revenge and the genital mutilation of girls. At the time of *Bruiloft aan zee*'s first appearance, however, these issues were not yet central to the public agenda, though they were debated in migrant women's circles. In dominant Dutch discourse, however, they were still often considered as culture-intrinsic characteristics that were to be respected as "pillar-specific" concerns. They were seen and more or less accepted as essential (if not natural) features of the Other culture. It is this combined essentialist and relativist mode of thinking, which precludes serious engagement with the other culture, that ties the discourse of tolerance up with racist underpinnings.

The novel *Bruiloft aan zee* challenges cultural relativism in a compelling way. Implicitly, it confronts readers with racist presuppositions about Moroccan culture. The narrative itself, through the rupture caused by Rebekka's intervention, forcefully brings about a change of perspective as to prompt assenting readers to self-reflection. *Bruiloft aan zee*'s normality concerns what mainstream Dutch discourse stereotypically represents as Moroccan normality. It suggests a large, unbridgeable cultural distance between the novel's traditional Moroccan world and the actual world of the enlightened, modern (non-Moroccan) Dutch reader. This cultural distance appeals to a certain exotic interest of the mainstream (white) Dutch reader in the traditional, if not backward normality of the cultural Other. This culturalist, that is: racist curiosity for what is, in fact, a highly problematic patriarchal normality stretches, but, surprisingly, does not over-stretch this reader's boundaries of behavior. The discourse of

tolerance demands the reader to accept this patriarchal practice as intrinsic and natural to *their* culture. The full awareness of the problematic character of this cultural relativism only sets in with the shock brought about by Rebekka's disruption of the patriarchal script. The denormalization that Rebekka performs forces the reader to critically reconsider both the "Moroccan normality" that the novel in first instance propagates, and his/her acceptance of this normality.[12] It makes the assenting reader realize how boundaries of tolerance are applied in culturally relativist ways. Tolerance appears to cover up a racist interpretation of cultural difference.

Read in this way Rebekka's act of violence becomes an act of resistance both on a narrative *and* a discursive level. On the level of the story Rebekka symbolically breaks with a patriarchal tradition by literally cutting off a piece of her bridegroom's penis. By this violent act she not only prevents the "normal" and "normalizing" conclusion of the story, but she also successfully disrupts the mechanism of racist discursive normalism.[13]

Conclusion

At a first glance Benali's light-hearted novel *Bruiloft aan zee* seems to fit its "happy multiculturality" context of the 1990s extremely well. The humoristic representation of the wedding consternation in a migrant family satisfied a mainstream Dutch readership that was open, if not simply curious, for the Other culture of its migrant neighbors. However, in this chapter I have demonstrated how *Bruiloft aan zee* actually offers an eye-opening reading experience in a time ruled by normalism, a normalism that gives preference to a racist practice of culturally relativist evasion rather than to a critical discussion of difference. This eye-opening experience particularly concerns the assenting reader who follows and enjoys *Bruiloft aan zee's* strongly directive narration until the moment that this narration all of a sudden and with forceful impact turns around and disrupts itself. By doing so *Bruiloft aan zee* gives short shrift to the racist discourse of cultural relativism and tolerance that considers patriarchal practices as essential characteristics of a stereotyped Moroccan migrant culture.

One can only speculate about how nowadays, in the post-Fortuyn, post-Van Gogh and post-tolerance era, the reception of the debut would differ. Possibly, if not probably, the novel's clearly critical stance in respect to patriarchal traditions within the migrant community—that remained in the background in the 1990s—would be appropriated for an other argument against Islam, reducing the novel's representation of the—gendered and generational—complexities of/after migration to a one-liner-statement. But the cultural criticism that this novel performs is infinitely more subtle, and at hand for all readers who are willing to open their eyes for their own prejudice.

Notes

1. See also Essed, *Diversity*.

2. New Realist politicians also criticise the strategy of evasion, but they offer an outspoken racist discourse instead. Baukje Prins carefully analyzes their claim to tell "The Truth" in her study *Voorbij de onschuld* [*Beyond Innocence*] (2000).

3. The term refers to literary representations of detours, roundabouts, bottlenecks and other forms of non-linearity.

4. For a discussion of the Dutch discourse of tolerance see Böcker and Groenendijk, Buruma, Essed and Nimako, Hoving, Prins, and Sniderman and Hagedoorn 123–38.

5. For a discussion of the emergence of "multicultural literature" in the Dutch literary field see Minnaard "Multiculturality."

6. Many of these hyped migrant writers were never heard of again. A common explanation is that they were celebrated for their "exotic" origin rather than for the literary quality of their writing. See Anbeek.

7. The term "migrant writer" often connotes marginality and a biographical approach to literature. See Minnaard, *New Germans* 51–67.

8. The term "racial other" was either seen as in bad taste, or inappropriate.

9. All citations from Benali's novel are taken from the English translation titled *Wedding by the Sea* (WS) by Susan Massotty (1999).

10. In the citation above the absence of daughter Rebekka, the bride-to-be, from the father's attention is striking. Despite the fact that her agreement on the arrangements is of central enabling importance for the ritual reassurance of the family honor, her existence is deemed irrelevant in the father's male-focused perception. The narrator's casual suggestion that the father *might* know of Mosa's illicit behavior does not influence the respectability of the transaction in the story-world. His sexual escapades in Melilliar's red light district contain neither a threat to the family honor nor to dominant notions of honorable masculinity. For Rebekka this situation is fundamentally different: her virginity stands in a synecdochal relation to the family honor. Pre-matrimonial sexual activity would destroy both Rebekka's respectable womanhood and the family's impeccable reputation.

11. Susan Massotty has translated the Dutch term "jongen" in the original text (BZ 152), literally meaning "boy," "youth," "lad" (*Van Dale Nederlands-Engels* 1999), with the term "young man," thus giving up on the striking and meaningful distinction between the "boy" Lamarat and the "woman" Rebekka.

12. Also the normalization of Mosa's ab-normal biography fatally fails: as the epilogue of the novel makes clear he seeks refuge in Dutch anonymity and dies alone and insane, in an extreme case of ab-normality. It is salient that it is particularly Mosa who is sacrificed as representative of the patriarchal system. His brother—the actual family patriarch who so much insisted on the preservation of his honor and actually initiated the wedding agreements—remains safeguarded from his daughter's fury. Moreover, retrospectively it seems that the dramatic dénouement also confirms Mosa's fear of women of the North. The fear that made him run away for his wedding obligations turns out fatally justified: a woman from the North, Rebekka, subjects him to her violent will and finally causes his downfall.

13. Despite her heroic intervention, Rebekka's fate is of doubtful outcome as well. She resists patriarchal normalization in Morocco, but then afterwards chooses silence back home in the Netherlands. Her active denormalization does not bring about a fundamental change in her traditional female fate of muteness. Her victory is of a paradoxical quality. She prevents the restoration of story-world normality but—disappointingly—does not profit from a turn to ab-normality. Another form of normality takes over in the end.

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3. Normalizing Racism, Resisting Humiliations

Neither With, Nor Without Them—Ethnic Diversity on the Work Floor: How Egalitarianism Breeds Discrimination

Lida M. van den Broek

In the Netherlands (as in many other countries), we are facing a societal paradox. The first article of the Dutch Constitution[1] prohibits discrimination on any grounds and yet, discrimination based on race and ethnicity (among other categories) is an everyday phenomenon (Essed, *Alledaags racism, Inzicht in alledaags racisme*; v. d. Broek, *Hoe zit*). Almost half of the ethnic minority population regularly experiences discrimination based on ethnicity,[2] as became clear from the first "racism monitor" in 2006 (v. d. Berg and Evers). Simultaneously, 75% of the total Dutch population states that they have no problem with colleagues who are from ethnic minority groups (Geassocieerde Persdienst). As an organizational consultant (Kantharos, since 1983), I face this paradox on a daily basis: how can we reconcile the widely supported ideal of equality with the daily practice of inequality? Are the allochthonous[3] Dutch oversensitive? Is only the 25% of the Dutch population who do have a problem with colleagues from ethnic minority groups (Geassocieerde Persdienst) responsible for discrimination? Or are we missing something? I believe we are.

In order to understand this paradox, I will explain in this article how the social ideology of equality provides a context in which ethnic inequality is created and maintained; a process that is happening, for the most part, unconsciously and unintentionally. To this end, I first briefly present two basic assumptions: a) the existence of daily practices of ethnic inequality, and b) the existence of a social ideology of equality. Then I will explore the situation of immigrants in the Netherlands in terms of the social ideology of equality, and then present the analytical instrument I will use to analyze a case study that was part of a larger research project on multi-ethnic cooperation in the workplace (v. d. Broek, "De ironie").

Daily Practice of Inequality

First, I will provide background on the immigrant situation in the Netherlands. There are substantial differences in employment opportunities between allochthonous and autochthonous[3] Dutch people, even though immigrant labor has increased since the turn of the century (CBS). Immigrants from non-western countries are more often unemployed (Dagevos and Bierings); are overrepresented in unskilled jobs (Dagevos); more often have temporary contracts (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau/ Art. 1 – The Netherlands Institute for Social Research); receive lower wages for similar work (Duyvendak, Pels, and Rijkschroeff); and regularly face exclusion and other forms of discrimination (Veenman; Houtzager). In both political and public debates, attention to the subject of discrimination as a pillar of inequality is diminishing, as well as to the possible role of Dutch society in opposing discrimination. (Gowricharn, "Het omstreden," "De grenzen"; Ghorashi, "Paradoxen"). Rather, it is seen as the responsibility and duty of minority ethnic groups to take the initiative for realizing their own "integration" (assimilation) into society.

Social Ideology of Equality

I mention the disadvantaged situation of immigrants in the Netherlands in terms of employment opportunities as a springboard in exploring some of the important elements of the theoretical background I used in this study. The literature in this field indicates that the "just world hypothesis" (Lerner) can be understood as an important foundation of the social ideology of equality. The assumption is based on the idea that, in life, people get what they deserve and deserve what they get. In the Western world, this is linked to the assumption that what a person gets is related to what someone does, produces, and/or achieves. This set of ideas leads to and confirms the ideology of equality, implying that everybody has fair and equal chances in contemporary, democratic society. The "just world hypothesis," however, contradicts the everyday reality of inequality. It is undeniable that place of birth and social context determine to a large extent what is allotted to an individual. Again and again, research has confirmed that unequal opportunities at work not only occur through deprivation and/or disadvantage, but also through discrimination (v. d. Werf; v. d. Vught; Dagevos and Bierings; Andriessen et al.; Crul, Pasztor, and Lilie). In order to maintain the social ideology of equality despite the daily practice of inequality, it seems that a system of arguments, explanations, and rationalizations has been created to justify the existing social, economic, and political situation (Jost and Hunyady, "Psychology of System," "Antecedents and Consequences"). The "just world hypothesis" is part of this system. Ideological justification serves to present the existing order, the status quo, as fair, logical, and just, maybe even as natural and inevitable (Jost and Hunyady, "Psychology of System," "Antecedents and Consequences"; Acker). The idea that the world is as it is supposed to be provides existential

security. People need to feel secure, even if it implies the justification of inequality. This phenomenon is illustrated by the fact that ideological justification of social inequality is not only put into operation by those who benefit from it, but also by those who suffer its disadvantages most; for instance, ethnic minority groups who are the target of ethnic discrimination (Sniderman and Piazza; Jost, Banij, and Nosek; v. d. Broek, "De ironie"). So, not just the colleagues from the ethnic majority are involved in maintaining unequal treatment, but also the colleagues from the minority groups. All are "partners in crime."

Three Mechanisms that Maintain the Ideology of Equality

In a pilot study for this research project, I found that respondents used three mechanisms that enabled them to maintain the ideology of equality despite the everyday practice of inequality (see also Komter). These mechanisms are: 1) selective perception—selecting what people do and do not (want to) see, 2) perceptual distortion—the interpretation of perceptions, and 3) personification—the attribution of meaning based on what one (wants to) see in individual people instead of considering the situation or the circumstances. People use these mechanisms to observe, give meaning to, and explain the world around them. They tend to create a world that meets their expectations. In doing so, they tend to see those environmental aspects that meet their expectations, while overlooking aspects that do not.

Before introducing the case study, I would like to briefly discuss societal changes in the expression of racism over the last fifty years and say something about the socialization of racism—matters that play a crucial role in maintaining the paradox between the social ideology of equality and the daily practice of inequality.

Changes in the Expression of Racism

Manifestations of racism have changed dramatically in recent decades (McConahay, "Self-interest," "Modern Racism"; McConahay, Hardee, and Batts; Gaertner and Dovido; Sears; Frankenberg; Meertens and Pettigrew; Brief and Barsky; Dovido, Kawakami, and Gaertner; Deitz et al.; Petersen and Dietz; Schinkel; v. d. Broek, "De ironie"). In modern society, the "old" forms of expressing overt and blatant hatred, violence, and insults directed at black people or people of color are considered socially unacceptable. At the same time, more subtle forms of racism, such as everyday marginalization and exclusion, are hardly acknowledged as racism. One reason is that we are stuck in the old notion of racism as explicit, intentional, and maligning. Also, everyday marginalization and exclusion are coupled with (assumed) deprivation and (assumed) cultural differences, by which the differences that are being noted seem just and fair (v. d. Broek, "De ironie"). But, things have changed since 9/11. Derogatory things said about Muslims are not subtle anymore; however,

this is not generally considered to be racism because, as is usually argued, it is about religion and not about an ethnic group.

Racism: An Automatic Process

The changes of expression of racism have influenced the appearance of racism. Another important influence is the socialization process. Prejudices (ideas) and discrimination (actions) are part of the same cultural heritage of society and part of an education from which no one escapes completely (v. d. Broek, *Hoe zit, Gein*; Devine & Elliot). At a very early stage in our education, we come in contact with hierarchically structured and stereotyped images of ourselves and others. In spite of the prominence of Nelson Mandela and Barack Obama, "black" is (still) understood to be the needy, lazy, and belligerent, in the context of the third world and the "backward" allochthonous people in the Dutch context. "White" is the helping and peace-bringing or peace-keeping (blue helmets) factor in the context of the third world, and they are the ones who set the standards and define the culture in the Dutch context. In daily life, in the mass media, and in many other ways, these images/associations are continuously confirmed. According to Devine (Devine; Devine, Evett, and Vasquez-Suson; Devine & Montheith), ethnic stereotyped knowledge is part of common sense (v. d. Broek, *Hoe zit*, *Gein*). Our society is saturated with these ethnic stereotypes, which are, for the most part, implicit and spoon-fed to us from birth. This knowledge is so structurally embedded in the mind that it is automatically activated if confronted with ethnicity. For example, if you ask for associations with "Africa" and "black people," many images about poverty, slavery, and colonialism will emerge. Few if any are able to circumvent the influence of this historical and social knowledge. Even those who do not subscribe to these social stereotypes because of personal convictions, still manifest this automatic response.

Devine therefore believes that people who think that they are not prejudiced are actually only "less" prejudiced. Based on three sequential studies, Devine reached the conclusion that:

1) individuals who are prejudiced in varying degrees still have equal knowledge of social stereotype images (study 1, Devine).
2) automatic activation of stereotype images is equally strong and inevitable, whether you are more or less prejudiced (study 2, Devine, Evett, and Vasquez-Suson).
3) the difference in the use of stereotype images is not found in the automatic activation (as it is the same for everyone) but in a conscious handling of images. (Devine, Evett, and Vasquez-Suson). Less prejudiced people try to censor and replace the stereotype knowledge with images that are more consistent with their own global vision (study 3, Devine and Montheith).

The studies of Divine and others show that the reproduction of racist images and related behavior is an automatic, unconscious, and involuntarily process. It can

however be controlled once one becomes conscious of this process and decides not to let it overtake one's actions. Making the invisible, the unconscious, and involuntary visible, is a first step in controlling the automatic process. It can contribute to creating a different knowledge system that can help to make nondiscrimination an automatic state. This was indeed the purpose of our research project: Making the often invisible, everyday racism on the work floor visible, and through this, showing participants that they can make a difference by actively choosing different behaviors.

Introduction to the Case Study

This case is a good example of a situation in which racism is created unconsciously, in spite of all the good intentions in the world. As mentioned above, this case is part of a larger research project that I did for my PhD thesis (v. d. Broek, "De ironie") in which ten cases were studied; with the following case having been one that was analyzed in great detail. The case study involves the team at the "integration desk" of an editorial office specifically concerned with the multicultural society, at a well-known media organization in the Netherlands. The team was formed after the murder of a well-known Dutch media artist, Theo van Gogh in 2004. The organization realized that it had (too) few contacts in the minority communities in the Netherlands, especially in the Muslim communities. In addition to the three white, native Dutch journalists, two journalists of Turkish and Moroccan background, respectively, were hired to develop and maintain contact with the Muslim communities.

I had conversations with all five members of the team as part of this research, as well as one of the reporters who often works with them: Adnan (the Turkish journalist), Mohammed (the Moroccan journalist), Roos, Julia, and Irene (the white Dutch journalists) and Leo (the white Dutch reporter). I have changed their names to protect their privacy. In addition, I had the unique opportunity to study the rough material of a documentary about the daily work of the integration team. The "film" was shot in celebration of the anniversary of the organization, and I was given permission to view all the rough footage and use it in my analysis. The following sections tell the story of this case. I then delve deeper into the details of the case and perform an analysis.

Practice of Inequality

Adnan and Mohammed, the team members of Turkish and Moroccan descent respectively, started off on unequal footing from the very beginning. The selection committee of the media institute set out to find journalists with a background (sufficient contacts and a lot of information) in one of the ethnic minority groups, preferably the Muslim communities. Although Adnan and Mohammed both met the criteria, the members of the selection committee still felt that they did not have sufficient experience. Nevertheless, they both got the job.

The perception about the employment of Adnan and Mohammed is illustrated by a statement from Roos about Mohammed. She states: "As far as experience goes, he absolutely does not fit in yet, but he is a guy with a lot of street talk and he will be able to get some people for us." Later Roos adds: "He was able to come up with some issues we wouldn't have thought of."

Why would Mohammed "not fit in" in terms of his experience? The desk was looking for colleagues enabling access to themes, information, and people. Mohammed can do that—and has done so, according to Roos, and yet he doesn't fit in terms of (his) "(work) experience"? It seems that we are dealing here with "selective perception" and "perceptual distortion" regarding the definition of "(work) experience." During the selection process, the criteria of the committee changed from its initial starting point. The "(level of) experience," as it was assessed during the selection process, seemed at a later stage no longer to include the "otherness" the committee was looking for: contacts with and information about immigrant communities (compare "otherness," Essed, "Cloning Cultural Homogeneity"; Ghorashi, "Ways to Survive"). Both candidates were qualified according to these original criteria. The "experience" that was assessed as insufficient during the procedure seems to be related to "sameness" (Essed, "Cloning Cultural Homogeneity"), experience as a general journalist, measured against the type of experience that the Dutch colleagues already sufficiently possessed. Adnan and Mohammed seem to have been appointed to the jobs because of the "otherness" they represent (contacts with and information about Muslim communities among other things), but subsequently, they are judged on not having "the same" experience as an average Dutch journalist.

The difference between "sameness" (the Dutch standard) and "being different" becomes an undercurrent for both journalists during their work for the organization. Colleagues do appreciate what they represent in terms of difference, while simultaneously, the fact that they are different is not really accepted: "We really need those views, but it is a lot of hassle as well" (Julia). This "perceptual distortion": how they initially measure up, then subsequently are evaluated as "lacking" based on "sameness," rather than on "difference," leads to systematic "selective perception" and again (more) "perceptual distortion" in the judgment of the two journalists' performance. The statement: "I don't think he's a journalist—in any case, not in the way we regard our ethics" (Julia), illustrated this. A distinction is made between "a journalist," "our ethics," and a non-distinct "they" (referring to Adnan and Mohammed) who are labeled as having "different ethics." "Selective perception" and "perceptual distortion" imply not seeing and/or recognizing the specific qualities of the two journalists, which ultimately leads to negative judgment of their performance: "If he weren't a Moroccan, I would have had it with him a long time ago" (Leo).

That Adnan and Mohammed are not only perceived as "different," but also treated differently, is illustrated by what Leo, one of the reporters states: "He gets away with

things a normal white journalist wouldn't have a chance with." Again, we notice a difference between a "normal white journalist" and an, obviously, "non-normal, non-white" journalist. But let us try to exemplify this difference. What is it that Mohammed "gets away with" that other journalists do not? Roos: "The problem with both of them, and I think that it is a cultural thing, is the basic understanding we have, our journalistic culture, about being on time, sticking to agreements, and showing initiative." "We" and "our journalistic culture" are again contrasted with "both of them." And "both" are Adnan and Mohammed. What are they "both"? Colleagues? Journalists? Or not? Or not quite? Or not the same? Based on selective perception, many variations emerge.

Sameness is the Norm

So, how did Adnan and Mohammed deal with work habits, with being on time, etc., as Roos mentions? Julia states: "Often I just had no idea where they were or what they were doing. It was difficult to make sure that they would start at 9 and finish at 5. It is an ongoing irritation." This complaint stands in contrast with other reactions. For example, Adnan talks about Mohammed: "He spends long days here as if he didn't have a life and was prepared to do whatever was necessary: translating, researching foreign topics. He did things for whomever needed it." Roos confirms Adnan's statement: "He was so driven, a bit overdone in fact. I had to protect him against himself." So, what is the matter? Was he there and working, like Roos and Adnan say, or not there and not working, as Julia is saying? We may assume "selective perception" here: Julia does not observe what Roos and Adnan do: Mohammed is present during long working days and does everything for everybody.

However, we may also be dealing with "perceptual distortion": Julia has a very specific interpretation of what work is. Doing everything for everybody might not be understood as doing his work (well). Also, Julia's norm may be interfering: working from 9 to 5 is a peculiar demand in a journalist organization. The norm may be valid for Julia, who works in the office. But Adnan and Mohammed don't; they work wherever the action is, often during evening hours and weekends. Again, we seem to be dealing with "perceptual distortion" around Adnan's and Mohammed's positions.

All the available examples show how "we" and "our journalist culture" (norms and habits) implicitly build the norm against which Adnan and Mohammed are judged. They may have been employed because of their otherness, however, their daily performance is being measured against and judged on sameness.

As Innocent as a Newborn Baby

In the everyday confrontations between the expectation of sameness and the practice of otherness, it becomes clear that Dutch colleagues position themselves outside the multicultural Dutch society (Schinkel). Julia reports about what she

perceives is a regularly occurring problem. Referring to a planned shooting with immigrants, she comments:

> Mohammed organized an appointment by phone. When the crew arrived, the people said: "No, we said no." I don't know if Mohammed thought that, if he didn't organize it, it would be a disaster, so let's just go and I will talk myself out of it. Or those people said no, but he thought, "Let's go anyway and overpower them." Or those people say yes to Mohammed and then they see the crew and get scared.

In this quote, Julia attributes the problem with the immigrants only to Mohammed or the people with whom he arranged an appointment. In her account, the Dutch colleagues seem to have no part in the emerging problem. Is this fair, or is this a case of "selective perception"? Not having a crystal clear appointment might have to do with cultural differences—how you deal with appointments—but also with differences in power relationships as they result from minority positions. An immigrant group may not automatically trust the media, for instance. Adnan and Mohammed's Dutch colleagues do not recognize (or know) the challenges that they face at work because of their position as outsiders. The "other" approach they are applying may not be recognized as inherent to working with immigrant groups. On the contrary, the "other" way of working is denounced as not professional enough (a matter of "personification"). By positioning themselves outside the multicultural society, they seem to be as innocent as newborn babies in the conflict that occurred.

In the film materials about the daily work of the integration desk, I found a similar, or maybe even the same, situation. In this film footage, one can see how Dutch colleagues tend to contextualize themselves outside the problem. Things seem not to be well arranged with an imam and they feel no sense of co-responsibility; rather, they feel victimized by Mohammed, who in their perception, did not make a tight appointment. Irene, the colleague who has been involved in integration issues far longer than the others, is convinced that there is an issue of cultural differences and that the Dutch colleagues don't account for, that: "Things work differently with the integration dossier, less clear and open. You have to give it some time to win trust. I knew that and prepared journalists for that." Irene recounts how reporters were utterly angry after such a mishap, and that they expressed harsh criticism behind Mohammed's back. Again, the Dutch colleagues tend not to account for cultural differences (dealing with appointments). They blame Mohammed's professional performance (or perceived lack thereof) for the awkward situation ("personification"). Because they position themselves "outside" the multicultural context (Schinkel), they do not see ("selective perception") that a problem is inextricably interwoven with intercultural cooperation. "Selective perception" enables linking the problems with Mohammed's skill and professional attitude ("personification"). By keeping oneself out of reach, the full responsibility for cooperation with immigrant groups shifts to

Mohammed and Adnan. Adnan and Mohammed are expected to build the contacts with the Muslim communities, to bring in information, and to create the conditions for their Dutch colleagues to, as it were, "drop in and out" of the immigrant communities. The "Dutch" colleagues don't bother to engage with immigrant groups, to understand them, or even to learn from Adnan's and Mohammed's behavior. Adnan and Mohammed turn into mediators. In this way, no integration takes place, neither from the Dutch colleagues nor from Adnan and Mohammed. The "Dutch" journalists maintain the position of "outsider."

An Immigrant as Messenger Boy

There were numerous complaints about Adnan's and Mohammed's qualities and professional attitude, as described above. But sometimes, things went well. Here is an example that Leo gives about how he perceives teamwork, an ideally cooperative situation: "In accordance with the 'Hofstad'[2] case, I just wanted to talk to some Moroccan guys. He organized that. He stayed in the background. But he made sure that those guys completely opened up to me, showed interest and no aggression. Not wanting to say anything and leave. That's ideal."

This implies that, according to Leo, the ideal role for Adnan and Mohammed is being intermediates in terms of contacts and information. We might recall that this is exactly what they were hired for: bringing in the topics and providing contacts to/with the immigrant communities. There would not have been an issue if the evaluation of their qualities had not also been based on the expectation that they would simultaneously be full-blown journalists, as is clear in the remarks made by their colleagues, e.g., "I wanted to look at them as colleagues" (Julia).

Moreover, their specific task (acquiring information, themes, and contacts) seems not to be taken as seriously as might be expected. In the raw material of the documentary, I could observe that Adnan had been a member of the interview committee hiring Mohammed. He later tells me that he was not involved in the ultimate decision about the candidate and that his preference was neglected: "I was very angry because I was called by, I think it was Roos, and she said that they had made the decision. I thought, 'How come? I was there as well, wasn't I?' I hoped to have a vote. You get the feeling that they don't think of you as a serious member of the committee at all." Mohammed recounts how, in the context of a sensitive issue around fundamentalist Muslims, his advice was ignored, while the advice of a Dutch Arabist was accepted.

> *Actually I was hired as a Moroccan specialist, but then there were a lot of doubts. I had talked to four imams about the Salafists and they all have exactly the same story, 'They're dangerous people.' And then a colleague of mine, who has this so-called good contact with an Arabic specialist, a white man who has read books and magazines, goes on and says that the group is not dangerous at all.*

In the film, we can follow this discussion. Mohammed advises against the item on the Salafists on such short notice, because it would be too dangerous and more research is needed. But the advice of the Dutch Arabist is followed and the item is included. Leo comments about this saying: "But we also have our own sources in the Moroccan world and I think that he (Mohammed) never knew that." Later on he adds: "We have contacts of our own in the Moroccan society that we can just call and organize things in our Dutch way. And because of that, I was less dependent on him." Why does Leo not want to depend on Mohammed, and why is it important that he has "other sources"? Is it that so he can "organize things in our Dutch way"? Does Leo prefer not to deal with "the Moroccan way" and is that why he concludes that Mohammed does not have enough work experience, because he does not consider "the Moroccan way" as relevant work experience ("selective perception" and "perceptual distortion")?

All this renders the situation an issue of perception around the question as to whether Adnan and Mohammed are considered specialists with their own genuine input, or as people providing the conditions for the Dutch colleagues to do their work. Because "sameness" is the norm, "the Dutch way" becomes the right way. When "otherness," the specialization, is not valued, being different becomes not good, becomes bad, or not professional, or not the right "experience."

Partners in Crime

The Dutch colleagues are not the only ones who do not want to deal with cultural differences. Mohammed and Adnan are also not sufficiently aware of the differences—or, in any case, they don't do much to address it.

From the interviews, we learn that Adnan and Mohammed do not take great pains to introduce their colleagues to the world of immigrants. Both take it for granted, like their "Dutch" colleagues, that they arrange everything for and in the immigrant communities and that their "Dutch" colleagues have access in that way (only). By accepting the role of ethnic informants and intermediaries, they inadvertently help to maintain separate worlds.

So far, we have seen that Adnan and Mohammed are being treated and judged unequally. They are perceived as "not good enough." What part do they play themselves? On different occasions in the stories, Adnan and Mohammed explain away and justify the unequal treatment. Although Adnan and Mohammed are irritated about the neglect of their expertise, i.e., the interview committee in Adnan's case and the Dutch Arabist in Mohammed's case, they do not want to define those situations as examples of unequal treatment, discrimination, or racism. Asked why not, Mohammed answered: "I don't know, there is no proof that this is discrimination. Let's say: no understanding of ethnic minorities."

In a study (Cain) about social mobility among ethnic minorities, managers with an ethnic minority background argue that they have not encountered discrimination or

racism in their careers. Simultaneously, they do come forward with examples of situations in which explicit discrimination or racist elements occur. Cain accounts for this paradox in terms of the attitude of success these managers need for their careers. Being a victim does not fit that story. By justifying or smoothing over instances of unequal treatment and by accepting the role of ethnic informant and intermediary, Adnan and Mohammed cooperate and contribute to rendering everyday ethnic inequality invisible. This helps to maintain the paradox of an ideology of equality and the everyday practice of inequality. It might be that they have learned to avoid mentioning discrimination given the often emotional, if not aggressive, response on the side of white Dutch (Essed, *Inzicht in alledaags racisme*). Whatever the reason, the result is that Adnan and Mohammed inadvertently become "partners in crime" with their Dutch colleagues.

Conclusion: Can't Make It With Them or Without Them

This case study provides insight into what the everyday practice of inequality looks and feels like—and how we can explain the persistence of this situation, in spite of a broadly acknowledged ideology of equality.

What emerges from this case study is, primarily, that Adnan and Mohammed are systematically reduced to their ethnicity. The organization needs ethnic participation, contacts, and information for the newly-founded integration desk. Adnan and Mohammed are hired for this work and perform well, as Roos acknowledged. However, despite being hired for what they have to offer, it looks as though, from a different angle, they are systematically evaluated and negatively judged on the basis of what they apparently lack, how they fail to be "the same" as "us," and how they differ from the normative image of "the white Dutch journalist" ("selective perception" and "perceptual distortion").

The theme of "experience" seems to play a pivotal role in the process of ideological justification. It triggers the paradox between the ideology of equality and the practice of inequality. The judgment that they (Adnan and Mohammed) have insufficient experience on the one hand, but do, on the other hand, meet the demands of possessing the "ethnic quality" for which they were hired, seems to feed into the justification for the unequal treatment: the dual evaluation standard; ignoring Adnan and Mohammed in final decisions; the expectation of organizing everything so that the Dutch colleagues can drop in and out to do their work; and Dutch colleagues not interfering in or feeling responsible for the contacts with members of ethnic minorities. It is all about "selective perception" and "perceptual distortion."

It is possible that the systematically negative judgments that Adnan's and Mohammed's work receives is because their Dutch colleagues are not really involved themselves in cooperating with the ethnic minority groups. They do not realize that working with ethnic minorities requires different methods. Because of this, they can

selectively perceive everything that goes wrong (or should I say "that goes differently") in terms of Dutch values and norms, and therefore attribute ("personalize") the behavior of their immigrant colleagues as insufficiently professional and lacking quality.

Whatever the reasons for the white Dutch journalists' perceptions of their immigrant colleagues as "less than," by not explicitly expressing their anger about many incidents or their hurt about being ignored, Adnan and Mohammed are, unfortunately, contributors to the paradox.

The three mechanisms: "selective perception," "perceptual distortion" and "personification" distort the everyday reality in such a way that the justification for unequal treatment (they have a lack of experience) seems justified. In everyday practice, the equality ideal stated in Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution: "everyone should be treated equally" becomes "all are equal" and is translated into "all are the same." Sameness becomes the norm. Being the same/similar becomes "normal." Being different becomes "bad." The ideal of equality grows into: when different, you are bad.

The Dutch journalists in this organization have no idea that they have participated in the downfall and failure of their colleagues Adnan's and Mohammed's careers at the center. As Leo states: "I always had a kind of respect for those guys. I think I gave Mohammed lots of space."

Similarly, Adnan and Mohammed will not blame their colleagues, not publically anyway: "You don't have hard proof. Let's just say it's due to not understanding ethnic minorities."

Mohammed gets fired and Adnan finds another job. As Roos concluded: "We can't manage with them, or without them."

Finally, this case illustrates the paradox between the ideology of equality and a daily practice of inequality due to "selective perception," "perceptual distortion," and "personification." While the media organization needs journalists who are "different" to be able to make reports about the multi-ethnic society, those very journalists are judged "not to be the same," and because of that, "not good enough."

If differences are not accepted, the ideology of equality causes a day-to-day reality of inequality. While striving for equality, equality is made synonymous with "sameness" and difference is taken out of order.

Notes

1. Artikel 1 of the Dutch constitution: All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.

2. The term race is rarely used in the Netherlands because it is too closely linked to the ideology of the Nazis. The term ethnicity is commonly used instead.

3. Allochthonous refers to migrants/foreigners/people of foreign descent, or origin. Autochthonous refers to people of Dutch origin/descent/appearance. These terms are commonly used in The Netherlands and derive from the (old) Greek.

4. In the Netherlands the term racism often evokes images of the holocaust and therefore of "absolute evil," which makes the terms objectionable when used to refer to other practices (see also the chapter by Evelien Gans in this volume).

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Black Dutch Voices: Reports from a Country that Leaves Racism Unchallenged

Dienke Hondius

Black Europeans today work and live among white people for whom they are often the only, the first, or one of the very few black colleagues, neighbors, classmates, family members, friends, or acquaintances. In this article, I focus on people of Afro-European descent, and on their experiences and memories of racism. I present the results of interviews with black Dutch men and women, conducted by Dutch university students.[1] The voices of black Dutch men and women provide insight in aspects of everyday life in a society in which explicit reference to visible difference such as skin color is preferably avoided. Racism is simply "not done," also meaning to suggest literally that it does not happen; it is considered self-evident that variety in skin tone is unimportant, irrelevant, and meaningless. This consensus remains largely unspoken and silent, and as a silent agreement it can have various interpretations and unintended but politically relevant consequences. I would like to mention two of each.

One interpretation of the silence is that it is better not to talk about color differences, not to mention "race" at all, presumably because of what has happened in the past. This reference to the past is usually not about colonization and slavery, but about the Holocaust.

A second interpretation is that as color is defined as unimportant, the presence or absence of black people, *people* of color, as human beings with identities and experiences because of their color, are considered "irrelevant" as well, as are their experiences of racism.

A first political consequence of this silence is that, because "race" is not mentioned, recognizing and monitoring racism becomes a significant challenge. A second politically relevant consequence is that, as blackness and whiteness are

not mentioned, the representation of black people at work, in education, and in any other organization remains institutionally invisible and inarticulate. This is also true for the respective underrepresentation and overrepresentation of black and white people in various segments of social life. Mentioning color explicitly, talking about blackness or whiteness, breaking this code of silence is unconventional behavior in Dutch politics, academia, and other circles, and also in private conversations. One can be accused of political correctness or of inappropriate or unsuitable behavior. This conscious avoidance of "race talk" may have good intentions: not giving an inch to "race," not allowing "race" any space in human interaction, in public policy, in politics, or in academic research. The result of this firm avoidance, however, is a certain uneasiness in everyday interaction, especially in a society in which racial and ethnic segregation in education, in housing, and in social and cultural life have developed unmistakably (Karsten et al.; Hofland; Musterd and Ostendorf). This can be observed both in the Netherlands and in Germany—not coincidentally two countries in which the deep memory of the Shoah and, to some extent, a postcolonial uneasiness, have produced what I would call a specific "anti-racist norm." This anti-racist norm takes the form of a prohibition of open and hateful expressions of antisemitism, and to a lesser degree, other forms of racism. There is, however, no culture of debate about these issues. Germany and the Netherlands, Austria, and more recently France as well have gone through an intense period of facing their Nazi past, and this has resulted in a dynamic and varied approach to antisemitism as compared to other forms of racism. The history and legacy of the Holocaust is increasingly being addressed actively; however, connections and comparisons with the broader history of race and racism are made less frequently so far and thus remain a more passive area (Hondius "Finding Common Ground"). Western-European countries have become visibly and audibly multicultural and multiracial only recently, after having had colonial empires for centuries without a substantial black presence "at home." Following the Shoah, an anti-racist norm thus developed, which did not translate into a fiercely anti-racist activist agenda, but rather into a passive, more or less silent consensus about not mentioning skin color, not naming racial issues. *Ras, daar doen wij niet aan,* "We don't do race." What is not explicitly mentioned is hard to challenge; forms of passive tolerance and intolerance, as I have argued elsewhere, are much more prevalent in Dutch society than active forms of tolerance and intolerance. Moreover, passive forms of tolerance and intolerance are hard to distinguish in everyday life. In my study of the acceptance and rejection of interethnic and interreligious marriage in the Netherlands since 1945, I noted this phenomenon of the dominance of passive reactions of family members and friends as a significant factor. Mixed couples often find themselves inside a circle of silence, which is unclear and difficult to interpret, because it can mean a lot of different things: silent acceptance, silent condoning, silent hesitation, silent doubts, or silent rejection. A more explicit acceptance

for a significant number of couples happened only after long periods of inexplicit, inarticulate silence from their nearest family members and friends (Hondius "Gemengde huwelijken" 8–12).

The Netherlands has been a multicultural society from time to time before; in particular, the larger cities in the 17th century were quite mixed. However, from the second half of the 19th century, the Netherlands became a much more closed, virtually all-white society until the 1940s. Therefore, its postwar development into a country with 13% people of color, from the former colonies, North Africa, Asia, and other countries was a real and visible change in just a few decades. Meanwhile, the terminology of racial difference within the Dutch language came to a standstill. As a result of this stagnation, once ordinary but now archaic terms lingered on or were re-installed, *such as halfbloed* (litt. 'half-blood,' for a person of mixed ancestry), and *neger ('negro')*. In public policy and in social science research, new words were offered as alternatives to racial or racist-sounding words: particularly for categories of people considered "other." Instead of "race," words such as culture, ethnicity, migration, diverse, minority—and the infamous dichotomy *allochtoon* versus *autochtoon* (institutionalized codes for born outside or in the Netherlands, usually meaning western versus non-western, black or brown versus white)—have ruled important parts of Dutch political and academic discourse for the last two decades. Recently, the minister of Integration proposed the term "new Dutch" to replace the term *allochtoon.* Similarly, instead of using the term "racism," the inclination is to use the word discrimination, or *onderscheid maken* ("distinguishing, sorting out, making difference"), or *uitsluiting* ("exclusion"). Additionally, there is a stubborn tendency among Dutch researchers and politicians to merge every "other" group together as one: *allochtonen* (those who are born outside "this country") or *migranten* (those who have come "here" from "elsewhere"). Apparently there is a strong need to have one single word, to be able to talk about "them" as opposed to "us." These broad categories reflect a degree of segregation and lack of interaction, because more ordinary and daily cross-racial or cross-cultural interaction would result in more and other categorizations than just a merged dichotomy. Time and again, critical minds have protested against being called *neger, allochtoon,* or *etnische minderheid,* but many do not care and alternative terms are not easily accepted. The struggle for the "right" words continues, in the Netherlands as well as across Europe.[2]

Speaking about Color

Following the tradition of Oral History, we interviewed 72 Afro-Dutch of Surinamese, Antillean, and African background. We included explicit questions about skin color, an approach I had used before. In an earlier study about the acceptance of intermarriage as a test for tolerance, I interviewed dozens of racially, ethnically, and/or religiously "mixed" couples living in the Netherlands, about the reactions they had

received from family and friends (Hondius, "Gemengde huwelijken") The impact of skin color difference turned out to be one of the most ambiguous aspects of their narratives. In one and the same sentence, they would tell me that color and skin tone were completely unimportant yet crucial; that color to them was something they did not see, yet that it was always there; they would deny and emphasize the importance of color simultaneously. This ambivalence sparked my interest in the longer history of race relations in Europe (Hondius, "Black Africans," "Blacks in Early Modern Europe"). It reinforces the idea discussed in other studies (Essed, Goldberg, Hall, Solomos, Small, and many others) that current race relations in Europe are the product of centuries rather than decades, the complicated heritage of hardly acknowledged and little-known colonial and postcolonial European histories.

European surprise when faced with blackness is a major topic in 16th and 17th century travel records of the early modern meetings between white Europeans and Africans within Africa. Dark skin color made a deep impression and was consistently noted. The travelogs show that white travelers chronicling these events experienced their early meetings with black people as new, surprising, and significant. This first experience has subsequently been followed by a four-century-old European tradition of surprise, and can be found until very recently. One Surinamese man we interviewed, in his late fifties now, offered a view of this phenomenon from a black perspective. He arrived in Amsterdam as a student in the early 1970s and needed some information. What he met was not just surprise, but fear as well: "I was walking on Leidseplein, and wanted to ask a woman something. She began to scream! Very loud!"[3]

Well into the late 20th century, every white boy, girl, man, or woman in the Netherlands seems able to recall his or her first meeting with a non-white person, as Rudie Kagie observes in his book *De eerste neger* ("The First Negro"): "This book describes the surprise that black provoked in a white country" (6). One explanation for this repetition of surprise is the general and long-term absence in north-western Europe of blacks, while simultaneously most of these nations had significant empires with black populations who were exploited, enslaved, put to work for the mother country, and treated as inferior.

Another political consequence is that, while the field of critical race studies expanded internationally, in the Netherlands there was little room for this. While research on "race" remained virtually absent, "migration" studies developed as an alternative. Even one of the most renowned Dutch journals in this field, *Migrantenstudies,* currently in its third decade, appears to have avoided the concepts of "race studies," or racism. The norm that states that "race" is not the right word and not the accurate focus, made the study of "racial" difference in the Netherlands appear irrelevant, as Philomena Essed and Kwame Nimako have shown. In a critical reconstruction of the short history of race studies in the Netherlands they observe that Dutch academic research is characterized by a "denial of racism and the

delegitimization of racism research," and point to some of the consequences this has had on this field of study:

> *Representatives and spokespeople of minority research, though rejecting extreme-right racism, generally denied the existence of, and thus lacked comprehensive knowledge about, systemic racism, its historical transmutations, its cultural expressions, its roots in the development of modernity of which Orientalism has been part and parcel. Here Stuart Hall's notion of historical amnesia could apply. (Essed and Nimako 285)*

"People with *a little color*"

One of the latest terms of "endearment" used in the Dutch language to mention non-whites addresses "them" as people of color—a term long known in English as well, but in the Netherlands this term is used in its diminutive form: "mensen met *een kleurtje*," people with *a little color*; a *kleurtje* is also the typical word Dutch children use for the small pencil or crayon they use to paint colors. This word tells us about its unimportance, its smallness: making it smaller, the intention is to "disarm" color difference by belittling it. Some examples from recent websites:

– Dark people obtain *their little color* by the large spreading of pigment in the upper skin.[4]
– The prisons are filled for the most part with *people with a little color*.[5]
– They are *ladies with a little color*, most of them Muslim.[6]
– Former criminals, the long-term unemployed, people receiving benefits because of physical handicaps, older people, *people with a little color* . . . Do we want to employ these when they fit the necessary demands?[7]
– Statistically you can prove that, all other factors remaining equal, *people with a little color* are being promoted less quickly within the police force.[8]

A simple search on the internet did not produce any findings of this "little color" with "men," some with "women," but most with the neutral sounding *mensen* ('people'). One young woman, a 20-year-old student of Surinamese-Dutch descent, uses the "little color" terminology to describe herself. She described the reactions she has received in her school where she is the only black student. They come in the form of jokes, and she is not always certain what to make of them:

> *With the new study I do (theatre academy), there are these little jokes all the time, like "you are the* (excuusneger) *token Negro," I don't care much about that. [. . .] Sometimes having a little color is to my advantage: when I look at the theatre academy, I think that they have accepted me also because I have "a little color." Well I do not know that for certain, but I think so. Anyway, I do stand out because I have a little color.[9]*

This quote is taken from the research project we report on in the next section. Here we see that skin color becomes a question mark—is it a factor? If so, to what extent? Seemingly, it is up to every individual to come to terms with this in his or her own way.

That the terminology of *kleurtje* "a little color" is also used in more explicit racist incidents was shown in Amsterdam in the summer of 2010. One of the main newspapers, *Het Parool,* published a front page article about a young black Dutch man in Amsterdam working as a caregiver in private homes for the elderly, employed by the largest organization, Cordaan. An office worker assigning the work phoned him at home to ask him to go to a new client, and bluntly asked him, "Do you have 'a little color?' If you have 'a little color,' you cannot go to this particular address. That lady does not like people with 'a little color.'" Rather than telling the client off, her racist attitude was presented by his employer as a given.[10]

Black Dutch voices: "Race" Matters

How do the current narratives about blackness, race, and racism in Dutch society play out today? A quarter century after Philomena Essed's pioneer work on "Everyday Racism," the interviews I asked my students to do have resulted in black Dutch narratives that can, to some extent, be compared to Essed's early work. The comparison would focus on the early 1980s, when Essed's first book appeared in Amsterdam (Essed, *Alledaags racisme*). At that time, the very term "racism" was not yet as unusual as it later became. There are several other titles that appeared around that time, including a volume "Nederlands racisme" (Bleich and Schumacher 1984), a conference volume (Prinsehof Conferentie 1984), and a volume about the fight against racism in the urban environment (Hondius 1986), as well as a small wave of publications about prejudice, racism in Dutch schoolbooks, discrimination in education and the field of social care, the concept of "cultural racism," old and new "fascism," and various aspects of migration. In social studies, Frank Bovenkerk's work on racial discrimination appeared even earlier (*Omdat zij anders zijn*). In these studies, occasionally, a Moroccan-Dutch, Turkish-Dutch, or Surinamese-Dutch man or woman was quoted. In Bleich and Schumacher's volume, a group interview with three academics of Moluccan, Moroccan, and Antillean descent was arranged to present insight in experiences with racism. Essed's work however was different: it was new in presenting black Dutch women's voices about their experiences in the Netherlands as direct data, as a source of knowledge and insight. It was particularly new in presenting individual testimonies, experiences, and memories as witnesses and as expert voices. As a field of study, oral history was pioneering and experimental, still hardly accepted in academia. The famous film by Claude Lanzmann, *Shoah*, that can be considered a breakthrough in the acceptance of eyewitness testimony as expertise, did not come out until 1985 in Paris. The first PhD. thesis based on oral history in the Netherlands appeared in 1987 by Selma Leydesdorff, who interviewed the

survivors of Amsterdam's Jewish proletariat (Leydesdorff 1987). Essed's work of 1984 therefore was also very early. A couple of years later, she conducted a second study of everyday racism, again based on interviews, but this time with highly educated black women in the Netherlands and the US only, published in 1991 ("Understanding Everyday Racism"). As a woman of Surinamese-Dutch descent, she was an insider to the voices, the analysis of which she used in the development of a theory of everyday racism. The stunned Dutch audience considered her critical approach so unusual that it provoked active opposition and rejection by some reviewers—rejection that turned out to be influential in the small world of the Dutch where consensus is highly valued. In particular, the rejection by Hans Moll of NRC Handelsblad, himself of Indonesian-Dutch descent, was harsh and influential at the time, as a study by Baukje Prins later analyzed. Moll ridiculed Essed's findings and declared them unacademic (Moll; Prins). As far as I am aware, no other studies about racism in the Netherlands based on interviews with people of color appeared until 2005, when a large survey study was published in which significant groups of, among others Surinamese Dutch were interviewed about their experiences with racism (Monitor Rassendiscriminatie 2005).

When I asked my students to do the interviews with black Dutch men and women, I did not design this as an in-depth comparative study. However, the aims of my investigation are similar to several of the research aims Philomena Essed formulated for the study of everyday racism based on interviews: to "listen first to what ethnic minorities had to say, to explore through probing and questioning what life felt like in a white-dominated society, to see dominant society through the eyes of those who were considered not to belong, not to be part of the 'norm'"; and to "understand why ethnic groups were discriminated against, and what discrimination could tell us about Dutch society" (Essed, "Everyday Racism" 190; "Naming the Unnameable" 125).

Dutch students of history and cultural studies, almost all white, conducted interviews about "race" and racism with black Dutch men and women of varying ages and social backgrounds, in the period between 2004 and 2007. These years were marked by strong political polarization in a climate of fear of terrorism and explicit anti-Muslim propaganda. In the Netherlands, conservative politicians managed to obtain the support of a significant part of the electorate with an anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant agenda immediately following the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001. Two political murders, of Pim Fortuyn by an environmental activist in 2002 and of polemicist writer and filmmaker Theo van Gogh by an Islamist activist in 2004, continue to influence this toxic political climate up to the present day (Buruma). I organized these interviews as an assignment in courses on the history and legacy of "race" and racism at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, at VU University in Amsterdam, and at Utrecht University.[11] The students interviewed light or dark brown people of Surinamese, Antillean (Caribbean), or African descent, made a full

transcript of the interview, and reflected upon the results both in class and in a report. A large majority of the students were white.

Through their interviews, the students found evidence of racism. The interviews were open, but usually not longer than one hour, and the student reports varied in length and quality, as most of them were first year students, learning academic skills. I suppose that the age and inexperience of the learning interviewers had specific effects on the interviewees as well. In many interviews, a sense of kindness and benevolence on the part of the respondents can be found, in particular among the older ones; they do not feel threatened or critically questioned by the students, but consider themselves to be helping the student get some material together for this university assignment. The significant differences between the interviewers and the respondents, in terms of age, race, their general common lack of experience with oral history and the interviewers' limited knowledge of the history of racism were a specific aspect of this assignment. In my view, one positive effect was that these differences created space for explicit explanations of the respondents. Many interviewees assumed, or soon realized, that the young, often white interviewer was not an expert in the subject at hand, which led them to explain more about their memories and experiences. Many respondents expressed their appreciation for the interest in the topic of racism, and many students reported that they were impressed and intrigued with what they had heard firsthand. This lack of experience in interviewing had its drawbacks as well, in missed opportunities, situations where further probing or encouragement would have been called for, but did not occur. As a result, the narratives about race and racism have an inventory character. Follow up research would have to take into consideration the insider/outsider positions of both interviewers and respondents, the effects of the interaction between mostly white students and black respondents; in fact, these interactions would provide an intriguing topic of research in themselves.[12]

The outcome of the student interviews is an overview of a number of situations in which racism occurs in the Netherlands today, according to these respondents. These situations and examples are highly similar to the findings of Essed in 1984 and 1991; my first impression is that there are many similarities and few differences, in spite of the difference in interviewing situations. My students were mostly white, and interviewed both men and women of varying ages; Essed's interviews were conducted by her, she did a comparative series of interviews both in the United States and in the Netherlands, and her respondents were women, mostly under forty years old.[13] The spontaneous reactions of the interviewees in 2004–2007 to the open question about the relevance and the impact of "race" as a visible difference represent a collection of incidents, experiences, and memories of events these respondents regard as racist. Given the setting of the interviews, it is understandable that this collection consists primarily of incidents which the respondents regard as unmistakably and blatantly racist. It is unlikely that the respondents would present their mostly white

and inexperienced student interviewers right away with implicit, indirect, or otherwise vaguer examples of racism. Some interviews go further and by "probing and questioning" did collect examples of more subtle and more hidden forms of racism as well as memories of situations where the respondents acknowledge that they were not entirely certain about the racist character, but felt comfortable and compelled enough to relate them anyway. In several cases, the respondents provide further insight by reflecting upon the reactions they and others had on the racist incident at the time.

The interview fragments are discussed in three sections, organized around different themes. First, questions about the respondents' views of race, the history of slavery and the slave trade; second, the respondents' experiences with and memories of racism in their own lives, as well as their observations of the relevance of "race" in Dutch contemporary society; and third, their remarks and observations regarding the change and/or persistence and continuity in Dutch racism against "black" Dutch or Dutch of Afro-Surinamese and Afro-Antillian descent on the one hand, and against "Muslim" Dutch, in paticular "Moroccans" who are targeted most explicitly, on the other. We designed a series of questions in advance, with some questions devised beforehand by me, and others added by the students. Among the questions everyone asked was: "Multicultural society has been discussed a lot over the last years. Do you feel that skin color matters in Dutch society?"

This question provoked a wealth of reactions among the respondents. My purpose in including a question concerning the impact and meaning of difference in skin color was to create room to discuss that which is very rarely addressed at all: visible difference. Several interviewees were startled initially, then stayed on the "safe" general terrain of commenting on recent political developments. This discussion included references to new anti-immigrant policies, remarks made by politicians, and things said on television in the weeks before the interview. A few respondents were outspoken in their denial of any impact of skin color in their daily lives. A large majority of the 72 respondents answered with a straightforward "yes" when asked whether skin color mattered, followed by direct personal experiences or memories of what had happened to them: 75% of those interviewed by Erasmus University Rotterdam students, and 90% of those interviewed by VU University Amsterdam students.[14]

Although students from three different universities were involved, I do not suggest that there were significant differences between the universities, as students in the Netherlands today do not necessarily live in the cities where they study, and also the interviews were conducted with respondents living both in and outside the major cities in a variety of places, mostly in the western and central part of the Netherlands. During the interviews conducted by VU University and Utrecht University students in 2006 and 2007, 85% of black Surinamese and Antillean men answered with a straightforward yes, 6% said no, and 9% were uncertain. Of the black Surinamese and Antillean women, 80% answered with a clear yes, and 20% said no.

Of these, half stated that earlier in their lives, they had felt different about this issue, having experienced more racism during their youth. One woman felt that location was important and that skin color had ceased to be important where she was currently living in Amsterdam.[15] From these results, as well as from the many spontaneous memories and experiences these respondents shared with the interviewers, we can conclude that color is evidently a factor in Dutch daily life, and that "race" as visible difference matters, also in the Netherlands. Older respondents had more memories of racism experienced during their youth. From this, we cannot conclude that racism is more directed at younger people. In my view, older respondents chose to share in this particular setting the memories that they considered most directly racist or race-related. Possibly, the examples they shared were also related to the young interviewers who asked the questions.

The vast majority of respondents had stories of direct experiences of racism. Most black men had experienced the situation of being denied access to a dance club. A 29-year- old Surinamese Dutch man who worked as a medical doctor recalled:

> Not long ago, I wanted to visit a club together with a cousin, and I was refused. We were stopped at the door and they asked for our ID. I showed my driver's license, my cousin as well, but we still could not enter. When we asked why we could not get in, the manager did not reply at all—but in the meantime, 'autochthonous' Dutch were entering. The police happened to come by, but they could not do anything either.[16]

Racism at work was another area where almost all of the interviewees spoke from experience. Many had been rejected during job applications and were convinced that their color had been a significant factor. Their experiences included negative expectations white people had about them, and white prejudice of colleagues about black people's work ethos. For example, they mentioned expectations about not coming on time, about being noisy, about a loud style in dressing, about not understanding the Dutch language, and about lacking intelligence. A man born in the Dutch Antilles, 45 years old, working as a carpenter, explains that in his workplace, white staff, his colleagues, could not get over the fact that he was in charge and that they had to take orders from him.

> I am one of the most experienced carpenters in our company, and therefore my boss often asks me to serve as project overseer. Other carpenters then need time before they will ask me something. They find it difficult that, as whites, they have to ask a dark man something. This is not how it should be, according to them.[17]

Other common experiences at work involve racist remarks presented as humor, fun, or just a joke. One man, 25 years old, thinks white Dutch people use humor to vent certain feelings: "Many Dutch feel the need to vent this in humor. They will make a

joke and they will say that it is a joke, but indirectly I think that they want to get it off their chest as well. There is this undertone—racism is there, certainly."

Black men reported many verbal racist incidents on the street, being spit at by complete strangers, getting into fights after hearing racist remarks. Black men and women reported being followed in supermarkets and shops, being met with distrust and hostility by shop personnel, or by other shoppers who cling to their purses or their handbags as soon as they see a black man. A Surinamese man, who is a science teacher:

> In a shop, waiting in the cashier's line, I experience this probably as often as once or twice a week: standing in line you look behind you, or in front of you, or next to you, and they [white shoppers] immediately look to see if their bag is in order, or keep their bag in front of them. Well yes, it has its reasons; most bag-snatchers are people who look a bit like my little person . . .

These experiences take place in public, among strangers, where color is an obvious, perhaps even first, marker. As one black man, 47 years old, said about his experience of "standing out" because of his skin color: "It works like a signboard, color: you cannot get around it."

Young black men are aware that how they dress has direct influence on white distrust, as one man, 23 years old, a student and working in a bar, says:

> Yes, strange experiences, distrust in shops, and when going out, at Rembrandtplein, Museumplein, the Albert Hein supermarket.[18] Refused at a disco. On the street, people will walk around me in a circle when I have my cap on, and my hood, and my pants low down. Then I think, hey, I'm not going to rob you.

Another man, 28 years old, a student, says: "I still do not feel at home here. People still turn me down—for my skin color, or for the way I speak Dutch. It's irritating. A job interview, I was turned down. Yes, it hurts, you know? I feel unwelcome."

Black women have another set of experiences in Dutch society. Some things are similar, like the experiences in shops, or the jokes they have to endure. Black women working in healthcare or other care jobs encounter racist reactions from patients who refuse to be helped by them because of their color. Others experience that they are not noticed, overlooked: a Surinamese woman, 60 years old, working as a teacher in special education: "Yes, it does occur at school that somebody comes in, ignores me completely, thinks that I am the cleaner."

In the interviews, the women also mention the reactions that their children and other family members have had. A Surinamese woman, 49 years old, working as a teacher: "My children have been shouted at, abused. My brother has been fired, and harassed." Older people remember racist abuse from a long time ago. A Surinamese woman, 87 years old: "A woman spat me in the face, when playing cards. In

Amsterdam. I was still young." A woman born in 1929, more than 50 years in the Netherlands: "Oh yes, my children were shouted at, called 'Sambo.'" On public transportation, the reactions can be harsh as well, as a woman, 31 years old, states: "I experience this as well. The bus driver who does not stop for me. Nobody stands up. I am the only one who has to show her bus pass." One Surinamese woman, now 63 years old, has positive memories of her own working days, but noted that her son had experienced verbal abuse in school: "Where I worked, I was always the only Surinamese, and I have worked well there, with pleasure. [. . .] But sometimes there is racism, yes. [. . .] My son was called a *zwarte neger* ('black Negro') in school, and they said, *ga terug naar je land* ('go back to your country'). He stayed home after that."[19]

All of these examples can also be found in the early and mid-1980s experiences Essed reports about in her publications, which reinforces those findings, but also suggests that there has been little change. Many interviewees were made to understand by white Dutch people at some point in their lives that they were not *really* considered Dutch. This was also true for the younger generations among the respondents. A woman born in the Netherlands Antilles, now 23 years old, who worked as a waitress, and had lived in Rotterdam from the age of 7 onwards, noted:

> It is still not very common to have a white Dutch friend. We are all citizens but they still look at you as a foreigner, even when you grow up here. They do not (want) to acknowledge it, you know what I mean? [. . .] When they look at me, it is like I am inferior to them, I think. Or that I am not really Dutch, in their eyes . . .[20]

A 26-year-old woman who had been born in the Netherlands Antilles, and now works as a lawyer, confirms this perception:

> The average white Dutch sees his colored fellow human being ultimately as inferior—with some exceptions. But they will not admit this openly, and so the impression is given as if [color] does not matter. However, in reality it does matter absolutely. A dark man in a dark alley is thought to be more scary and threatening than a white man. Nobody appears to have any problem with dark-skinned people, but you hear so often that, if a daughter or a son were to come home with a dark person as a partner, the average Dutch person would 'have to swallow,' or to take a deep breath, to use that expression. People with a dark skin color are more often branded in a negative way: dumb, criminal, etcetera. The fact that 'multicultural' is associated with skin color is typical of this: because the Chinese, the Norwegians, the Russians in this society are also multicultural![21]

Several black men and women reflect spontaneously on the more indirect forms of racism they encounter. An Antillian woman, 62 years old, a teacher at a primary school: "There's a lot of things . . . You have an accent, you don't belong. Especially with older people: those looks, as if to say, 'What are you doing here?!'" A

Surinamese man, 54 years old: "At the office you are 'that *allochtoon*' for whom people have to watch out. [. . .] You become a danger soon enough. And you are considered dumb: people think you don't understand, you cannot do the job." A Surinamese man, 46 years old: "It is very difficult with discrimination. I grew up here, but I can feel when something is going on, under the skin, under the surface. It's in the details, so that you cannot really get a grip. You cannot put your finger on it. [. . .] Unexpected, sometimes."

Strategies

Questions about the reactions and coping strategies were not explicitly part of these interviews, but several respondents spoke about how they handled the racist incidents they encountered. Philomena Essed distinguishes two types of strategies in dealing with racism: *defensive* strategies on the one hand, include gaining insight into racism; watchfulness; challenging discrimination; not to trust whites. On the other hand, there are *constructive* strategies, which include ways "to gain strength and autonomy as a group," such as understanding the history of black resistance; creating power within the system; keeping and developing black culture and perspectives; investing energy and money in black institutions, black community, and black talent in order to increase group power.[22]

Another distinction in strategies could be that in passive and active reactions. Several black men and some women spoke of their direct reactions, but explicit "black rage" in the Netherlands is rare. In a recent debate, the then director of NiNsee, the National institute for the study of Dutch Slavery and its Legacy, Artwell Cain, suggested that historical awareness of past injustice could lead to an attitude of caution: "Black Dutch people have to take care because historical exclusion could happen again."[23] The history of racism, the histories of slavery and the slave trade, and the awareness of the very long virtual absence of blackness in Europe may be factors that explain a degree of reserve and restraint among black Dutch. Take care: it has happened, therefore it may happen again—we are not so certain that things have really changed.

Teaching Children to Ignore Racism

A 2005 major survey on self-reported experiences with discrimination (Monitor Rassendiscriminatie 2005) illuminated underreporting to the police of racist experiences and incidents. Moreover, the majority of the respondents replied to the follow-up question as to why they had not reported the incidents, that they thought this would not have made a difference; their strategy instead was to get on with life. Surinamese and Antillian respondents in the students' interviews also mentioned as a strategy for dealing with racism that they decide to just ignore it. Several Surinamese and Antillean men and women explained that they taught their children to avoid confrontations with white Dutch whenever possible—not always an easy

task. A Surinamese father of 47, working as a security officer, explained: "There is racism here, for example, on the playground. But I prepared my children for that. I told them how to deal with that: ignore certain things, don't always react. Ignoring is much better than responding. [. . .] My attitude was just not to react to certain things."[24]

A 63-year-old Surinamese woman taught her children to expect problems and to be prepared for them:

> You need self-confidence, that is what I tell my children. Especially when they are with white friends, I remind them: Be careful with the police, because you will be the first they will arrest. You are black, you are Surinamese: they may arrest you first before any others, or maybe the others will not be arrested at all. [. . .] My children have to learn how to handle these things at an early age, otherwise they cannot deal with it when they are older. You have to teach them to have a thick skin [een harde huid te hebben]. You have to stand up for yourself, because if I won't stand up for myself, who else will, you know? That is what I tell them.[25]

A Surinamese Dutch man of 29 years old, a medical doctor, noted:

> I handle discrimination differently than I did before. You learn, I'm afraid, to deal with it, and you learn not to see things, because you cannot change them anyway. There is a lot of invisible discrimination. You will not hear people say 'I don't like you because you are black,' but you notice that your opportunities are being restricted very clearly, without any reason. Just like when you disadvantage someone, simply because you do not like the look of his or her face. Discrimination has become such an everyday phenomenon, that you do not really preoccupy yourself with it. You get used to it.[26]

The strategy to hide painful racist experiences was found repeatedly and reflects both the power of racism to hurt, and the perceived lack of power to fight racism individually. More research into the reflections and coping strategies of black Dutch people with regard to racism of varying generations and backgrounds is necessary. The insights of African American research can be a source of inspiration here. In her recent study about the development of racism, nationalism, and feminism in the US, Patricia Hill Collins states that African Americans have used a similar strategy of conscious protection against the damaging power of racism. She presents this as an old and tested strategy of black solidarity: "As a way to preserve their individual human dignity, Black children of both genders were encouraged not to take racism 'personally'" (Hill Collins 128).

Several of the black Dutch respondents voice precisely this strategy of self-protection. Being the target of racism means to experience the pain and the humiliation of exclusion, subtle or blatant. This quality of racism is one other reason to hang on to the term that makes many of us feel most uncomfortable, instead of looking

for more neutralizing, more general, and thus more comfortable-sounding alternative terms referring to cultural difference, immigration, or ethnicity. There appears to be no easy exit route, no simple plan to remove or to get over racism. Racism is about humiliation, about denying or attacking people's dignity: the struggle against racism aims to restore and to build the conditions for a dignified life for all.

Changes after 2001: Less Anti-Black Racism, More Anti-Muslim?

The study of racism appears to have entered a new stage in the 21st century. A new element in the debate about the appropriate terminology, about the categorizations, about the relevance of "race" is the anti-Muslim sentiment and activity in and outside Europe. One effect of the terrorist attacks in New York, Casablanca, Bali, Madrid, and London appears to have been the growth or spread of anti-Islam sentiment, and of fear and anger against Muslims, because they are perceived as terrorists. Several of the interviewees spontaneously commented on a shift they had experienced in their own lives. As these developments are very much fluid and ongoing, these individual observations and remarks deserve academic attention. Quite a few respondents noted they had recently seen that discrimination and aggression was increasingly directed against "the Moroccans" or "the Muslims." As a result, however, they felt that racism was less of a direct problem within their own daily lives. The older respondents described this change, which varied for all of them. An Afro-Antillean man who works in a high school as a caretaker and had come to the Netherlands in 1958, when he was four years old, described the positive surprise that he often encountered as a teenager and young adult. He enjoyed his life: "I could have every girl I wanted, if you understand what I mean, ha-ha. My curly hair they found fantastic!" However, during the 1970s, this changed. He says:

It became different, slowly. More people who looked different came, I mean who were black. [. . .] I noticed that an audience of people who saw only the negative sides of the newcomers was growing. According to them, we were only taking advantage of the welfare state. I can still get angry when I think about that. [. . .] I have always worked! [. . .] This was when I was about 25 years old, I think. Being black was no longer an advantage. People were fed up with blacks. [. . .] This was a real change. First the so-called blacks were nice, friendly, a kind of toy, children. I felt that was still positive. As a child, I did not get much negative feeling at the time.

Asked about whether he felt that skin color still played a role in the Netherlands, he said:

Actually, I am certain of that. [. . .] There are all these small things that are hard to describe. You just know that there are still a lot of racists. Just look at our last

election. What kind of idiot is beginning an anti-Muslim policy?! I mean this is not respectful toward people's values. The respect for other cultures is just gone, I think. It is just that I think that I am no longer exactly the group that is under fire now. I think now that the Turks and the Moroccans are experiencing this more, they have more trouble with it. They are getting all the prejudices about mosques, that they steal, that they oppress women. I know these prejudices too. I think the Turks and the Moroccans have now come under fire just like we were thirty, forty years ago. Suddenly, it is felt that there are too many of them. I can still hardly believe it. We brought them to our country, didn't we? And why are they now suddenly to blame?[27]

In a similar reflection during an interview, an 81-year-old Surinamese woman recalled coming to the Netherlands in 1948. Living in the Netherlands had never been easy for her, she noted. But she mentioned that *she felt that more recently the attitudes were getting worse.*

We were the first brown ones who came there. [. . .] When I first came here, I was ashamed of my own curly hair. I began to straighten it, because I did not want to show that I was of Negro descent. Because a Negro was much more inferior. They looked at Negroes as much more inferior. They did not like curly hair at the time. [. . .] Now, I notice it in the shops, sometimes. Because now the Moroccans and the Turks have a bad name, you know, they look at foreigners like me differently now too. Sometimes you notice. [. . .] No, they don't say anything. But the way they look at you. [. . .] I find that racism is going in a hypocritical, two-faced way. When they stand in front of you, you know, they are nice and friendly, but when they are behind your back, I have the idea that they talk about you in an inferior way—I don't know. I think it is different since there are Moroccans and Turks and that sort of people here. [. . .] And it got worse through the media, the last years. [. . .] One way or another, they make you feel that you are different in many ways.[28]

For this interviewee, racism seems to have branched into more directions, rather than shifted completely toward anti-Moroccan, or anti-Turkish sentiments. According to her, there was a general "anti-foreigner" sentiment behind this phenomenon.

We know that racism and discrimination can have a tendency, historically, to work as a seesaw, as in the image offered by French Tunisian writer, Albert Memmi: in this children's game, common on playgrounds, one goes up, the other goes down.[29] It appears that, as Muslims have been pushed down, other groups discriminated against as well, such as black people, have gone up on the social hierarchy, to some extent. The effect of the singling out of Muslims as the out-group, could be that blacks and Asians (who may be perceived as distinctive from Muslims) have gained more acceptance, and are less likely to be seen as different or as troublemakers.

However, it can also mean that racism intensifies generally. We cannot yet draw a general conclusion regarding such a shift on the basis of these interviews. Some interviewees reflected on a shift away from anti-black racism, while others described, rather, a doubling up and mixed form of discrimination that continued. Far from being a full scale analysis, the empirical evidence presented here concerning a perceived shift in focus from anti-black racism to anti-Muslim sentiments stands as building blocks for new research. It is too early to conclude that "race" is a thing of the past, and that "culture" and "religion" have replaced it. The respondents in the interviews presented in this article show that visible difference and "race" retain considerable relevance within Dutch society. There is no question that most Dutch citizens abhor racism; the problem is that the rejection of racism remains mostly a passive matter. When more academics and politicians acknowledge that "race" is a relevant factor, and that racism exists, not only elsewhere and long ago, but also in the Netherlands today, the tendency in Dutch society to leave racism mostly unchallenged could come to a halt, creating more space for insight in black and white Dutch people's lives in the past and present.

Notes

1. I thank the students of Erasmus University Rotterdam, Utrecht University and VU University Amsterdam for their work on these interviews, I thank my colleagues Maayke Botman and Mary-Ann Middelkoop at Utrecht University for their involvement and advice, and I thank all the respondents who trusted us enough to share their experiences and memories. Some of the interview fragments in this article are elaborated upon in a more historical context in Hondius "Race and the Dutch"; see also Hondius "Become Like Us."

2. The new field of Black European Studies, initiated in Germany in 2005, investigates how color and "race" have affected European histories in various countries, and what legacies can be traced and compared. Black European Studies project website <www.best.uni-mainz.de>.

3. Interview with Mr. K., born in Suriname, by Martha de Bruijn and Karin Arendsen, students at Utrecht University, Jan. 2007.

4. "Donkere mensen krijgen *hun kleurtje* door de grote verspreiding van pigment door de opperhuid." <www.Gezondheidsnet.nl>. 2007.

5. "De gevangenissen worden voor het grootste deel bevolkt door *mensen met een kleurtje*." (Volkskrant blog)

6. "Het zijn *dames met een kleurtje*, de meeste islamitisch." Volkskrant-blog, 2007.

7. "Ex-criminelen, langdurig werklozen, WAO'ers, ouderen, *mensen met een kleurtje*.. Willen we die in dienst nemen als ze voldoen aan de gestelde eisen?" <www.jongebazen.nl>. 2007.

8. "Statistisch kan je aantonen dat, alle andere factoren gelijk, bij de politie *mensen met een kleurtje* minder snel promotie maken." Volkskrant, blog, 2007.

9. Interview with Ms. E., by Puck van der Pijl, student at Utrecht University, Oct./Nov. 2007.

10. Het Parool, 27 July 2010, *Hulp "met een kleurtje" door Cordaan weggestuurd*. De medewerker aan de telefoon vroeg toen: "Heeft u een kleurtje? Als u een kleurtje heeft, kunt u daar niet naartoe. Die mevrouw houdt niet van mensen met een kleurtje."

11. Interview assignments, 2004–2007, full transcripts. Courses of D. G. Hondius at Erasmus University Rotterdam (Faculty of History and Arts), VU University Amsterdam (Faculty of Letters, Department of History), and Utrecht University (Faculty of Humanities, Department of Language and Culture Studies and Department of History), 2004-2007.

12. See the contributions of Miri Song, Alford A. Young, and Michell Duneier. Ed. Martin Bulmer and John Solomos, 2004. See also Essed "Against All Odds."

13. It is possible to expand the study of several of the incidents and experiences further using the five category analysis presented in Essed 2001. <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/essed45.htm>.

14. In 2004, I supervised sixteen interviews made by students at Erasmus University Rotterdam, and ten made by students at VU University Amsterdam.

15. In 2006 and 2007, I supervised 72 interviews made by students of Taal en Cultuurstudies (Language and Culture Studies, Faculty of Humanities), Utrecht University, with black Surinamese and Antillian men and women, together with Drs. Maaike Botman and Drs. Mary-Ann Middelkoop. Of the 33 black Surinamese and Antillian men interviewed, 28 said straightforward yes; 2 said no; 3 were uncertain. Of the 39 Surinamese and Antillian women interviewed, 31 said straightforward yes, and 8 said no.

16. Interview with Mr. F., born in the Netherlands, parents Surinamese, 29 years old, by Joost van der Kwaak, student of VU University Amsterdam, Feb. 2004.

17. Interview with Mr. K., 45 years old, born in the Dutch Antilles, by Bob de Jong, student of VU University Amsterdam, Mar. 2004.

18. Rembrandtplein is an Amsterdam area for nightlife; Museumplein is near the more affluent Amsterdam Zuid area; Albert Hein is a high end supermarket.

19. Interview with Mrs. N., by student of UU, Oct./Nov. 2007.

20. Interview with Ms. D., born in Curaçao, 23 years old, by Michael John, student of Erasmus University Rotterdam, Mar. 2004.

21. Interview with Ms. A., born in the Dutch Antilles, 26 years old, by Zahira Zaandam, student of VU University Amsterdam, Feb. 2004.

22. Philomena Essed, "Understanding Everyday Racism: An Interdisciplinary Theory and Analysis of the Experiences of Black Women," diss., U of Amsterdam, 1990, 87–88.

23. Artwell Cain, debate at VU University Amsterdam, 2 June 2009, Center for Migration and Diversity Studies.

24. Interview with Mr. B., 47 years old, born in Suriname, by Harmen Dijkhuizen, student at Utrecht University, Jan. 2007.

25. Interview with Mrs. N., by student of Utrecht University, Oct./Nov. 2007.

26. Interview with Mr. F., born in the Netherlands, parents Surinamese, 29 years old, by Joost van der Kwaak, student of VU University Amsterdam, Feb. 2004.

27. Interview with Mr. M., born in the Dutch Antilles, 52 years old, by Floor de Boer, student of Utrecht University, Jan. 2007.

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Courses of D. G. Hondius at Erasmus
University Rotterdam (Faculty of History and
Arts), VU University Amsterdam (Faculty of Arts,
Department of History), and Utrecht University
(Faculty of Humanities, Department of Language
and Culture Studies and Department of History),
2004-2007. In 2004, I supervised sixteen inter-
views made by students at Erasmus University
Rotterdam, and ten made by students at VU
University Amsterdam. In 2006 and 2007,
I supervised 72 interviews made by students of
Utrecht University, with black Surinamese and
Antillian men and women, together with drs.
Maayke Botman and drs. Mary-Ann Middelkoop.
I thank all students and my colleagues for the
commitment and enthusiasm with which they
worked on these interviews, and I thank all the
interviewees who agreed to talk to strangers
about these aspects of their personal lives.
The students, the majority of who are white
Dutch born in the Netherlands, found someone
to interview in a variety of ways, including their
own direct circles of friends, colleagues, friends
of their families, but also random people on the
street, in cafés or restaurants, on the market,
in a shop, or from their home villages or towns
all over the Netherlands were among the
interviewees. For reasons of privacy I have
anonimized the names of the interviewees
in the following quotes from the interview
transcripts.

Interview with Mr. K., born in Suriname, by
Martha de Bruijn and Karin Arendsen, students
at Utrecht University, January 2007.

Interview with Ms. E., by Puck van der Pijl,
student at Utrecht University, okt/nov 2007.

Interview with Mr. F., born in the Netherlands,
parents Surinamese, 29 years old, by Joost van
der Kwaak, student of VU University Amsterdam,
February 2004.

Interview with Mr. K., 45 years old, born in the
Dutch Antilles, by Bob de Jong, student of VU
University Amsterdam, March 2004.

Interview with Mrs. N., by student of UU, okt/nov
2007.

Interview with Ms. D., born in Curaçao, 23 years
old, by Michael John, student of Erasmus
University Rotterdam, March 2004.

Interview with Ms. A., born in the Dutch Antilles,
26 years old, by Zahira Zaandam, student at VU
University Amsterdam, Feb. 2004.

Interview with Mr. B., 47 years old, born in
Suriname, by Harmen Dijkhuizen, student at
Utrecht University, Jan. 2007.

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Interview with Mr. F., born in the Netherlands,
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der Kwaak, student at VU University Amsterdam,
Feb. 2004.

Interview with Mr. M., born in the Dutch Antilles,
52 years old, by Floor de Boer, student at Utrecht
University, Jan. 2007.

Interview with Mrs. W., by Hester van den Blink
and Iesja Westebeek, students at UU, Oct./Nov.
2007.

Strategies and Aesthetics: Responses to Exclusionary Practices in the Public Arts Sector[1]

Sandra Trienekens and
Eltje Bos

Introduction

Olu Oguibe, in his analysis of what he calls "the culture game" and the "politics of perception, reception and patronage in contemporary art," concludes that:

> While we touch on the role of institutions and the market in the global culture game, it is important too to bear in mind that institutional predilections, though structured, methodical, and self-regenerating, are nevertheless inseparable from the broad cultural dispositions that inform them, and in this regard the attitude of cultural institutions, the market, and the critical establishment toward non-Western contemporary artists is only a reflection of deep-seated, firmly entrenched dispositions within Western society itself. [. . .] At the turn of the twenty-first century, the struggle that non-Western contemporary artists face on the global scale is not Western resistance to difference, as might have been the case in decades past; their most formidable obstacle is Western obsession with and insistence on difference. (xiv)

This contribution extends Oguibe's conclusion to the Dutch public arts sector. This sector is obviously only a small segment of the entire cultural field that includes all artistic and cultural, professional and amateur, renowned and unknown, commercial and unpaid, individual and collective art expressions. The public arts sector is nonetheless an interesting field, because fueled by public funding, it is required to function inclusively and be accessible to all. As part of the Dutch public arts sector, we consider: art policy, art critics, the main art institutions and established artists and art companies. Against the backdrop of an increasingly multicultural society, the

Dutch public arts sector has been struggling with the concept and the incorporation of "diversity" in its policy and funding practice. On a discursive level, in policy documents, recently one can read a reasonably developed notion of diversity,[2] but, in the implementation of policy, cultural diversity is still being marginalized as we have shown elsewhere (Trienekens, *Urban Paradoxes*; Bos, *Cultural Policy*). Cultural diversity also receives an almost negligible share of public arts funding.[3] Is this a consequence of white normativity, racism, culturalism, or a combination of all three?

To some extent, the Dutch public arts sector can be seen as being shaped by "whiteness," if one takes white normativity and the application of a hierarchical perception of cultures and artistic traditions as an important indicator of whiteness. To some extent, the Dutch public arts sector is, indeed, also racist in its preference for certain artists above others.[4] But in the Netherlands, the obsession with and insistence on difference is above all culturalist. Difference is based on "racial-ethnic" indicators (Essed, *Diversity*): public and political discourse focuses on ethnicity and national identity rather than race. In particular, when referring to Muslims in Dutch society, terms such as "backward" and "less civilized" are used. Essed and Trienekens maintain that notions of race are immediately attached to notions of civilization and that the prime trigger for exclusion is a perceived lack of—what they call—"cultural acquiredness:" in the dominant perception, non-Western cultures would not have (yet) reached the same level of civilization as the West (60–63). In the domain of the arts, the concept of cultural acquiredness takes on a double meaning and refers—in addition to general allusions to an incomplete civilization process—to a lack of knowledge of and reference to developments in the history of Western art. In this respect, cultural acquiredness can also be understood as "cultural literacy," or, in Goldberg's terms, as an expression of racism as racial historicism (Goldberg, *Racial State*; Goldberg, *Threat of Race*).

Nonetheless, whether triggered by whiteness, racism or culturalism, the obsession with difference in the Dutch public arts sector is manifested in the forms of "everyday racism" artists are exposed to (Essed, *Understanding Everyday Racism*). The first goal of this contribution is to analyze how specific notions of ethnicity are applied in the Dutch public arts sector. We focus on the racist underpinnings of dominant norms and conventions of what art is; and what kind of obstacles artists with international roots[5] face when they seek access to the public arts sector—particularly the institutions for vocational art education. Secondly, this contribution juxtaposes such dominant cultural practices to the lived experiences of artists with international roots by analyzing the different *strategies* they develop in response to the public arts sector. In doing so, this contribution shows that these artists are no passive victims of (everyday) racism, even when not all of their strategies are as successful in countering the specificities of racism in the Dutch public arts sector.

Methodological Reflections

One of the research projects of the research group Citizenship and Cultural Dynamics, run by Trienekens at the Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences, dealt with diversity in the arts. In this context, Trienekens and Bos conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 18 artists with international roots during the period 2009–2010. Their lived experiences enabled us to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the meaning of diversity in the public (performing) arts sector. It is important to note that the empirical data in this contribution reflect the performing arts sector only, because each cultural discipline differs (slightly) in the way in which diversity is discussed or excluded.

The interviewees are artists of various backgrounds: Indonesian, Chinese, Turkish, Moroccan, Egyptian, Iranian, Lebanese, Surinamese, Dutch Antillean, Russian and German. The twelve male and six female interviewees ranged in age from their late twenties to late forties. The semi-structured character of the interviews allowed the interviewees to expand on related topics of their interest. The interviews lasted between 50 minutes and two hours, and were conducted in the interviewees' studios or workspaces.

Getting in touch with a variety of artists with international roots with a considerable amount of experience proved not to be as easy as we initially thought. Although we have published on cultural diversity, worked as advisors, and are quite familiar with the performing arts field, we had to mobilize our networks to find the right people.[6] This probably indicates how modest or marginal the exposure of these artists is. The 18 interviewees expressed an eagerness to discuss the topic of diversity with us, which can be read as a strongly felt need to move ahead; to move beyond the restrictions dominant diversity thinking places on their careers. We contacted an additional three artists who declined our invitation to share their thoughts on diversity with us. Two of them were too tied up with busy schedules and one, the only one in our pool, actually, explicitly expressed not to be interested in discussing the topic.

The Notion of Ethnicity in the Dutch Public Arts Sector

Identifying ethnic diversity as relevant to the public arts sector dates back to the early 1980s. At the time, it coincided with the launch of a national policy directed at the integration of "ethnic minorities" into various domains of society. Since then, the terminology has shifted every few years in the public arts sector, and with it, its focus and so-called target groups: from "integration whilst maintaining one's cultural identity" directed at migrants' traditional, collective cultural experience; via "interculturalism," i.e., the artistic exchange between the culture of immigrants and the established Dutch (Western-European) culture; to "cultural diversity" at the turn of the century, which covers the incorporation of immigrants, youngsters and—in the case of, for instance, the composition of boards of cultural institutions—also women.

The use of "target group" terminology raises at least two major issues.[7] First, any such term separates one group of citizens and their artistic expressions—those with roots that stretch beyond the Netherlands—from the majority group. Here the negative effect of the "diversity paradox" (Trienekens, *180°* 10) becomes apparent: in a genuinely inclusive arts sector, diversity would cease to be a topic that needs to be discussed explicitly and would be fully integrated into the general practices of the sector. But to achieve such an inclusive state, explicit attention first needs to be drawn to diversity to make the sector aware of the need to deal with diversity issues. In doing so, however, the distinction between minority and majority art is reinforced repeatedly, and over time, it becomes progressively more difficult to bridge the gap.

Second, the development of the terminology from migrant culture, via interculturalism, to cultural diversity is problematic because it came to encompass an increasing number of target groups. As a consequence, under *cultural diversity* policy, artists with international roots need to compete with ever more target groups for a share of the limited arts funding budgets directed at the "enhancement of cultural diversity." Moreover, the broadening of the scope of cultural diversity policy beyond *ethnic* cultural diversity diffused the need for a critical debate in the public arts sector on the hierarchy of cultures, the relationship between Western-European and other artistic traditions and specifically those of formerly colonized people. The controversy about the extent to which the introduction of new perspectives (sometimes derived from different cultural frames of reference) can innovate the Dutch public arts sector, has not even reached as much as a preliminary conclusion.

This also holds true for the degree to which ethnicity should be understood as a marker of the artistic identity of the artist. Debate in this critical area is much needed to make current practices visible and contestable. For instance, in the public theatre sector, although less explicit than in the past, a one-dimensional and static conception of ethnicity and multiculturalism prevails:[8] migrant actors or playwrights are supposed to deal with migrant or multicultural issues, preferably in the way in which the dominant group perceives these issues. Or, in the words of one interviewee:

> I participated in a program for scenario writers from non-Western backgrounds. I wrote a story from the perspective of a girl with a Chinese grandfather; how she and he perceive the world. My contribution was criticized for not dealing explicitly enough with multicultural society (writer/director, male, early-40s).

Moreover, typecasting is also still a common practice. One of the interviewees recalls:

> In the beginning of my career in the Netherlands, after I moved here from Egypt, I was confronted with typecasting: I was offered marginal roles or the role of a Surinamese character because of my slightly darker skin. I am still opposed to roles

that depict black people in a one-dimensional stereotypical way. In my work, which does not necessarily thematize ethnicity, I experiment with colorblind casts and find it perfectly normal that white Dutch actors play my children. But when a work does indeed deal with a migrant story or ethnicity, I feel a migrant actor should be playing the lead migrant character. With the established companies, however, this rarely happens. Migrant actors hardly ever perform main characters—neither migrant nor non-migrant. And although every actor is allowed to play every role, I feel it's odd that make-up is used to turn white actors into black characters. Then I would say: give the migrant actor a chance! (theater director/actor, male, mid-40s).[9]

These two examples are indicative of a more general situation. Both in policy and in practice, in the field of the performing arts, practices in the name of "diversity"—even when addressing more groups than just ethnic groups—may become forms of marginalization in that the label of "diversity" systematically sets groups apart from the dominant group and directs different policies and budgets to them. Underlying this form of everyday racism is cultural denigration, the perceived lack of cultural acquiredness or literacy: these groups receive extra attention because they are ascribed the need to "catch up" with the arts and culture of the dominant group. Our research suggests that typecasting and the unwillingness to cast migrant-actors, even for migrant-roles, point toward a different form of everyday racism; toward a combination of cultural denigration and a lack of trust or confidence in the artistic capabilities of non-Dutch actors.

Norms and Conventions of What Art Is

To understand the dominant norms and conventions, defining what art is, we have to point out that the Dutch public arts sector is historically divided into two predominant strands. The largest strand and dominant in terms of status and funding, receiving roughly 80 to 85 percent of the national arts budget (Bos, "Tongkus"), consists of "art with a capital A": the artistic expressions of acclaimed Dutch theatre groups, musical ensembles, opera companies, orchestras, individual visual artists and so on, which are praised for and judged on the intrinsic artistic value and artistic quality of their work. This is the strand of cultural production vested in a Romantic notion of the autonomous artist. The second, and much smaller strand, covers the domain of cultural participation and receives around 15 to 20 percent of the national arts budget (Bos, "Tongkus"). Nonetheless, cultural participation by a wide range of societal groups and the impact of participation on individuals and society (the civilizing ideal) has always been one of the main legitimizations of the investment of public funding for the arts in the Netherlands. This strand is generally discussed in terms of the social benefit for society rather than its intrinsic artistic value and artistic

quality. Whereas it is considered "blasphemous" to debate the social benefit of the cultural production in the first strand,[10] this is fully accepted in the Dutch public arts sector in relation to more participatory forms of art, such as amateur culture. Not new, but recently more central in the Dutch art policy debate is a third strand: the contextual strand (receives around 5% of the national budget for cultural organizations (OC&W "Voortgangsbrief"). Contrary to the dominant perception of the Romantic strand, this strand understands cultural expressions as always specific to and shaped by the context in which they are produced.[11]

When the artistic expressions of artists with international roots are discussed, it tends to be under this third strand. Although it may occasionally do better justice to the artistic expressions, the drawback is that the "valorization" of the artwork is subjected to different rules than that of the artwork in the Romantic strand, which sets artists with international roots apart *qualitatively*. Given the importance and dominance of artistic quality as a criterion to label cultural expressions as "art" in the Netherlands, this signifies an unequal starting position. When acknowledged under the third strand, at least the artistic productions of artists with international roots are discussed. More commonly, however, cultural diversity is discussed under the second strand in the public arts sector and thereby limited to the diversification of audiences for established Western art expressions or the stimulation of active cultural participation among migrants.[12] In other words, the dominant tendency toward a "social" interpretation of the work of artists with international roots diverts the discussion away from their *artistic contribution* to the Dutch public arts sector. As one interviewee phrases it:

> The things I regret most about the context I am working in is that the work of an African is understood as "culture," whereas the same sort of work produced by a Dutch person is seen as "art." The themes we choose in our work are interpreted in social and political terms; my background and the alleged "clash of cultures" are central to reviews of our performances (theatre maker, male, early-40s).

Another interviewee adds: "I avoid the diversity debate these days, because it diverts attention from our artistic skills and views, from our inventiveness" (visual and performing artist, female, mid-40s).

The norms and conventions in the first strand of what art is, also result, in the performing arts, in quite a straightjacket for artistic directors regarding the kind of plays they can choose from. The range seems limited to the classical Western theatre oeuvre drawing from Greek mythology and a selection of British, Russian, Scandinavian and German playwrights. Non-Western epic pieces, such as the Indian epic Mahabharata, which was directed and staged, e.g. in London, are unlikely to be seen on stage in Amsterdam.[13] Moreover, although the Western-classical plays are sometimes rewritten and adapted to the contemporary context, there hardly exists

a tradition of new writing in the Netherlands. Together this results in a kind of "triple closure" of the public arts sector to artists with international roots. To illustrate again with an example from the performing arts sector: firstly, the way ethnicity is dealt with makes it impossible for a non-white actor to play a leading role without it having a political connotation. Hence, artistic directors of established theatre companies shy away from such decisions. Secondly, plays from non-Western cultural traditions are beyond the frame of reference of art critics and audiences. They are little understood, let alone appreciated. Or, in the experience of one interviewee:

> I was always interested in Greek tragedies at art school. My Dutch professors praised me for my—in their perception unexpected—interest in the heart of European cultural heritage. I had to point out that this culture was much closer to where I come from [Turkey] than to the place we were in at that very moment in time. Nowadays, I use various sources from the Balkan, Bulgaria, Poland and former Yugoslavia. I also reference Iranian, Turkish and Kurdish authors. But I have to prove myself to both the audience and other theatre makers, because my work does not fit the prevalent codes. Art critics often have not even heard of the, say, Bulgarian philosopher whose work I used (theater maker, male, mid-40s).

The final form of closure, caused by the limited space for new writings, is the difficulty this poses to artists with international roots to establish a new theatre language. In the words of another interviewee:

> The established theatre scene performs old plays, old texts. [. . .] There are so few assignments for young artists, to write their own plays. Consequently, hardly any texts and performances deal with the contemporary city and its inhabitants (theatre director, male, early-40s).

As may be clear from the account above, more than anything, the strong *Eurocentric* definition of art hampers change, while continuing to inform the disposition of the cultural institutions. The main Dutch public arts institutions become like bulldozers threatening to crush whatever is in their way, forcing the "Others" to seek shelter in the margins. This marginalization of non-Western artists can be seen as a form of racism, because they are subjected to different standards and criteria (those of the second, at best those of the third strand, but hardly ever those of the first strand) and/or their artistic contributions are not acknowledged for their worth, for instance when art critics lack the cultural knowledge to evaluate their work. Thus far, it has proven difficult to break the power of the elites to define what art is in the Dutch context, regardless of public schemes aimed at change and discussions about redefining artistic quality (see NCS; Trienekens, *180°*). Additionally, attempts at "mainstreaming" often turn into "streaming-away" (sidetracking), i.e., in the move from specific to generic diversity policy, attention to diversity and artists with

international roots tends to water down rather than to become structurally and centrally integrated in the everyday practice of the—performing—arts policy and related cultural institutions.

Formal Access to the Dutch Public Arts Sector

Part of the dominant Dutch public arts sector are the accredited vocational training institutes of the performing arts. These institutions also function as gatekeepers in their selection of the kind of students they wish to train and the body of knowledge they wish to transmit. Several interviewees have direct personal experience with Dutch arts education. Some acknowledge slow, but positive change. One interviewee, teaching at one of the drama schools and involved in the auditions of students, notices: "There is a change compared to my days at school; there is more focus on the individual and less on a 'standard profile' of a drama student" (actress, female, early-30s). Those involved in the performing arts schools try to contribute to change and renewal of the programs offered. But one of them remarks that:

> My input only makes a difference when the schools are sincerely interested in change. It is not about these schools starting to teach Hip Hop all of a sudden. More so, it is about them broadening their awareness and sensibility for diversity. Only such a new consciousness will change the way they teach dance (choreographer, female, mid-40s).

On the whole, the interviewees agree that—as the choreographer just cited continues: "These institutions are somewhat blind for developments in society. There is this self-indulgent conviction that what they teach is the foundation of skill, knowledge and art." Another interviewee recalls:

> I was the only student from Turkey at the drama school in 1990. Among the students and the teaching staff, nobody else came from Turkey or Morocco. Even nowadays, in 2009, these institutes are not well equipped to deal with youngsters from such backgrounds. These schools somehow lack the insight and sensitivity to deal with Abdel who was born in Amsterdam. In art school, he will be reduced to a stereotypical Moroccan, a construct of his teachers and fellow students. The young people with a Turkish, Moroccan or other non-Western background, who train with us before they enter the formal schools, get a shock once they get there (theatre maker, male, mid-40s).

A male theatre maker in his late twenties, who graduated from drama school just a few years ago, confirms these observations: "At drama school, there was very little understanding of the place and the stories where I come from: a black neighborhood in a Dutch town, where people rarely meet native Dutch." Furthermore, even when artists with international roots are trained at the Dutch arts educational institutions

and manage to get their degrees, it is not guaranteed that they will make it in the public arts sector, i.e., even less so than their native Dutch fellow students:

> The youngsters who made it to and through the formal drama schools initially don't want to work with us [Turkish-oriented theatre company], but with the acknowledged Dutch companies, and why not? The tragedy is, after three years or so of working with these companies, they come back knocking at our door for work and tell us 'they don't understand us' (theatre maker, male, mid-40s).

Clearly, artists with international roots experience a lack of formal access to the arts education system, and consequently, to the Dutch public arts sector. The situation in the Dutch arts schools is a consequence of both the way ethnicity is dealt with in the Dutch arts sector and the way in which art gets defined, as discussed above. In terms of everyday racism, this results in a long list of indicators (Essed, *Understanding Everyday Racism*): Eurocentrism; whites as the norm; the schools systematically fail to facilitate black participation; there may even be discouragement before or after auditioning, for instance, on the basis of an alleged language deficiency (having an accent). In the case of the absence of concrete, effective programs for change, we can also speak of "non-implementation" in the terminology of everyday racism.

Lived practices: strategies, identities and aesthetics

Oguibe maintains that there is a

> fundamental difference between subjecthood and its lack, between choice and contingency, between the artist who is free to elect the content and direction of his practice without the inordinate pressure of a culture other than his and one who exists and practices in that terrain of difficulty where his success and failure are subject to the demands and expectations of another culture to which he does not fully belong but must nevertheless answer to, where he is required to wear his difference and Otherness as a badge or run the risk of disregard, ignominy, and failure. (19)

Our interviewees show that this badge can however be worn in different ways. The remainder of this contribution focuses on the lived practice of artists with international roots, who respond with different strategies to their ascribed position in/outside the public arts system. Central to these strategies is the way in which the artists perceive their (ethnic) identity and the way in which they want this identity to figure in their artwork. True to the fact that identities and identifications are multi-layered (see, e.g., Essed, "Multi-identifications"; Solomos) artists with international roots apply different strategies simultaneously depending on the context they are in.[14]

The "I'll stick to my cultural heritage" strategy

In this strategy, there is a strong, linear relationship between the artwork and the ethnic identity as is the case with, e.g., theatre groups that stage predominantly repertory theatre plays from the country of origin. Their concern is their cultural heritage. One example is Moksi Alesi, a Surinamese "volkstheater" (people's theatre) company in Amsterdam. The "my own cultural heritage" theatre scene is relatively small, and mostly privately funded, but in the music scene this strategy is much more distinct. In general, one can say that this strategy is rather more clearly visible among art initiatives set up by the older (first) generation migrants, born and raised in a non-Western cultural tradition before they migrated to the Netherlands. Buikema and Meijer (4) add that the articulation of a clearly ethnic identity among artists with international roots was a distinct emancipatory strategy in the early 1980s, but became less prominent in the course of the 1990s (Buikema and Meijer 4). One reason is that the younger generations, not interested in just looking back at the culture their parents come from, turned to other strategies. As a director of a company for urban talent puts it:

> Their Moroccan or Antillean identity is the cultural image that their parents project on them. This cultural generalization or stereotype contrasts with the highly individual way in which they experience their identity (theater maker, male, mid-30s).

The "who cares? I'll do my own thing" strategy

For several reasons, young artists (the second and third generations who grew up in the Netherlands) often start off thinking, "who cares?" with regard to the public arts sector. Sometimes they do not know how to access public funding for the arts. More likely, for these young artists, being accepted by the public arts sector is not an ultimate goal, because this sector is not their frame of reference. This is the case among so-called self-made practitioners (e.g., not trained in public art schools) or among those who develop new artistic genres (e.g., urban theatre). To a large extent, this strategy is applied by almost all up-and-coming artists—irrespective of ethnicity—who are not able to rely on the public arts infrastructure initially because they are not sufficiently well known and tied-in yet. They have to prove themselves first on the fringes. Once they are "in," however, even when they get stuck in the margins of the public cultural sector with marginal project funding and peripheral stages, their "who cares?" strategy often develops into a "nomad, beyond identity" strategy, discussed below. One interviewee reiterates his experience as follows:

> In the beginning, we did enact our own journey and did present ourselves as an English and Egyptian theatre maker. But those more ethnic themes soon ceased to inspire us. Nowadays, I use the word "world theatre" for the work I would like to make; work that deals with themes from nearby or far off, that draws

inspiration from any source. We'll produce our own eclectic mix (theatre maker, male, late 40s*).*

The "art is politics, identity is politics" strategy

In this strategy, artists create a strong relationship between the artwork and identity, without it being confined to cultural heritage. Both art and identity are portrayed as highly political and the artists take on an activist stance. Some representatives of this strategy reflect on the colonial past. For instance, particularly in the 1990s, the Dutch-Indonesian community (from the former East-Indies colonies) staged plays from the colonial era that were critical of the Dutch colonizers. They thereby addressed a period in Dutch history that the Dutch are rather not confronted with and they performed plays Dutch theatre companies rather not perform.

Other representatives of this strategy actively work to alter dominant perceptions of artworks that (may) incorporate non-Western art traditions, they fight for proper attention for diversity in arts policy, for a position among the fixed-term funded organizations or for changes in, for instance, selection procedures applied by arts schools. They want to actively change the status quo in the public arts sector and want to be part of and accepted by this sector "as they are"—a quest for the acceptance of difference. Therefore, if there is an ethnic element in their artwork, they want it to be acknowledged, but in a non-exotic way. Two examples of the heightened sense of responsibility to instigate change among those artists engaged in struggle:

When the issue of diversity is raised, all my negative energy is activated. Change is slow and of an opportunistic character, which feeds on immigrants. No space is created for them, nor are they taken seriously. If I talk like this, people think I am negative. I know, but someone has to say it. I don't want the next generation to go through the same thing that we had to go through. I'd rather look for solutions. That is why I developed the concept of "new cultural citizenship." It includes all the confronting issues in a positive manner. Many people support it; I enjoy that (cultural entrepreneur, female, late 40s*).*

The pieces I made were the pieces I wanted to see myself, but weren't being made by other companies. That's why I took that role . . . that mission: an artistic mission to enhance the representation of the non-Western, new-European Muslim (theatre maker, male, late 40s*).*

This political strategy is more pronounced in the Anglo-Saxon world than in the Netherlands. It is visible, for instance, in the work of writer/critic bell hooks and filmmaker Spike Lee in the USA and in the work of visual artists such as Keith Piper, Donald Rodney, Sonia Boyce or Eddie Chambers in the UK. In Chambers' words: "[. . .] the only kind of art that is important in the Black community, is art that focuses on the Black struggle and sees itself as an integral part of our struggle

against racism" (Chambers). Such a stance was and is rare to find in the Dutch context. Strikingly, it was the African-American theatre maker and coach Rufus Collins' presence in the Netherlands in the late seventies that triggered the development of a political strategy and of Black Theatre in the Netherlands (van der Geest). Several, still existing art companies find their roots in (t)his tradition,[15] some of them have however somewhat tempered their political activism in the meantime. The more outspoken political struggle is currently recharged by the artwork and initiatives of artists with international roots who arrived in the Netherlands more recently—often, but not always, as political refugees.[16]

The "I'll accept the context I am working in, but . . ." strategy

Quite a few interviewees exert a high degree of acceptance of the context they work in. One of the interviewees already pointed out, in a quote above, that it has proven impossible to get rid of the ethnic label. Consequently, he works with this label the best he can:

> I get along really well with my neighbor; we have each other's keys and all. But I am sure that, when he is talking about me to someone else, he will call me 'my Kurdish neighbor.' In the beginning, I tried to oppose this reflex when I encountered it in my work; now I try to use the ethnic label to our advantage. In the Netherlands, we have tried to be a Dutch group, but here it is simply not possible to escape the ethnic label. Now we just say: we are a Turkish-oriented company. I don't mind calling it that, as long as it doesn't impede our artistic development. In Turkey, we present ourselves as a Dutch theatre group that has an international flair and that way we get attention from the press! If I had stayed in Turkey, I would have directed only Western plays; in the Netherlands I also draw from a non-Western body of work. It is a way to distinguish oneself; that can also be one's strength (theater maker, male, mid-40s).

Nonetheless, the interviewees applying this strategy are clear on one point: they will still protest and become political when injustice is done or when confronted with ignorance. Also, they are fierce when confronted with ignorant behavior:

> Sometimes it is really difficult. Then you get people who have not even looked on the Internet to see what kind of work we produce and they come up to us and ask, "Why is Turkish theatre important in the Netherlands?" I'll answer that it isn't important at all. Turkish theatre is what one finds on stage in a theatre in Turkey, or what one can see when Turkish groups are invited to perform in the Netherlands. We do not produce Turkish theatre. I do not even know what that is; I was trained here (theater maker, male, mid-40s).

His approach could be described as the "I accept the context I am working in, but oppose stupidity."

Another actor and director (theatre maker, male, mid-40s), who went to drama school in the Netherlands and played various guest roles with established Dutch theatre companies, feels he was never accepted by the theatre scene in the Netherlands. So, he temporarily returned to his motherland, where he successfully set up two theatre companies. His success in Morocco helped him to gain a better platform for his work in the Netherlands. His strategy may be understood as "I accept the context I am working in, but I won't get stuck." He actively invents detours when the context is not yet ready for his approach and work.

The "nomad, beyond identity" strategy

The artist's ethnic identity in this strategy is not defined as an (political) issue. This strategy is often applied by those whose identities are so "multi-everything" (as opposed to bi-cultural) that it is impossible to entangle the identity issue. Inspired by Gilles Deleuze's work, Braidotti uses the term "nomad" in this respect, with which she refers to a specific way of life of those who "are at home everywhere and nowhere, who are not readily classified in fixed nationalistic, ethnic or gender-based identities" (Lavrijsen 12). In the context of the arts, it concerns artistic productions that are influenced by a large number of artistic traditions, disciplines and genres. The influences are however integrated in such a way that it is no longer a matter of being "in-between," but of being "beyond." When the artistic productions deal with multicultural themes or identities, they do so not primarily because they want to teach society a lesson or take revenge, but because the artistic inspiration originates in the everyday-life reality of the artists and their audiences.

These realities and related identities are intrinsically "multi-everything." The members of these art companies are multicultural rather than monocultural and they tend to be relatively young. As one of the interviewees maintains: "Diversity is not important in our work. If we address identity it is about contemporary city-life. That is diverse in the sense of multi-everything rather than just multi-ethnic" (playwright, male, early-40s). For them, this is not a political stance but a fact. Yet, in living their nomadism, nomads are very much aware of the power structures they invariably have to deal with and have become incredibly agile in either using the opportunities or avoiding the obstacles these power structures bring about.[17]

The nomad strategy is applied in different ways. Some art companies write and perform (and theatre venues commission) theatre plays for young artists with international roots that often turn out to deal with topics such as exclusion and multicultural city life: for example, Cosmic/Made in da Shade,[18] Urban Myth, Likeminds and Don't Hit Mama. Other companies run talent-scouting programs that support young people with international roots to start a career in the arts. Examples in this case are Roots and Routes, ISH, and Kweekvijver (SKVR). Characteristic of these companies is the "urban" and interdisciplinary character of their work: street culture, club life,

video clips, concerts, cartoons, videogames and film are all part of the performance, as well as, e.g., dance on inline skates, street dance, break dance, martial arts, turntabalism, rap and acrobatics, and in some cases, even soccer, panna and basketball. These art companies freely quote any cultural canon and discipline: urban or classical, old epics or new writings, traditional or popular, from the West or the Rest, they combine any art idiom and tradition that seems appropriate for what they want to express.

Conclusion

Except for the "I'll stick to my cultural heritage" strategy, an incredible mixing and bridging between cultures, artistic traditions and languages characterize all strategies. The artistic practices of the artists with international roots deeply express the fluidity and compatibility of ethnic and artistic traditions. This is in great contrast to the largely static and Eurocentric approach to ethnicity and artistic expressions still dominant in the public arts sector. Simultaneously, the different strategies show that the way ethnicity influences the self-identity of the artists with international roots varies (from implicit to explicit) and that the ethnic influences can be used in different ways (political and non-political). Concluding that ethnic and artistic cultures are already mixed and combined in practice and that there is "diversity within diversity," feels to us like stating the extreme obvious. Nonetheless, it seems to be necessary to underline this once more, given the various expressions of everyday racism in the public arts sector—in spite of the slow, but positive change that can be discerned.[19]

Given the specificities of exclusion in the Dutch public sector, how successful are these strategies likely to be? There are obstacles to all five strategies. Generally speaking, the public arts sector still tends to be somewhat hesitant to fund "monocultural artistic expressions" (OC&W, *Pantser* 22), which may limit the "I'll stick to my cultural heritage" strategy in its professionalization. Given that this strategy is applied mainly by the first generation, the non-funding of these artists can be understood as a form of "generational exclusion" by the public arts sector. A risk of applying both this strategy and the "who cares?" strategy, both working with limited (private or public) funding and facilities, amounts to amateurism and relative isolation, according to Weltak (Buikema and Meijer 7).

The "art is politics" strategy is by far the least appreciated strategy in the public arts domain, due to a strong "allergy" to those applying the "language of exclusion" and those taking a political stance toward the arts. The "I accept the context I am working in, but . . ." strategy is much more appreciated and accepted by the public arts sector. The artists in the "I accept" strategy also appear to be more effective in influencing the prevalent, dominant idea of artistic quality.

Exercising the "nomad, beyond identity" strategy appears to set the practitioners free from both the dominant cultural order of the country they live in and of that of

the country their parents migrated from. They may also set themselves free from the restrictions of the Western dominant order with regard to genres and artistic disciplines. Additionally, this strategy holds a favorable image of a future that can be truly multicultural and diverse without it being constantly problematized. Although the "nomad" strategy is also appreciated and accepted in the public arts sector, it is nonetheless difficult to sustain due to cultural routines, deeply engrained in the public arts sector, i.e., the dominant obsession with diversity will continue to force them into ethnic categories. Secondly, these and other prevailing power dynamics may well sentence the dream of a "beyond" to remaining utopian.[20] Thirdly, due to their *urban* character, the nomad companies cater to a relatively small audience of mainly young people. As such, they will not easily become part of the core of the public arts sector.

Looking at the history of the various artists and arts organizations with international roots, one often sees a start in the "who cares?" or the "political" strategy. Over time, and specifically once part of the publicly funded arts organizations, the strategy evolves into an "I accept" or "nomad" strategy. To some extent, this can be read as a process of pacification of difference and a silent cooptation of these artists by the public arts sector: in return for funding, one has to cease being (too) political. Moreover, even when publicly funded, the fact that the works of artists with an "I accept" or "nomad" strategy crossover with non-Western art, popular art and urban influences locates these artistic expressions in the third, contextual strand. There they remain outside the core of the public arts sector, represented by the first strand, where not only the lion's share of funding but also status is to be gained.

Notes

1. Inspired by the two main concerns of the 1987 "D:Max: A photographic exhibition," Ikon Gallery Birmingham: "exploring strategies of how young Black photographers can most effectively gain access to white-dominated art and the development of an aesthetic, a sensibility, that can somehow be considered characteristic of 'Black photography'" (Chambers 32).

2. Recently, the minister of Education, Culture and Science (OC&W, "Culturele Diversiteit") published a letter on cultural diversity, which resulted in a "code on diversity" to be developed by the established cultural organizations. Some of the national funds responsible for the allocation of funding have been more articulate on the issue of diversity, e.g., the Dutch Fund for the Performing Arts intends to enhance the "artistic dynamics (also) through a culturally diverse approach" (NFPK 5). Moreover, the main advisory body to the ministry of Education, Culture and Science, Raad voor Cultuur, advocates a more complex understanding of diversity with the term "cultural citizenship" (Raad voor Cultuur 13) and the Department of Culture of the city of Amsterdam aims with its policy to "let freedom and creativity go hand in hand with solidarity and justice" (DMO 12).

3. There has not been a single year between 1985 and 2001 in which even one percent of the total national arts budget was dedicated to cultural diversity (Bos, "Cultural Policy"). A recent "quick scan" of the allocation of arts funding by the city of Amsterdam calculated that three percent of the total arts budget is allocated toward cultural diversity (Lagroup). Higher percentages to cultural diversity are allocated by some of the national arts funds (e.g., 19% through the National Fund for the Performing Arts (NFPK 5)) and on the sub-local level of borough councils, although the latter budgets are generally infinitesimal (Trienekens, *Urban Paradoxes* 143). On the whole, artists and art organizations with international roots receive non-structural and small amounts of funding.

4. Expressed, for instance, in its concern about Eastern-European artist refugees and its lack of help or specific attention to all other non-European (refugee and other) artists within its national borders (cf. Buikema and Meijer ix).

5. "Artists with international roots" are artists living and working in the Netherlands who were born and (partly) raised in non-Western countries and Dutch artists whose ancestors experienced migration.

6. We would like to thank the staff of Kunstenaars & Co. and Liane van der Linden (Kosmopolis Rotterdam) for their help.

7. Target groups are disadvantaged groups who, according to Dutch policy makers, would qualify for special support or attention.

8. Some publicly-funded theatre companies take a different stand toward diversity and multiculturalism. Most radical in this respect is probably Onafhankelijk Toneel, Rotterdam. Their choice of plays and the way in which they rewrite existing plays challenges the established art sector and its audiences. One example is their performance of *Othello*. Realizing that the play can no longer be performed for a contemporary audience due to both the stereotypical portrayal of Othello as a black man and the sexual connotation in the play, they turned the script inside out. Onafhankelijk Toneel's *Othello* was played by a white actor, the entire rest of the cast consisted of (Dutch-) Moroccan actors, speaking in Arabic and French only. Language barriers for the Dutch-speaking audience were overcome through supertitles.

9. The interviewee refers to performances such as *Othello* by Theatre Group Amsterdam (2004/05) by The National Theatre (2006) and the *Merchant of Venice* by Theatre Group Amsterdam (2001/02) and by The National Theatre (2008); plays in which the main character was played by a white actor, made black.

10. Since the turn of the century, several established companies were subjected to severe critique by art funding bodies: they were negatively evaluated in terms of artistic innovation. Unprecedented, this came as a shock to the public arts sector. Additionally, also

the established art companies and institutions are probed to develop a sense of economic entrepreneurship, so as to become less reliant on public funding. In short, although the established cultural sector is still not evaluated in terms of its social benefit, it is becoming less "untouchable." Furthermore, as mentioned above, the established companies have now to establish a "diversity code."

11. This third strand is more inclusive of a wide variety and mixtures of art forms and genres. It also includes what Hall and Whannel refer to as "popular art." On the fringes of, or rather outside, the public arts sector, an artistic practice has come into existence that incorporates new genres and hinges on new stories. Its orientation is transnational: apart from the Western canon, it refers to other artistic sources and traditions; it shifts the perspectives of stories and contributes to the return of political and religiously inspired theatre (Top). This development is visible in the work of Dutch artists, immigrants and non-immigrants alike. This practice (Top even calls it a "new paradigm") is labeled "heteronomous" as opposed to the "autonomous" cultural practice of the first strand. In the policy period 2001–2004 (OC&W, *Ruim Baan*), several dominant players in the public arts sector perceived this third strand as a threat to and disturbance of the historic, be it unequal, division of status and funding between the Romantic strand and the participation strand. They were highly averse to the period's policy targets.

12. E.g., in the period 2005–2008, art policy celebrated mainly the social benefit of cultural diversity and praised the "cohesive power" of the arts (OC&W, "Meer dan de Som"). Art policy during the period 2009–2012 initially only proposed, with regard to cultural diversity, the structural allocation of extra funding to stimulate cultural participation and audience diversification (OC&W, *Kunst van Leven* 25).

13. Even though the largest ethnic group among the Dutch-Surinamese population has a strong transnational bond with Indian culture.

14. The account of strategies may not be exhaustive, but represents those most visible in the Dutch arts sector.

15. E.g., Collins established DNA (an Amsterdam-based theatre school and production company) as preparatory theatre education to enable black students to gain access to the mainstream institutions for professional drama education. DNA also staged theatre productions. DNA became one of the two publicly funded culturally diverse initiatives of the late 1980s. It still exists, produces theatre plays and offers a one-year course for "talented youngsters of different cultures." In this respect, DNA still functions as a mirror to the established arts educational system. Subsequent directors have however broadened the scope from Black theatre and Black youngsters to a more multicultural frame of reference, and today especially, its productions tend toward the "nomad strategy," discussed below.

16. E.g., InterArt, founded in 1996, works with themes such as "new cultural citizenship," Islamic cultures, artists and consciousness of the Diaspora and the role of art in society.

17. Our notion of nomadism in this strategy differs in this respect from that of theorists working in the tradition of Deleuze and Braidotti, who were criticized by Marxist scholars because of their downplaying of the importance of political and economical power structures (cf. Peter Hallward, Timothy Brennan).

18. Founded as a Black Theatre company under Collins, but developed toward a nomad strategy.

19. At the time of writing, it is not yet clear how the very severe cutbacks in all cultural sectors, announced by the national government at the end of 2010, will eventually redesign the cultural landscape. It is to be expected that this will also negatively affect the position of artists with international roots and their organizations or companies in the public arts sector.

20. The change in government in 2010 resulted not only in massive cutbacks in almost all sectors (including the arts), but also in a rather harsh political climate with regard to issues of immigration and integration. Like the cutbacks, this too will influence the speed with which the positive change will be effected.

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Biology, Culture, "Postcolonial Citizenship" and the Dutch Nation, 1945–2007

Guno Jones

"Their customs, social views, physical and mental condition do not dispose them for residence in a Dutch community foreign to them."

The above quote is an abbreviated statement by Secretary Peters of Union Matters and Overseas Territories in 1951. It concisely captures the theme of this chapter: the ways in which Dutch political discourses on the identities of people from the (former) colonies and their offspring have determined dominant ideas about citizenship and nation. Through these discourses, members of the Dutch government and the House of Representatives (henceforth the House or HR) mediated the ex- or inclusion of the (former) colonized and their offspring in the imagined Dutch community, sometimes with far-reaching consequences for their citizenship status and associated rights. This was especially the case in times of increased migration from the former Dutch colonies of Indonesia, Suriname, and the Dutch Antilles to the Netherlands in the 1950s, 1970s, and 1990s respectively. Although migration from the colonies to the Netherlands dates back to the early years of the Dutch colonial enterprise, an upsurge would emerge shortly before and after the independence of Indonesia and Suriname. From the perspective of the Indonesian government, Indonesia became an independent republic in 1945, while the Dutch government considers the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949 as the official date of Independence. Suriname became an independent republic in 1975, while the Dutch Antilles are still part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. As a consequence of decolonization, approximately 315,000 (former) Dutch nationals from Indonesia settled in the Netherlands between 1946 and 1968, while approximately 130,000 (former) Dutch nationals from Suriname settled in the Netherlands between 1973 and 1980 (Jones 85–87;

E. Marshall 192–93). Their settlement into the Netherlands was contested: while the Dutch presence in the overseas territories had long been seen as natural, the inclusion of people from these territories into the Netherlands was far from self-evident to many politicians in the Netherlands. As I will illustrate in this paper, this can be inferred from political discourses on their citizenship status, migration, integration, and identity.

Most Dutch studies on people from the former colonies who resettled in the Netherlands start from the premise that their identities, citizenship, and national belonging reflect their own orientations, choices, and identifications. Identities, citizenship, and national belonging are primarily analyzed as "self-achieved"; as matters that are initiated by "postcolonial minorities" which they have in their own hands. Likewise, "postcolonial identity politics" is conceptualized as a phenomenon that involves people from the former colonies themselves, while the role of dominant actors within the state apparatus is seen as secondary and "reactive." "Being the other" is mainly analyzed as a result of identity politics by postcolonial minorities themselves (Oostindie 12–16, 113; Bosma; Smeets and Steijlen 16). This approach pays less attention to the role of the members of the Dutch government and the House as powerful actors in the formation of identities, national belonging, and citizenship of people from the former Dutch colonies. Although this paradigm has generated rich and instructive studies on "postcolonial citizens" (see for instance Oostindie, Bosma, Smeets and Steijlen), it needs to be complemented by an approach that foregrounds dominant actors within the state apparatus. Without denying the role the formerly colonized and their offspring can play in shaping their identities, etc. in the context of all kinds of organizations, it must be seen that members of the Dutch government and the House are powerful actors in these processes (Jones; see also Yanow and Van der Haar for an analysis of the racialized binary "autochtoon"/"allochtoon" in Dutch state discourse). This chapter qualifies the importance of "self-achieved" processes by highlighting the ways in which Members of the Dutch government and the House have ascribed "identity" to people from the former colonies. Hence, the focus of this chapter is not on analyzing "otherness" but on processes of "othering." Being "the other" is inextricably bound up with processes of "othering" by Dutch politicians.

Contrary to Dutch "cultures of scholarship" that explain the position of minorities by primarily referring to intra-group dynamics, as critically discussed by Essed and Nimako, I will analyze how *ascribed* identity discourses by the Dutch government and HR Members, characterized by constructions of cultural and biological difference, can destabilize the citizenship of "postcolonial citizens" and limit their individual choices concerning their national belonging. However, politicians also summoned the *agency* of people from the former colonies: in many instances, "postcolonial citizens" resisted being "othered." In this sense, their "own" orientations certainly made a difference.

Political discourses articulated by politicians in the Netherlands were not only exclusive, but productive as well: the symbolic and physical presence of "othered" citizens enabled many politicians of the majority group to construct the characteristics of the Dutch nation. Postcolonial citizenship, in this sense, produces a "postcolonial" majority through narratives on "postcolonial" minorities. The *terminology* politicians apply to distinguish between "the real Dutch" and "the unreal Dutch" or "not quite Dutch" is part of these productive discourses as well. However, the discursive and institutional tools employed by the Dutch government to produce a sense of national belonging are extremely versatile. There are no fixed criteria that decide whether an immigrant will be included in the nation, but rather the *political will* of the majority to include a certain group.

"Postcolonial Citizens" and the Blind Spots in Citizenship Theory

Citizenship theory, though a varied and in many respects very instructive field of knowledge, has largely ignored the ways in which politicians in "the motherland" have dealt with the citizenship of (former) overseas citizens (see, for instance, Soysal, Sassen, Benhabib, Bosniak). The historical experiences of the colonized and their offspring with "modern" citizenship are rarely analyzed *simultaneously* with those of the normalized citizens in the metropolis. While postcolonial theory has mapped hierarchies between colonizers and colonized, such an approach is much rarer in citizenship theory. Citizenship theory's predominantly modernist notions of formal equality, legal protection, and legal and socio-economic improvement (see, for instance, T. H. Marshall; Boeles; Savater) are still largely informed by a focus on the position of accepted members *within* the borders of the metropolitan nation-states. These notions are rarely placed in a broader analytical framework that crosses territorial borders and comprises both motherland and colony (cf. Wimmer and Glick-Shiller).

T. H. Marshall's seminal work epitomizes this territorially delimited and universalist-inclusive approach to citizenship. In his canonical 1950 essay *Citizenship and Social Class,* Marshall presumed a necessary connection between nationality and rights. Moreover, he analyzed how nationality became "thicker" by the successive granting of civil, political, and social rights to national citizens within the borders of European nation-states in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries respectively. Of interest here is that Marshall completely overlooked the colonies. He would have noticed that the situation "overseas" was much less progressive than in the centers of European empires. Whereas the latter saw the development toward more equality between the *male* citizens and a more "thick" citizenship, the consolidation of colonialism during the same period—from the 18th century onwards—implied the genesis of hierarchies between colonizers and colonized, citizens with full rights and colonized subjects who did not fit Marshall's progressive model (cf. Cooper and Stoler). Critically

reflecting on the pretentions of "European humanism and universalism," Achille Mbembe stated:

> The face of Europe which was experienced by the colony was far from being that of liberty, equality and fraternity: the totem which colonized peoples discovered behind the mask of humanism and universalism was not only deaf and blind most of the time, it was also, above all, characterized by the desire for its own death.

Mbembe, in others words, stresses the necessity of including the colonial experience in citizenship theory. Observations such as these are still very relevant. Although many present-day citizenship scholars have made innovative contributions to the study of citizenship, the dominant discourse about the meaning of citizenship is, nonetheless, still characterized by a relative absence of the position of colonized citizens. Soysal, Benhabib, Sassen, and Bosniak have, for instance, mapped new legal conditions which all demonstrate that formal membership (nationality) is not the only route to access rights: the concepts of "denizenship," "the citizenship of aliens" (Bosniak), "postnational membership" (Soysal), and "denationalized citizenship" (Sassen) all refer to *non-nationals* who are partly treated as *nationals* by the polity. However, even these recent and very instructive contributions pay surprisingly little attention to the phenomenon by which states (begin to) treat *nationals* as *semi-* or *non-nationals*, as the colonized in the overseas territories and their offspring in the European motherlands could experience. That is to say: the dominant approach to citizenship still endorses the view that formal membership of a nation-state guarantees a minimum of inclusion. In accordance with this paradigm, scholars are, for instance, still tempted to assume that "those who are status citizens may travel unconditionally into the country of citizenship and reside there" (Bosniak 111; Benhabib 170; cf. Savater). In 2007, legal scholar Pieter Boeles, professor emeritus of migration law, stated:

> Nationality is an essential possession. We need only to consider the more than 11 million stateless people that exist in the world, people without identity documents, without [. . .] the protection that ordinary citizens receive. Nationality normally guarantees the individual a right to enter his state, to reside there [. . .] In a democracy, nationality includes the right to choose and be chosen.

Although I fully agree with the normative content of these statements, I would like to question their (teleological) optimism with regard to citizenship.[1] Dominant citizenship theory overlooks the position of people who live or used to live in the periphery of European empires, such as (former) Dutch nationals from Indonesia, Suriname, and the Dutch Antilles and their offspring. The actual discourse among Members of the Dutch government and the House on postcolonial citizens causes me to question

the inclusive assumptions in dominant citizenship theory. A closer look at these discourses reveals that the guarantees offered by citizenship are relative, situated, and reversible. Firstly, it was and remains of crucial importance to Dutch citizens in and from the overseas territories that they do not lose their Dutch nationality against their will—as colonial subjects or citizens, this was the nationality they were born into. However, the Dutch nationality of people in the periphery of the Dutch empire proved to be uncertain compared to those born in the "motherland." While the citizenship status of Dutch nationals in the Netherlands remained uncontested, a significant number of Dutch nationals in Indonesia and Suriname had no choice but to accept the transfer of nationality as a consequence of the independence of these countries in 1949 and 1975 respectively. Although for many the transition of citizenship status signified a newly acquired freedom (especially in Indonesia), for others it meant the loss of an age-old status as Dutch nationals. This status meant access to better education, health, housing, and economic conditions in the motherland. Hence, secondly, it is of great importance to Dutch nationals in the (former) overseas territories that their citizenship status guarantees the right to migrate to and reside in the Netherlands. Instead, Dutch policies problematized these rights, as I will demonstrate. Thirdly, it is important to postcolonial citizens that, once settled in the Netherlands, they and their offspring are considered as real, competent, and permanent members of Dutch society. Yet, in spite of their age-old Dutch nationality, they were initially seen as aliens within the borders, as political discourses on their integration reveal. In sum: while the *citizenship of aliens*, as legal scholar Linda Bosniak terms it, is a much theorized phenomenon in present day citizenship theory, the *alienage of citizens* (or *citizenship alienism,* with regard to the political process) is a much more familiar condition for the colonized and their offspring, both in the overseas territories as well as in the metropolis. Under specific circumstances, essentialist identity narratives intertwined with exclusionary political debates and practices in relation to nationality, migration, and integration (Jones).

Socio-biological discourses had been inherent to colonialism, but they also became part of ethno-nationalist discourses long thereafter. After the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century, the idea of biologically inferior and superior races and corresponding social roles continued to be inherent to a system of dual citizenship in the Dutch East Indies. Like the "separate but equal" doctrine in the US, the apartheids regime in South Africa, and the caste system in India, these socio-biological discourses signified *hierarchal* relationships: in the Dutch East Indies between the (subjugated) "native" *subjects* and the (elevated) "European" *citizens* (Captain and Jones; cf. Baker). Political decolonization did not signal an instant decolonization of the minds: while socio-biological discourses had been instrumental in reproducing a racialized, if not racist, colonial order, after independence these discourses determined the symbolic and legal boundaries of the Dutch nation, when

people started to move from Indonesia to the Netherlands in greater numbers in the 1950s. Jumping forward two decades, this trend continued, but was masked—the terminology became more cultural than racial.

Notwithstanding the very different Dutch ideological climate in the seventies, the culturalist discourses that were prominent in this era functioned, *grosso modo,* in the same way as the socio-biological discourses of the fifties. The idea of innate difference between "races" had been condemned by then by the global community (see for instance UNESCO's seminal 1950 statement *the Race Question* written by UNESCO rapporteur Ashley Montagu). However, this shift signaled the replacement of one form of essentialism by another. Politicians in the Netherlands translated the idea of "respect for other cultures" into an *ascribed* idea of national belonging in which people from the West Indies (Suriname and the Dutch Antilles) who relocated to the Netherlands (often Dutch citizens) were represented as alienated from their "own" socio-cultural habitat in the Caribbean. The consequences for their Dutch citizenship were significant, as I will demonstrate below. These political reflexes are not uniquely Dutch. Dutch political discourses, *mutatis mutandis*, bear resemblance to postwar British political discourses on people from the British overseas empire, for instance (Anderson 9; Schuster 48–59; Dummet and Nicol 2–3). For now, I will take a closer look at the Dutch political discourses.

Mirror Constructions: Competent and Incompetent Dutch Citizens in the Fifties

The fifties and sixties of the previous century were years of major geographical mobility from and to the Netherlands. While the postwar scarcity of jobs prompted Dutch citizens to emigrate, 312,500 individuals from Indonesia (the former Dutch East Indies) settled in the Netherlands as a consequence of social exclusion in Indonesia in the wake of decolonization (Jones 87).

The idea of a Dutch "civilizing mission," explicitly articulated by members of the Dutch government before the independence of Indonesia, became part of a discourse on the uplifting role of the "real" Dutch in the world long after the end of colonialism (Jones and Böcker; cf. Kennedy; Spijkerboer). The Dutch government implemented an intense emigration policy in order to combat postwar scarcity of housing and labor in the Netherlands. Approximately 342,000 Dutch emigrants left the Netherlands to settle, in declining order, in Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Brazil (SER 80). Discursively, political support followed them in the form of *long-distance nationalism.* Not in the classical sense of the identification of "diasporic communities" with an imaginary homeland (Anderson; Glick Schiller), but the other way around: the identification of politicians in "the homeland" with emigrants who had left the Netherlands. Dutch politicians did not represent the resettlement of Dutch emigrants in countries abroad as a loss to the Dutch nation, but quite the

contrary, as a reproduction of the Dutch nation overseas. In recurrent political debates, Members of the Dutch government as well as the House pictured the emigrants as pioneers who would disseminate the Dutch virtues of "vitality, entrepreneurship, productivity, [and] thrift" in the receiving countries.[2] Thus, the Dutch secretary of social affairs and public health stated: "The pioneers move to Latin America; others join friends or relatives who had moved earlier or choose a country, where there lies fallow stretched out fertile land, and where hard work, combined with great thrift, soon can result in permanent residence."[3] The political discourses on Dutch emigrant identity contrasted with the discourses on the identities of Eurasian Dutch and Moluccans who relocated to the Netherlands during the same years. While the Dutch government encouraged Dutch "pioneers" to promote "Dutch values" in the receiving "emigration countries," the Eurasian Dutch and Moluccans were not supposed to relocate to the Netherlands, because politicians felt they were "unfit" for Dutch society. At first sight, the reluctance on the part of the Dutch political class to welcome these groups seems consistent with the socio-economic rationale of the emigration policies. The Dutch government referred to scarcity in housing and labor not only to implement its emigration policy, but also to discourage migration from Indonesia to the Netherlands. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that these political discourses were racialized with regard to specific target groups. They were not articulated in connection with the "*totoks"* ("white" Dutch) who relocated to the Netherlands from Indonesia. From the perspective of dominant identity narratives at the time, the reluctance of politicians to accept Moluccans and Eurasians as members of Dutch society was in line with an already racialized emigration policy, which exclusively equated white Dutch nationals with productivity and vitality.

Before we take a closer look at these discourses and how they functioned as a rationale for exclusion, it is instructive to take a brief look at the position of Eurasians and Moluccans before the independence of Indonesia in 1949. In the colonial Dutch East Indies society, these social categories occupied a specific position with regard to language (many spoke Dutch), education, religious conviction (Christianity), or profession (many served as civil servants or soldiers in the Dutch colonial army). After Indonesian independence, the position of Eurasian Dutch and Moluccans became untenable because of the increased exclusion they (like the *totoks*) experienced in Indonesian society. In the 1950s and 1960s, both Eurasian Dutch and Moluccans made the journey to the Netherlands. In that period, a total of approximately 312,500 people migrated from the Indonesian Archipelago to the Netherlands. They included Eurasian Dutch (200,000), Moluccans (12,500), as well as 100,000 *totoks* (Jones 91; 137). While politicians had represented Eurasians and Moluccans immediately before the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia as "closely related, loyal and excellent Netherlanders," immediately after the transfer they constructed innate

differences between them and Dutch society (Jones 96–97). I will now take a closer look at this discrepancy, first by focusing on the Moluccans.

Silent Exclusion: The Case of the Moluccans

Dutch politicians praised Moluccans for their loyalty to Netherlands in the conflict with Indonesian nationalists but did not include them into the Dutch nation-state after the independence of Indonesia in 1949. Dutch politicians ignored the citizenship status of the Moluccans in 1949, as a consequence of which they lost their Dutch nationality and became Indonesian citizens.[4] During political debates on the issue of nationality (part of the agreements on sovereignty with Indonesia), neither the House, nor the Dutch government took into consideration the troubled relations between the Moluccans and Indonesian nationalism, their loyalty to the Netherlands in the military conflict with Indonesian nationalists, or the fact that they strongly resisted the idea of gaining Indonesian nationality (Jones 99–101). Only some Members of the Dutch Senate "deplored the fact that the government has not met the wishes of those Indonesians (meaning the Moluccans G. J.), who stated explicitly that they wish to keep the Dutch nationality."[5] These politicians suggested that the Dutch government should grant the Moluccans the right to opt for Dutch nationality (Jones 101; cf. Heijs 27).

These critical remarks by members of the Senate carried little political weight, however; immediately after 1949 the political aim of the Dutch government with respect to Moluccans was their eventual integration into Indonesia, despite their disturbed relationship with the Indonesian government. At the time, 12,500 Moluccans, soldiers of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) and their families, were staying in temporary camps in Indonesia (Java). The Dutch government did everything in its power to also make them Indonesian citizens in a social sense, by exerting pressure on the Moluccan soldiers to "demobilize in Indonesia." The Moluccan leaders rejected this demand by the Dutch government: for them, the only acceptable option to remain in the Indonesian archipelago was the formation of an independent Moluccan state. After a fierce legal battle between Moluccan leaders and the Dutch government, which came to an end when Dutch courts ruled that the Dutch government could not force Moluccans to "demobilize in Indonesia" in view of their troubled relationship with the Indonesian government, the Dutch government eventually decided to collectively grant Moluccans entrance to the Netherlands (Jones 109–10). However, this did not signify a first step in their inclusion into Dutch society. Secretary Peters of Union Matters and Overseas Territories unequivocally represented their admission to the Netherlands as "the worst solution conceivable" that was "temporary."[6] According to the Dutch government, the Moluccans would eventually have to return to Indonesia.[7] Apart from referring to economic conditions, the government also justified its views by articulating identity discourses which constructed

insurmountable differences between the Moluccans and Dutch society. In 1951, Secretary Peters made the following remarks on the matter:

> The government holds the view, that the customs, social views and the physical and mental condition of the Ambonese (Moluccans, G. J.), and the climatic circumstances in which they will come to live do not dispose them for permanent residence in a Dutch community that is unknown and foreign to them. From the beginning, the government has considered the residence of the Ambonese in the Netherlands as temporary, and has communicated this view to Ambonese leaders.[8]

The symbolic exclusion of the Moluccans from the Dutch nation was consistent with policies in the years to come. Although some HR members had already argued in favor of inclusion in 1951, the exclusion of Moluccans from mainstream Dutch society dominated the policies for a long time. Moluccans were discharged from military service, segregated from Dutch society in housing, initially not allowed to work, and they could even be expelled (Jones 116–22; Berghuis 152–56; Belserang and Manuhutu; Van Praag; Van Amersfoort). It was not until the 1970s that the Dutch government, supported by a majority in the House, formally changed its course. This policy change needs to be understood against the backdrop of the escalation of Moluccan long-distance nationalism in the Netherlands. In the early seventies, Moluccan youngsters hijacked several trains in order to reinforce their claim for the establishment of an independent Moluccan republic (Republik Maluku Selatan) in Indonesia. Several hijackers and civilians were killed during these actions (Steijlen). The Dutch as well as the Indonesian government rejected the claim for an independent Moluccan republic, which underlined once more that citizenship of Moluccans in Indonesia was highly unrealistic. The Dutch government, in this context, started to critically reflect on the former exclusion of the Moluccans from Dutch society: in the new policy of the Dutch government, "extensive social opportunities" for Moluccans in the Netherlands became the new guiding principle. In this context, the possession of Dutch formal citizenship proved *not* to be a *sine qua non* to enjoy rights: from 1 January 1977 onward, Moluccans in the Netherlands, who had become stateless in large numbers, would be treated "as Dutch citizens." This "social Dutch citizenship," which was enshrined in the *Act Concerning the Status of Moluccans,* implied an absolute right of residence and eligibility for almost all rights Dutch citizens had, with the exception of political rights (Jones 122–34). The significant restoration of rights via this act compensated for injustices committed by the Dutch state toward the Moluccans in the past and signified a late recognition that they were permanent residents of Dutch society. Still, the treatment of Moluccans "as Dutch citizens" under the new regime did not signal full inclusion in Dutch society. As mentioned, the Moluccans were excluded from political rights. Furthermore, because the Dutch government designated them as an "ethnic minority," they remained excluded from the

imagined Dutch community. However, at present, politicians no longer construct Moluccans as a social problem. A significant number of individuals that used to be stateless have become *legal* Dutch citizens with all the related rights. What the Dutch government regarded as undesirable immediately after 1949, namely full Dutch citizenship for Moluccans, has become a fact that Dutch politicians proved to be ready for after a considerable period of time, and only after violent political pressure from the Moluccans themselves.

Refusing and Accepting Citizens: The Case of the Eurasians

Dutch political discourses on the Eurasian Dutch after World War II illustrate that even the possession of full Dutch citizenship is no guarantee of inclusion in Dutch society. Politicians can re-signify Dutch citizenship as a status to which certain groups are "actually not entitled." In contrast with Moluccans, most Eurasians had retained their full Dutch citizenship after the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949. However, in Dutch political discourses in the fifties, the potential inclusiveness of the Dutch citizenship of Eurasians was overshadowed by essentialist notions on Eurasian identity that resulted in the alienation of these citizens. These Dutch political discourses, which unfolded in the first half of the 1950s in the prospect of the increased settlement of the Eurasian Dutch in the Netherlands, had multiple dimensions. First, the Dutch citizenship of Eurasians as such was problematized. As mentioned above, the majority of the Eurasian Dutch retained Dutch nationality after the independence of Indonesia in 1949. One of the provisions concerning nationality was that Dutch nationals who were born in the Dutch East Indies or had lived there for more than six months had a right to opt for Indonesian nationality until the 27th of December 1951. However, in political debates, the Dutch government and members of the House re-signified the *right* to opt for Indonesian nationality as a *duty* for Eurasians (Jones 143–46). In this context, Members of the House constructed the Eurasian Dutch as people that were "strongly oriented on Indonesia":

> Many members expressed their concern on the sizable group of strongly Indonesia oriented, so called Indisch [Eurasian, G. J.] Dutch. The end of the option period, namely 27th December 1951, is approaching quickly, on which date the possibility expires to acquire Indonesian nationality in a simple way. These members were convinced that it is of instant and crucial importance for the majority of the Eurasian Dutch to choose Indonesian nationality.[9]

The Dutch government was of the same opinion: Secretary Peters stated in 1951, in reaction to members of the House, that it was "in the best interest of the Indonesia-oriented Eurasian Dutch to accept Indonesian nationality," while representing the reluctance of Eurasians to opt for Indonesian nationality as their own lack of judgment on their "true" national identity.[10] Consequently, the Dutch High Commissioner in

Indonesia pressured Eurasian Dutch to opt for Indonesian citizenship (Schuster 94). The Dutch government also started a search for a new "tropical" fatherland outside the Netherlands for Eurasian Dutch: it considered traditional Dutch emigration countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand unsuitable for Eurasians (Jones 157–59). Politicians were aware of the fact that "these countries don't admit people who are born in Indonesia, because they assume that they are of mixed blood" (cf. Meijer 252).[11] The Dutch government did not raise objections to these racialized policies: its views on Eurasian identity were not inconsistent with that of the emigration countries. Moreover, the government, backed by a majority in the House, even began to conduct a policy of discouragement toward Eurasians who wished to relocate to the Netherlands. At that time, the Dutch government provided loans to Dutch nationals who wished to migrate to the Netherlands but could not afford the travel expenses. In 1954, Secretary van Thiel of Social Affairs made it very clear that the majority of the Eurasians (in contrast with the *"totoks")* were not considered eligible for these loans: "The Government holds the view, that there needs to be a close scrutiny whether it is in the right interest of the persons concerned to come to the Netherlands. In the majority of these cases, the answer to this question is negative, so that the requested loan will not be granted."[12] The government, next to referring to economic conditions in the Netherlands, justified its policies by representing Eurasians as "mentally, physically, culturally and socially maladapted" to conditions in the Netherlands (Schuster 99). According to Secretary van Thiel, migration of Eurasians to the Netherlands would result in "irresolvable uprootedness" and was thus to be discouraged.[13] By contrast, the government did see a future in the Netherlands for the 100,000 *totoks:* their requests for loans were, at least, not problematized.

The citizenship status of the Eurasian Dutch took another turn than the Dutch government had aimed for (a future Indonesian citizenship). The ethnic identity and national belonging that Dutch politicians ascribed to the Eurasians was at odds with their self-definitions. Eurasians massively decided against exercising their option-right for Indonesian citizenship (and held on to Dutch citizenship, which they perceived as an important symbol of their identity), and many made the journey to the Netherlands at their own expense (Nagtegaal 3; van de Veur; Meijer). It was not until 1956, against the background of a further deterioration in the Indonesian-Dutch relationship due to the New Guinea crisis (both countries claimed sovereignty over this island) that the Dutch government changed its policies toward Eurasians, who were increasingly excluded from Indonesian society (Captain 174; cf. Pekelder). Against this backdrop, the Dutch government abandoned its discouragement policy toward these Dutch citizens, and also opened the borders to Eurasians who had lost their Dutch nationality after opting for Indonesian nationality (Jones 170–71; Pekelder).

After the Dutch government had abandoned its discouragement policies, the emphasis in political discourses on Eurasian Dutch citizens shifted toward their

assimilation into Dutch society (cf. Rath; Captain). That policy, financed by the Dutch government but delegated to Christian social work organizations, was a polyvalent practice. Firstly, it signaled the acceptance by the Dutch government that the Netherlands was both the legal and the factual fatherland of the Eurasian Dutch. Secondly, "assimilation" implied the departure from a socio-biological truth regime on Eurasian identity. Politicians no longer represented differences between Eurasians and the rest of the population as innate and thus insurmountable, but "bridgeable" by policies, good education and re-socialization (cf. Goldberg). Hence, implicitly, a culturalist definition (here understood as the discourse that sees ethnic identity as the product of socialization instead of biology, but that, as I explained above, is basically as essentialist as socio-biological discourses, because ethnicity is often treated as something inherent) of Eurasian identity gained ground in the political discourses on the Eurasian Dutch. But, thirdly, this shift did not simultaneously signify their symbolic inclusion in the Dutch nation: politicians constructed Eurasians (unlike the *"totoks"*) as "Asian oriented" or "Eastern oriented" Dutch who had to be civilized, thereby excluding them from the (simultaneously elevated) white majority (Jones 171–77; cf. Schuster). The effects of the assimilation policy were gendered: Christian workers were asked to discipline (mainly) Eurasian women into hygiene and housekeeping, while men were offered job training (Mak; Essed). Apart from its paternalism, the assimilation policy may also have resulted in an unintended symbolic advantage in later years. Eurasian Dutch were not incorporated in the Dutch minority discourse that emerged in the 1980s. On the contrary: in the 1980s, politicians began to construct the Eurasian Dutch tacitly (they were no longer referred to as a problematic group) and expressly as exemplary citizens who "largely integrated in Dutch society without problems" (Jones 177–80; cf. Captain 175–80). Seen from a historical perspective, the representation of Eurasian Dutch as people who have "largely integrated without problems" is quite ironic. In the past, Eurasian Dutch were subject to intense processes of racialization, as we have seen. Following Stuart Hall, the evolution of Dutch political discourses on Eurasian Dutch clearly shows that "race" is a floating signifier. While Eurasians in the fifties, like Moluccans, were constructed as people who were biologically and culturally very different from the Dutch majority, today Dutch politicians no longer represent them as groups with innate and problematic differences. Paralleled by these discursive changes, the Dutch citizenship of Eurasian Dutch and the associated rights are now uncontested.

Constructing New Differences: The Case of the Surinamese Dutch

The political problematization of the Dutch citizenship of people in and from the colonies is not exclusively connected with socio-biological discourses in the fifties; Dutch politicians in the Netherlands also drew boundaries between the Dutch nation and Surinamese and Antillean Dutch citizens in the seventies, when "race thinking"

was considered obsolete among the mainstream political parties in the Netherlands. In the context of a "leftist" political climate and a strong anti-colonialist and -imperialist sentiment from the end of the sixties onward, "culture" had become the normalized way of reflecting on "differences" between people (Ghorashi; Jones). "Culture" even came to be represented as something that people were entitled to; it was "recognized" (cf. Ghorashi). This paradigmatic shift, however, did not necessarily signal an inclusive turn in Dutch political discourses. Notwithstanding the dominant premise in the sixties and seventies that differences between people stemmed from nurture and not nature, the political representations of Surinamese and Antillean Dutch identity still remained static, reductionist: a new form of essentialism became visible in these discourses. Moreover, culturalist discourses even became instrumental in drawing the boundaries of the Dutch nation when migration from the West Indies increased in the seventies.

These political developments were, however, preceded by political discourses in the fifties in which politicians in the Netherlands stressed the similarities between Dutch citizens in different parts of the Kingdom. The historical context of these discourses is the "traumatic loss" of the "Dutch East Indies," whereupon politicians in the Netherlands began to stress the importance of the constitutional relationship between the Netherlands and the remaining overseas parts of the Kingdom, the West Indies (Jones 185-93). While political debates on the Dutch nationality of people from the former Dutch East Indies (in the context of increased migration) signified the boundaries of the Dutch nation, the Dutch nationality of citizens in the West Indies in the same period was a symbol of the continuation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Politicians attached great value to both territories (Suriname and the Dutch Antilles) remaining within the Kingdom, which coincided with the fact that politicians in both overseas territories did not aim at independence but at autonomy in internal affairs (Marshall, *Ontstaan;* Jones 185–88). The Dutch government and the House, in the context of the wish to safeguard the unity of the Kingdom, expanded full Dutch citizenship to the entire population of the West Indies, stressed the principle of equal citizenship for all, strongly denounced the discrimination experienced by Surinamese students in the Netherlands and were in favor of the recruitment of teachers, male workers, and female nurses from the West Indies (Jones 185–94; 200–203).[14] At the same time, however, the limits of inclusion could already be read between the lines. Politicians expected the recruited Dutch citizens from overseas to "return to their own country" after the expiration of their labor contracts.[15] Moreover, we should not overlook the fact that, in the 1950s, Dutch citizens from the West Indies were not a large community of settlers yet when compared to the Eurasian Dutch. Under those circumstances, the status of the Dutch citizenship of the former was unproblematic and their migration to the Netherlands a secure right.

In the course of the 1960s, the political discourses shifted from care for the Kingdom of the Netherlands to concern about the ethnic composition of the Dutch

nation. In these years, migration from Suriname surpassed that from the Dutch Antilles.[16] Against this background, politicians in the Netherlands increasingly expressed concerns about the numbers of Surinamese Dutch that moved to the Netherlands (which were still small in comparison with the 1970s) in connection with discourses on their identities (Jones 210–22; cf. Schuster). Surinamese migration had become more "democratic": in the earlier years, members of the elite left Suriname for the Netherlands followed by workers in subsequent years. In the wake of this "democratization," Dutch politicians began to problematize the arrival and presence of male Surinamese Dutch workers. In political discourses, stressing similarities slowly but surely gave way to constructing "cultural differences." During political debates in 1963, for instance, Members of the House suggested that male Surinamese workers were causing "problems," which they represented as related to the "Surinamese workers culture" (Jones 213–15). One might get the impression from these statements that something was terribly wrong with the population of Surinamese Dutch in the Netherlands. But these observations were not backed by research. Moreover, authors of government-commissioned reports stated in the sixties that alleged problems such as crime and lack of "work ethos" were small and unrepresentative (see Bayer; van Amersfoort). Although these reports were, thus, critical of observations made by politicians, they were also consistent with political discourses in the sense that they invented "the Surinamese Dutch" as a distinguishable "non-Dutch" minority group with specific characteristics. This is also underlined by the ways in which the Dutch government as well as government- commissioned reports dealt with "mixed relationships." Although "mixed relationships" in the Netherlands traditionally referred to marriages between people of Protestant and Catholic faith, relationships between black Dutch men and white Dutch woman were also constructed as an anomaly. In this context, politicians represented Surinamese Dutch workers as being "in search of thrills and adventure," for which there was "little room within Dutch society" (Jones 218–19; 274–75). Such remarks, made in 1963, undoubtedly referred to relationships between working class Creole Surinamese Dutch men and working class white Dutch women, which newspaper reports and some circles within the Dutch civil service represented as a problem (Schuster 119–28). Thus, it was no coincidence that, in the above mentioned report by Bayer on "Surinamese workers," this type of relationship was placed under a magnifying glass (Jones 215–18).[17] The combined effect of these discourses on migration, "Surinamese workers culture" and "mixed relations" was that the boundaries around those considered "Dutch people" were *symbolically* drawn along lines of gender, ethnicity, and class: working class black men who relocated to the Netherlands were considered to pose a threat to the Dutch nation, especially when they became romantically involved with white women; although these black men were all Dutch citizens, they were apparently not seen as belonging to "the Dutch people."

Political discourses in the seventies demonstrate how decolonization became a means to draw the boundaries of the Dutch nation. In the context of increased immigration in the seventies, politicians started to re-signify "self-determination," meaning political independence, from a *right* into a *duty*. The anti-imperialist and anti-colonial social and political climate in Dutch society in these years certainly helped to make this shift possible; Dutch politicians began to represent relations with the remaining overseas parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Suriname and the Dutch Antilles, as a neocolonial anachronism that hindered the overseas citizens from becoming familiar with "their own place and identity" (Jones 222–25). On the 17th of February 1970, HR member Goede expressed the *communis opinio* as follows: "The present day neocolonial relations have to come to an end. The Netherlands can't take responsibility for good governance [in Suriname and the Dutch Antilles, G. J.] any longer."[18] Dutch politicians, while simultaneously expressing concerns about the increased migration of the Surinamese Dutch, began to construct the Dutch citizenship of the population of Suriname and the Dutch Antilles as an improper status (Jones 224–26). The Dutch citizens in the West Indies were represented as "victims of Dutch nationality."[19] HR member Den Uyl (PvdA politician and later prime minister) stated that independence would give the Surinamese "their own identity, their own face."[20] Next to this, many politicians represented the Netherlands as an unnatural social and cultural habitat for Surinamese Dutch. HR member Van Dijk (VVD) stated that "the association with the Netherlands" had resulted in "cultural isolation" and little contact with their "own" country.[21] According to Jongeling (GPV), immigration from Suriname implied "the flow of lifeblood to the Netherlands" and would result in "socio-cultural integration problems" in the Netherlands and "uprootedness" of the people concerned.[22] Pors (DS' 70) stated that "Dutch citizens from overseas cannot adapt to our community" and would become trapped "between shore and ship."[23] De Goede (D66) was "increasingly convinced" that: "Suriname and also the Dutch Antilles will need to find their place in that part of the world where they happen to be placed, on the edge of the Caribbean and the northern part of South America. We must try to raise their state of mind, so that they [. . .] turn back to their country."[24] Views like these functioned as justifications for a speedy independence of Suriname. Moreover, on several occasions, some Members of the House advocated a restriction of immigration before the independence of Suriname. Apparently, politicians in the Netherlands were unconvinced of the universality of the rule that "those who are status citizens may travel unconditionally into the country of citizenship." Although the Dutch government ultimately rejected the restriction of migration on moral grounds, it was well aware of the fact that a quick independence, which it demanded from politicians in Suriname, would effectively end free immigration from Suriname (Jones 224–34). Just as in the case of the Eurasians, the identity Dutch politicians ascribed to Surinamese Dutch citizens (that they were not real

Dutch citizens, did not belong in the Netherlands, and should give up Dutch citizenship) did not coincide with the self-definitions of many Surinamese Dutch citizens: the rumors about an admission scheme and a speedy independence only added to the migration of Surinamese Dutch to the Netherlands in the early 1970s. As a result, the population of Dutch individuals with a "Surinamese background" (currently around 300,000 individuals) grew from 28,000 in 1970 to 104,000 in 1975 (E. Marshall 193). The Dutch government, in reaction, urged the Surinamese government to make haste with independence. Notwithstanding fierce opposition to the independence in Suriname, the Surinamese government complied and in 1975 the republic of Suriname was born.[25] The opposition against independence, however, almost led to civil war. As a concession to Surinamese opposition parties, and in the hope of channeling the social unrest in Suriname, the Dutch government agreed to a less restrictive admission policy for these former Dutch citizens for a period of five years (1976–1980).

In the seventies, politicians seriously questioned the ability of the Surinamese Dutch to adjust to Dutch society. Presently, the Surinamese Dutch in the Netherlands are not considered a threat to Dutch community. Just as in the case of the Eurasians and Moluccans, the idea of fundamental differences between Surinamese Dutch and Dutch society silently disappeared from political discourses. Although the Surinamese Dutch are still symbolically excluded from the ethnic majority of so-called "autochtonen" ("native Dutch"), politicians no longer construct them as a major problem. Since the 1990s, they have sometimes even represented them as integrated in Dutch society (Jones 263–66). The idea that Surinamese Dutch citizens in the Netherlands "are doing reasonably well" may have had some unexpected consequences for *Surinamese* nationals. With the borders closed (migration from the colony has been strictly regulated by Dutch migration law since independence), the Dutch government decided to enact minor legal improvements for Surinamese nationals, because of "language," "culture," and the "longstanding relation between the Netherlands and the former colony of Suriname." Surinamese citizens who wish to migrate to the Netherlands in order to reside there were, unlike other legal aliens from outside the EU, exempted from the "Dutch integration exam abroad" that was introduced in 2006 (Jones 265-66; see chapter de Leeuw and van Wichelen). Moreover, from 2008 onward, students with Surinamese nationality, in contrast with students from other non-EU countries, have paid the same lecture fees as students with Dutch nationality. [26] However, notwithstanding these minor legal improvements for Surinamese nationals, the independence of Suriname resulted in a division between Surinamese nationals and Surinamese-Dutch which, because of strict migration rules, still poses enormous challenges to the many transnational family relationships that exist between the Netherlands and Suriname today (van Walsum).[27]

Repeating Patterns: The Political Alienation of the Antillean Dutch

Analogous to the shifts in political discourses toward the Eurasian Dutch and Surinamese Dutch in the fifties and seventies, Dutch politicians in "the center" began to problematize the Dutch citizenship of the Antillean Dutch when they increasingly began to make use of their right of free migration to the Netherlands. During the 1990s, the population of Antillean Dutch in the Netherlands increased somewhat (71,200 persons in 1990, 92,800 in 1995, and 110,000 in 2000) and became more of a cross-section of the Dutch Antilles than before (Jones 299). In the context of increased immigration, political discourses on the Antillean Dutch citizens were characterized by an exclusive *pars pro toto* mechanism, following Elias: from the late 1990s onward, politicians would inflate the problems of the underprivileged by taking recourse to culturalist explanations, while keeping silent on the great majority of successful (in socio-economic terms) Antillean Dutch citizens. While Dutch politicians represented the Antillean Dutch in the sixties as "exemplary," "calm," and "hard working" people, from 1998 onward they have almost exclusively represented them as a problematic and culturally distinct group (Jones 269–331). That change was rather provoked by the quantitative increase of immigration of the Dutch Antilles than by "cultural changes" among them. There were, after all, no indications that traits of the Antillean Dutch as a whole had suddenly changed (Jones 299–306). Changed political discourses on the identity of "Antilleans" were paralleled by changed political ideas on the content of their Dutch citizenship. In the seventies, the Dutch government and the great majority of the House shared the opinion that the right of free migration to the Netherlands was inseparable from the Dutch citizenship of the Antillean Dutch. Ideas to restrict migration of Antillean Dutch to the Netherlands were fiercely rejected as discriminatory. The situation in the nineties was quite different: restriction of the migration of the Antillean Dutch to the Netherlands "in order to combat the problem of the socially weak that move to the Netherlands" became part of the accepted political discourses in the House (Jones 300–21). Interestingly, the Dutch government (which initiated these debates) stressed on more than one occasion that "the majority of the Antillean Dutch in Dutch society is doing well" (Jones 314–22). In other words, the government's aggregated statistics on the socio-economic position of people designated as "Antilleans" did not support the dominant idea that, on the whole, they constituted "a major problem." On the contrary; the Dutch government, because of fierce Antillean opposition and "legal obstacles," did not restrict free migration. By now, however, the Antillean Dutch were constructed as a maladjusted group, whose citizenship of the Netherlands was conditional. Their status as others within the Dutch borders was underscored by the fact that in 1998 they, in contrast with EU-citizens, became a target group of the Civic Integration Newcomers Act (*Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers*). Although the Dutch government refrained from restricting free migration to the Netherlands in 2000, in the years

thereafter the right of the Antillean Dutch to migrate and reside in the Netherlands was still a subject of recurrent political debate (Jones 328-29).

The Dutch citizenship of the Antillean Dutch goes back a very long way. The Antillean Dutch have always been "on the inside" in this regard. But Dutch political discourses in recent years have primarily constructed them as alien to the Dutch nation. This once again questions the meaning of formal legal citizenship for inclusion in the nation-state.

Concluding Remarks

In the past decades, Dutch politicians in the Netherlands have repeatedly drawn the symbolic and legal borders of the Dutch nation through political discourses on identity, nationality, migration, and integration of people from the former Dutch colonies and their offspring. The discourses that politicians in "the center" articulated on their identity and citizenship were not dictated by the principle of equal citizenship for all, nor by a "fixed" belief in the content of identity discourses, but by the *political will* to exclude (or in later years include) them under a variety of historical circumstances. The unpredictable power dynamics involved in this process explain why the possession of citizenship does not guarantee unconditional ("equal") inclusion in the Dutch nation-state. These dynamics also explain why the loss of citizenship does not necessarily lead to an exclusion from the rights that citizens enjoy. However, the political discourses on people from the former colonies and their offspring also functioned to (re)produce the Dutch nation. Politicians in the symbolic center need "significant others" (overseas and within the borders of the Dutch nation-state) to construct the identity of the Dutch nation and their own identity (cf. Said; Goldberg; Balibar). The fact that politicians in the center have constructed colored overseas citizens and their offspring as maladjusted and unreal Dutch citizens enabled the promotion of the idea of the real Dutch as competent people with certain physical features. Notwithstanding the present day acceptance of Dutch citizens from the former colonies and their offspring, they are still designated as "people with foreign looks." (Dutch: "mensen met een buitenlands uiterlijk") That is, "whiteness" still is represented as one of the essential conditions of "real" Dutchness. Citizens of *all* backgrounds reproduce this idea. In political discourses of today, however, the binary between "us" and "them" has become increasingly connected with the division between "Muslims" and "Non-Muslims." The ever changing construction of "we" and "the others" makes the ideal of equal citizenship for all difficult to realize. Formal citizenship is not a stable "predictor" for the social position of a person in society. The possession of formal membership of a nation-state does not guarantee anything in itself. The political will of dominant groups in society, and the government, to include or exclude people, regardless of citizenship status, is much more important in determining social positions.

Notes

1. As former member of the House of Representatives, Chantal Gill'ard (PvdA) stated: "rights are not inborn but should be fought for every day." From the quote of Pieter Boeles onward, all translations are mine.

2. Kamerstukken II, 1951/52, 2300 (XII), nr. 7, 12; Kamerstukken II, 1955/56, 4100 (XII), nr. 2, 11; Kamerstukken II, 1959/60, 5700 (XII), nr. 2, 12; Handelingen II, 1964/65, 1015.

3. Kamerstukken II, 1951/52, 2300 (XII), nr. 7, 12.

4. The mere fact that Moluccans, in the Dutch East Indies legal order of "dual citizenship," were legally Dutch *subjects* (unlike all *totoks* and most Eurasians who were Dutch *citizens*) resulted in their exclusion from Dutch nationality and ascription of Indonesian nationality after the Independence of Indonesia. This is due to the fact that ascription of nationality after the Independence of Indonesia was based on the colonial, racialized, Dutch East Indies nationality law.

5. Kamerstukken I 1949/50, 1478, 17.

6. Kamerstukken II 1950/51, 1900 (XIII B), nr. 9, 10–11.

7. Kamerstukken II 1950/51, 1900 (XIIIB), nr. 9, 11.

8. Kamerstukken II 1950/51,1900 (XIIIB), nr. 9, 11.

9. Kamerstukken 1951/52, 2300 (XIIA), nr. 5, 6.

10. Kamerstukken II 1951/52, 2300 (XIIIA), nr. 6, 16.

11. Handelingen II 1951/52, 733.

12. Kamerstukken II 1953/54, 3200 (XIIA), nr. 9, 8.

13. Kamerstukken II 1953/54, 3200 (XIIA), nr. 9, 8.

14. Before 1951, some of the descendants of Javanese and Hindostani indentured laborers who migrated to Suriname were still Dutch *subjects*; thereafter they became Dutch *citizens* like the rest of the population (Jones 189).

15. Kamerstukken II 1957/58, 4900 (XIII), nr. 12, 2–3.

16. As a result, "the Surinamese community" in the Netherlands increased from 8,000 individuals in 1960, 11,600 in 1965, to approximately 29,000 individuals in 1970. The "Antillean Dutch" community in the Netherlands increased from approximately 3,000 individuals in 1965 to approximately 13,600 individuals in 1970 (Oostindie and Klinkers 225).

17. This was a report by Bayer. The content was ambiguous: on the one hand, Bayer stated that problems attributed to Surinamese workers in the Dutch media were non-existent, but on the other, he focused in great detail on sexual relations between Creole Surinamese Dutch men and white Dutch women.

18. Handelingen II 1969/70, 2287.

19. Kamerstukken II, 1971/72, 11500 (XVI), nr. 70, 1.

20. Handelingen II, 1969/70, 2294.

21. Handelingen II, 1971/72, 1192.

22. Handelingen II, 1971/72, 1195.

23. Handelingen II, 1971/72, 1196.

24. Handelingen II, 1971/72, 1202–1203.

25. At the time, a small but influential nationalist party (PNR, headed by Eddy Bruma) was part of the Surinamese government coalition (Marshall, *Ontstaan*). Although the PNR party was in favor of independence, the biggest party in the coalition, NPS (headed by Prime Minister

Henck Arron), had never made independence an "urgent matter": it was seen as a long-term goal. The instant compliance of the Surinamese government was also "a matter of self-respect" (Jones 234–41).

26. Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 31346, nr. 3; Handelingen II 2007/08, 84-5903.

27. Most of the 495,000 Surinamese citizens have relatives in the Netherlands, and most of the 300,000 Surinamese Dutch in the Netherlands have relatives in Suriname.

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Institutionalizing the Muslim Other: *Naar Nederland* and the Violence of Culturalism

Marc de Leeuw and
Sonja van Wichelen

Introduction

On the brink of the European demise of multiculturalist discourse, "culture" configures prominently in the debates on immigration of European nation-states. New discourses of integration emphasize dominant values and norms and define civic membership through cultural commitment or loyalty. How are the Dutch doing integration? And what is integration doing to Dutchness? Taking our cues from the new integration exam we analyze how "culture" is paradigmatically disciplined upon new aspiring citizens. By employing cultural tropes of sexual freedom, gender equality, freedom of speech, and individualism as emblems of Dutchness, integration is identified as the successful adaptation to hegemonic liberal and secular virtues, leaving little room for cultural or religious variations. We argue that this need of reinstating Dutchness signals its very crisis, and that culturalism reinforces revivals of national identity.

Understanding discourses of multiculturalism (historically) as a depoliticized ideology of secular liberalism, we argue that, rather than simply seeing the strive for multiculturalism (in terms of moral position) as better than that for integration (see for instance Duyvendak, Engelen, and de Haan), we should consider and analyze the premises and complexities in which it operates. The entanglement of migration and globalization is key to understanding current changes in thinking about citizenship and multiculturalism. What is more, *culturalism*, while obscuring its nature as a form of racism, is in fact a mode of racist and (post)colonial *ressentiment*. It is a violent mechanism that appeals to exclusionary mechanisms of racialized, classed, and gendered identification, that reduce groups of people to essentialized characteristics,

and that affirm constructions of "us" and "them" by using them as absolute forms of differentiation. We emphasize the need to understand the concept of culturalism as an inherent complification of the concept of racism. Culturalism is no new phenomenon. It is very close to cultural racism, which has already been identified by Essed (288). Our discussion of a notorious video on Dutch national identity will help to clarify the nature of culturalism, which we see as the form Dutch racism has taken on since the last few decades. What makes culturalism different from the cultural racism in the past is its (obsessive) instrumentalization of religion. It is in such a way that culturalist discourses operate successfully in the Netherlands today.

Testing "Newcomers": Cultural Tropes of Dutchness

As a prerequisite to obtain a temporary residence permit it is compulsory for particular groups of foreigners that they pass an integration exam at an early stage—even before their arrival in the Netherlands.[1] This new measure primarily targets foreigners who want to marry or be reunited with their partners or family. It complements two other criteria: a minimum income and a minimum age of 21 years for both partners. It is also intended for religious clergy who want to work in the Netherlands. An important component of the exam is the film *Coming to the Netherlands*.[2] In this one and a half hour long video, seven themes are explored—ranging from Dutch history and its constitution to parenting and healthcare—that are meant to give an overview of basic knowledge of Dutch society, values, and culture.

The film is guided by a female presenter who seems to stand for both the image of the modern Dutch woman and, through her narrative, for the voice of the state speaking to its new immigrants. She explains to them what they need to understand, learn, accept, and do, before they attain the privilege to enter the Netherlands. The second character is a male figure, depicted as naive and somewhat dim-witted, and meant to represent the typical immigrant. Newcomers are expected to identify themselves with this character who in one of the excerpts expresses total amazement at seeing a political debate on television. Through the sullenness of the "Wally" and the disciplining voice of the female presenter, the tone of the film is somewhat infantilizing—as if it was crafted for elementary school children.

The section entitled *Constitution, Democracy, and Legislation* underscores the importance of article one of the Dutch constitution and is narrated through stories of white Dutch citizens and well-articulated (well-integrated) migrant-citizens. They function as "testimonials," giving evidence of how Dutch constitution gives you "the freedom and space to be yourself" (*Naar Nederland* 2007). The female presenter and a male voice over summarize the section with:

> So, every one in Holland has equal rights, men and women are equal. They each
> make their own choice, and both are allowed to express their own opinions, women

and men have the right to live with or marry the partner of their own choice, homo-
sexual couples can also get married. The constitution states that the church and the
state are separate, so, there is no state religion, there is freedom of religion, this
means that everyone in Holland has the right to practice his or her own religion,
which means that everyone needs to have respect for all the other religions. (Naar
Nederland 2007)[3]

At the end of the section, the female presenter stands in front of an image of a land-
ing strip at the airport. While looking straight into the camera, she tells the "arriving"
newcomers in an imperative manner that there are also firm limits to freedom and
that the Dutch constitution is very strict when it concerns honor killings, possession
of arms, female circumcision, and domestic violence, and narrates the following
newspaper accounts:

A man kills a woman because she has behaved like a whore, she flees, but he finds
her, honor killing he says, murder says the Dutch judge. [. . .] A girl's clitoris and labia
have been partially removed and then sewn together. Female circumcision says the
proud family, deliberate mutilation says the Dutch penal code. [. . .] A woman
reports her husband to the police because he beats her at home. That's private he
says, that's abuse says the police.

Newspaper headlines with the Dutch interpretation of these acts, backed up by dra-
matic sounds, appear from the back of the screen to the front, reading for instance
"WOMAN VICTIM OF HONOR KILLING" or "LIFELONG MUTILATION BY CIRCUMCI-
SION." After every newspaper headline, the female presenter utters the verdict:
"punishable by law."

On a symbolic level, the film suggests that the Netherlands is giving migrants a gift,
namely the gift of freedom. This gift of freedom emotionally appeals to a "common
humanity" in which people mutually respect, accept, and value each other. But the gift
of freedom is restricted to certain conditions which are defined through four different
cultural tropes, namely gender equality, sexual freedom, freedom of speech, and indi-
vidualism. These cultural tropes turn the right of citizenship into a demand for cultural
loyalty—a demand not existing in previous versions of citizenship testing.[4]

Although made to look generally accepted, the progress of women's emancipation
and gay sexuality is certainly more arbitrary than absolute in Dutch society. Besides
persistent inequalities in fields of labor, childcare, household, and continuing experi-
ence of gender based harassment and violence, institutional sexism is not absent
in the Netherlands.[5] This is also true for the acceptance of gay sexuality and gay
marriage. Moreover, by presenting violence against women as practices that *they,*
the immigrants, do, (murder, domestic violence, bodily harm) and informing the viewer
that they are punishable by law in *our* society, the film suggests that these modes of

gender based violence are not similarly evident in the Netherlands. In other words, what the film does is that it represents these virtues as absolute, while hiding the tensions within Dutch society.[6]

In implementing the exam, the responsible Department of Justice expected greater "self-responsibility" and "more commitment" from newcomers. The Secretary for Immigration and Integration Verdonk explains that through the civic integration exam, newcomers can be tested whether their choice to come to the Netherlands was a conscious one, whether they understand what this choice *really* implies, and whether they are sufficiently motivated to genuinely and consciously embrace Dutch values (*Tweede Kamer* 2005). The cultural trope of individualism is pivotal in the exam and statements made by Verdonk are a classical example of the paradox at work in "repressive liberalism": although you, immigrants, are locked in a collective culture with certain imposed values, at the same time, you have the individual possibility of free choice. Here the notion of "free choice" implies a call for self-liberation by embracing Dutch values. At work is an ethno-culturalist ontology in which the (dis-integrated and over-cultured dangerous) migrant can simply make a—neoliberal—individualistic choice to be like "us."[7] It is *ethno*-cultural since it specifically targets countries with people of color.[8]

Similarly, the "freedom of speech" trope lends itself flawlessly for the disciplining nature of citizenship tests because it assumes that "we" must be intolerant in defense of Tolerance, or, put differently, "we" can take away certain freedoms of cultural Others in order to defend "real" freedom. Such a moral superiority however can only succeed if the violence implied in this position is made invisible. Recent court cases in the Netherlands for instance have defined hate-speech (or the right to insult) as a "freedom of speech."[9] This justification can only work because the notion "freedom of speech" is disconnected from its actual content and used as a general, universal, and absolute symbol of western modernity and civilization. The result is that any critique on the abuse of the freedom of speech—for instance when it is used to structurally insult minorities or to practice hate-speech—is considered a critique on western liberal values in general.

The integration exam links cultural codes and assumptions to quasi-neutral historical narratives of Dutch culture and laws. Definitions of "Dutch culture"—such as shaking hands, kissing in public, dressing correctly at work, taking flowers if you go to your neighbors' birthday—are not just used as an ideological tool but, far more complex and subtle, culture is used as an appeal to an emotional wish of belonging, citizenship, and recognition. The message of the exam is: the extent to which you will be recognized or excluded by Dutch society is entirely up to yourself: *we* tell you who *we* are and, simultaneously, though not explicit, *we* explain exactly what *our* cultural codes are and, thus, what *you* need to do to be included in the Dutch *we*. The cultural tropes give newcomers the essence and parameters of hegemonic Dutch liberal

culture, and loyalty to this "Dutchness" becomes measured in terms of whether immigrants accept "our" women's emancipation, "our" homosexuals, "our" individualism, and "our" freedom of speech.

It seems that this construction of Dutchness (in which local and internal tensions regarding gay marriage, gender equality, freedom of speech, or individualism are willfully ignored) is a projection in order to contain and control the imaginary Dutch "we." But who really is this Dutch "we"? To whom does this Dutch culture belong? This "we" seems a strong homogenization of what should in fact be a plurality of voices. Embodying the Enlightened liberal subject, the "we" disregards non-liberal subjects evident in many Dutch religious *and* secular, as well as ethnic/cultural communities. For instance, while there are people in the Surinamese-Dutch community that are radically in favor of women's rights and gay rights, there are people in secular white Dutch communities that reject these rights on the basis of biologism. Or to refer to another example, Dutch Catholics and Dutch Muslims can very well uphold the very same merits of freedom of religion—even if it would impede the freedom of speech. Nevertheless, *culturalization* prevents us from seeing these commonalities, while it emphasizes certain differences. Again, implicit and hidden is the ethno-cultural dimension of Dutchness that is ontologized in much the same manner as is blackness or Muslimness. The integration exam is then, not so much about what Dutchness *really is*, but rather, what the government wants Dutchness *not* to be or *not to become*.

Culturalization of Secular Liberalism

One of the testimonial statements from Dutch citizens in the integration video reads as follows:

> *Accepting people as they are, that is important, That is, in fact, not just trying to shape a democracy, but, it is shaping a civilization [. . .] It has taken us as a country—the Netherlands—500 years, if it is not more, to get this far and I would like to put in a plea to keep it like this for a very long time. (Naar Nederland 2007)*

The statement implies a normative position in terms of achievement within a progressive and evolutionary framework, namely from a primitive to a civilized nation-state. The urge to reinvent or reaffirm core values of Dutchness refers not only to a wish to compensate the loss of actual national borders, but also refers to a Dutch moral stance in claiming a western civilization that omits the violence of its history, such as witch-hunts, religious wars, colonialism, slavery, two World Wars, the holocaust, and so on. Ironically, 500 years refers exactly to the beginning of the colonization of non-European countries, implying indeed the start of the civilization mission. Erasing the barbarism of this period, these events are treated as "evil incidents" that stand outside the systemic structures of western modern civilization.[10]

The statement also suggests a need for intervention: if we do not take measures now to "keep it like that," civilization will deteriorate. This *civilizational pathos* (De Leeuw and Van Wichelen, "Transformations") exaggerates the actual facts by using apocalyptic metaphors and engages in a politics of fear. In this pathos, forms of self-pity, victimhood, and *ressentiment* merge.[11] The effect of civilizational pathos is that it positions autochthonous populations as victims of a social drama. With integration we can contain this drama by forcing unwilling migrants (unwilling to learn Dutch, unwilling to accept "our" values, and unwilling to participate in public life) to follow our rules. The civilizational pathos provides a nation in crisis with a "grand narrative," conveniently hiding the actual complexities of postmodern life and identities, and offering instead the "warm" sentiment of a cultural, universal and moral superiority disguised by a universal secular liberalism.

The Integration Exam was designed in order to contain two integration problems related to two target groups. The first relates to the so-called radicalization of imams in Dutch mosques. Incidents were reported in the media about radical imams influencing Moroccan youth and contributing to the extremism of young Muslims in the country. The anxiety about imams was also produced by the media's voracious coverage of their unwillingness to adapt to Dutch norms and values (such as shaking hands with women).[12] The second integration problem was that of so-called "import-brides." Marriage migration, or migration based on family reunification, was reported as having increased tremendously. Media and politics presented the marriage migration as typically involving the import of primarily Moroccan and Turkish women from remote villages. The common assumption was that Moroccan and Turkish men in the Netherlands had a preference for traditional women from their birth country. These women were said to be poorly integrated in Dutch society because they were uneducated, dependent, and submissive. Their children ran the risk of dropping out of school, only to become a disturbance to public safety, and in the worst case to become criminals. As Verdonk argued:

> [t]hey come to the Netherlands without preparation, do not speak the language, do not know our way of living with each other in the Netherlands and do not know anything about Dutch values. But yet they are the mothers of children. The influx of these newcomers will hamper the ongoing process of integration. (Tweede Kamer 2005)

In 2008 around 15,000 men and women from 160 different countries came to the Netherlands to marry or to be re-united with their partner and/or family. Only one in ten women who entered the Netherlands in 2008 to marry their partner came from Morocco or Turkey. This is less than, for example, the number of women from the Phillipines, Thailand, Brazil or Russia entering the country to marry autochtonous Dutch men. While the Dutch state is concerned with "emancipating" women from

Morocco and Turkey who come to marry allochtonous men, they do not seem to care as much about emancipating women from other countries who come and marry autochtonous men. While this echoes the colonial redemption mentality of "saving brown women from brown men" (Spivak cited in Cooke 2002:469), the statement by Verdonk—that these women are also "mothers of children"—complements this colonial structure by using classical racist stereotypes of non-western women being governed by their (essentialized) uncivilized natural impulses and (thus) failing in their cultural parenting duties to educate and prepare their (many) children for modern society. Sexism is involved in the assumption that white Dutch men will properly discipline their foreign wives to fit Dutch society, but also that no mention is being made of men entering the country to marry women of whichever ethnic background.

It is not so much the moral defense of secular liberalism that is problematic in the discourse of Dutch integration (and European integration in general), but the ways in which this defense is *culturalized* and thus *depoliticized*.[13] This portrayal of Dutch identity is completely consistent with the emergence of European and (Dutch) identity as carved out in relation to an oppositional (uncivilized) other (Goldberg). Central in the *culturalization* of secular liberalism are sexual politics, for the public discourse is not about certain values or norms as such, but is explicitly and iconically involving sexualized bodies: bodies of abused women, bodies of homosexual men, and engaging issues related to kinship, sexual freedom, and law. Nevertheless, while Islamism is seen as an ideological movement, threatening the moral fabric of western civilization, secular liberalism is seen as neutral and universal—a universal value that Dutch culture would embody in exemplary fashion. A moral superiority speaks from the ways in which secular liberals aim to educate or civilize non-western migrants through means of integration. As Bhikhu Parekh argues:

> *Liberals want to convince [Muslims] that these values are right, and think that this requires them to give transculturally compelling reasons. While such reasons are available in the case of some liberal values such as respect for human life, human dignity and equal human worth, they are not in the case of others such as individualism, personal autonomy, choice of spouses and minimum restraints on freedom of expression. There are good reasons for the latter, but they are internal to the liberal tradition and not transcultural.* (25)

The culturalization of secular liberalism functions also as a means to avoid conflict with the principle of freedom of religion and as such with secular liberalism's separation of church and state. This is most evident in contemporary discourses of Dutch Christian parties. In their shift to an anti-Muslim populism, the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) for instance, needs to justify their position without turning against religion. Instead, they strategically position themselves as defenders of "western" or "democratic" values and define Muslims as culturally opposed to Christians because

they have not experienced enlightenment or critical reform. Rather than recognizing their sameness in terms of fellow religious citizens, Muslims are approached as "cultural Others" that have religious practices incompatible with liberal democracy and could harbor a potential threat to the fabric of western societies.[14]

We have argued elsewhere that a form of Enlightenment-fundamentalism is at work in the Dutch and European discourses attacking Islam and its incompatibility with western liberal democracy (De Leeuw and Van Wichelen, "Please, Go Wake Up!"). Ideas of Enlightenment—as well as Dutchness or Europeaness for that matter—are used to uncover "the real face of Islam" in order to turn the Muslim other into a more "comfortable other." In this perspective, the use of the concept of "Enlightenment" aptly resembles the superficial application of the term as described by the cultural theorist Ien Ang who argued that

> [w]hat matters in this context is not the philosophical debt or virtue of the legacy of the Enlightenment (a topic sufficiently debated among philosophers themselves) but, rather, the more superficial impact of the instinctive cultural identification of Europeanness with the Enlightened modern which still informs contemporary, self-definitions of European culture and identity. (84)

Hence, "Enlightenment," "Dutchness," or "Europe" as the name for something we need to defend, refers not so much to the dangers of Islam, nor to a conflict with migrant Others, but rather to the actual identity crisis within Europe and European nations.

Transnational Institutionalization of "Integration"

The Dutch civic integration exam proved to be a success and other countries soon followed its lead (Joppke; Löwenheim and Gazit; McCrea: 36). While the UK and Denmark revisited their citizenship exam after having been introduced to the Dutch model, Australia took over the test almost literally and implemented this in 2006.[15] Most interesting is the case of Germany, which used to be most "generous" in term of immigration flows, where the so-called "Hesse Test"—which was implemented in September 2008—included all elements of sexual politics evident in the Dutch case.[16] What are we to conclude about the popularity of the Dutch case? What does it imply for the notion of multiculturalism? And how do these new citizenship regimes inscribe new understandings of notions of membership of a European society?

Of great importance is the fact that, in the Netherlands, not every foreigner is required to take the exam. People from the EU, the European Economic Community, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, South-Korea, and the US are exempted. The Secretary of Justice legitimized this discrimination in nationalities, by pointing out that it concerned people from countries that are socially, economically, and politically comparable to European nations. From this respect, as the

Justice Department argued, the exemption would not lead to "undesirable immigra-tion" or "fundamental problems with integration in Dutch society" (*Tweede Kamer*, 16 March 2005).

This measure, discriminating between nations that are and are not obligated to take the exam, is internally contradictory and therefore highly objectionable. The bill was intended to make sure that migrants have sufficient knowledge of the Dutch lan-guage and society before coming to the Netherlands. By excluding countries such as Australia or Japan, it is implied that Australian and Japanese newcomers do not need this knowledge. This goes against principles of justice as articulated in international conventions, such as the convention on racial discrimination and the convention on civil and political rights. More precisely however, this measure makes visible how the Justice Department imagines and projects only a certain group of "newcomers," namely "newcomers" that are to be cultivated, that are not yet "enlightened," and often enough, these categories are conflated with the category of Muslims.[17]

Nevertheless, the bill was accepted and the measure is still in place today—even after the replacement of the populist and liberal-right government by a more labor-oriented government in 2007.[18] In several cases, the European court of Justice and the European Treaty on Human Rights rebuked the new Dutch policies on immi-gration and integration (*NRC Handelsblad*, 12 January 2007). However, rather than being affected by these rulings, Dutch politicians expect other European countries to follow their lead and overrule the position of the European court and its conven-tions.[19] Politicians and the media sometimes vent their irritation with the fact that there are still European countries with more tolerant and liberal policies towards migrants. Tensions between nation states and European conventions were not necessarily seen as actual ethical problems, but as legal hurdles that needed to be overcome.

The tensions displayed above mirror a deeper dilemma in contemporary post-modern society between a politics of sovereignty and an ethics of human rights. These developments need to be seen against the background of rapid changes in a world of globalization, transnational migration flows, and flexible citizens.[20] There is an increasing discrepancy between flexible European laws grounded in the human rights tradition and more restrictive national laws. But instead of subjecting proce-dures and decisions of naturalization policies to a critical examination, either for their constitutionality or for violation of human rights conventions, and instead of working toward a more flexible perception of citizenship, nation-states in Europe are tighten-ing their definition of national membership. The developments are symptomatic for nation-states stuck between modern normative frameworks and postmodern reali-ties. Paradoxical tensions evolve out of this situation and create a narrowing space between political commitment to cosmopolitanism and political complicity with new exclusionary regimes and civilizational discourses disguised as liberal universalism.

Racism and Culturalism

How do these tensions echo back onto the national scene? How are global developments implicated in current constructions of Dutchness, Dutch understandings of multiculturalism, and its relation to discrimination and racism?

Since the 1990s, the end of multiculturalism has been predicted from different sides of the Dutch political spectrum. While populist pundits have pointed out the detrimental effects of multiculturalism to the welfare state, education, and neighborhood liveability, leftist intellectuals have dismissed these effects from a belief in a tolerant, color-blind, and multicultural society. Distancing ourselves from this politicized debate, and following Essed and Nimako, who talk about the "minority research industry" and Schinkel who refers to the "integration-industry," our analysis of the citizenship test and the preceding political debates shows that multiculturalism as a democratic paradigm has been replaced by the "integration paradigm." Unlike multicultural paradigms, integration demands of the newcomer motivation, sacrifice, and loyalty. This is clearly communicated by the integration video and the political justifications of the governmental apparatus.

The turn to integration discourse deliberately constitutes a political move to set boundaries to political membership and thereby moves away from a politics of recognition (Taylor et al.; Fraser). Analyzing the political justifications for the integration exam, it becomes evident that certain groups of people from certain communities are—in advance of coming to the Netherlands—already excluded from the chance to participate in the democratic polity. From the political discussions, those who are targeted are illiterate Muslim men and women from remote villages. Seen as being backward, un-emancipated, and confined to a patriarchal religion, these men and women are regarded as not able to integrate properly. From this viewpoint their arrival ultimately leads to the ghettoization of urban neighbourhoods and a backlog in education. On a national level this belief conveys that their increasing numbers and its effect on the next generation will not only disturb the democratic and liberal equilibrium of Dutch society, but will also threaten national security.

With the conflation of global discourses of terrorism with Islam, the immigrants suddenly became Muslims and the "Muslim danger" enabled anti-immigrant sentiments to be openly manifested.[21] While highly diverse groups were monolithically defined as "Muslims," a call to revive Dutch norms and values started to dominate the political realm and to overtake the consensus-seeking *poldermodel*.[22] The end of this "consensus model" was celebrated as the end of multiculturalism. Through anti-Muslim statements by public figures such as Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh, Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders, people had found legitimate grounds for their xenophobic sentiments. These developments also reflected a dynamics between the elite and popular masses. Earlier critiques by intellectuals such as the liberal right Frits Bolkestein or the sociologist Paul Scheffer did not appeal to popular masses.

The turn from covert racism to the proliferation of overt anti-Islamic sentiments created a backlash in the idea of Dutch tolerance with respect to multiculturalism.

The social critic Sjoerd de Jong refers in this respect to the manifestation of something which he called a "regret-revenge" discourse (spijtwraak). With this term he aims to explain how the Dutch are regretting their tolerant attitudes toward immigrants in the past and are taking revenge on their earlier positions. We could define the "regret-revenge" attitude as representing a discourse of ressentiment (Brown). In overcoming feelings of powerlessness, alienation, or fragmentation, ressentiment refers to the production of rage or righteousness, the production of a culprit, and the production of a site of revenge. In the new climate of ressentiment, socio-economic and political clarifications with respect to migration, colonialism, and racism were declared politically incorrect and any reference to these explanatory factors became taboo in the public sphere. This, as Paul Gilroy indicates, enhances feelings of powerlessness since the nation refuses to work through its participation in slavery and colonialism.

This also reflects modes of Dutch self-victimization as articulated by Essed and Nimako. In their well-researched article on scholarship and public policy about immigrants and minorities in the Netherlands (Essed and Nimako), they point to the deplorable state of critical research in relation to race, ethnic, and migration studies in the country. They argue that throughout the 1980s minority research in the Netherlands have mostly problematized ethnic minorities while structurally silencing influences of racism, colonial history, and Dutch cultural superiority (285). They observe that, within the academic field, strong backlashes against anti-racist discourses lead some of the researchers to stop using the term "racism" in their work. In such a way, researchers act like "prisoners of tolerance" that are pleading "guilt" (303). This does not mean that all forms of racism had become acceptable to the public, as we will explain below; the aggression concerned the critique of racism against especially black people, people from former colonies, and Muslims. This backlash fostered a climate of scrutiny and aggression against this anti-racist work and advocacy. As the "regret-revenge" paradigm in contemporary politics and public discourse suggests, this mood of self-victimization not only emerges in scholarly discourse, but also appears in popular public discourse and is linked to an "anti-political correctness" attitude.

The inherent ambivalence underlying the term "political correctness," namely of genuinely aiming to "correct" discrimination or of aiming to just "being correct," disappears into a new dominant discourse that defines political correctness as a hollow gesture. Moreover, it homogenizes political engagement with political correctness and leaves it vulnerable for ideological abuse (on both sides of the political spectrum). Anti-racist paradigms of the left were seen as naive (at best) and dangerous (at worst) because they supported multiculturalism while forgetting to defend

western liberal standards. The twisted dialectic behind this new stance of "anti-political correctness" is evident in its inherently paradoxical nature: to defend tolerance we need to not tolerate the Muslim intolerance (for instance regarding women's equality and homosexuality) and to defend the freedom of speech we need to be capable of "insulting" Islam (just as we were able to insult Christianity). "Political correctness" as such has become an object of political instrumentalization and independent from the original motivation it has become a new ideological tool to justify forms of exclusion.

This climate of "anti-political correctness," defined and defended by "new-realists" (Prins), made it possible for "ordinary" citizens to vent their fear and anxiety of the cultural "other" in a public domain that would now not accuse them of racism or xenophobia. At last they were given the space to openly express the view that integration had failed and that "our" tolerance towards immigrants had caused an irreparable damage to Dutch social coherence. The citizenship test should be placed within this Dutch political context of constituting "anti-political correctness" that is based on a restrictive form of integration that includes a "well-integrated," "emancipated" and thus "tolerable" outsider-subject.

Though the new "anti-political correctness" targeted anti-racism, it did not disrupt older appreciations of anti-racism, in other words, racism was still seen as undesirable, to the point that allegations of racism were often responded to as if they were unacceptably aggressive indictments of the ultimate, unimaginable crime. This had everything to do with the way in which in the Netherlands, the word racism is linked to antisemitism and World War II. Dutch victimhood of Nazism during the Second World War fuelled the idea that *real* racism equals antisemitism. It was impossible for the Dutch to conceive of themselves as being antisemites and by extension racists. The terms "anti-fascism" and anti-racism"—strong in the 1970s and 1980s—indicate a general social rejection of racism. Hence, it was not because the Dutch had worked through their own racist past (colonialism/slavery/antisemitism), but because of moral outrage toward French colonialism in Algeria, Apartheid in South-Africa, racism in the United States, or the perception of the Vietnam-war as a new imperialism (Hondius; Joppke). The lack of self-reflection with respect to Dutch history of slave-trade, the colonial imperialism of the VOC, or their collaboration with the Germans in enabling the deportation of Dutch Jews, created the strange paradox that the Dutch perceived themselves as exemplary anti-racist defined in relation to racism and racist regimes outside the Netherlands rather than their own racism within Dutch society.

Culturalism became the new discursive tool. According to the Dutch sociologist Willem Schinkel, culturalism has five different elements: 1) it focuses on "backlogs" and problems in more general terms, 2) it presumes an essentialist image of "culture" as a stable entity of norms and values, 3) rather than based on group dynamics, it is based on an individualized understanding of integration and

emancipation, 4) "Culture" is seen as the all-encompassing explanation for backlogs and problems, and 5) minority "culture" is approached as intrinsically problematic, and as incompatible with the dominant culture (148). In complementing this definition, which builds upon Schinkel's final characteristic, we would add that in the current European context, culturalism inherently presupposes a *civilizational pathos* to be productive in a normative sense. Evident from the integration exam, this civilizational pathos is inextricably linked to the instrumentalization of religion. This is what distinguishes the new culturalism from earlier conceptualizations of "cultural racism" or "ethnicism" (Essed, *Understanding* 288).

The new discursive tool of culturalism institutionalizes the recognizeable Muslim while excluding the *un*recognizeable (Muslim) Other—and a civilizational pathos is at the core of this process. In the Dutch (and European) case the seemingly sudden need to re-invent or re-affirm the core qualities of Dutchness/Europeanness does not only refer to a wish to compensate the loss of actual national borders, but also shows that Dutchness or Europeanness is reduced to a universal "enlightened" claim of a moral superiority which deletes the violence in its own history. The use of a new civilizational pathos to civilize the Muslim Other can only function if "we" enable the erasure of the barbarism of "western modernization." As such, the defense of human rights or the freedom of speech as an act of defending moral superior values and societies functions through the silencing of violent pasts.[23]

Conclusion

For the past decade, the Netherlands witnessed a tremendous transformation with respect to its socio-political make-up. From a relative content and secure welfare state in the 1990s, in which the Dutch consensus-model embraced cultural diversity, the Netherlands transformed into a confused country with anxious citizens which have increasingly started to support extreme right parties. With respect to immigration, naturalization, and integration policies, they have managed to become one of the strictest countries in Europe. Within this new situation, a populist liberalism has successfully deployed feminism, gay culture, and secularism as ultimate signs of an enlightened western civilization. "Dutchness," or a successful integration into Dutch society, became measured in terms of whether immigrants accepted "our" women's emancipation, "our" homosexuals, and "our" freedom of speech. In such a way, feminism, homosexuality, and freedom of speech were embraced as symbols of Dutch tolerance while national practices of the exclusion of women and gay people in Christian institutions remained unchallenged. The new civic integration test, in which these same symbols were of central concern, needs to be placed against this changing background.

While policies of "citizenship as rights" were pushed to the background, stricter integration policies received enormous popularity. By approaching the citizenship

exam as a tool of civilization, the test functioned as a new disciplinary force that civilizes outsiders to Dutch bequests of liberal secularism, conveniently collapsed with ideas of Enlightenment, modernization, and progress. Moreover, the civic integration exam and its political justifications also lay bare the violent operations of culturalism. Viewing culturalism as an oppressing mechanism inherent to the operation of racism, contemporary European societies face a new challenge: either acknowledge the violence of culturalism and face their unresolved pasts, or continue deploying culturalism as a means to maintain and secure their moral superiority.

Notes

1. The Civic Integration Exam Abroad is part of the larger Naturalization Test which was introduced in 2003 and replaced by the Integration Test in 2007. The exam consists of two parts, knowledge of Dutch society and knowledge of Dutch language. The applicant takes the exam (computerized testing by means of a telephone) at the Dutch consulate in their country of residence. The exam takes about 30 minutes and the overall costs (including the practice package) are 420 Euros. Having outsourced the logistics to private companies, these test-fees are not state subsidized. For more information on the content and procedure of the integration exam see www.naarnederland.nl.

2. This film has a censored and non-censored version in which the latter displays images of public nudity or sexuality such as topless women on the beach, or two men kissing each other in a public space. The censored version was made to accommodate countries in which the depiction of nudity and explicit sexuality in electronic or print material is a criminal offence and forbidden by law.

3. All translations are by the authors unless otherwise indicated.

4. By contrast, in the US, rather than culture and way of life candidates need to answer questions that concern American "facts" in the field of geography, history, laws, nature of governance, native American tribes. See http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/blinstst_new.htm.

5. Until 2013, one of the three Christian parties in parliament for instance, a small Calvinist party called the Reformed Political Party (SGP) did not accept women as active party members. How is it possible that we demand from outsiders a commitment to women's emancipation when members of parliament and the cabinet are not committed to these values themselves?

6. See also Butler and Haritaworn, Erdem, and Tauqir for a discussion on the instrumentalization of sexual freedom in the West's struggle against Islam.

7. Thanks to Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley for this comment. See for an analysis of all the complexities involved Žižek 119–34.

8. The examples of circumcision for instance are clearly targeted at nations in Africa and concern only female circumcision. Also, the examples do not state that bearing arms is not a right in the Netherlands, which it is in the US.

9. In 2011 a hate-speech charge forced the far right Dutch politician Geert Wilders to defend himself in the Court of Justice. As expected, instead of a serious juridical process questioning the definition of hate-speech and the limits of the "freedom of speech," the case turned into a political spectacle. The core of this case illustrates the current double standard: while insulting Muslims is successfully presented as a form of defending the freedom of speech, there is clear legislation (and public acceptance) that regards similar insults towards Jews as a punishable hate-speech. The Wilders case should have resolved this double standard. Instead, Wilders was able to present himself (again) as a victim of a "left" judiciary.

10. This is also demonstrated in the guidelines for instructors that give religious clerks integration courses (see http://www.vrom.nl/docs/bijlage-10-art-3.7-regeling-inburgering-aanvullende-eindtermen-KNS-geestelijke-bedienaren.pdf). Here religious clerks who want to work in the Netherlands are expected to have knowledge about Dutch religious and secular history, events, and values. Unflattering histories are silenced. As such, three centuries of Dutch colonial rule over the biggest Muslim country, Indonesia, is conveniently erased.

11. In 2000 the Dutch political commentator Paul Scheffer wrote the divisive article "The Multicultural Drama" in a national daily. Ever since this publication the drama has had a performative effect—but in our opinion especially in the opposite manner: not multiculturalism suffered from a "drama"

but the autochthonous (white) dominant population perceived themselves as victims of a social drama.

12. This example refers to the much mediated "handshake incident" in 2004 in which an imam respectfully refused to shake hands with the immigration minister Verdonk.

13. See also Schinkel (2007) and De Leeuw and Van Wichelen (forthcoming) for a discussion of how this produces a new cultural racism called *culturalism*.

14. When Christian parties are criticized in the Netherlands, culture or cultural difference is never used in the political discussions, instead commentators talk about the politics of paternalism or palling of Christian parties ("*vertrutting van de politiek*"). Moreover, the appropriation of secularism is an important difference between Europe and the United States. The U.S. would seldom proclaim secularism as one of their national foundations.

15. Similar to the situation in the Netherlands, even though the rightist government of Prime Minister Howard was replaced by a cabinet consisting of the labor party, this exam was not revoked. This proves that the citizenship tests were not so much the product of rightist politicking, but normalized in everyday discourse.

16. Germany has assigned the citizenship requirements separately to all its regions. Hesse is one of those regions. Known to have been one of the most "generous" European countries with respect to immigration, they have now started to be more restrictive, especially with respect to Muslims. The Hesse Test for instance is also known as the "Muslim Test" (*Tagesspiegel*, 2 May 2007).

17. The law, however, has curious contradictory effects. It also affects Dutch citizens. If a Dutch citizen marries a partner from, for example, Morocco or Argentina, this partner is forced to take and pass the test in the homeland before she/he is able to join her/his partner in the Netherlands. But if an American living in the Netherlands marries a woman from Morocco

there is no examination and she can enter immediately. The same counts for Dutch citizens who live in other EU member states. This legal loophole has created so-called "Europe-routes." These emerge from the combination of the European law that permits the free flow of persons and traffic within the European territory, and the ruling in the so-called "Metock case" which states that non EU-partners of European citizens can not be forced into an immigration examination or language test when EU-citizens move to a different EU-country (See Court of Justice of the European Communities, Case C – 127/08, 11 June 2008). The consequence of this ruling is that Dutch citizens who go, for example, to Belgium, and marry a Turkish or Argentinean woman or man while living in Belgium, can once they return to the Netherlands, not be forced to let their partners take the citizen-test.

18. The cabinet before 2007 consisted of the Christian Democrats CDA, the liberal-right party VVD, and the liberal-left party D66. After 2007 the labor party PvdA and the Christian party CU replaced the latter two. In 2010, an exceptional minority government was formed by liberal-right party VVD and Christian Democrats CDA, with the support (and great influence) of the populist PVV.

19. See also the discussion of European anti-discrimination laws and its tension with national legislations in Joppke.

20. See Aihwa Ong for the concept of flexible citizenship.

21. According to Shadid, immigrants have already been referred to as Muslims in the 1990s. However, we argue that this has solely been in intellectual discourse. It was not until the rise of Fortuyn and the global and national violence that ordinary people started to talk about Muslims as a problematic group in the Netherlands.

22. Following the end of the Cold War, the 1990s were predominantly characterized by a distinct Dutch consensus model (or so-called *poldermodel*) in which the labour party (PvdA) and the liberal right party (VVD) formed a pragmatic non-ideological coalition. In such a

way, it seemed to be managing a form of "Holland, Inc." without eschewing the concept of a multicultural society for pragmatic and instrumental reasons. This model depoliticized politics and contributed towards the idea that politics operated on the level of the elite whose decisions resemble a form of ivory-tower "administrative engineering" (Holmes 2000).

23. In the Dutch case, this silencing is for instance illustrated by the reaction to a front-page advertisement in the Dutch daily newspaper *De Volkskrant* by the well-known television producer Harry de Winter, which stated: "If Wilders would have said the same statements about Jews (and the Old Testament) as what he has said about Muslims (and the Qur'an), he would already long ago been rejected and convicted of anti-Semitism" (2008). The popular outrage over this statement shows that the discrimination of Jews means a return to the ghost of the past—the holocaust—while the systematic stigmatization of Muslims is seen as a necessary form of disciplinary practice toward an "incompatible religious culture" that is curtailing our democratic freedom, especially as Muslims are represented as hostile to Jews. The term "islamofascism" exactly mirrors this paradox of modernity: to defend tolerance we must be intolerant, or to put it more bluntly, to defend the Jews and ourselves we must discriminate against Muslims. The meaning of liberalism, tolerance or the freedom (of speech) depends on the group or power inhibiting the force of definition.

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Refusing to be Silenced: Resisting Islamophobia[1]

Miriyam Aouragh

This essay is an autobiographic account of observations, concerns, and dilemmas about resisting and experiencing Islamophobia, it is an attempt to write *back* and *off the shelf* (Waterstone and Vesperi). In retrospect, it seems as though I was traversing between echo chambers hearing about "freedom of speech," "tolerance," and "democracy." But those values were not equally distributed. They were reserved for the Dutch "autochtoon" (the west) and not deserved by the "allochtoon" (the rest). What happened to the liberal values of individualism, I wondered, when one Muslim is expected to answer for all? Besides, what does "allochtoon," a term used for even a third generation child who hardly speaks the native language of her grandparents, really signify?

Uniformly vilifying highly diverse Muslim communities has become part of a global development since the war on terror, but it has a particular twist in the Netherlands.[2] These, and other important matters, are addressed in this volume at length. I wish to shed light on the lived experiences of Islamophobia and on antiracist resistance in particular, something that is part of the broader social movements in the Netherlands. This *internal* view is that of an academic, an immigrant, and above all, an activist. It is a reminder that the "post-Fortuyn" era has not completely subjugated us; that there were and are moments of subversion and opposition and, however small the victories, in the long run they matter and need to be told.

The period I refer to throughout this chapter broadly covers the years 2002–2008, a phase during which the limits of what is considered "acceptable" in the dominant Dutch public debate were pushed to the extreme. The style of the debate nurtured anti-Muslim sentiments and produced a new modus operandi of Dutch xenophobia. This creeping racism was partly familiar because it reflected a continuation of Dutch racism that shaped the Netherlands long before, yet it was also different, and on the surface, somehow invisible. To understand this paradoxical dynamic, I will revisit a

number of important marking points. Apart from the 9/11 turning point toward global anti-Muslim stigmatization, two other local incidents were crucial in shaping current dominant racist discourses and, in turn, antiracist resistance against it: 6 May 2002, the murder of Pim Fortuyn, and 2 November 2004, the murder of Theo van Gogh.

The Bullet Came From the Left

On 6 May 2002, within view of the national elections, scheduled for 15 May, right wing candidate Pim Fortuyn was killed. We, Muslim communities and antiracist activists, held our breath; the immediate question on the tip of our tongues was, "Was the shooter Muslim?" This was perhaps an embarrassing reflex, but it is the scrutiny we felt, for 9/11 had showed us the reality of anti-Muslim backlash. The perpetrator, Van der Graaf, was an "autochtoon," a native Dutch animal rights activist. However, as it turned out, this hardly mattered, for the fatal shot that took the life of a politician boomeranged back to antiracism activists after all. Fortuyn built his notoriety not for his views on animals but for his attacks on Islam and for humiliating Muslims. Thus, even while the assassin was not a Muslim, linking Muslims to the murder of Fortuyn became a common slip of the tongue in everyday life. In other words, Muslims were held (co-)responsible for his death and thereby anti-Muslim polemics increased sharply.

What is now completely forgotten is the fact that five days later, on 11 May 2002, the seeds of a grassroots voice against racism could have been planted. A coalition of organizations under the banner *Keer het Tij* (Turn the Tide, KHT) had planned a massive protest.[3] It was to be the first grassroots response on that scale against Fortuyn's anti-Muslim rhetoric that had dominated the public discourse the preceding year. Moreover, the demonstration would not have taken place in the city of Amsterdam, as was usual for national protests, but in Rotterdam, the local domain of Fortuyn himself. Rotterdam immigrants had been exposed more immediately to Fortuyn's political aggression and it had been a harsh space in which to operate for antiracism activists. Pim Fortuyn had become increasingly popular and his racism remained overall unchallenged. As activists, we had all been happy to finally see some response from the mainstream as well. The demonstration on 11 May had the potential of turning the tide, and as we optimistically felt, even to prevent a right-wing election victory. Obviously, the demonstration had to be cancelled; it would be political suicide for the few politicians involved, but also dangerous for the antiracism movement. Most of the initial supporters of KHT had already fled the planning scene because "this was not the right time or place." While the political right was bursting with confidence, the political center-left was paralyzed. But we, most of the activists, were confused too. We didn't know how to deal with the assassination of a politician, a situation the country had not seen since the murder of prince Willem van Oranje in 1584. We had wanted to oppose Fortuyn democratically, through people power. By

killing him, Van der Graaf turned Fortuyn into a martyr. He single-handedly destroyed not only a human life, but also the fragile attempt to take a public stance against anti-Muslim racism of which Fortuyn was the main agitator at the time.

Because the planned demonstration was to take place a week before the national elections, a television documentary about antiracism campaigns had been scheduled to air that same week. The documentary included extensive interviews with people who were critical of Fortuyn. His premature death made airing the documentary problematic. The network feared that it would be accused of slandering Fortuyn and it was also concerned about retaliation against activists who had spoken out in the documentary against Fortuyn's politics—myself included. These concerns were not unfounded as pictures of activists, with their addresses, were already circulating on right-wing websites. We received hate mail, intimidating threats at private addresses, or were stalked by telephone. We made a conscious choice not to go public about the threats so as not to add more fear (and self-censorship) to the already growing reluctance among politically engaged community activists and academics to speak out.

While Muslims indeed got the bulk of the blame, "the left" (anyone from center-left politicians and critical journalists to public opponents of Fortuyn) became the primary victims of a vengeful public witch hunt. Under pressure from the right-wing parties, the elections were *not* postponed, and because the elections were so soon after the assassination, ticking Fortuyn on the ballot became a political statement, like signing Fortuyn's condolence register. The political party named after Fortuyn, the party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), won without the P and the F. The Netherlands, already tripping by an uncommonly frantic election campaign dominated by Fortuyn, experienced a political earthquake after the election results.

Notwithstanding Fortuyn's anti-religious "enlightenment secularism," characteristic to his discourse, the mourning of his death had a strongly religious aura. His villa in Rotterdam turned into a shrine for thousands of visitors. They were staring in tears or hugging each other in front of cameras, leaving behind candles, teddy bears, flowers, and personal notes. The funeral procession was unparalleled by Dutch standards, resembling archive footage of the John F. Kennedy and Princess Diana funerals. Fortuyn's death unleashed a sentiment that, even though it existed under the surface, was unprecedented. Riots broke out almost immediately after the assassination. Fortuyn supporters mingled with skinheads and extreme right figures. Most of them agreed about the question of guilt, pointing their fingers at the "Linkse Kerk" ("left-wing church") and scoffing that "the bullet came from the left." This was a double reference: Van der Graaf was a leftist and Fortuyn was shot on the left side of his head. Windows of political party offices were smashed and politicians received death threats, including letters containing bullets. And thus, instead of leading to a step forward in the struggle against racism, the murder of Fortuyn became an important marker in the recent history of racism that threw the country several steps backward.

This Is Our 9/11

> *When the world is compelled to coin a new term to take account of increasingly widespread bigotry, that is a sad and troubling development. Such is the case with* Islamophobia. *(Kofi Annan, UN, 2004)[4]*

The Fortuyn episode provides the political background against which, two and-a-half years later, Theo van Gogh was killed on 2 November 2004. This background, combined with the symbolic meaning of Van Gogh as a well-known writer and artist who deployed "free speech" for his anti-Muslim ranting, contributed to the most determining marker in the political trajectories since 9/11. With Van Gogh as the celebrity enfant terrible—his trademark reference to Moroccans or Muslims was "Geitenneukers" ("goat fuckers")—insulting Muslims became avant-garde. This time, the perpetrator was a 26-year-old Dutch Moroccan. And so the brief relief that the killer of Fortuyn was not a Muslim was doubly avenged and a new level of anti-Muslim violence was reached.

The massive public gathering in the capital's Dam square on the evening of Van Gogh's death was something unprecedented as well. Among the speakers were Amsterdam Mayor Job Cohen, Van Gogh's celebrity friends, his family, and a variety of politicians. The atmosphere was extremely tense. Especially, the demagogue speech of then Minister of Integration and Immigration Rita Verdonk, notorious for her anti-immigrant policies, made many shiver.[5] The theme of the evening was "free speech"—to honor what Van Gogh stood for. At this and other highly publicized events that followed, Muslims in particular were expected to condemn the murder, signaling that the whole Muslim community was held accountable for the acts of one extremist individual. This logic was terribly confirmed when, in the same week of Van Gogh's death, several Muslim schools and mosques were set ablaze and many more defamed with racist graffiti.

Although the anti-Muslim connotations were not surprising since the 9/11 attacks occurred in the US in 2001, the intensity of the backlash in the Netherlands took many by surprise. Despite the extremely tense context, there were several protests and calls for unity that I will describe below. Nevertheless, in my conversations with co-activists, and more generally, speaking with victims of the backlash, the situation was often dubbed as "our 9/11." The international media that flooded the Netherlands analyzed the events in astonishment. The Dutch media, in contrast, were giving airtime to politicians who fuelled the flames, and in due course, repro-duced the hype over and over again. Right-wing and leading (center-right) politicians alike resorted to vindicating anti-Islam speeches. Minister of Finance Gerrit Zalm declared "war on Islamists," and the country's leader, Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende, stated regretfully, "We have been too tolerant."[6]

The debates in parliament were like a roller coaster—swinging from left to right, each member shouting louder than the other. There was no space for self-reflection,

no time to take a breath, and apparently no need for nuance. Politicians seemed to be competing over a piece of the pie, and in doing so, one after another described disaster-prone scenarios, meanwhile not mentioning that most of Van Gogh's terminology about immigrants and Muslims had been simply racist.

In fact, the issue of discrimination or racism was avoided like the plague. In the post-Van Gogh mania, positive references to Muslims were met with ridicule. Moreover, a special commission (*Commissie Blok*) was set up to study what the national sentiment considered to be the failure of immigrant/Muslim integration. This unusual investigation was Ayaan Hirsi Ali's initiative (then MP for the VVD, the rightist Conservatives).[7] But to her dismay, the outcome of the study was that the "integration" of "allochtonen" was actually "progressing." The report's main message was not to condemn one or the other, but on the contrary, to *build bridges* (Bruggen Bouwen). The report signaled a rising Turkish and Moroccan middle class, confirming that a majority of children, although being from mostly illiterate parents with rural backgrounds, completed their education with success.[8] It thus suggested that, *despite* the stigmatization and institutional impediments, a majority of the disadvantaged youth wanted (and managed) to succeed.

Although Blok (who led the investigation and after whom the committee was named) was a member of parliament for the *same* conservative VVD party as Hirsi Ali, the report was sidelined as a leftist conspiracy. The report was said to deny the "problems of multiculturalism" and it was branded "politically correct." These qualifications, as well as the aforementioned "linkse kerk" ('left church') slur signify the tone of the public debate. The media provided the platform for the growing anti-Muslim discourse and the vehicles of Islamophobe racism as I will discuss. But this hostile transformation had already started with the innocent-sounding label "Islam Debate," so perhaps more obstinate was the instrumentalization of progressive (enlightenment) ideals as this made it possible to vent anti-Muslim arguments in the name of "tolerance."

Intolerance . . . In the Name of Tolerance

The absence of a critical discussion of race and racism in the Dutch context has a long history as was also strikingly exemplified by euphemisms such as "politionele acties" ("police actions") for the violent colonial oppression in Indonesia; neatly swept under the carpet and not part of the curriculum in history class. This partly explains why, as the work of Essed (*Understanding Everyday Racism*) demonstrates, it has always been difficult to discuss racism in the Netherlands. Positioning religion against race and placing it within the overall "freedom of speech" framework was a powerful way to strip Islamophobia of its racist features and block the debate even more forcefully. According to this logic—that religion is not race—unlike race, people *choose* a religion.[9] Hirsi Ali was a strong proponent of this claim, for instance in her

comment that when people don't rid themselves of a religion whose main prophet is a pedophile, they should also accept the consequences.[10] The *religion vs. race* card became a handy device in the public debate with which it was possible to continue to wear the mask of "tolerance."

To the international media, the rising stardom of Pim Fortuyn and after him Geert Wilders seemed like a dramatic turning point from the small tolerant country becoming such a confused intolerant mess. But to activists and others involved for a bit longer, it was like hearing echoes of earlier sounds. Taking a step back and re-examining the arguments, a pattern appears. The general legitimization of an extremely stigmatizing debate was the novel need to "break taboos," and there is the hint. The *breaking taboos* card, though presented as something unique, was a replica and continuation of earlier stages. Influential and well-known VVD politician Frits Bolkestein started "breaking taboos" regarding Muslim minorities in the early 1990s (after the 1991 Gulf War); later PvdA (Labour Party) affiliated writer and commentator Paul Scheffers basically polished this theme with his "Multicultural Drama" essay in 2000. His contribution was much better received by the larger public since now it came from the center-left and it was endowed with what was considered "intellectual" value. And then, with a lot more pomposity and affront, former academic and political newcomer Pim Fortuyn picked up where Bolkestein and Scheffers left off. But there was one crucial difference: the objective conditions had meanwhile changed considerably after 2001: Fortuyn was able to mold his raison d'être with a global post-9/11 paradigm and this was an explosive mixture. Fortuyn's main legacy is *zeggen waar het op staat* ("call a spade a spade"). Adopted from Bolkestein and Scheffers, it was again repackaged as "religion critique." This new format effectively led to a *commoditization of Islam:* Islam-related issues became an easy score. The persisting civilization discourse that soon evolved began to mirror that of the religious fundamentalists it claimed to critique; it represented an *enlightenment fundamentalism.*[11] These seemingly contradicting conditions led to the paradoxical phenomenon of actually promoting intolerance in the name of tolerance.

Thus, anti-Islam politics culminated after 6 May 2002 and 2 November 2004 as Muslims became the common denominator for danger, oppression of women, over-population, social crisis, and so on. The willingness to at least entertain the idea of multiculturalism that existed prior to 2002 made way for some of the most coercive assimilationist policies in Europe. Steadily, "Moroccan," "Muslim," and "Allochtoon" became interchangeable terms. For instance, images of Muslims could be about Moroccans and vice versa; the visual representations had come to trigger a chain of negative associations such as violence or unemployment. Stretching the limits of free speech immunized society and hence opened the door for hate speech against Moroccans in particular, using terms such as "geitenneukers" ("goat fuckers") by Theo van Gogh; also "kut-Marokkanen" ("cunt Moroccans") originated by Labour Party

politician Rob Oudkerk; or "straatterroristen" ("street terrorists") by Geert Wilders. As no systematic counter-narrative was presented in this rapid transformation, a process of racist normalization was activated.

Indeed, many examples showed that behind racist verbal violence creeps the possibility of physical racist violence. Although stereotyping is important to discuss, racism is about more than *representation*. It is also about real, embodied, tangible facts and treatments that deeply hurt, scare, and anger. Moreover, Muslims in the Netherlands are mostly working class people of color: Islam is the religion of the ethnic minority. This matters greatly because, firstly, it is a class with limited power or access to social capital and cannot afford the elitist "just ignore it" whiff, and secondly, it is a religion with demarcated visibility which means this kind of racism involves more *hostility*—Muslims were (literally) spit at in the face, veils were torn from women's heads, Molotov cocktails were thrown at mosques. This new form of racism is both an *incident* (a bus driver not stopping for a veiled woman) and a *structural* problem (candidates with Arab names are not invited for job interviews; Muslim (appearing) youths are more likely to be arrested due to biased profiling).[12] Perhaps unsurprising, but important to note, is that Dutch Islamophobia surpassed the racist backlash in the US in the wake of the 2001 terror attacks. If a comparison with the US does not sit well, anti-Muslim attacks in the Netherlands were also worse than those in the aftermath of the terror attacks, during which hundreds of civilians died, in Spain (2005) and the UK (2007).[13]

Gatekeepers of Racism: Mediating the "Other"

It was and still is a struggle to get antiracist counter-narratives across and into the mainstream public sphere. The public dehumanization of Muslims, and the absence of firm protest against it, seemed to remove the ability of the Dutch polity to recognize injustice or at least to exercise a basic level of self-control in public debates. Racist propagandists were welcomed to vent their ideas in the widely read opinion pages or to sit next to celebrities on popular television shows. As a follow up, the comment lists on websites of popular television programs or newspapers showed a string of racist comments and became the main hosts of a distasteful and nasty "onderbuik" ("under-belly") opinion. As a result, the mediatized debates effectively functioned as the gate-keepers of racism. A major site of resistance thus became the debate itself.

Dutch journalism became unbearable for many of us and led to the complete avoidance of certain popular programs because they were too upsetting to watch. By and large, Muslims were mainly invited to confirm the stereotypes. As a critic and public figure in the antiracism movement, I was also approached for interviews. Several times after the pre-screening interview, I would be called back (or not at all) to say that the planned interview had been cancelled. Sometimes, someone else (often less critical or more stereotypical, e.g., a religious-conservative imam) was

chosen instead. This is important to note, because one of the fatalist arguments within the minority community was that not enough was being done to change public opinion; that we were complaining but not challenging the media. The media rituals were focused on side-lining critical voices or confronting these opinions with what was said by a reactionary imam. The worst approach was probably when two migrants were provoked to debate each other, opposing each other rather than starting from what they had in common, and in doing so, they functioned as entertainment for the Dutch host. The vastness and speed of the hype made it extremely difficult to push back.

The way the media organizes the debate is key to unraveling the structural racism that antiracist activists face, both on the everyday tactical as well as on the organizational strategic levels. There are numerous levels of explicit media biases. When the 2006 *Monitoring Racism and Extremism* report (University of Leiden with Anne Frank Stichting) showed that "autochtoon" (white) far-right extremism constituted larger groups and more serious threats than Muslim radicalism, this received very shallow attention and only mentioned sections of the report that dealt with Muslims radicalism. Incidents involving Moroccan youth are not only blown out of proportion in the media, they even started to cause hysteria and were internalized by other minority groups. The mediated public debates feed into massive hype and practically engineered the public opinion that has impacted society in the wider sense. Revisiting several polls at the time, for instance, show that (according to the 2005 TNS-NIPO) before November 2004, 45% of Muslims felt "at home" in the Netherlands. In 2007 the number dropped to 27%. Another case in point is that a large number of highly educated Dutch Muslims who face racism want to (and did) emigrate.[14]

When these phenomena take place in a *counter-terrorism* context, i.e., a war on terror context in which civil liberties are sacrificed, Muslims more than others become subservient to intolerant measures. On 1 November 2005, two young men travelled by train from Germany to Amsterdam. Several passengers called the police because, besides their beards and wearing a *djelleba* (Muslim overcoat dress), they allegedly behaved suspiciously. This suspicious behavior later was identified as the fact that they carried a backpack and stayed in the restroom longer than "normal." The two Dutch Moroccan men who were thought to be preparing a terrorist attack were on their way back home from their study abroad. They were on their way to celebrate *Eid al-Fitr* (the Feast of Sacrifice marking the end of Ramadan) with their family. During their journey, they went to the lavatory to perform ablution (the pre-prayer washing).

Major news networks televised the arrests live. They captured the young men being cuffed by police, removed from the train, blindfolded and escorted by a special anti-terrorist squad. It was like an action movie. It was a traumatic (and humiliating) experience for them first and foremost, but it affected many others too. Coincidentally,

it was a day that many Muslims were spending at home. Families and neighbors who visited each other on that *Eid al-Fitr* holiday watched this drama unfolding on television, all along aware that this could have happened to their family too.[15]

This example demonstrates that the more "integrated" Muslims are in the strict sense, the more squeezed between a rock and a hard place. In terms of how "to behave" following the media standards, this is in fact a catch-22: the potential terrorist is at times represented as the unemployed juvenile dropout, and at other times, well-educated students (such as those young men on the train) are considered particularly susceptible to recruitment for terrorism. Also, the influence of the internet is a special point of concern.[16] It is hardly surprising that the process of "othering" becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Ironically, the tragedy is not them rejecting society as the mantra about Muslim youngsters goes, but about them being rejected by their country of birth. Their very presence belies the one-dimensional imagined community of the Netherlands as a unified (provincial) white society, a fantasy bearing no resemblance to 21st century urban reality. Their message is: "we are part of the Dutch nation and we are here to stay." However, they were left to fend for themselves while the general public got mobilized to tolerate if not support racist ideologies. As I will discuss bellow, what was sorely missed was the crucial support from the political left when it was most needed.

The Dutch Social Movement: *Better safe than sorry?*
Despite the overwhelming nature of events, antiracist groups organized numerous initiatives a few highlights of which will be mentioned. The groups I was closely involved with were *Stop de Hetze* ('Stop the Hype') in November 2004, *Samen tegen Racisme* (STR) ('Together against Racism'; see picture), and in later phases of the struggle, the (reanimated) *Nederland Bekent Kleur* (meaning 'showing our colors,' i.e., 'taking sides'). These initiatives were meant to create space for new and old antiracist activists to join forces. Looking back, our interventions and protests contributed to countering the so-called Islam debate, led by the aforementioned *enlightenment fundamentalists,* and their (brown) apologists.

There were several examples of fighting the racist tide with which I was involved. At a large public meeting of STR, a white Dutch woman told me she had joined antiracism demonstrations in the early 1990s and had done voluntary work with illiterate immigrant women.[17] It was her complaint at the end of a long deliberation about women's oppression that struck me in particular: "We gave a lot . . . you know." This made me realize that there was a deeper resentment, a *disappointment* perhaps. The truth is that Muslims *are* indeed more "visible." They are not hidden in factories nor do they hide in fear. Young second and third generation Muslims *demand* a place and a role in society. They refuse handouts *and* they are vocal about it. The outcome of not accepting them on their own terms—such as their own clothing and faith—is counter-productive. Wearing a veil or growing a beard is not only part of religious practice in the context of social exclusion and denial of one's identity; these are markers that signify the protection if not reclamation of an identity under attack. It was rather surprising to discover that these social dynamics are not self-evident. It seems that the political compass of secular white liberals (who make up the majority of the progressive social movements) does not include non-western religious minorities.[18]

The next examples I will share are further examinations of this observation and based on the two important moments in the Dutch context that can be considered the sites of contestation: the international day against racism on 21 March and the Kerwin Herdenking (memorial) on 21 August. The commemoration of Kerwin is an important event, organized on the 21st of August in Amsterdam in the Dam square, the day and place where the 15-year-old black Kerwin was stabbed to death by a skinhead in 1983. Generally, the political aim of progressive political commemoration is to relate particular incidents or events to current examples of injustice that need to be countered. Nevertheless, it was very much about the past and behind us, and whereas the commemoration of Kerwin Duinmeijer is broadly acknowledged, fighting anti-Muslim racism is only exceptionally accredited. As activists and Muslims, we

wanted to remind the audience that honoring Kerwin is to fight the current expressions of racism. The "old" approach of the commemorations continued during the crucial years 2001–2004; void of reference to racism suffered by Muslims. When our new anti-racism initiatives gained more and more momentum, STR was approached to co-organize the 2005 commemoration of Kerwin's murder. Through our involvement, we engaged a diverse range of speakers and artists. Muslims, Antilleans, and Surinamese representatives also spoke about the ongoing and more recent manifestations of racism.[19]

As it generally happens with oppositional political movements, outspoken antiracists, because they disrupt the status-quo, are readily dismissed as *provocateurs.* It was almost as important to change the ruling ideas in the movement itself. We had to go back to basics as the titles of the public meetings we organized show: *Is Islamophobia the New Racism?; Islamophobia and Hirsi Ali's False Feminism; What Does Wilders want?*

At the 2004 Dutch Social Forum (NSF, chapter of the World Social Forum), the *False Feminism* meeting was particularly tense; Hirsi Ali was widely supported and had not been seriously challenged before. This was an issue on which public figures would have a certain opinion informally and another opinion publicly; the tactic seemed to be "better play it safe now than be sorry later." Perhaps that's why this NSF seminar was one of the largest meetings of the Social Forum.[20] The meeting was made up of a panel with Turkish lawyer Famile Arslan, then head of the Moroccan women association Fenna Ullichi, the well-known author and Dutch white feminist Anja Meulenbelt and myself. Meulenbelt opted, from her critical feminist understanding of *power*—white privilege class—to differentiate between dominant and minority groups in debates about emancipation and religion. She was one of the very few white feminists in support of Muslims and for the right of women to wear the veil.

An academic feminist objected to my critique of the Western feminist embrace of Hirsi Ali. Also my argument that Dutch feminists patronizingly offer Muslim women *emancipation from above* such as right-wing celebrity feminist Cisca Dresselhuys (and good friend of Hirsi Ali)[21] was staunchly countered and provoked heckling. One local (female) politician shouted, "You are a demagogue." Another attendee was furious at Meulenbelt for betraying her (Dutch 1970s feminist, as she later explained) principles.

Moroccan speaker Fenna Ullichi explained that Islamophobic feminism complicates the struggle of migrant women. Threatened groups tend to "close ranks" when their collective safety is at stake and this dynamic, in turn, tends to mute internal critique. Our main message—besides that *oppressed* Muslim women were not waiting to be liberated *by* Dutch women but wish to do that on their own terms with the *support* of Dutch women—was that we did not want to be used as pawns in political affairs.

Where is the "Left" When You Need Them?

There are several ways to smear dirt on oppositional voices and activists. International Middle East politics is an important part of this method. One of the strategies to silence dissent is to claim that antiracist activists *promote* antisemitism.[22] I have been a target of that too through my active opposition against the so-called War on Terror, the Dutch involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in support of Palestinians. Even after growing a relatively "thick skin" and trying to ignore the provocations, it remains dismaying when accusations of antisemitism are aimed at Palestinian solidarity campaigners and become instrumental in silencing dissent.[23] But among the most painful moments in my experience was the 2008 Day Against Racism held on 21 March, the second "test" case to mention after the NSF experiences. The Dutch political left had no backbone when it was most needed; Muslims were simply abandoned.

In the early 1990s, the antiracist organization NBK used to mobilize almost 100,000 people for 21 March, but this had not been the case in the Netherlands for years. In 2008, protest was more urgent than ever. In the absence of strong voices against racism, politician Geert Wilders managed to emerge as a dominant figure. The first major warning was when Wilders evolved from a dissident MP to seize nine seats (almost 10 per cent of the vote) in the 2006 national election. By the end of 2007, Wilders' tirades against (Black) Antilleans, Moroccans, and Muslims multiplied until they dominated the public agenda. Soon after his humiliating call to put former colony (Dutch Antilles) with its people for sale on eBay, Wilders' Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Freedom Party) proposed to strip Muslims of their civil rights with a ban on the Quran. Wilders compared the Quran to Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and Islam to Nazi ideology. He proclaimed that Muslims who want to stay in the Netherlands must first rip the Quran to pieces. NBK and STR joined forces and decided to organize a national demonstration against racism when this Islamophobic hyperbole reached its dangerous peak; this was during Wilders' publicity campaign for his anti-Islam film *Fitna*. Due to the prevailing context—the perceived heroism of breaking (politically correct) taboos and the

glorification of free speech dogmas—(leftish) politicians and groups who would tradi-tionally have participated got cold feet; here too, the political compass was often deter-mined by a *better safe than sorry* approach. From our many talks with civil society organizations and other activists, we had to conclude that the by now pretty battered immigrant communities were not ready to mobilize for mass protest. Therefore, the coalition called for a 21 March Manifestation on the Dam Square in Amsterdam, with musicians, politicians, and a broad representation of activists. Assembling all together on this location would avoid a low participation rate, which would be more visible if we had continued with the original plan of a march through the city of Amsterdam. Maximization of unity in a low-key initiative could form a bridge towards a broader and more massive mobilization. The more important and overall aim in the stage we were at was to make clear that racism was taking place; this needed to be admitted and combated.

Although Wilders was the main megaphone of the racist agenda we were strug-gling against, we did not emphasize this too much because we did not want to feed into the argument that we were "demonizing" him, his successful defense ploy. Advocating a broader antiracism message was a strategic choice precisely as not to scare off political parties which were still very shy to participate. Our approach was purposely very moderate; the politicians were invited as representatives of parlia-ment to say whatever they wanted. They would receive a petition against racism and against Wilders' Islamophobia to take with them to The Hague, in other words—all very soft. The logic was that, in the long run, the presence of MPs, however weak in their antiracist message, was more important for boosting morale and countering Wilders than having a purist platform of speakers without them with very few people attending. Our mobilization was gaining increasing attention and Wilders' team started to indeed complain of *demonization*.

Shockingly, the three "leftist" speakers of the PvdA (Labor Party), GL (Green Left) and SP (Socialist Party) collectively withdrew their support three days before the event. Worse, without consulting with the organizers, they announced this in the press. They claimed that it was "inappropriate" for MPs to participate in an event where a fellow MP was criticized, although no such protocol ever existed as their participation in other protests affirms. It was astonishing to read these former allies claim, in the papers, that we should not focus on Wilders but talk about discrimination in general: "demon-strations are against ideas, not against people" (Karabulut, MP for SP).[24] Blaming us for criticizing Wilders was not only unfair, but completely unrealistic. Wilders had already been single-handedly dominating the news for months, predominantly with his *Fitna* film release and the scoops about it: it would have been bizarre to ignore this.

Knowing that their absence would lift many eyebrows, the MPs pre-empted critique by indicting the initiators of the protest. For instance, in a widely quoted interview for the daily (right-wing tabloid) Telegraaf, Khadija Arib (MP for PvdA) notes, "NBK claims to be 'against polarization' but is doing that [polarizing] itself . . . There is this smell

of instigation (*Het heeft allemaal iets ophitserigs*)."[25] In deliberately constructing this image and collectively boycotting the manifestation, they effectively formed a *cordon sanitaire* against antiracists rather than against racists. In my speech during the protest (which we continued to hold regardless of their embargo), I remarked that politicians who publically refused to attend the event were effectively *de*mobilizing antiracism. In addition, by also claiming Parliament as their only space to counter Wilders, they reminded us of the main problem: antiracist interventions in parliament by MPs were exactly *not* happening (exceptions aside) which is why we took to the streets in the first place. Former MP Hedy D'Ancona (PvdA—Labor Party), who did come to the demonstration, gave a passionate speech. She asked the 5,000 people present in the pouring rain, "What has become of the Netherlands if politicians don't dare to come here and address you?" She closed with the words that sent shivers through our spines: "It is a disgrace that *one man* [Wilders] can take them [politicians] all hostage; it is a disgrace I tell you." These experiences taught us an important lesson: we need to think outside of the (election) box of parliamentary politics. Political parties are not an end in itself but the means. People can make more of a difference when they organize from below in grassroots groups, ones not restricted by parliamentary political loyalty, independent and willing to criticize leftist parties. This, in due course, has the potential to force those very parties to take sides. A movement that fights back also helps against despair: it empowers us because at least, as in the words of Alice Walker: "If the civil rights movement is 'dead' and it gave us nothing else, it gave us each other for ever . . ."

Breaking the Chains

> *. . . It gave us courage and strength for our little boys and girls to follow. It gave us hope for tomorrow, it called us to life." Alice Walker*[26]

By May 2009, antiracists were baffled to learn that Wilder's PVV won 17% of the vote during the European elections, thus becoming the second largest European representative for the Netherlands. And in the March 2010 local elections, our fears were confirmed when Wilders gained a stunning numbers of seats in several cities. In one city, Almere, the PVV even had a dominant position. Mid-2009, when there were already clear signs that the PVV was to grow, and when Wilders proposed what he called the *kop-vodden-tax* ('head rag-taxation') under which Muslim women wearing a veil should be fined 1,000 Euro (for "pollution"), his remained the most popular political party in the polls. This was a sign that we were approaching a crossroad; effective antiracism will require a more pro-active stance to change the course of events. The electoral shifts and the prominence of an extreme right-wing and racist party leeching on anti-Islam sentiments demonstrated most clearly that Islamophobia is not just about "debates"; the PVV, an outright racist party with a fascist ideology, had

now penetrated our decision-making bodies. In effect, the PVV hijacked the 2010 national elections and was the proxy-leading party.

This chapter thus shows that antiracism works in two ways: firstly, self-defense and mobilizing resistance to injustice, and secondly, channeling of legitimate anger in a productive and empowering manner. Self-activism and solidarity are two sides of the same (antiracism) coin. However, in this regard, the Dutch context with its weak social movements in general and legacy of antiracism in particular, is seriously lacking. The most notable cause is the disloyalty and weakness of the political left to organize crucial support when most needed.

It is true that the mainstream (center-left) parties suffered from what Fortuyn's breakthrough inflicted on them; but the formula that Wilders sets the tone and the rest are either quiet or follow suit, must be broken. When politicians and public intellectuals do not counter racism, it becomes common sense and people in the Netherlands have become quite susceptible to the moral panic about Muslims (or Moroccans). The hope that racist politics will disappear with time is dangerously naïve. Complacency is now complicity. Looking back at the many events we organized, it seems as though we tapped into a great desire as the events and meetings attracted large numbers. They became those rare spaces where Muslims and non-Muslims came together to talk politics. The potential of solidarity was apparent when well-known Jewish figures spoke out against Islamophobia. Television producer and presenter Harry de Winter did so, for instance, in a front-page ad in the daily *Volkskrant*: replacing "Muslim" with "Jew" and "Islam" with "Judaism" in a quote by Wilders, he asked (rhetorically) whether this would still be accepted under the free speech arguments. Holocaust survivor and campaigner Hayo Meyer and former Mayor of Amsterdam and Secretary of State (Labour) Ed van Thijn (also WW2 survivor) helped expose the bias during various presentations and speeches at our events.

Breaking the chain of racism in a consistent manner demands an *internationalist* approach. A concrete suggestion is that Belgian and Dutch antiracists cooperate as these are countries where racist policies and discourses are very similar. For instance, activists Nadia Fadil and Sarah Bracke in Antwerp are doing significant work to combat racism in their country.[28] It is crucial for us in the Netherlands to join forces with neighbors in Europe to strengthen our collective efforts. But, as argued, Islamophobia is also legitimized through the "war on terror" and the label "antisemitism," and this somehow makes it a transnational phenomenon as well. From personal experience in Palestine and anti-war campaigns, when diverse groups join forces around a shared cause for justice, a powerful momentum is generated. These are the spaces where people are united; and when collectively facing the police or smear campaigns against fellow activists, the walls come down even faster. During these human intersections, however brief, one can taste the potential of a world without racism. This tingling taste is the best antidote for defeatism and a stimulator of collective antiracist resistance.

Notes

1. This chapter discusses Islamophobia and hence the focus is on Muslims. Racist subjugation of other minority groups exists as well, most notably Antilleans and refugees. I wish to thank the editors of this book and Philomena Essed, Mayida Zaal, Andrew Gebhard, Mohammed Waked, Nadia Fadel, and Jelle Klaas for their very valuable comments. Although this contribution stems from *past* experience, I wish to salute my comrades Mohamed Benhadou, Jamal Ftieh, Mohammed Rabbae, Rene Danen, Hakima Aouragh, Mohammed Achabar, Peyman Jafari, Pepijn Brandon, Frank van Schaik, and many others whose continuous efforts keep antiracism part of my *present*.

2. Work that has inspired me includes (for Belgium) N. Fadil."Breaking the Taboo of Multiculturalism: The Belgian Left and Islam." *Thinking through Islamophobia.* Ed. S. Sayyid, and A. Vakil; K. Arnaut, S. Bracke, B. Ceuppens, S. De Mul, N. Fadil, and M. Kanmaz. *Een leeuw in een kooi: de grenzen van het multiculturele Vlaanderen*; (for the US) A. Bakalian, and Bozorgmehr, *Backlash 9/11: Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans Respond*; (for Australia) A. Aslan. *Islamophobia in Australia.*

3. KHT had been involved in several mass mobilizations against the new neo-liberal government known then as "Balkenende 1."

4. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/ Press/docs/2004/sgsm9637.doc.htm> (last accessed 2008).

5. Verdonk was feared by many Muslims. Beside her anti-immigrant policies and enforced assimilation programs, Verdonk was implicated in the dramatic events at the Schiphol detention center which, under her ministerial decisions, imprisoned refugees before deportation. The unsafe and locked-up bunker meant that, during a fire, 11 refugees were killed. Yet, she became increasingly popular with her graft right-wing populism. She was a fan of Pim Fortuyn, and although competing for the same constituency, very friendly with Geert Wilders too. She was a leading figure for the rightist conservative VVD,

but grew increasingly defiant to her party. After losing the party leadership contest, she set up her own movement called "Trots op Nederland" ('Proud of the Netherlands').

6. C.f. the interview in Volkskrant, 26 February, 2002, in which Zalm, who also was vice Prime Minister, linking global/local political paradigms reiterating an "either with us or against us" logic.

7. Rather than as Member of Parliament, she was better-known as an author of books about women's oppression in Islam that gave her celebrity status, and as a friend of Van Gogh with whom she worked on the film *Submission* about the role of women according to the Quran. The perpetrator of Van Gogh's death mentioned Hirsi Ali as a target. As a result, under state protection, this also gained her global fame and she soon toured around the world. When Minister Verdonk claimed to have discovered that Hirsi Ali had given false testimony about her refugee status when she applied for asylum, Verdonk announced that Hirsi Ali would therefore be stripped of the Dutch nationality she had been given. Obviously, this caused an enormous political row. After a dramatic live-aired press conference which ended with a farewell, Hirsi Ali moved to the US and joined the right-wing, and at the time, Bush-allied think tank American Enterprise.

8. "Bruggen Bouwen" is available at <http://www.parlement.com/9291000/d/ rapportcieblok.pdf> (last accessed 2008).

9. To be clear, this is different than the critical academic debate about the meaning of race and racism, such as that discussed by Kenan Malik in the seminal *The Meaning of Race* (1996) as well as David Goldberg's *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning* (1993) and his excellent *The Racial State* (2002).

10. In the television program *Rondom 10* (aired on 12 September 2002), Ali made similar derogatory remarks. One of the Muslim guests was furious and walked out of the studio.

11. This became a Europe-wide phenomenon which is outlined by Liz Fekete in her "Enlightened Fundamentalism? Immigration, Feminism and the Right."

12. Many of the incidents and the general growth of racism-related violence have been archived by *Monitor Racisme & Extremisme.* The reports can be found at http://www. monitorracisme.nl/content.asp?pid =1&lid=1. A helpful English source on the post-Van Gogh backlash can be found at <http://www. annefrank.org/content.asp?PID=472&LID=2> (Last accessed 2008).

13. A European comparison offering extensive data about (anti-) Muslim-related developments is "Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia," available at <http://www.eukn.org/binaries/eukn/eukn/research/2007/4/muslims-in-the-eu-dec-2006.pdf (last accessed 2008).

14. Interviews with migrant Muslims who wish to emigrate can be found at http://www .novatv .nl/page/detail/uitzendingen/7063/'Hoog+ opgeleide+jonge+moslims+willen+weg'

15. I experienced this with family who gathered drinking mint tea with special almond sweets on this celebratory day. The television was on and news programs were airing those scenes. "When will they leave us alone" and similar comments were floating around the room. A cousin said, "This time they took them off the train. Next time they will put us on the train." This comment struck me because it signifies a certain historical knowledge: it references the symbol of the train in Dutch consciousness during WW2 when, in Amsterdam in particular, hundreds of thousands of Jews were put on the trains to Nazi camps. But it also struck me as extremely cynical.

16. Sociologist Albert Benschop for instance writes about Dutch Muslim radicalization, their great source being cyberspace, jumping to conclusions about offline terrorism. See the chapter "From Cyber Jihad to Political Murder in his Jihad in the Netherlands" from his *Chronicle* (2004) available at http://www.sociosite

.org/jihad_nl_en.php#cyberjihad> (Last accessed 2008).

17. Her criticism of my defense of Muslims became a familiar one. The passion of defending freedom against religious oppression made me wonder whether those secular intellectuals really knew what they were talking about or whether they envisioned the Taliban when we talked about Islam and veils. The image of Muslim women is generally very distorted by hypes about "the burqa" with a counter-productive impact. See the important work of Annelies Moors, e.g., in the daily newspaper *Trouw,* 4 December 2009 at <http://www.trouw.nl/krantenarchief/ 2009/12/04/2931397/_Maatregelen_tegen_ nikab_werken_louter_averechts_.html>.

18. Anti-discrimination campaigns led by liberal/white leftists often prefer moderate/secular representation. The approach implies that racism is a "white burden" and illustrates some of the obvious infantilizing connotations. For instance, *Kom niet aan mijn buren* ('don't touch my neighbor') sounds very much like white "autochtonen" calling on white "autochtonen" to help brown "allochtonen."

19. For instance, regarding the Antillean Index (listing which Antilleans, although Dutch monarchy subjects, are not allowed to travel to/live in the Netherlands) or the humiliating strip-search policy applied to Surinamese travelers on Schiphol airport. The day closed with a demonstration from the Dam to the Vondelpark, through the heart of the city. In the park at the *Moeder Aarde* monument, family and friends of Kerwin continued with special tributes. Rather than the meek approach attended by the usual handful of activists, this broader approach helped us to mobilize hundreds of people from different backgrounds, and in doing so, provided a pro-active space for engagement and greater media impact.

20. The Dutch Social Forum was part of the European and World Social Forum, which are considered the global activist answer to the neo-liberalization of the World Trade Organization and IMF policies and is referred to as anti- or

alter-globalization movements with (bi-) annual conferences on the global, regional, and local levels.

21. Ironically, not long after Dresselhuys declared that she would never hire veiled women at her popular magazine *Opzij,* it was the veiled Dutch-Turkish lawyer Famile Arslan who was at our meeting that posed on the cover of *Time* magazine as an example of a success story (see picture, with permission from Famile Arslan).

22. Among the most persisting is Carel Brendel (http://www.hetverraadvanlinks.nl\) who even wrote a book vilifying prominent Muslims, antiracist activists (including myself), and politicians that defend multiculturalism. "Traitor" is his mildest smear.

23. At times, Dutch groups like *Ravage*, *Fabel van de Illegaal* and part of *Anti Fascistische Aktie* (AFA) that were once known for their radical critique of Dutch immigration policies, also joined this bandwagon. A common reference to silent dissent at the time was the 13 April demonstration in 2002. Some people carried Israeli flags painted over with swastikas to express anger at the violent military assaults that led to thousands of Palestinian deaths, not as neo-Nazi symbols as the media portrayed them. A small number of incidents, among a massive crowd of 30,000 protesters, was outrageously blown out of proportion. It was even referred to as a new Kristalnacht: an uncontrolled angry mob burning flags and attacking Jews. There was a widely reported incident of Moroccans attacking a Jew that turned out to be a hoax. But the protest itself was not placed in context, such as the military invasions by the notorious Ariel Sharon of Palestinian cities and the Jenin massacre in 2002. The bitterness was also fierce because the Dutch government expressed unconditional support for Israel. None of these contextual references were made. Neither was the violent

police behavior. I stood on the main stage overlooking thousands of people and saw, in the very back of the big square, smoke from burned flags. Then a scene unfolded which left me stunned. Police on horses charged into the crowd at the back end and angry people started throwing stones in response. A sense of powerlessness overtook me when the disruption at the outer circle moved to the center. Women with children were screaming. Some elderly men were desperately trying to calm the police and youths. It was clear: this demonstration would turn into media hype and all of us into scapegoats.

24. This has probably been the most shocking, for the SP was our closest ally due to its progressive agenda vis-à-vis foreign policy and crony capitalism. But its avoidance of actively rejecting racism is a serious problem. Besides electoral opportunism, the paradoxical position vis-à-vis Muslim immigrants/Islamophobia is also related to its historic focus on the "white working classes" as illustrated in the brochure "Gastarbeid en Kapitaal" (1983). Although the text causes embarrassment for many of its members, it is also used as a shield against "politically correct" critique: "We already said this 25 years ago." The critique of Brandon (Internationale Socialisten) against Van Raak (SP) about this particular legacy in Jaarboek Kritiek 2009 is eye-opening.

25. Kamer boycot Nederland Bekent Kleur. De Telegraaf, 20 Mar. 2008.

26. "The Civil Rights Movement: What good was it?" Referenced by Gary Younge. *The Guardian,* Monday, 16 March 2009. http://www.guardian. co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/16/miners-strike-gary-younge-comment

27. See for their projects and writings, for instance, <http://www.nextgenderation. net/index.html> and http://leeuwinkooi. wordpress.com/>.

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4. Dutch Situations: Reflections From Visitors and Other Keen Observers

First Impressions: Race and Immigration in Holland

Stephen Small

Introduction

In the 1970s in Britain, the Netherlands was heralded, in popular culture and in academic texts, as a haven of harmonious relations. It was portrayed as having a colonial history characterized by limited conflict, mutual understanding and extensive racial inter-mixing. This fit in with the international Dutch reputation of liberalism and openness, best reflected in its attitudes towards soft drugs and sexuality. When I lived in the Netherlands for almost a year my personal experiences were somewhat different. Yes, there was openness and liberalism, but I also met legal and undocumented migrants, subjected to police raids in factories and homes, alongside Surinamese of African descent, victims of racial discrimination, stereotypes and social segregation. More than twenty-five years later, my return to the Netherlands in 2006 revealed continuing contradictions. There was clear evidence of economic and cultural improvements, but these were confounded by racial stereotypes, limited power for its minorities, a disproportionate number of sex workers of color, and hostility to Muslims. In this chapter I narrate some of my personal experiences and impressions of race and ethnic relations in the Netherlands, including change over the course of three decades. In this way I provide insights into how international reputations rest precariously on first impressions, positive and problematic indicators of harmonious ethnic relations often coexist, uneasily, alongside one another, and how the little differences can often make a big difference depending on who you are.

The Context of the 1970s

For me, the 1970s was a decade of dramatic change and awakening, irrepressible curiosity, political maturity and formal education. I moved from living in inner city Liverpool, to increasing my knowledge and cultivating my intellect at University, as

well as expanding my horizons with international travel. Economic difficulties in Britain were intense in the 1970s, immigration problems were always in the news, as was racism. Margaret Thatcher swept to power in 1979, riding a wave of xenophobia and fear—much of it whipped up further by the racist National Front—after her very public speech that people in Britain (read "white people") were afraid of being 'swamped' by people of a different culture. Protests against businesses working with Apartheid South Africa were ubiquitous—especially against Barclays Bank. And my friends and I, the children of immigrants—the so-called Black "second generation"—were emerging as the biggest challenge to "harmonious race relations" in Britain, with high levels of unemployment and educational obstacles, police harassment and brutality, along with transformed levels of cultural identity, self-awareness and pride, fueled by Reggae music and Rastafari.

South Africa was in turmoil, segregated Bantustans were being consolidated, further depriving Black people of their citizenship, and Nelson Mandela was still imprisoned in Robben Island. The MPLA struggled for liberation in Angola, as did FRELIMO in Mozambique, (with Samora Machel becoming president in 1975), while ZANU and ZAPU were soon to transform Rhodesia into Zimbabwe in 1980. Angela Davis moved from public enemy back to university Professor, a weakened Black Panther Party continued its community development, Arthur Ashe won Wimbledon, James Brown was into his third decade as the hardest working man alive. And Watergate sunk Nixon's presidency. In 1975, Suriname became independent. While most people in Britain got this news from the mainstream, we young Black people got most of it from Reggae music, riding a rising wave of popularity in Britain that decade, following Bob Marley and the Wailers' international success. In 1979 the album "Survival" was released, from which one of the hit songs—"Zimbabwe"—was performed by Marley and the Wailers at the Independence celebrations in Harare in 1980.

I was a teenager in the 1970s while all of this happened. My father was black, an immigrant from Jamaica, my mother white, born and bred in Liverpool. My mother faced frequent verbal abuse because she was married to my father. I had known discrimination first hand—white kids at school called me "nigger" or "coon", skinheads attacked my friends and I, especially at weekends when football games with Liverpool or Everton were in play. It was a constant struggle to avoid violence. A "colour bar" operated intermittently in city centre nightclubs and racial discrimination in schools and at work was common. Despite having the longest standing Black population in the nation, the Black community in Liverpool remained the worst off compared with Black communities elsewhere in the nation (Law and Henfrey; Small, "Racialized"). In the city with the dubious title of having been the largest slave port of the largest empire to ever ransack the continent of Africa, there was no mention of slavery anywhere.

While a student at the University of Kent at Canterbury, 1976–79, I studied several courses on race and ethnic relations in Britain, and around the world. I read

about the Netherlands several times in the academic literature. And it was mentioned too by friends in Liverpool. The literature conveyed the image that the Netherlands was a haven of harmonious relations. That slavery in the Dutch colonies, especially Curaçao, had been "mild," (especially as compared with slavery in Jamaica) that its colonial history revealed limited conflict, and that mutual understanding and extensive racial inter-mixing were common (Hoetink; Bagley). All of this resonated with the international Dutch reputation of liberalism and openness, best reflected in its attitudes towards "soft" drugs and sexuality. I also knew that in Holland work was plentiful, pay was high, and that because we were now part of "The Common Market" those of us with British passports could work there. There was also, of course, "soft" drugs, and bars that opened until the early hours of the morning (unlike British pubs that closed way before midnight). This combination attracted my friends. I was attracted by the possibility to earn money. After working for several months in France, a friend of mine pushed me hard to go.

Without a single word of Dutch between us, and not a single contact in the entire country, we took an overnight train from Paris to Rotterdam. Several days of a fruitless search for work there pushed us on to Amsterdam. I got a job, but my friend returned to Britain. At the job I met some African friends, who gave me a place to stay. A few months later, my brother Colin, came to stay with me, along with another friend. I lived in Amsterdam for almost a year (1979-1980), working several low status jobs—in factories and hospitals—involving long days and evenings, seven days a week. I was saving money to travel the world, especially to get to Africa and the Caribbean.

Amsterdam in 1979–1980

My experience of race and ethnic relations was somewhat different from my impressions and expectations. Yes, I experienced many of the things that resonated with Holland's international reputation. Everyone seemed to speak English fluently, and even drunken old ladies sitting on buses would tell me jokes in English. You only had to walk around the red light area, or see the coffee shop's to see Dutch liberalism in effect. Walking around the central shopping area one had the distinct impression of a multicultural society. But I also saw many of the unpleasant aspects. And I experienced a few myself. My first view of the harshness of racial antagonism in Holland, with a vivid reminder of life in England. It involved a young Black guy—he looked West Indian, and was probably Surinamese—being harassed by the police in the train station in Rotterdam. There was loud shouting and he was very angry. The police were angry too, and they crowded and poked him. It sure reminded me of Liverpool. And London.

My African fellow workers, almost entirely men, were to become my friends, advisors and family network during my stay. All had come to Amsterdam looking for work.

Most had followed family members, or friends. And they piled into cramped rooms, with multiple beds and limited personal space. They took part in few social activities, mainly socializing with other friends in their homes. Most of our friends lived in the Bijlmermeer. I had never seen anything like it in my life. Huge, citadel-like structures, that seemed to haunt the horizons on the edge of town. Occasionally we went to a nightclub, including a club in the Bijlmermeer, with Surinamers, people from Curacao, other Africans. We found comfort in our numbers, in our music, in our style, and in being ourselves without the white majority demanding explanation.

All had immediate family members, mainly wives and children, back home, to whom they sent regular cash remittances. Most believed that they were temporary immigrants—expecting to stay only sufficient time to earn the money they needed to set themselves up back home. (Most, as it turned out were wrong—and remained there still, for better or for worse, 25 years later). Most were overqualified for the jobs they did in Amsterdam—having completed far more educational qualifications and even work experience back home than the jobs they were doing—which were mainly of a temporary nature, and in factories. All accepted this work because it paid well. They all worked long hours, kept out of trouble, and were offended but did not agonize over the petty racial indignities, especially Dutch condescension and racist stereotypes that confronted them each day. Their priorities were work, and they found solace and comfort in their own community. I wanted to fight. I did not realize that my boldness was a result of the British passport that I held, and the citizenship that it conferred.

I frequently saw racial hostility in news programs on television about "illegal immigrants," or read them in the newspapers. I experienced being stopped by the police and asked for my papers many times—an experience which was very strange to me as a Brit, after never having been subjected to that in the UK at that time. However, (white) Dutch friends told me that this was normal on the Continent—and it is true that I had experienced that in France, too—so I took their word for it. I was shocked by the prostitutes and the red light area, and had never seen anything like it in my life. We Brits thought that Soho in London was a "red light district" but compared to Amsterdam Soho was like a village compared to Metropolis. I was struck by the high numbers of women of color, among the prostitutes—far greater numbers, it seemed, than their numbers in the immigrant population of color. But I didn't know for sure.

Before I arrived in Holland I already knew that we immigrants carry our passports on our faces and it did not take long for me to be reminded. As soon as I walked into an uitzendbureau (work agency) and asked for work, they asked where I was from. I got frequent immediate refusals—some, just by looking at my face. Some staff, finding out I spoke no Dutch, said they had no work. However, other places desperately needed workers—there was a shortage of labor, and this was not the kind of work that local white residents rushed to obtain. So they asked for my passport. Within

two months I was speaking some Dutch. I got a "Teach Yourself Dutch" course from the library and spent many hours practicing grammar and pronunciation. I was young, highly motivated, and ready to study hard. I had already had much success studying French. Dutch presented some initial problems—especially pronunciation, and idio-syncrasies of syntax. But it had much in common with English including common vocabulary, and a similar technique for conjugation (using an auxiliary verb, modified by person, as opposed to French or Spanish where conjugation is achieved by deploy-ing changes in the endings of the persons). It may sound complicated, perhaps, to someone who does not study languages but to someone who does study them, it is easy. On more than one occasion, I entered an Uitzendbureau, while the staff mem-ber was talking with an African guy in English, telling him he had no work. I spoke in Dutch and asked for work. I was told—in Dutch—"Yes, I have some work, so please wait a minute" and while the African guy was told "I'm afraid we have no work." I was usually offered a job. I told my friends, and they insisted it was not language, it was color. That I was not dark skinned. They had friends, Africans, who spoke Dutch and got no offers. Who could know for sure!

I worked exclusively in low level, unskilled work, in factories and hospitals. I was "taught" to do spot welding in an hour, while working at Ford's factory on the outskirts of the city. I worked as a welder making filing cabinets and bookshelves. I ferried around milk cartons, yogurt and ice cream in a refrigeration factory. And in the evenings and at weekends, I worked in hospitals, cleaning toilets, and brushing and mopping the floors. In most of these factories there were many immigrants—Africans, North Africans, Turks, Indonesians. Of course, there were some whites too, but almost always in management positions. Many of us immigrants spoke no Dutch. But there was usually at least one person in each ethnic group, that spoke Dutch and he—it was invariably "he"—would interpret for the group as a whole. With the Turks I spoke Dutch. I met Turkish men who had worked in Amsterdam for 25–30 years, often spending 2-3 months per year back home. Many had come with the intention of working a number of years and then returning home permanently. But unfortunately, they too were victims of "the myth of return" (that is, the idea that migration is tem-porary) and many remained indefinitely. It was fascinating to me to discover that every couple of months, management informed us that they expected an immigration raid at the workplace on a specific day that week, and that if we didn't have "the proper papers" we should not come to work. On the day of the raid, many workers stayed away. The following day, they were back to work as usual. This reflected the continuing contradiction of immigration to Europe. Namely, that employers sought unskilled labor to meet the shortage of workers, but the indigenous population fre-quently expressed anxieties, fears, and government half-heartedly implemented the laws. And because "capital and the state were concerned with the maximization of profit, not with the alleviation of social need," a blind eye was turned where

immigrants worked in low and unskilled work. Even so, the white locals felt exploited, especially because of housing pressures (Sivanandan 104).

It was also clear that I carried my passport on my face, while I travelled across borders. During my stay in Amsterdam, I made several trips to England. On one occasion I brought my daughter to Amsterdam, and on to Paris, for a short vacation. She was only 5 years old at the time, and I was determined that she begin to see the world as early as possible. We arrived in Holland with joy and excitement, after an overnight boat trip from Harwich. I explained our plans to the immigration office, informing him we were going on to Paris, and showing him our travel itinerary and tickets. Imagine my shock when he brusquely informed me that my daughter was not allowed to work in Holland! I responded, "but she's only 5 years old!" "Yes," he said, "but she is not allowed to work here in Holland." I said something indignant about not putting a child to labor, and he said that he would write this prohibition in my passport. He wrote it. I was furious, and steamed off. When I got to Amsterdam I had the text translated. It said: "Niet geldig voor het in het paspoort bijgeschrevend kind" (i.e. not valid for the child written in the passport). This is what we in the academic game call "the petty indignities of discrimination" practiced by the local officers of enforcement. I kept the passport as a memento and still have it today. As it happened, my daughter and I enjoyed our travels, and I returned her to Liverpool the following week.

Back in Amsterdam, 2006

More than twenty-five years later—in 2006—after living in the United States, and researching race and ethnic relations there, in comparison with Britain and the British Caribbean, I returned to the Netherlands. The experience revealed many continuing contradictions. When I left Amsterdam in 1980, I worked at the Policy Studies Institute in London, completed a Master's degree in Race and Ethnic Relations at Bristol in 1983 and moved to Berkeley, California in 1984. By 1989 I had earned my PhD in Sociology. I taught at several universities before returning to a faculty position at the University of California, Berkeley in 1994. By now I had conducted research across the United States and in the Caribbean, I had directed summer school programs in Zimbabwe and Brazil, and a two year Education Abroad Program in Bordeaux, France. I had invested long periods in language study and now spoke French fluently, and was highly conversant in Spanish and Portuguese. In preparation for my return to Amsterdam, it amused me to restudy my Dutch, which I did for several months.

I went back to Amsterdam in 2006 at the invitation of Dr. Glenn Willemsen and Dr. Kwame Nimako at the National Institute for Dutch Slavery and its legacy (NiNsee), to give a lecture on Plantation Museums in the United States. This lecture was based on my recently published book *Representations of Slavery: Race and Ideology in Southern Plantation Museums,* co-written with Jennifer L Eichstedt, and based on

research at 120+ plantation museums in Virginia, Georgia and Louisiana. I spent about five days in Amsterdam, traveling to my old haunts, visiting different neighborhoods and learning about NiNsee's work. I spent another two weeks in Amsterdam in summer, 2008 working more closely on issues to do with the legacy of slavery in the Netherlands. Though my visits to the Netherlands were short, my impressions of change and contradiction were vivid. Over the lengthy period since my sojourn in 1979–80 I had already read a lot more academic material about the Netherlands and its colonies. This included work by Malcom Cross and Jan Entzinger, Philomena Essed, Helma Lutz, Teun van Dijk, Kamala Kempadoo, Kwame Nimako, and Allison Blakely. I now had far greater insights into the nuances of race in the Netherlands, and its colonial history, than the first time I arrived in Amsterdam.

During these recent visits, there was clear evidence of many legal, economic and even cultural improvements. For example, the Bijlmermeer was not recognizable as the place that I knew. The structural improvements were astounding to me, its aesthetics looked far better, the impression of thriving businesses was strong, and evidence of many Black-owned businesses, albeit small ones, was also clear. I had read that there were far more immigrants and settlers of color in Amsterdam, and that, too was obvious, from strolling in the streets. The Black population seemed residentially more dispersed across the city. Several of the people I knew in the 1970s are still in Amsterdam, and they, too, reveal some signs of progress, with greater economic success achieved, Dutch language far more easily spoken, many, especially younger people, fluently. Many were still living the myth of return, after more than 25 years.

I was astonished and impressed to visit the National Institute for Dutch Slavery and its Legacy and to see the National Slavery Monument across the Oosterpark. I was intrigued to hear of the struggles involved in even getting the institute funded and started, but disappointed to see that it had none of the artifacts typically associated with a museum. It was inspiring to be involved in the first Black Europe summer school, which took place in Summer 2008, created by Dr. Nimako and Amy Abdou, led by Dr. Nimako and Dr. Hondius, in collaboration with the University of Amsterdam and NiNsee. The program was launched in NiNsee. More than 22 students spent two weeks covering all aspects of immigration and settlement, xenophobia and racism, law and education, housing, employment and social life, in the Netherlands and across Europe. I heard stories of an entirely new generation of Black men and women born in the Netherlands, and achieving far higher levels of language ability and educational success.

But I saw many troubling signs too, including many racial stereotypes, limited power for minorities of color, increased residential segregation, a disproportionate number of sex workers of color, and hostile attitudes to Muslims among the majority population, with backlash, antagonism and conflict. The Dutch reputation for

tolerance had already been sullied by international media coverage of right wing movements, as well as the murders of Pym Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh. Friends and colleagues told me there were few Black school-teachers, and even fewer Black university professors. I was dismayed, but not surprised, to hear this—it takes a long, hard struggle in the corridors of academia to make progress. We know from England and the United States. It was troubling to find out that people of color, many of whom were born in the Netherlands or have lived their all their lives and are Dutch citizens are still called non-natives or aliens (*allochtonen*) (Essed and Nimako). It's a strange regression. Many of these issues are covered in detail in other chapters in the book.

My most vivid experience occurred in the starkly different responses of Black and white Dutch people to my research. Especially strangers. When people asked about my visit, and learnt that I was a professor and was doing research in the Netherlands they almost always asked me what I was studying. I would reply "the Legacy of Slavery and race in the Netherlands!" Black Dutch people almost always said something like "its about time someone studied slavery in Holland closely, it's long overdue!" While Dutch white people invariably said something like "But what are you studying exactly, the Dutch were not really involved in slavery!" And they often added "and race isn't an issue in the Netherlands!" As I met Dutch white people far more often than Dutch Black people—in stores, museums, on the tram, along the canals—their statement that "the Dutch were not really involved in slavery" was said so often, I almost began to doubt the facts that I had read in the many books that exist on Dutch slavery.

Conclusion

International reputations rest precariously on fleeting images in the media, passing anecdotes from friends and strangers, rapid weekend visits, and cursory readings of out-of-date texts. They rest, too, on first impressions. Scratch the surface and another reality appears, like so many organisms in water under a microscope. When I first got there in 1979, Amsterdam turned out to be more complicated than I thought. Harmonious relations on the surface hid underlying patterns of inequality and antagonism. A return to the city in 2006 and beyond, reveals no resolution to these contradictions. A new kaleidoscope of indicators leaves the visitor intrigued. In many ways it is just like England, and like the United States. Racial discrimination, conflict with the police, high levels of unemployment and limited numbers of Black people in positions of power. Black organizations are increasingly pushing their demands into the public arena, and the legacy of slavery is—though still marginal—now being discussed more than ever before in the history of the nation. In other ways it is different, too. Many Black people are immigrants or the children of immigrants who, nevertheless, are still seen as aliens. The public arenas are still dominated by effortless assertions by Dutch white people that "race" was not an issue—that

"race" did not even exist—in the Netherlands. The shifting terrain of race and ethic relations, as so many chapters in this book attest, is far more complicated, with indicators of progress alongside disturbing trends of backwardness and hostility. I think that John Travolta's character—Vincent Vega—in the movie *Pulp Fiction* said it best. Upon his return to the USA after a long period in Amsterdam, he told his associate—"They've got the same shit there that we've got here . . . it's just a little different!"

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The Politics of Avoidance – the Netherlands in Perspective

Ellie Vasta

Growing up in Immigrant Australia

As a child of Italian immigrants in Australia, I grew up in the late 1950s and the 1960s during the assimilation era when teachers entreated us to speak English at home and to become as Australian as possible. Italians in those days were called wogs and dagos, and were often confronted in the streets and told to go back to where they had come from. Even as teenagers, my sister and I insisted that my mother should speak English to us when walking down the street, not only to avoid any possible abuse, but so that we could appear as Australian as possible. I grew up in an immigrant community in Sydney, where many of the women worked as unskilled labourers in order to help their children become upwardly mobile. The Italians, Greeks, Poles, Serbs and Croatians and Anglo-Australians lived side by side in working-class areas. In the early post-war decades, they gradually began the long journey from a dominant mono-cultural society to the multi-ethnic and multicultural society that Australia is today.

After 1972, with the election of a progressive Labor party that introduced a non-discriminatory immigration policy and initiated multiculturalism, I became involved, along with many other first and second generation immigrants, in the process of opening up Australia to the world. I was involved both at the grass-roots level, working among community organisations and immigrant women's groups, and later as an academic. Australia, along with Canada, started a global trend towards multiculturalism in the 1970s and 1980s. In both these countries, multiculturalism had a two-fold meaning. First it was based on the recognition that immigrants would maintain their languages, cultures and religions and cluster together—at least initially. Second, it

required the state to take active measures to combat racism and to ensure equal opportunities for all residents, whatever their backgrounds. But whereas Canada enshrined multiculturalism in its constitution, Australia has been more ambivalent, with constant redefinitions of multiculturalism by various governments, and periodic waves of public scepticism by more conservative groups. It is important to note that many of the European debates on multiculturalism have been reductionist: they have focused on the cultural recognition aspect, while ignoring the need to combat racism and ensure equality.

In 2001, I moved to Europe. As a visiting professor in Sweden for a few months, I discovered that while Sweden appears to have good integration policies, it has one of the highest rates of immigrant segregation in Europe, particularly in housing and the labour market. I visited one of the housing estates, where newcomers have become concentrated, and asked one man what he thought of the recent media coverage about the non-integration of immigrants in Sweden. He replied: "What do you mean we are not integrated? That I mix little with Swedes has nothing to do with integration. Of course we are integrated. I mix with people from many countries here. I work. Of course I'm integrated." That was one of my first lessons in Europe—that these terms are very complex—and it influenced some of my later research work.

Our understanding of immigrant integration is intimately linked to how immigrants are perceived and how the so-called "native" ethnic groups, in countries of immigration, perceive themselves. The Swedish experience and my time in the UK influenced my interest in the Netherlands, a country that, in a similar way to my own home country Australia, perceives itself as an egalitarian society. Many of the national myths are based on an idea of fairness and "tolerance" of difference. In all these countries, these myths lend themselves to a denial of injustice, of prejudice and of racism. However, the denial of Dutch racism is striking.

Let me begin with a brief overview of the British approach to immigrants and diversity, before placing the Netherlands in perspective.

Race Relations and Multiculturalism in the UK

When I moved to the UK at the beginning of 2001, I learnt about its unique mix of race relations policies and multiculturalism. In the earlier post-war decades, Britain had gained the reputation of being one of the most openly racist countries in Europe. In the 1950s and 1960s, Afro-Caribbeans, Africans and Asians, newly arrived from the former colonies, experienced blatant discrimination in housing, employment and public spaces. Accommodation adverts stated openly: "no blacks need apply." The first Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1968 were based on the idea that special agencies should be set up to help black immigrants with settlement problems but also to educate white communities about immigrants. The Acts were premised on the idea that the state should combat racism and promote equality of opportunity

through legal sanctions and public regulatory agencies. The murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence in 1993, the subsequent police cover-up and the long struggle for a public inquiry (which was finally set up in 1999) were glaring reminders that racism in the UK was alive and well.

Much effort has gone into introducing and refining anti-discrimination and equal opportunity policies. In the 1960s and 1970s legislative measures were introduced at the local government level to address the impact of immigration on certain localities and to help meet the education, welfare, labour market and housing needs of ethnic minority groups. Multicultural policies were introduced in the schools in an attempt to give ethnic minority children language teaching and a culturally relevant education as a way of developing mutual respect and self-esteem in multicultural classrooms. Some black activists called for "anti-racist education."

Three crucial features have evolved from the 1960s British model of integration. First, issues of discrimination, conflict or exclusion have come to be defined in terms of race or ethnic membership, based on the bureaucratic definitions of the various groups. Second, this model is based on the institutionalization of measures to prevent discrimination and combat racism. The 2000 Race Relations (Amendment) Act gave all public institutions the duty to promote racial equality rather than just preventing discrimination as in the previous Acts. Third, starting in the 1960s, the black movement in Britain emerged as one of the strongest ethnic rights movements in Europe. The protestors involved in this long-term struggle developed a compelling anti-racism platform. Nevertheless, while anti-discrimination legislation has been in place for nearly five decades, racism remains a problem both in the public and private domains.

In the 1990s under the Thatcher Government, there was a shift away from interventionist anti-racist policies towards a more market-oriented approach. Then in the early 21st century, things became more complicated. The terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London, had a big impact in the UK because the perpetrators were not recent immigrants, but young men who had grown up and gone to school in England. Suddenly, multiculturalism was perceived as a licence for the propagation of threatening practices. British sociologist McGhee suggests that the introduction of integration and cohesion, while promoting the importance and acceptance of multiple identities within multicultural societies, is used as a way of promoting and legitimizing "a regime change in both Government and non-Government funding" (McGhee 102).

Crocodiles and Kisses: the Netherlands in Perspective

The early 21st century was a period of retrenchment with regard to policies and public discourses on immigration and diversity throughout Europe. Increasingly migrants were blamed for not meeting "their responsibility to integrate" and for practicing

"backward religions" and holding "inferior values." But the backlash had begun earlier. Since the 1990s, there has been a steady shift away from multiculturalism towards coercive policy and public discourse. What appeared to be "liberal" and "tolerant" societies have now shifted to the other extreme, demanding assimilation and conformity of immigrants, and becoming ever more willing to enforce such behavior through a range of sanctions. A "politics of fear" has emerged, based on concerns about identity—and specifically about ethnic or religious identities versus the perceived homogenous national identity.

People studying immigration and ethnic diversity have been particularly intrigued by the apparently quite extreme changes in the Netherlands. This country had long-since institutionalized the acceptance of difference through the model of "pillarisation," originally developed to allow peaceful coexistence of previously warring Catholics and Protestants through acceptance of separate institutions and differing values and cultures. The adaptation of this approach to immigrants through the "minorities model" had given the Netherlands a strong reputation for its high levels of "tolerance." Yet in the early 21st century there was a sudden shift from multicultural policies to what might be perceived as a coercive and assimilationist approach. How could such a "liberal" and "tolerant" society go to the other extreme? Furthermore, why were immigrants being blamed for "lack of responsibility" in the integration process and for practicing a "backward religion"? To my surprise, I was to find my answer in the academy—of which more below.

In fact, the Netherlands shares this change in approach with other seemingly-"tolerant" immigration countries—even Australia—as a superficially comical analogy reveals. Both Australia and the Netherlands have developed a series of videos to keep certain types of immigrants away. The Australian videos—shown in countries like Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early this decade—contained images of burning deserts and deadly crocodiles, snakes and spiders. The aim was to scare off potential refugees, who might otherwise try to come as "boat people" to Australia's shores. The Dutch videos, made specifically to deter would-be Muslim immigrants, contained images of women lying semi-naked on the beach and of gay men kissing. Prospective migrants received these DVDs in their application packs; the message is "accept our culture, or stay away." The Australians sought to use nature as a weapon against unwelcome immigrants, while the Dutch preferred a cultural deterrent.

So what is going on? One fear expressed widely in both public and academic discourses in the Netherlands is based on the premise that western democratic values will be destroyed by "too many" foreigners or by immigrants whose values are perceived to be different or inferior. Such values are thought to threaten national identity and to have a damaging effect on social cohesion, leading potentially to violence and to a loss of freedom. Another argument is that immigrants and ethnic minorities put

strains on social services, through high rates of welfare dependency. Certain observers claim that some immigrants have not met "their responsibility to integrate" just because the multicultural principles of the welfare system are too generous. Another widespread argument is that the receiving country has been too lenient and generous by not expecting enough of migrants. The line of reasoning adopted by Paul Scheffer, an influential Dutch journalist, was that the Dutch have been benevolent by providing funding and resources to help immigrants integrate while immigrants have not done their share (see Vasta, "From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy"; and "Engaging with diversity").

The Netherlands poses a particularly poignant picture because attitudes and policies have moved so quickly from a fairly liberal approach to a rather narrow and restrictive one. Since 1998, the Netherlands has introduced a number of compulsory programmes for immigrant newcomers in an attempt to ensure that they integrate into Dutch society and culture to a much greater degree than in the past. Populist politicians like the late Pim Fortuyn have claimed that the Netherlands had too many immigrants and that Islam is a backward religion. Now Geert Wilders of the far-right Freedom Party openly pushes an anti-Islamic line, accusing Muslims of trying to "colonize" his country.

Racism and the Academy

In order to find explanations for what seemed to be an assimilationist turn, I began to examine the Dutch policies of immigrant incorporation from the early Pillarization approach to the Ethnic Minorities Policy, through to the Integration Policy introduced in the 1990s. I began to look at some of the statistical data from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics and from the Dutch Report for OECD SOPEMI migration monitoring system. I read many articles reporting Dutch research on the integration of immigrants in the Netherlands; and I examined media reports to gauge attitudes. In the early stages of this research, it became clearer and clearer to me that the general public, policy makers and many academics in this field of study were practicing a "politics of avoidance" in which the structures of Dutch society and the attitudes and behavior of the Dutch population were being largely left out of explanatory models for integration difficulties. It became evident that the drive for consensus had led to a politics of avoidance and denial: the idea of the "tolerant nation" had become the dominant paradigm, so that any problems could be blamed on the attitudes and behavior of the immigrants. Thus there is much talk about Dutch tolerance but little about Dutch racism. In a project that examines everyday ways of thinking about multiculturalism, social anthropologist Verkuyten indicated that although people can simultaneously hold liberal and illiberal views, there is a tendency in the Netherlands to blame the migrant while appearing mainly ignorant of how the "native Dutch" are implicated, except in a rather positive way (66-67). "Tolerance" is problematic in

number of ways, but relevant here is that tolerance can mean the avoidance of facing up to systematic racial discrimination through the structural marginalization of ethnic minorities.

I was soon to discover that this politics of avoidance exists also in the academy. In 2005, I was invited to a leading Dutch university to discuss my research at a departmental seminar. In retrospect, the whole proceedings took on the character of an ambush. My presentation focused on the questions: why were immigrants and ethnic minorities on the Netherlands being blamed for not integrating; and why was there such a sharp turn from openness to difference towards an assimilationist and illiberal approach to immigrant inclusion? The analysis focused on the high rates of differentiation between the "native Dutch" (the autochton), and ethnic minorities in educational achievement, in labor market performance and in housing. I came to the conclusion that patterns of disadvantage could not be explained solely by the low human capital attributes of the original immigrants or by their unwillingness to integrate. My analysis revealed pervasive institutional discrimination and the persistence of a culture of racism (see Vasta, "From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy").

What followed at the end of my presentation revealed a worried academic audience who did everything they could to demolish my argument. Indeed the reaction resembled the ritual refutation of a heresy. Firstly, I was astonished to find that the organizers had arranged *four* discussants to follow my presentation—a highly unusual procedure for a departmental seminar. I was told that each would respond for five minutes. In fact the duration of the highly negative and even hostile responses was far longer. The gist of their response was that I had no proof of racism, and in particular of institutional racism. This was later driven home by some in the audience. It became clear to me that many Dutch academics do not believe that institutional racism exists in the Netherlands—or indeed that racism exists at all. Dutch social scientists prefer to speak of discrimination, and define racism very narrowly, that is, in terms of biological differences. However, this raises a significant problem. If we speak in general terms of "discrimination" or "institutional discrimination," then we cannot understand the specific type and form of discrimination based on a persons' or groups' racial categorization, ethnicity or cultural background. In turn, this means we cannot understand how certain institutional practices, embedded in the institutions and cultures of the society, create disadvantage based on a persons' or groups' race, ethnicity, culture or religion.

At the seminar, one person told me that one had to differentiate between "racist intent" and the "racist effect" of institutions. Many of the seminar participants appeared not to understand how ideology is deeply embedded in institutional and societal practices. We cannot deny that policies like the Ethnic Minorities policy was based on "well-intended multiculturalist paternalism" (see Scholten, "Episodes and

Punctuations in Dutch Immigrant Policy"), but that in effect says it all. Apart from the problems with paternalism, such an approach cannot even attempt to weed out the ingrained discriminatory practices that may work in subtle ways, while having devastating effects on various groups. Institutional racism is not about "racist intent" but rather about the systematic cultural and institutional detrimental effect it can have on particular groups in the society, in this case ethnic minorities.

I came to the conclusion, that many in the audience were not prepared to consider the position of the racialized other in the Netherlands. It also became clear to me that, unlike the UK, there is an absence of critical race studies in the Netherlands (See also Essed and Nimako, "Designs and (Co)Incidents"). Discourse analyst Van der Valk clarifies this point (186):

> In general, mainstream Dutch academia shows little interest in racism as a social phenomenon, let alone as a discursive one or as a theoretical concept . . . It is argued that contemporary ideological and practical forms of exclusion and domination of (ethnic) others that refer to culture or religion cannot be explained by this conceptual framework . . . The lack of conceptual clarity and the under-theorization of racism in their socio-historical contexts in many cases lead to a situation in which racism is defined away.

There were some in the audience who supported my presentation, one claiming that those in the academy who avoid a critical examination of racism are stuck in an ivory tower. Others got in touch with me later (including all four women in the audience), revealing how shocked they were at the level of denial. The one woman, among a sea of men, who attempted to make a comment was cut short at the very end, when she was told that the session was closed.

Conclusion

Racism is a power relationship imposed on those who are perceived to be inferior. Despite all the liberal rhetoric, both in the UK and in the Netherlands there is a pervasive sense that western democracies and their values are superior to those of immigrants from the (former) colonies, that whites are superior to blacks, and that Christians and their values are superior to Muslims and other religions.

As my discussion indicates, the similarities between the two countries are strong. Both have had variants of multiculturalism for several decades. Both countries have developed programmes, both at a national and a local government level that make provision for equal opportunity in the labor market, equality of education, the right to language and cultural maintenance and immigrant participation. Both have anti-discrimination legislation. Nevertheless, there is one major difference—the British seem more prepared to confront racism. The Dutch would rather hide behind more neutral terms. Racism is dealt with in a more forthright manner in the UK than in the

Netherlands where the term "racism" is eschewed in favor of the term "discrimination." What is unique about the UK is that through its Race Relations Acts it acknowledges and has attempted to deal with racism in a way that many other countries have not. Britain has come a long way since the 1950s and 1960s in that some changes have occurred in key institutions such as the police and the law courts, although there is still a long way to go. Britain does seem to be facing up to the challenges of institutional racism (police commissioners periodically admit to institutional racism), in a way that has yet to be seen in the Netherlands. There, belligerence against critics still serves as a substitute for constructive engagement.

Note

1. I defined racism as follows. Firstly, it is not just an aberration of an individual's pathology. Rather it is deeply rooted in the history, culture and traditions of modernity and is closely linked to class and sexist domination. Secondly, it is a relationship of power, a process whereby social groups categorize other groups as different or inferior, on the basis of phenotypical characteristics, cultural markers or national origin. Dominant group structures, institutional or cultural practices and processes that exclude or discriminate against minority ethnic groups, is known as *institutional racism*. The more spontaneous type of prejudice is often known as *informal racism*. These two types of racism are closely related for they express forms of group power or domination. I linked this definition to concrete issues such as the "black and white schools," the failure to fully implement multicultural education policy, the racism experienced by job applicants, and the huge disparities in educational achievement between various groups, and more.

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The Covenant of the Allochthons: How Nativist Racism Affects Youth Culture in Amsterdam

Pooyan Tamimi Arab

This reflection is based on growing up in Amsterdam myself, as the child of an Iranian refugee, on conversations with today's teenagers, and on comparative experiences related to this topic while living abroad for two years, in New York City. First, I give an impression of teenagers' handling of Dutch society's tricky politics of belonging as "allochthons." They have come up with a self-proclaimed "Covenant of the Allochthons." This, I will argue, is deeply interdependent with nativist, often also described as culturalist, forms of racism. In the second section, I briefly discuss how living in the United States has made me question disproportionate alliances between Dutch allochthons. The cosmopolitanism of so-called allochthons is tied to an "allochthon covenant" and must therefore be criticized and seen in the light of nativist racism.

Going to School in Amsterdam

Granted, I did not graduate from high school that long ago, and could write about myself. But to me, more interesting and revealing of Dutch racial tensions is the life of fifteen-year-old Michael Tan, my neighbor's son. I have tutored Michael ever since he first entered primary school. He has seen more of the world than I had at that age. His parents, hardworking people originally from China and Malaysia, have taken Michael on many (family) trips; to Asian countries, North America, and other European countries. I have been fortunate to visit Michael's maternal grandmother and extended family in a village in a tropical forest area close to Kuala Lumpur. They make a living by harvesting rubber and durian trees. It was there that it truly dawned on me how many rapid changes each successive generation of his family must have

experienced. In Holland, Michael's parents run a modest but successful snack bar in the Baarsjes district of Amsterdam-West, selling mostly Flemish fries. Michael has spent much of his youth in the back of the store's kitchen, reading, playing videogames with friends, and practicing the guitar in his tiny space surrounded by soda cans and boxes of paper dish ware. For years, he would come upstairs to study with me in my house above the snack bar. The store is located on a busy shopping street, which is a border area between the white, "autochthonous," city center and the "allochthonous," or non-native, districts surrounding the center. On a map produced by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the population of the area is shown to be highly mixed.[1] Next to the snack bar are, for example, a Surinamese Indian restaurant, a Dutch butcher, and a Turkish baker, right on the corner of the busy intersection. Michael's parents bought a house in Badhoevendorp, a suburban town connecting to Amsterdam, where he attended a Catholic primary school. Most of his friends at school were blue eyed, white, and usually much taller. He was one of the few "allochthons." When he performed in a school play in his final year before secondary or Dutch high school, it was hard not to notice that he was one of only a handful of (second and third generation) migrant children. I vividly recall his parents' somewhat uneasy relationship with the other, mostly Dutch, parents gathered at the event. There were friendly conversations, for sure, but Michael's parents' Dutch language and social performance could not match that of the other parents, who mingled with much greater ease.

Michael thrived in school. Despite the initial skepticism of his white primary school teachers—after all he was this small kid, who barely spoke Dutch when he came to their school—he had done very well and was selected to go to the Barlaeus Gymnasium, one of the most prestigious schools in the country, where he would study Greek and Latin along with the regular subjects. The school is located at Leidse Square, right in the heart of the Dutch capital, a more mixed high school, very different from his school in the suburbs. Many of its students are from an educated upper class, and live in the well-to-do parts of the city.

A year later, for his thirteenth birthday, Michael's father and I took him and his friends to play laser games. He had invited new friends from his former school as well as the Barlaeus. His companions were of various backgrounds and education levels. At one point, one of the children started talking about being "really" Dutch, contrasting himself to Michael, to a Surinamese boy, and me. Bas, the blond child, said that he was "oerhollander." The literal translation would be "primordial Dutchman," which has a slightly stronger nativist overtone than the adjective "oerhollands," which is more commonly used. Michael's much smarter friends from the Barlaeus immediately reprimanded the boy for using exclusivist language that reminded them of the populist and Islamophobic leader of the so-called Freedom Party, namely Geert Wilders. Their quick dismissal of nativist discourse, I conjectured at the time, had to

do with their different positions on the social map. Bas lived in a small town and was tracked into the most average high school level, whereas the other kids were going to an elite school that allowed posters on its doors that mocked Wilders, as he often claimed to defend the "ordinary man." On the one hand, it was reassuring to me, Michael's tutor, that he had befriended people from a great variety of social and ethnic backgrounds, and that among them were critical teenagers. On the other hand, I also sensed that the Barlaeus Gymnasium, despite good intentions, could still be an intimidating place for my young friend. The white children, different in terms of class, race, and culture, could decide not to befriend him.

He told me that sometimes he had trouble adjusting to the other children and finding his way, especially in his first year at the high school. In the next three years at the elite Gymnasium, Michael made new friends, increasingly with other allochthons. My conjecture on the importance of the social map had not turned out to be totally wrong, but highly questionable if overemphasized. Though he had already interacted a little with Moroccans, he met his first Moroccan friend, Mohammad, at the Barlaeus. Even though his parents' snack bar is located in a district in Amsterdam that houses many Moroccans and Turks, Michael mainly knew people of Muslim background through me. His parents often expressed skeptical sentiments toward young Moroccan boys in the neighborhood, because they had misbehaved in their snack bar. There was also a conflict with the Egyptian neighbor, who had once taken trash out in front of the store. In general, they preferred to keep their distance from the Dutch Muslim population, and in particular the Moroccans, who in the recent decade have been constantly scrutinized in public spheres, but Michael did not share their skepticism to the same extent.

Michael's new friendship signaled a typical second generation phenomenon, namely allying with other allochthons in the presence of a dominant autochtonous group, a reaction that his parents can understand, but not feel with the same intensity. He joked that he had made many allochthonous friends and that they had even come up with a name for themselves: the Covenant of the Allochthons, *de Allochtonenverbond*. They comically used the wrong article "de" instead of the correct "het," appropriating the stereotype of allochthons who cannot get their grammar right. The covenant currently consists of about ten members. Michael and the others joke that next year they want to run in high school elections for student councils as the Covenant of the Allochthons. They have also created a private Facebook page. As its background image, they use a black and white picture of Saddam Hussein accompanied by other "allochthons," who according to Michael "look surprisingly much like us."

Although my own high school experience at the Spinoza Lyceum in Amsterdam was similar, my friends and I had never so explicitly self-identified as allochthons at that age. I was even more alarmed when Michael used the Surinamese, that is,

Sranan Tongo word "ptata," short for patata which means potato, for the one white child that belonged to their group. Michael (and I) did not know that ptata, which to ears not used to Sranan Tongo, may sound like "tata," referred to the potato-eating stereotype of white Dutch, but the word has a certain pejorative quality that the word "autochthon," a term he does not use often, does not. Michael used "tata" in a way that distanced and sharply distinguished him from the "Hollanders." He would suddenly talk about "tata's" in general as well. He and his friends had learned the word in the neighborhood of the snack bar from other Moroccan children, who did not differentiate between "tata" and "ptata."[2]

I say that I was alarmed because I realized that there had been little progress in reconciling "autochthon" and "allochthon" groups in comparison to a decade ago. Michael's self-definition as allochthon, something he did not do in the past, reminded me of my own visceral experiences of not being accepted, sometimes even rejected, based on racial formations in school. In general, however, conflicts were few and racism existed only in very subtle, though persistent, ways. Language was and remains one of the dividing markers. A 2002 quantitative study of interethnic language use in secondary schools showed that allochthonous groups used "street language" significantly more often than autochthonous children. Language is used to build solidarities between ethnic groups, who can show respect for each other by taking over slang, while demarcating territorial boundaries vis-à-vis white children. Making fun of each other's background is another way of creating a reassurance that would be much harder to realize with children marked as autochthonous (Vermeij). Pejorative language is not only used to transgress racial barriers, but also to identify and distinguish class.

It should therefore not come as a surprise that allochthons in general, not just the youth, interact more with each other than autochthons do with other allochthonous groups. A 2012 quantitative study corroborates this hypothesis for Amsterdam. The study also indicates that segregation in the capital has increased slightly in the past 15 years, as well as that segregation in schools, following general spatial segregation, remains prevalent (Scheffer and Entzinger).

Furthermore, Jan Willem Duyvendak has discussed Dutch nativism as being reinforced by the homogenization of shared values, particularly among authochthonous Dutch citizens. In that sense, it is a misunderstanding to believe that "the Netherlands has developed into a pluralist, highly diverse society." In fact, writes Duyvendak, "since the 1970s, the majority population has rapidly become more culturally homogeneous. Whereas in many countries, including the US, majority opinion is divided on issues of gender, family and sexuality, almost the entire political spectrum of the Dutch majority population supports progressive values on these matters" (88). Being progressive, according to Duyvendak's analysis of nativism, has not resulted in smooth acceptance of diversity, however.

The allochthon's resistance to what the majority perceives as integration, e.g., by refusing to speak Dutch at home, is a refusal to homogenize. The net result is that, even though ethnic diversity has increased dramatically overall, contemporary Dutch nativism is characterized by being less able to navigate around diverging ethical norms, most notably those of conservative Muslims, but also of other groups.

Allochstan on the North-Sea

A covenant of allochthons is not merely a joke of a group of teenagers, but an exacerbated symptom of a social reality in which subtle forms of segregation, even in mixed schools, continue to persist. A covenant, as Thomas Hobbes theorized, is an "artificial bond" (ch. 21) between people who, by agreeing on a "construction" of power (ch. 47), seek to regulate life for the sake of "safety" (ch. 15). The paradox of a covenant as social contract is that it is agreed upon by a people, but is simultaneously that which defines a people as a people. It is a covenant only in the first sense of being artificial, which in no way relativizes its impact on Dutch youth cultures, and does not exist in exactly the same form in other western countries, for example, those with a stronger tradition of civil religion, such as the United States and France. It is not a true covenant because the territory of its people, described by Lammert de Jong as "Allochstan on the North Sea," is not created in a process of self-determination, but mainly in response and thanks to the dynamics of the country in which it exists: "Allochstan on the North Sea is a catchphrase to identify the subordination of non-western immigrants and their descendants in the Netherlands . . ." (89). An allochthon covenant is a symptom of that subordination.

Michael's self-proclamation of their Covenant of the Allochthons should be thus seen in the broader context of the creation of Allochstan on the North Sea, which was neither his doing, nor that of his friends. The discrepancy of the Covenant of the Allochthons lies precisely in the imposed self-identification of Michael and his friends as allochthons *before* the act of contracting, which when following the Hobbesian logic, should be that which defines them as allochthons *a posteriori*. On the one hand, they must integrate, but their status as citizens of the Republic Allochthonia, *Republiek Allochtonië*, the name of a well-read blog on matters relating to Dutch allochthons,[3] simultaneously limits the extent to which this demand can be met.

The marking of such boundaries happens through language, but one's physical appearance matters as well. These are not unidirectional black and white borders, as allochthons may discriminate against each other, depending on context, and since white individuals can be admitted to allochthon covenants as well. A white, blue-eyed, teenager of Hungarian-French descent can be one of their friends, but he can be perceived as different from a relatively similar looking "ptata" or native Dutch. The ptata, the native Dutchman who is described in the national anthem as "of German blood," *van Duytschen bloet*, is a caricature, a mock-identity that is more comfortable to refer

to for the children labeled as allochthons. The cross-allochton adoption of the ptata releases entrenched feelings of resentment, and while mocking language is employed, boundaries between friends are torn down, but also redrawn. Especially when there are no ptata's present, the use of the word functions as a way to create a sense of them and us.

These borders are visceral, intuitive, and fundamentally permeated by racism. Ash Amin's analysis of Islamophobic biopolitics relates subtle, implicit, "territorial" demarcations in everyday school settings as well. Muslims are not the only targets of everyday biopolitics: in general, the allochthon's not being native or his different cultural background are easily read off the body, skin color, dress codes, gestures, and so forth. In short, an instinctive relation to practices that Amin and others, have called "cultural racism." Cultural racism is intimately tied to nativism and racism, not in the least because "race," a concept that is taboo in the Netherlands, is often identified through bodily traits. Culture too is read off the body, so the issue should not be whether a new "cultural" type of discrimination has emerged that makes race critical discourse sound obsolete, but to point out the family resemblances or hybrid entanglements between nativism, culturalism, and racism.

What unites the allochthon children in a covenant are not their cultural differences, but especially their shared status as "non-natives." By creating their own "street language," they create a counterculture that becomes recognizable to them alone, freed from the more exclusivist ways of their parents, and woven together with a variety of possible racial formations. Such countercultures result from what Essed calls everyday racism, and Amin describes as everyday doings that give shape to a "phenotypical" racism:

> Accordingly, racial practice becomes an everyday "doing," well before thought, effortlessly weaving together historically honed folk summaries of others that people carry in their heads and a phenomenology of bodily response that also recurs with uncanny consistency . . . we might describe such everyday doings of race as "phenotypical" racism, working with handed down folk summaries of "racial" grouping based on essentialized biological and cultural markings . . . and reliant on the sensory-affective sorting of surface phenomena through these summaries. (7)

The extent to which the curious grouping of allochthons can be pervasive becomes painfully clear when stepping outside the Dutch context. I spent two years as a graduate student in New York City, at the New School for Social Research, whose student population can be characterized as hyperdiverse.

On one occasion, a Dutch-Turkish friend and I were strolling in the city and accidentally met Regillio Tuur, a Dutch-Surinamese boxer who is famous in the Netherlands. Tuur was very happy to meet Dutch speaking individuals. He repeatedly said how he missed speaking Dutch, and we obviously reacted positively to his

professed nostalgia. The same happened, for example, when an old Indonesian woman started speaking Dutch to me after seeing my ID, wishing me the best of luck. There were also "native" fellow students from the Netherlands, and we met on several occasions as well. But I did not develop the same need to befriend them as they appeared to feel toward each other. Instead, my Iranian identity became emphasized with much greater ease in the American context, though it was also clear that I was at times somewhat different from students who had recently arrived from Tehran.

As the two years passed, I became increasingly aware of how much easier it was to feel accepted as belonging to the city in New York than it was in Amsterdam, despite always being delayed or questioned at JFK airport when entering the country, usually based on my Middle-Eastern appearance. True, racism is a blatant malady in New York and in the United States in general: the social injustices that exist, e.g., among the Hispanic and Afro-American populations clearly made Amsterdam look paradisal. And yet, New York City would bombard me with signs that evoked a powerful sense of cultural recognition that does not exist in the Netherlands to the same extent, from the available languages on ATM machines and statues celebrating immigrants to everyday interactions with people.

Susan Fainstein's comparison between New York and Amsterdam, from a critical urbanist perspective, presents in detail why, in general, it can be judged that both New York and Amsterdam are relatively successful in managing cultural diversity. The United States succeeds in absorbing and producing hyphenated identities without the Dutch allochthon category, but Amsterdam is much more successful in realizing socio-economic justice, providing goods that are scarce in the United States, such as excellent health care for all, good public schools, and social housing. From a global perspective, Amsterdam is still an emblem of democracy, social justice, and diversity. However, since the rise of explicit xenophobic discourses, previously suppressed racial or ethnic—the "neutral" alternative to race in the Netherlands—tensions have become more obvious.

One of the critical challenges to my Dutch cosmopolitanism came from friends in New York. They pointed out that, of the nine individuals that visited me in two years, only one could be classified as unambiguously "true Dutch," supposedly "of German blood," and he was a former teacher of mine, not a young individual. The other visitors had Chinese, Surinamese, Turkish, and other backgrounds. My friends and I in New York also had contacts with people from a great variety of backgrounds, which they identified positively as cosmopolitanism (unless they took issue with the concept for academic reasons). My Dutch cosmopolitanism, however, was frowned upon: why were so many of my Dutch contacts "allochthons"? With their skepticism in mind, I returned to the Netherlands and found Michael's statement about his friends' Covenant of Allochthons amusing at first, but increasingly disturbing. I would think back upon past experiences in a less apologetic fashion, admitting to myself that

nativist racism, which is not a one-dimensional or unidirectional phenomenon, is perhaps more persistent than many in the Netherlands would like to believe. And all of this is despite positive experiences of cohabitation and strong ties to the authochthonous population. Allowing such thoughts released feelings of resentment and resulted in a more conflictual manner of addressing Dutch racism. For example, the matter of Black Pete, our annual blackface tradition, led me into heated arguments with both allochthons and authochthons, who preferred a live and let live attitude and did not understand why I had to make such a big deal out of something they considered so insignificant.

The idea that racism is an everyday doing is especially critical in the Netherlands, because of an often resolute public denial of any hints of racism. An extreme example is a Dutch public prosecutor's claim that the death of Aziz Kara, a 64-year-old Turkish man who was recently fatally injured by his white neighbor, was merely the result of a fight between neighbors. Despite the accounts of the victim's son and mother, the prosecutor has tried to politically isolate the case by explicitly denying racist motives, reassuring the Dutch public that they do not need to worry about being infected by racism themselves.[4] Such public, but also academic, denials or the downplaying of everyday racism have dragged individuals such as myself, whose academic work is not primarily concerned with racism, into the debate (Tamimi Arab).

These experiences have led me to believe that my Dutch cosmopolitanism, manifested especially in daily interactions with the many different groups that live in the Netherlands, is an "allochthon cosmopolitanism" that is deeply tied to nativist racism. Being excluded as non-native, particularly when the appearance of the body becomes experienced as a marker of discrimination, mixed with cultural forms of racism, can heighten cosmopolitan sensitivities. Such an allochthon cosmopolitanism is infected by resentment, categorization, and responses to "benign" forms of racism. All of these words describe the more general phenomena of subordination and oppression.

Cosmopolitanism in the philosophical sense of the word, as defended today by thinkers such as Kwame Anthony Appiah, is however far removed from the need to create an allochthon covenant, to claim specific racial boundaries, and to use the language of us and them. For the philosopher, cosmopolitanism today means cultivating appreciation for human diversity as well as holding on to universalist notions of the good, not as a reactive but as an actively affirmed value. Allochthon cosmopolitanism cannot be exhaustively reduced to being merely a response to nativist racism: it can affirm the value of having multiple identities, and help people transcend the Dutch polders. But allochthon cosmopolitanism cannot be a satisfactory solution to exclusion either, especially when it reproduces the categorical thinking that it must escape. Even in a prosperous country such as the Netherlands, dealing critically with diversity and racism will remain a challenge.

Notes

1. www.nrc.nl. Statistiek saai? CBS-cijfers komen tot leven op de kaart. February 14, 2012.

2. The "p" in ptata is so subtle that you have to know it belongs there to hear it, and, alternatively, it is easy for Sranan Tongo speakers to hear its absence because tata has a different meaning, namely father (figure) or ancestor. Also see: http://www.sil.org/americas/suriname/sranan/national/srannnldictindex.html

3. www.republiekallochtonie.nl

4. www.nos.nl. OM: twee jaar cel voor burenruzie. December 12, 2012.

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Racisms in Orange: Afterword

David Theo Goldberg

Philomena Essed and Isabel Hoving have curated a unique volume. It is, significantly, the first coherent and comprehensive account to take on all the dimensions of Dutch racisms in their historical and contemporary expressions. But it is unique also as a comprehensive analysis of a peculiarly national racism in the mainland European context. It is not that there haven't been occasional volumes about other Euro-national contexts, but none is as comprehensive and varied as this. The volume begins with Dutch colonial history and ends with observations about current racial and racist expressions in the homeland. Between the covers there are careful analytic accounts of structures, psychologies and logics, the affective as well as scientific and political dimensions of racisms in their extended historical and contemporary Dutch expression.

National accounts of race and racism have tended to take up reference to transnational contexts in a comparative frame. Comparisons to different national contexts are intended to highlight similarities and notably differences with the national one in question. *Dutch Racism* breaks with this dominant analytic tradition, offering instead a deeply relational account of racisms. There is a focus on the relation between Dutch metropolitan racisms and those in the (former) colonies as well as their global extensions more broadly. The stress is on the logics of mutual conceptual influence and impact as well as systemic and structural reinforcement.

It follows from this, second, that racisms are seen to have global and globalizing dimensions, as much in their (local) definition as in more extended implications. Racisms are more often than not irreducible to simply national phenomena. Constitutive of modernity's globalizing reach, they have shaped the making of Western modernity, in particular, as modernity has ordered racial configuration and reach.

Dutch racisms—the peculiar version of racist expression, structuration, and influence identified with the Netherlands and its global colonial arc—accordingly are not merely delimited to the national boundaries of the Netherlands. As Dutch commerce and culture circulated well beyond both national and European boundaries, they carried Dutch racisms back and forth with them embedded within nationally identified assumptions, values, and expressions. Racisms historically developed and expressed in the Netherlands, themselves fashioned in the European theatre of political consciousness and contestation, articulation and identification, were carried on the globo-colonizing boats to Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the Americas. And the hardening of attitudes and ideologies of European superiority and exclusion in the colonies were re-imported into the metropole, cementing the metropolitan sense of self-elevation and magnified self-worth, forging class definition as racial articulations.

At home, the Dutch historically presented themselves and acquired a reputation as a modern bastion of liberal hospitality, a generous host to political exiles fleeing from more repressive regimes, whether Spain, Portugal, and England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries or Germany, South Africa, and Morocco in the twentieth. The truth was always more nuanced. It is safe to say that Holland has long been defined by at least two traditions, a liberal and sometimes anarchic one emphasizing individual independence and free expression, on the one side, and a conformist, even culturally stifling if not repressive tradition, on the other. Perhaps this points to the divide between urban cosmopolitanism and rural insularity. Afrikaner Calvinism in South Africa, after all, was a pointed and related outgrowth of the latter.

In the aftermath of World War II especially, Dutch historical self-representation was refashioned over time—one could say "whitewashed"—in order to produce a national record and identity more consistent with its self-image as supporting liberal tolerance, welfarism, and a free-spirited culture, one more palatable and reputable, even emulatable in the context of the gathering European liberal consensus. Because wartime antisemitism and ill treatment of Jews had also marked Dutch society, Anne Frank's experience among others notwithstanding, the Dutch were quick to embrace European reluctance to categorize or refer to humans in racial terms.

Dutch Racism makes evident, at least by implication, that this emergent anti*racial* consensus and, in the Dutch case, the projection of an international reputation for liberal tolerance are maintainable in the face of unjust social conditions only through a series of less visible conceptual and social repressions and restrictions. For one, the consensus is predicated on an implicit understanding that the principal profile of racist expression is antisemitism. This, in turn, partly accounts for the increasingly extreme expressions of Islamophobia identified with European societies such as the Netherlands and Denmark, but also Belgium and France, among many others. Islamophobia has come to constitute a key means to the maintenance of a peculiarly European identity as "Caucasian" (white) and Christian.

Now the exclusion of blacks and Muslims, alongside Jews, has marked European self-formation from its modern conceptual inception in the mid-fifteenth century: Moors, Jews, and blacks were deemed from the outset of European coherence as extrinsic to Europe's self-idea as white and Christian, its constitutive outsiders. The horrors of the Holocaust opened Europe's doors to "its" Jews; they could be admitted to European identity as white, honorary members of the Continent in the way blacks and Muslims never fully could be. Even Israel, after all, is extended a sort of honorary cultural membership in Europe. The site of self-ascribed European religious provenance, Israel participates in the EuroSong Festival, in major European sporting competitions, flights to Israel are considered intra- rather than transcontinental, Israel's clock time is mostly found online often under the European rather than Middle East zone, and so on.

Second, European societies generally and the Dutch in particular have refused to collect systematic data on discrimination, whether in housing or education, employment or in-person consumption. This refusal extends and exacerbates the discrimination at issue, evading any charge by externalizing the basis of the ignorance. It banishes the charge of discrimination and the structures rendering it possible and repeatable to outside Dutch society, to outsiders, to those not properly in the know or members of the society, good for nothing troublemakers. And in externalizing racisms' conditions of possibility and performance, it rationalizes away the ignorance of local racist expression by making it more or less literally inconceivable. This ignorance, the editors make clear, is institutionalized, disappearing behind the walls of denial.

The anti-antiracism at work here, to put a twist on Paul Gilroy's characterization, is thus predicated on a handful of refusals and denials. First, as I have hinted above, there is the refusal of any charge of systematic racism, the denial of its structural underpinnings. There is no racism for which Dutch society admits responsibility. This reduces what racist expression is admitted to exist within Dutch boundaries to the irresponsibility of individual anomaly. Hand in hand with this is a deep silence regarding the history of Dutch colonialism and slavery, and especially their contemporary legacies. Slavery may be memorialized publicly every July 1 while the national research institute for the study of slavery is defunded in the name of generalized budget cuts; and the figure of Zwarte Piet (Black Peter) continues to be celebrated every December as the national mascot and defended against antiracist criticism year round despite its patently sambo-esque aesthetic.

A deeper if more subtle denial is signaled here, namely, of relationalities. There is a refusal of any connection between Dutch colonial history and contemporary racisms in the Netherlands, indeed, between Dutch colonialism and its racist articulations, as if colonialism had no racial, let alone racist, resonance. Nor is any consideration given to the relation between apartheid as a formulation to which Dutch

settler successors made so formative a contribution and the history of Dutch racisms, or to the mutually reinforcing ties between Dutch racial articulations, including antisemitism, and European expressions of racism more generally. For all of this, the Netherlands could be an island, historically and contemporarily, of pristine toleration. This volume reveals, in thick ways, in details large and small, how delusional such a self-image is, in formulation and operation.

Ignorance entails both a failure and a refusal to know. Failing to know could be predicated on denying that there is something worthy of knowing. Many white Dutch may know little about Islam because they deny in advance that there is something about Islam or Muslims worthy of consideration. Refusing to know implicitly acknowledges value in the repressed content behind and despite the denial. Racial fundamentalists insist that those they regard as inferior couldn't possibly have created anything of intellectual value, dismissing any counter-evidence as incredible or unworthy of attention.

There's a sense, then, in which the ignorance in both instances is itself a mode of knowing, by indirection. Ignorance stakes a claim—"it doesn't happen here"—made with conviction. But it also can refuse, deny—"It could not happen here." In a tolerant society we are above and beyond. The counter: in an ignorant and ignoring society, racism is within and un- or mis-recognized, covered over, held from view by others if not oneself by tolerance. In its ignorance racisms know; and they can only know in ignorance. Dutch tolerance more often than acknowledged is racism in orange.

The Dutch case evidences a related observation about the sort of social ignoring licensed by racisms. It is curious how much attention is accorded to those deemed not worthy of it. One could call this attentive ignoring, if not ignorant attention. Derided groups are attended to with the view to belittling and humiliating them culturally or to policing their existence because considered a threat of some kind. But this disciplinary attention is exerted in lieu of ignoring the condition of the subject group so as not to have to address the grounds of their subjection.

It is in this fraught and frayed interfacing of ignorance, indifference, rebuffed attention, and ignoring that the subjected are minoritized, are made to become "problem people." I use the term "minoritization" in the race critical tradition in which it was taken up from the late 1980s and early 1990s onwards. The term stands for the ways in which racially identified and characterized groups and their members have been made "minor" members of the society in question, through marginalization and belittlement, disparagement and degradation, preclusion and exclusion. This notion stands in striking and critical contrast to the race-avoiding and ethnicizing invocation of "minorizing" and "minorization" (*minorisering*) used by the likes of Jan Rath in the Dutch context.[1]

Indifference underpins the failure to care or be concerned about the plight of other social subjects; heightened attention is a manifestation of the drive to control, to

manage the undesirable, to make sure they have no discernible impact on the daily lives of those considered properly Dutch. As coping mechanisms, those made minorities in turn either often ignore the humiliations so as not to extend by confronting the pain they cause or avoid situations, environments, and places where the humiliations are likely to manifest or be experienced especially acutely. Avoidance and evasion, as the editors put it, become reinforced both by the society at large and by those humiliated, abused, and subjected to racism.

This knotted set of conditions is manifest most obviously in the case of the Dutch (and other Northern European societies such as Denmark but perhaps increasingly so in all contexts of postraciality) in relation to the claimed "right to offend": Offending the minoritized, humiliating them, conveys discomfort with the targeted, a desire to purge the society of their presence, while the minoritized are expected to sit on their hands, "niet zo zeuren" ("no whining")

In the case of the Netherlands, much of this is tied up with, even prompted by, the projection of Dutch arrogance regarding cultural others, a small society needing to assert its bigness by the projection of what Philomena Essed insightfully calls "entitlement racism."[2] A popular T-shirt slogan expresses this tellingly, if a touch ironically: "As Finishing Touch, God Created the Dutch." The arrogance hides the slogan's ambiguity, which might leave a less self-possessed wearer nonplussed: the beginning of the end rather than the end of the beginning. The sort of paternalism manifest both in the times of tolerance and multiculturalism has given way to entitlement racism: "This is my place, our place, act like us, become one of us. Though you never can, really, without giving up on your existing self, if then." White (Dutch), but never quite, to particularize Homi Bhabha's well known formulation. This manifest failing opens the made-to-be-unbelonging to the humiliations they are rationalized to deserve.

One could call this confluence of new and renewed racist expression the Dutch version of postraciality. Dutch postraciality is indicative of the generalizable features at play, while its Dutchness is an index of its local specificity. Dutch postraciality, as postraciality at large, insists that racism has no relevance to the 21st century, a worthy normative proclamation at once parading as overblown contemporary descriptive fact. The claim to postraciality presumes, in the Dutch case as in others, that racism is nothing more than the expression of extremist hate groups, most notably targeting Jews. This silences any debate on everyday racism, precisely because the latter by definition is so normal, so not extreme in its everydayness, so taken as the unchallengeable status quo, but no less debilitating as and in its consequence.

Alongside this is the almost total absence of antiracism—as disposition or programmatic practice—within dominant social institutions, most notably the academy. Dutch society is notoriously bounded by insular social networks, very difficult to open into for those not deemed to belong, as much in friendship and social circles as in

business practices, the academy and the reproduction of future generations of scholars. In a society so taken with its own tolerance to outsiders, to the non-belonging, the network furnishes the invisible community gates, the boundaries of actual(ized) belonging. Since the early 1990s when the Center for Race and Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam was forcibly shuttered, there has been no systematic reproduction of another generation of critical race scholar-activists like Philomena Essed, Gloria Wekker, Kwame Nimako, and Dienke Hondius, of a cohort of comparable critical scholars researching racism or engaged in institutional anti-racist politics (all are contributors to this volume). The silences of the last 20 years, now giving way hopefully to a small group of younger critically activist voices, have further cleared the way for the tolerance of racism, its at least tacitly presumed acceptability.

The Netherlands also exemplifies the processes, the logics, for what it means to be a "normal" society, what it means for racisms to become unremarked. In its everyday unremarkableness and unremarkedness, it reveals what it is for racisms to be normal to the social, to be a "natural" because so ordinary part of the everyday, noticeable only to those subjected to them. Underlying this is the taken for granted homogeneity, insistent and imposed because the only way homogeneity can be sustained is through repressive imposition of otherwise undeniable and expansive demographic and cultural heterogeneities that globalization has at least in part enabled and exacerbated.

Orange racism against this background, then, is the pervasive but more or less quiet racism of the House of Orange, the racial state of Dutch society. Orange is the Dutch national color, the country's obsession. The Dutch largely revel in their orangeness, a statement as much of their collectively self-asserted individualism (perhaps in a society renowned for having not so much) as of its nationalistic drive. Orange is a color not so becoming, a non-primary color, mixing red with white. Orange tends to the sharp end of the palette, almost vulgar in its loudly assertive display when nationally adopted for events like Queen's Day (the nationalism palpable in the name of the holiday) or for international football matches. It is thrown into public display almost as a punch in the face of aesthetic judgment. This is the "see if we care" attitude prolific across the national landscape, at one with the in your face racial and religious insults that have become prolific (Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali's "Submission" and Wilders' "Fitna" being perhaps the most extreme and well known).

So, it can be asked, what is unique to Orange Racism beyond the particular and specific Dutch emphases on more general racial considerations that Essed and Hoving insightfully identify at the close of their introduction? The phenomenon of Zwarte Piet (Black Pete) for one. While insistence on freedom of expression as a license to say disparaging things about those not seen as properly Dutch or European has become Euro-generic, the emphatic tradition invested in the figure of Zwarte Piet is uniquely Dutch. No other European society has Sambo as a national

teddy bear (Zwarte Piet is present in Belgian culture, but weakly, and there is certainly no comparable investment in the figure as a national icon). White Dutch dress up in black face and thickened red lipstick, embracing the historical and histrionic stereo-types (a sort of carnival jester, a "coon" figure) unaware of the racist resonances, in denial (of the denial) when called on it. The figure of Zwarte Piet abounds in early December as the bearer of good cheer and gifts, identified with frivolity while lacking all intellectual identification. Any charge that Zwarte Piet bears racist connotation is swatted away, the accuser belittled as bearing bad faith, as unDutch, throwing a wet blanket over the national pet.

Then there is tolerance too, taken up as a national sensibility. As the national sen-timentality regarding racial otherness, this too is unique to the Netherlands. It is not that other societies don't claim to be tolerant. But no one else has really drawn on tolerance as the driving national projection, considered as characteristic of national sentiment and sensibility as loudness, self-assertedness, or hospitality, say, may be of other societies. In the past decade or more, tolerance and its racial articulation have transformed in the face of shifting conditions of political economy. Tolerance has been tested, its limits supposedly reached and breached by the projected intol-erance of the newly arrived. Tolerance has been qualified, then, giving way to an insis-tence on intolerance to protect the *tradition* of tolerance. Tolerance is an assertion always from a position of power. Once tolerance is placed in question, power tends to assert itself in defense against being victimized by its own tolerance, as Halleh Ghorashi puts it in her contribution to this volume.

So, just as the claim to be *the* model tolerant society marked Dutch commitments of the closing decades of the last century, Holland today could be taken as emblem-atic of postracial racism in the name of tolerance. Dutch society accordingly exem-plifies this brand of racism exercised *as* tolerance. This is reflected in the cultural resistance to—a generalized social restriction on—using the notion of race explicitly to refer to human beings. This, in turn, has resulted in a censorious conceptual creep, of sorts, limiting the invocation of "racism" as an accusatory or even analytic term to characterize debilitating experiences and structural conditions. At the same time, outmoded terms long identified with racist representation (for example, "neger") remain readily invoked, as much in public political (even media) representa-tion as in private circulation. Consequently, what could and should straightforwardly be regarded as racially demeaning characterizations of people are expressed in the name of freedom of expression while vocally denying their racial disparagement or racist intent. Any critical questioning of these expressions or dispositions is dis-missed, in turn, as intolerance on the part of the (once) tolerated.

These entangled threads of Dutch liberality, tolerance, and self-entitlement, along-side racial offensiveness, humiliation, and debilitation signal wider sets of ambiva-lence to racial alterity. South African apartheid could be opposed and post-apartheid

reconstruction supported as racisms' elsewhere, reinforcing the sense of liberality and racial fairness at home even while erasing Dutch complicities in the making of apartheid's very terms. Deeply and complexly entangled with apartheid in South Africa, it is all too easy to overlook the quickness and facility with which the informalities of late modern neoliberal postracial segregations are readily absorbed, taken up, and become the lived condition, part of the renewed habitus of Dutch sociality as much at home as in postapartheid South Africa. South Africa now may have given up the referential orange in the republic's flag in one symbolic attempt among others to break with its unfortunate legacy. Racisms in orange alas remain all too resonant if articulated in new ways and directions, reordered in relation to a newly mixed set of targets in the case of the monarchical metropole.

The noted artist, Marlene Dumas, South African by birthright but residentially Dutch, captures in her characteristically insightful way the nuanced complexities shifting over time in the articulation of racisms in orange. In the poem, "Pretty Boys," she teases out the tense contemporary play between ignoring and racially indexed attention, tolerance and minoritization, oversight and avoidance, exoticizing desire and dismissal, excitement and threat, interactive engagement and incitement, historical stereotypes and personal prejudice prompted and reinforced among all those implicated by the resonances of what this volume has covered under the umbrella of Dutch racism:

> Once upon a time, you didn't exist
> When I came here, to Holland (thirty years ago)
> You didn't yet exist here then
> (your fathers did, but they were different)
> You didn't exist yet
> As the Moroccan
> As a specific group
> As a concept
> As a subject, as a picture
> For every newspaper, TV, and magazine column
> (I was not allochtoon yet
> And so neither were you)
> But when you came
> So did the attraction and fear.
>
> You the Mediterranean type
> The physiognomy of the Latin lover
> The Arab on the white scooter
> The lover boy, the rapper, the Palestinian brother.
> And the Dutch daughters fell in love

And their fathers grew confused
And called all Turks Moroccans
(All Moroccans are named Mohammed, Rashid, or Ali
and all Dutch boys are named Piet or Jan)
Her new Turkish boyfriend says:
Your father and I have at least
One thing in common:
Neither of us likes
Moroccans.

Marlene Dumas, "Pretty Boys," 2005.[3]

Notes

1. Rath, Jan. *Minorisering: De Sociale Constructie van Ethnisiche Minderheden.* Amsterdam: Sua, 1991.

2. Essed, Philomena. "Entitlement Racism: License to Humiliate." *Recycling Hatred: Racism(s) in Europe Today*. Ed. ENAR. Brussels: ENAR (European Network Against Racism, 2013. 62–77.

3. http://www.marlenedumas.nl/pretty-boys-2005/

The Contributors

Amy Abdou teaches sociology and cross cultural management at Nyenrode New Business School Amsterdam and Webster University. She worked as a program manager for the National institute for the study of Dutch slavery and its legacy, co-creating the Summer School on Black Europe with Dr. Kwame Nimako.

Miriyam Aouragh, PhD, was national organizer of the Dutch anti-racism coalition between 2004 and 2008. She currently lives in the UK where she studies and teaches the political implications of the Internet at Oxford University. See http://miriyamaouragh. blogspot.ncom for a comprehensive list of publications and activist campaigns in which she is involved.

Pooyan Tamimi Arab (b. 1983, Isfahan) is a PhD candidate at the Cultural Anthropology department of Utrecht University. He holds two B.A. degrees in Art History and Philosophy from the University of Amsterdam, and a M.A. degree in Philosophy from the New School for Social Research, New York City. His main research interests include political theories of secularism, material religion, and the anthropology of religion in general. He is currently writing his dissertation, which is on mosque aesthetics in the Netherlands.

Eltje Bos, PhD, is director of the school for social cultural work at the University of Applied Science in Amsterdam. She is the owner of Vaverra consult. As a consultant (from 1998) she has worked in the Netherlands and South Africa as a researcher, advisor and manager in the sociocultural field. Until 1998 she held a management position at the Dutch Ministry of cultural affairs. Her dissertation (University of Amsterdam, 2011) addresses the issue of cultural policy and immigrants in the Netherlands.

Lida M. van den Broek, PhD, is organizational anthropologist and founder/director of Kantharos (1983). Kantharos is the oldest consultancy for managing cultural diversity in the Netherlands. Lida published on racism, the position of women, and on bullying, intimidation and discrimination at work.

Rebecca Parker Brienen is Vennerberg Professor of Art and Head of the Department of Art, Graphic Design, and Art History at Oklahoma State University. Dr. Brienen is a specialist in early modern Dutch visual culture with a focus on travel and cross-cultural contact. The Dutch artists Frans Post and Albert Eckhout, who both spent time in Brazil in the seventeenth century, have been a particular focus of her research.

Esther Captain, PhD, is a historian and senior researcher at the National Committee May 4 and 5 in Amsterdam, the Dutch organization for the commemoration of the Second World War. At present she is writing a book on generations and their view on freedom in the postwar Netherlands (due 2015). Her specialisms are the heritage of the Second World War in the overseas territories of nowadays Indonesia, Surinam, Aruba and Curaçao, postcolonial memories and histories. The works she has written include *Overseas War Legacy: The Legacy of World War II in the Former Dutch Colonies* (in Dutch, 2010) *and Traces of Slavery in Utrecht: A Walking Guide* (2012).

Philomena Essed is professor of Critical Race, Gender and Leadership studies, Antioch University (USA), *PhD in Leadership and Change Program*. She has a PhD from the University of Amsterdam (1990) and an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Pretoria (2011). Well known for introducing the concepts of *everyday racism* and

gendered racism, her work has been adopted and applied in a range of countries. Books and edited volumes include *Everyday Racism; Understanding Everyday Racism; Diversity; Refugees and the Transformation of Societies; Race Critical Theories; A Companion to Gender Studies* ("outstanding" 2005 CHOICE award); and, *Clones, Fakes and Posthumans: Cultures of Replication*, (2012).

Evelien Gans is professor of Modern Jewish History, University of Amsterdam and also affiliated to the Netherlands Institute for War-Holocaust and Genocide Studies (NIOD). Her publications include *Gojse nijd & joods narcisme* (Goyish envy & Jewish narcissism); *De kleine verschillen die het leven uitmaken*, a study of Dutch Jewish social-democrats and socialist-zionists in the 20th century (Henriëtte Roland Holst award); and a double biography on the Dutch-Jewish father and son *Ischa en Jaap Meijer* (Henriëtte Boas award). Since 2010 she leads the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research funded project *The Dynamics of Contemporary Antisemitism in a Globalising Context.*

David Theo Goldberg is Director of the system wide University of California Humanities Research Institute and Executive Director of the MacArthurUCI Research Hub in Digital Media and Learning. The latter is the international center coordinating all research for the MacArthur Foundation initiative in connected learning. He is a Professor in Comparative Literature, Anthropology, and Criminology, Law and Society UC Irvine. He has written extensively on race and racism, law and society, on critical theory, and digital media's impact on higher education.

Halleh Ghorashi is professor of Diversity and Integration in the Department of Sociology, VU University Amsterdam. She is the author of *Ways to Survive, Battles to Win: Iranian Women Exiles in the Netherlands and the United States* (2003). She co-edited among others the volumes *Paradoxes of Cultural Recognition: Perspectives from Northern*

Europe (with S. Alghasi and T.H. Eriksen, 2009) and (with Haideh Moghissi) *Muslim diaspora in the West: Negotiating Gender, Home and Belonging* (2010). She has published extensively on topics such as identity, diasporic positioning, cultural diversity, and emancipation. See also: www.hallehghorashi.com

Isabel Hoving is diversity officer at the Leiden University. She is also affiliated with the Department of Film and Literary Studies of Leiden University, with focus on postcolonial theory (also in the Netherlands), cultural analysis, gender studies and ecocriticism. Her study on Caribbean migrant women writers, *In Praise of New Travellers,* was published in 2001 by Stanford UP, and she was the editor of *Veranderingen van het alledaagse* (SdU, 2005), a volume on post-war Dutch migration. She co-edited several other volumes on migration, Caribbean literatures, African literature and art, and has just completed a monography on the intersections of postcolonial theory and ecocriticism. She is member of different international editorial boards, for example of *Thamyris/Intersecting: Place, Sex, and Race*. In addition to her academic work, she is an awarded youth writer.

Dienke Hondius is assistant professor of history at VU University Amsterdam and Amsterdam University College, and staff member on international affairs at the Anne Frank House. She has published extensively on the history of antisemitism and race relations in the Netherlands. Among her books are *Return,* a study of post-Holocaust antisemitism; *Mixed Marriages, Mixed Feelings*; *Absent*, a book about the segregation of Jewish school children in Amsterdam during the Nazi occupation; and *Oorlogslessen*, about educational memorial culture about the Second World War and the Holocaust. Current research projects include "Mapping the European history and legacy of slavery and the slave trade."

Joseph D. Jordan is an independent scholar who received master's degrees in

Postcolonial Studies and African American Studies, and has just started a PhD-project at VanderBilt University. He is committed to teacher training as well as democratic and antidiscriminatory practices in education. His research interests include entanglements of memory, narratives of slavery, philosophies of history and Black speculative fiction.

Guno Jones is a researcher at VU University Amsterdam. His interdisciplinary research interests include political discourses on migration, citizenship and national identity in the Netherlands, Belgium and Great-Britain, the legacies of colonialism (especially transatlantic slavery) and the politics of memory and commemoration of World War Two.

Marc de Leeuw lectures legal theory in the Law School at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. He received his PhD from the University of Humanistic Studies in Utrecht and held positions at Macquarie University (Australia), Yale University (USA) and the University of Humanistic Studies (the Netherlands). He published in a variety of books and peer-reviewed articles in journals such as *Parallax and the European Journal of Cultural Studies*. His main research interests concern theories of identity, politics, science and ethics, within the fields of continental philosophy, cultural sociology, and law.

Liesbeth Minnaard is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at Leiden University. She specialises in interculturality in literature and in cultural effects of migration and globalisation. She is the author of *New Germans*, *New Dutch. Literary Interventions* (Amsterdam UP, 2008) and co-editor of *Multicultural Literature in Scandinavia and the Low Countries* (forthcoming 2014).

Kwame Nimako, PhD, teaches International Relations at the Graduate School of Social Sciences (GSSS) at the University of Amsterdam; he is also a member of the scientific council of NiNsee.

Michael Orlando Sharpe is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at York College/CUNY. Dr. Sharpe's areas of specialization are comparative politics and international relations and his research interests include looking comparatively at globalization, the politics of international migration, immigrant political incorporation, and political transnationalism. Dr. Sharpe is a dual citizen of the US and the Netherlands of Aruban/Dominican origin. He is a board member of the Tokyo based UN affiliated non-governmental organization, the International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR).

Stephen Small is Associate professor of African American Studies, University of California, Berkeley; and Extraordinary Professor of History at the University of Amsterdam. He works on museums, public history and collective memory in the African Diaspora. He recently published *New Perspectives on Slavery and Colonialism in the Caribbean* (with Marten Schalkwijk), 2012. His next book is tentatively entitled *Inside the Shadows of the Big house: 21st Century Antebellum Slave Cabins and Public History in Louisiana.* He is co-writing a book (with Dr. Kwame Nimako) on Public History, Museums and Slavery in England and the Netherlands.

Joy L. Smith teaches in the English Department at Hunter College in New York City. Her publications include a co-edited volume, *Sonic Interventions* (2007), a book that argues for the importance of the aural in theorizing literature, subjectivity and culture. She is currently working on a project about Dutch Caribbean literature, slavery and cultural memory.

Melissa Steyn is professor at Witwatersrand University. Her work on Diversity Studies engages with intersecting hegemonic social formations. Her book *Whiteness Just Isn't What it Used to Be: White Identity in a Changing South Africa* (2001) won the 2002 Outstanding Scholarship Award in International and Intercultural Communication from the National Communication Association

(US). Her co-edited books include *The Prize and the Price: Shaping Sexualities in South Africa* (Vol. 2) (2009), *Performing Queer: Shaping Sexualities in South Africa* (Vol. 1) (2005), *Under Construction: Race and Identity in South Africa Today* (2004) and *Cultural Synergy in South Africa: Weaving Strands of Africa and Europe* (1996).

Sandra Trienekens, PhD, is founder/owner of Urban Paradoxes, the central focus of this research agency is the relation between citizenship, diversity and the arts (www.urbanparadoxes.nl). She is affiliated with the University of Amsterdam. Trienekens held a professorship at the Amsterdam University of Applied Science (2007–2011) and did research and taught at Tilburg University, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Goldsmiths University of London (1999–2007). In 2004 she successfully defended her dissertation entitled "Urban Paradoxes: lived citizenship and the location of diversity in the arts."

Gloria Wekker is a social and cultural anthropologist (PhD UCLA, 1992), specialized in Gender Studies, African American and Caribbean Studies, and Sexuality Studies. Between 2001 and 2012 she held the Aletta-chair in Gender and Ethnicity at the Department of Gender Studies at the Faculty of the Arts of Utrecht University. From September 1, 2012, she is emerita. Her research themes are: constructions of sexual subjectivity in the black Diaspora; gendered and racialized knowledge systems in the Dutch academy and society; and the history of the black, migrant and refugee women's movement in the Netherlands.

Sonja van Wichelen is a Research Fellow with the Institute for Culture and Society at the University of Western Sydney, Australia. She received her PhD from the University of Amsterdam and held positions at Yale University and Brown University in the US. Her books include *Religion, Gender and Politics in Indonesia: Disputing the Muslim Body* (Routledge, 2010) and *Commitment and Complicity in Cultural Theory and Practice* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, co-edited with B. O. Firat and S. de Mul). Her research projects broadly engage with moral economies in the age of globalization and its effects on our understanding of citizenship.

Ellie Vasta is Associate Professor in Sociology, Macquarie University, Sydney. From 2003 until 2009 she was a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAs) at the University of Oxford. Her recent work in Britain and Europe focused on immigrant work strategies, participation, identity, community, irregular migration; on racism; and on the ideological shifts in the European models of immigrant inclusion, focusing on policies and public discourses. Her current projects include work on "immigration and the new politics of solidarity", and on "Affinities in multicultural Australia".

Glenn Willemsen, PhD (1948–2008) was the first director of National Institute for the Study of Dutch Slavery and its Legacy (NiNsee), from 2003 to 2008.

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